Spechler, Martin C. "Authoritarian politics and economic reform in Uzbekistan: past, present and prospects". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.2 (2007): 185-202.

Spechler, Martin C. "Authoritarian politics and economic reform in Uzbekistan: past, present and prospects". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.2 (2007): 185-202.

• Recently in popular media contemporary to this publication, Kazakhstan underwent a character rebirth and was increasingly accepted while Uzbekistan's reputation continues to be dismal. Both of these countries and uniquely atrocious human rights record, which do not generally correspond with their treatment by Western governments or the media (186).
• This paper seeks to examine changes in Uzbekistani human rights policy during the 15 years of independence. Contrary to popular opinion, the government of Uzbekistan is not totalitarian and its approach towards human rights and freedoms has also featured significant variation during President Karimov's administration. The potential reasons for these changes are examined, with a particular focus on changing economic policies (186).
• Although by GDP per capital scores alone, Uzbekistan is one of the poorer Central Asian republics, however this belies the fact that is has the strongest economy in the region relative to its GDP in 1989 with the smallest decrease. Additionally, the growth in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been driven by gas and oil revenues, which generally employ fewer people than the devastated agriculture and manufacturing sectors and enrich the oligarchs at the expense of others (186).
• Uzbekistan has avoided some of this economic polarization and mass impoverishment through its unique economic strategies. As a result it has the lowest Gini coefficient in Central Asia, although this does not take into account the differences in living standards unrelated to wealth (187).
• Economic Freedoms can be measured as the rights guaranteed under the 1948 UN Convention on Human Rights, i.e.: the right to possess and manage property; the right to manage income regulated only by taxation; the right to become employed; the right to education (187).
• The first two economic rights can be roughly measured -- albeit in a biased manner -- by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. On a scale from 1 to 5, Uzbekistan is given a 3.91, the second lowest in Central Asia, but still in the same category as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (187). All states save Turkmenistan were given a '4' in property rights, with primary concerns being corruption and chronic non-enforcement of contracts (188).
• The discrepancy in the description and summary provided for Kazakhstan versus Uzbekistan can be largely accounted for by bias on the part of the neoliberal authors, obviously willing to ignore equal human rights abuses b/c of a more welcoming business environment. The difference in 0.66 points between the countries' scores is likely due to the Kazakhstani financial sector, where the tenge has been convertible since 1990 compared to the so'm convertibility introduced in 2003. For ordinary citizens, however, economic freedoms are modest across Central Asia (188).
• Uzbekistan did not always lag behind Central Asia in reforms. Until 1996, its reform profile was welcomed by the World Bank, which gave it a score similar to Kazakhstan and Russia. However, at this time all of the CIS economies retracted reforms as monetary over-expansion and speculation devastated economies during the 1998 Ruble Crisis. Uzbekistan suffered similarly, as high commodities prices encouraged high spending which could not be maintained afterwards (188).
• Interestingly, during the good years of Uzbekistani economic growth: 1992-1996 and 2002-2005, both economic freedoms and broader definitions of human rights improved (188). This may suggest either real improvement or increased optimism.
• "Labor market reforms enacted in 1995– 96 created a liberal set of rights for employers to hire and fire at their discretion, replacing the Soviet practice of effective ‘job rights’. The minimum wage is negligible, and pension payments, while nearly 40% on employer and employee, are required for only 11% of the workforce. After a probationary period, firing workers is still not difficult, though severance pay of two months’ wages is due if a contract is terminated. Unions are all centrally controlled and have little effectiveness beyond health and safety concerns. Special protections are extended by law, however, to pregnant women and the handicapped. Many Uzbekistanis participate in the informal sector, operating outside the bazaars without apparent systemic inference. People are free to spend their incomes, sometimes frivolously as in all free societies, and taxes on the person are moderate" (189).
• Enrollment in education at all levels continues to be high, although many report higher formal and informal costs as well as a declining quality of education likely linked to low salaries (189).
• "For most Uzbeks, conditions during the lean years of retreat (1996– 2003) were not favorable. Various administrative measures, like a 50% surrender requirement for hard currency proceeds, made exports very unprofitable and imports hard to obtain. Tariffs were raised—and sometimes collected. Banks were enlisted to register and in fact to regulate imports to prevent over-invoicing; withdrawals of foreign currency, even for NGOs, became difficult to impossible" (189).
• During this period, real wages stagnated or decreased, and industry became non-profitable. Employment in small and medium business halved during this period. The government's attempts to prevent inflation in preparation for a convertible so'm has carried-out through lack of pension and work payments, eventually leading to riots at factories in Farg'ona (189).
