Star, S. Frederick. "Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia ". Uppsala: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2006.

Star, S. Frederick. Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia. Uppsala: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2006.

• This report was commissioned from Dr. Star by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in preparation for their EU Presidency in 2006. Although for legal purposes this document only represents the views of Dr. Star, it can be considered to reflect the contemporary opinions and understanding of the Finnish government about Central Asia, as well as the policies of the contemporary EU Presidency.
• Despite the encouragement of parliamentary systems by a number of international organizations and Western countries, the post independence politics of Central Asia and the Caucasus is decidedly presidential and authoritarian. As a response to apparent failure, Western governments largely back NGOs outside of politics rather than political organizations in Central Asia, with goals bordering on calls for regime change (6).
• The author believes that this struggle between a powerful presidency and a feckless parliament is only a sideshow to 'real politics' within the country, described as the interplay between official systems of control and shadowy power brokers -- often misrepresented as clans. The author labels these systems "Politics A" and "Politics B", respectively (6-7).
• Politics B has its early history under the Soviet Union, where, to deliver stability and increased revenues of agricultural goods during the post-Stalin period, cadre members of the politburo actively supported local power brokers to positions of civic authority, thus institutionalizing these patronage systems (8).
• The power brokers replete in Politics B can exist in different forms, especially between the different groups. Among the formerly nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, the author claims that there are large kinship systems including massive groups which gradually terminate in networks of extended families. The author claims these groupings continue to strongly affect politics, with the relations between the three Kazakhstani "Jo'z" continuing to shape politics (7).
• There are long memories in each of these lineage groups, with decisions of the seven forefather affecting perception of one's 'clan'. For example, the author believes the reason that some of Southerner Kurmanbek Bakiev's greatest rivals are southern is because his 'clan' sided with the Uzbeks in Qo'qon against the southern Kyrgyz in the 1880s (7).
• Regional networks and alliances also mark Central Asian politics. The switch between power centers and regional cliques within Politics B has led to the destabilization of countries: Gorbachev's failed favoritism of the Farg'ona and Xorazm cliques; the wartime transfer of power from Xujand to Kulyab; southern power following the Tulip Revolution (8).
• The third identified source of power in Politics B are powerful magnates and oligarchs. They may be either legitimate or illicit businessmen, but they control extensive economic power. There is often significant overlap of this group with members of regional networks or kinship groups (8). 
• The rise of Gorbachev's authority during the 1980s instigated a purge of previously existent forces of Politics B in Central Asia, resulting in the replacement of all previous heads of the republics between 1982 and 1986. The men were all servants of Moscow and ignored or actively dismantled the local systems of patronage and control. The public anger at this direct control led to the Almaty Revolts of 1986, the first violent incident in Soviet Central Asia in decades (9).
• The leaders and soviets elected in 1989 and 1990 reflect this anger and was meant to restore the pre-Gorbachev forces to positions of power. They were intended as a restoration of native leaders and native systems of control against the russified Soviets, as well as other points of increased national sovereignty within the union (9).
• The powerful executives of the republics have had a strong and genuine interest in the electoral process and parliamentary activities -- albeit in a carefully controlled setting -- because it allows them to create a formalized and institutionalized power base outside of the control of informal power brokers. This is one of the strongest motivators of prohibiting the direct election of governors -- which would risk the creation of personal fiefs for already powerful local leaders (10).
• The creation of de jure or de facto bicameral systems can also be seen in this context, as an upper house reporting directly to the president allowed for an effective check on the power of the lower house should it ever become controlled by oligarchs and regional power brokers (10).
• Central Asian political systems have tended towards autocracy not because of any historical or cultural bias, but because establishing false elections and strong executive powers was viewed by the elite as a convenient way to diminish the power of figures in Politics B, including the suppression of elites within parliament (11).
• Presidents in Central Asia have been known to use democracy and the pressure exerted by 'democratization' to force change within their states or push corrupt officials and magnates out of government. The author claims that this was President Karimov's goal in agreeing to democracy promotion projects in a post-9/11 treaty with the US (12).
• "To exert pressure on the main power base of the regional networks and magnates, namely, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the U.S., preoccupied with the operations in Afghanistan, did not exert the pressure that the reformers around Karimov (Safayev, Gulyamov, etc.) had hoped it would. This undercut the reformers and forced Karimov himself back into the hands of the power brokers. As this happened, Uzbekistan again embraced the Russian/Chinese authoritarian model, which posed no danger to the country’s traditional power brokers" (12).
• The expansion of the powers of the presidential office, and the informal power of the person of the president, in Central Asia has also been motivated by a partial recognition of state weakness following independence (12). Presidents who recognized their weakness noted that they depended on figures in Politics B to maintain systems of governance and were often loath to take action which could empower those groups (13).