• The period of stagnation also saw an increase in authoritarian policy and opportunities for extortion. As imports and exports became controlled, an increased administrative and police presence presented greater opportunities for corruption and petty extortion -- often of food (189).
• Many of the government policies of withholding wages in preparation of new economic policies, as well as increased policing of bazars, lead to violence and riots not typical of Uzbekistan. This has lead the author to concluded that: "Much more than any deprivation of political rights, these material abuses—along with corruption and arbitrariness of officials—are what are behind popular complaints" (190).
• Rights for the use of languages are typically kept by the government. Generally documents are available in Uzbek and Russian, and the only positions requiring Uzbek are managerial as a professional asset. Public schools mainly use Uzbek, but education can be found in all minority languages, including Armenian. The setbacks are mainly a lack of skilled teachers and textbooks. Resources are less available because Uzbekistan refuses to import foreign textbooks (190).
• "It is sometimes said that President Islam Karimov is restoring atheistic Soviet methods of controlling Islam. This is only partly true. Besides embracing Islam as the Uzbek national religion, he made the haj pilgrimage, took his oath on the Koran, and allowed the opening of 5000 new mosques and madrassas in the country. Attendance on Fridays is large and uneventful; sermons on personal and ethical themes are encouraged. The Muslim Spiritual Board and the muftiate are controlled, it’s true, but Islamic studies have been supported" (191).
• Unfortunately the primary legacy of the atheistic Soviet regime has been a shortage of qualified imams trained in the moderate hanafi and sufi traditions. Although these are traditional to Uzbekistan, a number of mosques are being controlled by more radical forms of Islam due to these shortages (191).
• The government largely tolerates non-official versions of Islam as long as they do not become radical or political. Outward signs of religious devotion often result in harassment, often with intervention organized by mahalla organizations. Additionally, many report that all mosques have at least one member of the secret police to monitor the congregation (191).
• 'Traditional' non-Muslim religions are also largely tolerated. Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism are all seen as acceptable choices. Some Protestant groups are under deep suspicion, particularly those linked to proselytizing (191).
• Uzbekistan faces significant challenges in the field of political rights. 'genuine' opposition parties have been excluded since 1991, with all the registered political parties expected to support the candidacy and decisions of the President without question. Parties based on ethnic or religious grounds are especially illegal (192).
• A crackdown on human rights began in 2003, when Georgia underwent the Rose Revolution, and continued until a climax after the Andijon Incident. During this period NGOs were gradually restricted and eventually thrown out. Criminal charges were prepared against several opposition figures suspected of encouraging regime change (192).
• Things have also been bad in other Central Asian countries during this period. The Nazabayev Administration made and then undid minor changes (192), the Kyrgyz Republic inched towards civil war, Tajikistan remaining an authoritarian and divided nacro-state, and Turkmenistan representing the incarnation of dictatorship (193).
• Publications are no longer censored prior to printing, however journalists know their limits and self-censor. The news sources are generally self-congratulatory with reporting on the actual situation of life in the country. Any information is generally accessed through Russian news sources or the internet, although Uzbekistan tries to crack down on this (193).
• "Uzbekistan suffers from incomparable secrecy laws. Data routinely available in other post-Soviet countries, not to mention the West, are hidden there. The list of secret data is indeed codified in a law—but the law itself is secret!" (193).
• Since 2003, news sources have been increasingly able to report on local issues and the economic condition in the country, however this is interspersed with sycophantic praise of the regime. The same freedoms are not given to foreign journalists, how are often required to reprint more favorable statements or be removed from the country (194).  
• The author places great trust in the account of the Andijon Incident provided by Margarita Assenova: "It is likely that Islamic extremist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its various offspring, executed the operation. At least some of the insurgents must have received training in terrorist camps abroad; this kind of military operation usually takes careful planning and preparation, reliable intelligence, and recruitment of collaborators. Shortly after midnight on May 13, roughly 50 armed insurgents attacked a police station and a military garrison, seized hundreds of weapons, broke into a high-security jail to release about 600 prisoners, armed the inmates, engaged in a fierce gun battle with officers in the local National Security Service station, took over the municipality headquarters, burned down the local cinema and theater, set cars ablaze, and captured about 20 hostages. According to [an] eye-witness, there were scores of dead, including civilians, before the government deployed security reinforcements to the area. [emphasis added—MCS] To secure their no-go territory, the insurgents applied another classic guerrilla tactic, using the civilian population to serve as a human shield while they presented their demands to the government. It may have proved easy to attract the local population to the main town square; peaceful protests against the trial of 23 local businessmen [the Akramists—MCS] had taken place for a week before they were sentenced for religious extremism on May 12. Moreover, the Uzbek population is so frustrated by poor economic conditions, corruption, and incompetent officialdom, that the insurgents could easily rally protesters. ... At the end of the tragic day of May 13, when the insurgents pushed the hostages to the front in order to break out of the cordon established by the government forces around the square, the security units started shooting indiscriminately, killing first the hostages, many insurgents, and scores of civilians" (194).