• This partially explains the promotion of intense nationalism, or cults of personality, by the leaders. This is an attempt to mobilize popular support to achieve increased freedom away from unofficial power brokers. It also serves to break down regional barriers in individual mindsets, decreasing the potential for cliques to capitalize on the same effects (13).
• The diagonosis provided by Dr. Star is that the essential issue of authoritarianism in Central Asia is not too much government, but a dearth of essential services caused by weak administrative capability and a hopeless corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy. As a result, presidents are partially beholden to power brokers and cliques, making certain routes of reform potential challenges to national stability (14).
• The current Western strategies towards Central Asia focus on increasing the position and role of civil society groups. However, those organizations are viewed as both foreign and potential elements of instability. These opinions of especially common among local officials, who envy the resources of Western-backed civil society groups and resent their refusal to cooperate with local government (15). 
• So far, this was not been a effective method. Good practices are not been spreading through-out general administration and states have taken actions against these NGOs. Furthermore, the role of NGOs in the Tulip Revolution sends a mixed message about their effectiveness even during regime change (15).
• Presidential elections are unlikely to be agents of democratic reform. The presidency already has too many ways to effectively eliminate opposition figures, and often local bureaucrats are so beholden to presidential power that they will manipulate election results even if asked not to. It is unlikely that these contests are the way to real systemic change (16).
• Parliamentary elections are a much stronger basis for democratic progress. They have a broader array of candidates and can lead to populist anger or revolution when falsified. In all the states except for Turkmenistan, parliamentary elections have greatly improved with each iteration and rarely feature outright deception. Moreover, when they do, the opposition can often force concessions in a public way without immediate repression (18).
• Parliamentary elections also serve a positive cultural function, as they inure popular attitudes to accept democratic processes. Additionally, competition for parliamentary powers can distract the ambitions of power brokers and cliques, diverting it into potentially constructive channels (19).
• Even when their powers are limited, parliaments present a platform for the public performance of opposition politics, with even bought representatives competing to demonstrate independence and democratic credentials to an audience of fellow parliamentarians and the public (19).
• Many Central Asian presidents were initially opposed to political parties for fear that they would serve as vehicles for the advancement of clique or business interests, as they frequently have in Eastern Europe. In other words, the presidency has generally supported the growth of political parties when they bolster Politics A, but repressed their growth when they threatened to further institutionalize Politics B (22).
• All of the Central Asian republics have the legacies of laws intended to crush nascent political parties, from limits on financing and registration, to decrees banning organization on certain ideological principles. They demonstrate the fear of earlier eras over the growth of these parties (22).
• Most presidents attempted to create their own parties as vehicles of personal based around their policies. Islom Karimov, however, went his own way and repeatedly switched political parties depending on whichever was the most popular in the polls, providing him with a base in parliament (23).
• The roles of all the political parties in Uzbekistan as of 2006 are provided here: "The Democratic National Rebirth Party opted for a nationalistic path, championing national unity and appealing to government officials, older civic leaders, and the moderate Sunni Muslim majority. Fidorkorlar (also known as the National Democratic Party) presented itself as the party of the progressive intelligentsia, supporting openness and free markets. The People’s Democratic Party found a niche for itself as the defender of social welfare programs, and therefore appealed to poorer farmers, the urban lower middle class, retirees, and former Communists. The Adolat or Justice Party staked out similar territory but proposed more moderate left-centrist solutions, even rebranding itself as the Social Democratic Party. And the Liberal Democrats took up the cause of young business people in the major urban centers" (24).
• In Uzbekistan especially, all political parties requested and received the support of political parties and international affiliations abroad. The Russian Communist party helped the XDP develop its policies, while Fidokorlar received assistance from the German Social Democrats. All deputies gained valuable experience in parliamentary function and procedure (25).
• The conclusions of this report suggest a number of policies the European Union can implement in its foreign policy towards Central Asia to increase the effectiveness of programs promoting democracy: fostering contacts between political parties, promoting direct contacts between Central Asian and European parliaments, and concentrating on parliamentary elections and electoral practices (25).
• The author suggests that it will also be necessary to invest in Central Asia and cooperate with local governments to improve infrastructure and technical expertise, so that the state will be able to exercise for effective control (26).
• The author presents a number of interesting points, however the entire piece is undermined by a complete absence of sources for a number of controversial claims. If everything in this paper is true, however without sources, many of the claims made seem dangerously close to assumptions that will lead future scholars astray. I am especially skeptical of the claims regarding the influence of actual hereditary 'clans', even in Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. Good for a interesting theory, but try to find confirmation before citing any information found within.
•  The central claim of the author, that the power of the presidency is restrained by cliques, is also potentially false. Much of my current research would oppose this conclusion, and the lack of citations make it difficult to verify the reasons the author believes state control to be so weak in Central Asia.