• Despite the brutality of the repression of the Andijon Incident, most mass incidences have been handled without deadly force or military action. The most common tactics of repression are arrests and beatings, not torture or killings (195).
• Another research, Dr. Shirin Akiner, supports this version of events. His estimates of the dead based on funeral processions and the number of graves around Andijon is closer to the government figure of 170, no where near the Western media reports of several hundred (195).
• Uzbekistan treaties protests with repression and mass arrests, but this is generally followed by concession to the protestors, often involving the arrest of corrupt local officials or slight increases in the provision of basic goods and services (195).
• Repression of political opposition and crackdown on mass demonstrations have been traits of Uzbekistani politics since the beginning. From 1992 onward, President Karimov sought to repress his main political rival -- Shukrulla Mirsaidov, who would eventually go on to found Adolat SDP (195). The regime has continued this repression, turning on Islamist groups in recent history and especially after the Toshkent bombings (196).
• Connections with foreign countries and acceptance in the international community is very desirable for President Karimov, as his press office and the media in generally are thrilled at any sign of Uzbekistani participation in the wider global community. The author believes that this desire to be accepted could be exploited as a pressure point to stimulate democratic reforms or the release of certain dissidents (196).
• The US has applied inconsistent pressure for reform since independence, with the US government most willing with Uzbekistan following the 9/11 terror attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. The Department of Defense found a willing partner in Uzbekistan, despite mounting political pressure, and wanted to continue successful cooperation on narcotics and border control activities (196). Even after the US was forced out of the Qarshi-Xanabad airbase in 2005, Uzbekistan made it clear that it did not hold the DoD responsible and asked for training and education programs between the two countries to continue (197).
• In 2004, when the US still needed use of transport and logistics into Afghanistan, the assistant secretary for defense made this statement regarding the American-Uzbekistani partnership: "We are in the middle of a war, and it is a war on radical Islam in which Uzbekistan on the front line. Oftentimes, at war, people’s civil liberties are violated. Now, to be fair about it, Uzbekistan, long before the war on terrorism, was engaged in policies that violated people’s civil liberties. There is no doubt about that, but when we are looking for change in the middle of a conflict situation where we have $2 billion worth of drug money being poured into that region from Afghanistan financing radical Islam, which is our enemy in the war that we are fighting, we have to realize that we have got some complicated decisions to make" (196).
• This during this, however, other branches of American government attempted to promote human rights organizations and pressured the Uzbekistani regime for important legal changes, such as the drafting of habeas corpus legislation. The main organization responsible for this side, and arguing for decreased or terminated support, was the State Department (197).
• Following the eviction from Qarshi-Xanabad, the US has limited its human rights presence in Uzbekistan, instead preferring to work through NGOs funded and supported from America. This leads to fewer risks, and less chance of American nationals being detained, however it has poisoned the reputation of the human rights community in Uzbekistan as being primarily and tool of the West -- possibly directed towards nefarious ends (198).
• "Clearly Central Asian policy of the United States—hardly a top-priority matter— is pushed and pulled by different parts of the Administration and also by several interest groups. The International Crisis Group (ICG), a human rights organization active throughout the world, argues that Uzbekistan’s repression increases Islamic militancy or drives it elsewhere. However, the American–Uzbekistan Chamber of Commerce—representing Case, Newmont, Siemens, Caterpillar and other firms— lobbies for continuation of the business relations. In Europe similar divisions have appeared, with the business-minded Germans willing to be more tolerant of human rights shortcomings than other EU governments" (198).
• The author notes a distinct correlation between the economic situation in the country and its human rights record, for both economic and political rights. During periods of strong economic growth, the legal and rights situation in the country improves, as it did from 1992 to 1995, and from 2002 onwards, despite the increased tension of the Rose Revolution that same year (199).
• The economy scenario rights now is fairly rosy, with strong commodities markets, large foreign reserves, and a substantial budget surplus spend on industrialization and investment -- and corruption. As a result, the government will not be forced to increase repression, and will likely progress on many issues of cementing the rule of law (199).