Swanström, Niklas. "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.1 (2004): 41-53.

Swanström, Niklas. "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.1 (2004): 41-53.

• Since the collapse of the USSR, there has been no effective way to settle disputes and issues between the Central Asian republics. International mechanisms are few and their function is impeded by conflict and high levels of distrust. Despite the presence of issues like transnational crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism as shared highest prioritizes for all states, the mechanisms to address these issues collectively are minimal (41).
• Regional conflict prevention is essentially dependent upon multiple strong states cooperating on mutual issues. It cannot be easily applied to Central Asia because state authority is not robust enough for conflict prevention to be effectively implemented, meaning incidents could easily escalate into warfare (41-42).
• States in Central Asia are still weak because there were created artificially by the Soviet Union, and have not consolidated national identities because ethnic divisions and regional 'clans' are still more powerful and influential than the national governments (42, 50).
• Attempts to encourage cooperation or integration within Central Asia have been opposed by the Central Asian republics, most stridently Uzbekistan, as discouraging the development of distinct national institutions and identities. This nascent nationalism results in low levels of trust (42, 50).
• There have been limited successful in Central Asia in establishing military or security cooperation, particularly the creation of a joint Uzbekistani, Kazakhstani, and Kyrgyz peacekeeping battalion for service in Tajikistan. Such a project has not, however, been repeated in Afghanistan (43).
• The Central Asian states, led by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, did develop a nuclear weapons free zone for the course of a decade, finally signed in 2002, but this move is largely meaningless in the context of all states except Turkmenistan being members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (43).
• The Central Asian Economic Union was created in 1994 by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, later expanding to include Tajikistan in 1998. Originally established to coordinate economics and trade, the organization became a body for coordinating military intervention in the Tajik Civil War by 1995. The body became dysfunction by 1997 because Uzbekistan refused to modify its tactics and had extreme distrust in the capacity and willingness of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to fight terrorists (43-44).
• In 2001, the Central Asian Economic Union was rebranded as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization and entrusted with drawing up plans to establish a security zone around Central Asia and curtail extremism and crime within the region. The unwillingness of Uzbekistan to compromise leads other states to distrust the organization as a front for Uzbekistani hegemony (44).
• Drug trafficking is a great example of a common problems for Central Asia for which states have utterly failed to come up with a collective solution. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are not motivated to solve the problem, as their security forces are heavily compromised by the drug trade -- as are the Russian border guards in Tajikistan. As a result, none of the other states trust another enough to develop a common anti-drug platform with differentiated responsibilities (44).
• The fear of Uzbekistani hegemony in any regional organization has prompted the Central Asian states to include foreign great powers, like Russia or China, in their regional organizations to assuage fears of Uzbekistani dominance and build the trust required for such an association to actually function (45).
• "It is however clear that bilateral approaches are preferred by the Central Asian states over the multilateral approach to cooperation in the region. This is due to the lack of trust between the Central Asian states and the reluctance of the strongest actor in the region—Uzbekistan—to decrease its own leverage over the lesser powers, but also the weaker states’ fear of being dominated" (48).
• The Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] has created in 1996 as a forum to settle the border disputes between China and the Central Asian republics, which had caused a lot of tension during the Soviet period. The organization has been very successful in reducing border tensions and building mutual confidence in Central Asia. In 1997, the SCO also agreed to combat extremism and terrorism in the region, a goal which has steady increased in importance among members (45-46).
• The SCO succeeded because its members have shared norms, shared interest in the topics covered, and because the organization's agenda was developed progressively in line with the emerging interests of members. The members also value the prioritizing norm of non-interference in the organization, which is viewed as a way to prevent the SCO from used to mask Chinese, Russian, or Uzbekistani domination (45).
• There have been some suggestions in the past to give the US or some EU states observer status in the SCO. This would be an awful idea as it would do nothing for EU or US interests in the region and would foment distrust and scheming within an otherwise functional organization (50-51).
• Turkey has attempted to great its own international organization through the Turkic Council, but has faced opposition at ever turn. Not wanted to be dominated by Turkey, the Central Republics have prevented Turkey from having any political, economic, or military power through the Council. Russia, China, and Iran have all also tried to undermine Turkish influence in the region (46).
• Based on a 1997 proposal by Uzbekistan, the 6+2 Group of the bordering states of Afghanistan plus Russia and USA has been successful at implementing a common programme to stop the drug trade. Actual efforts at conflict resolution through the forum have been useless, however, undermined by a lack of mutual trust and the absence of coordinated security strategies (46-47).
• The Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] has been involved in Central Asia since its establishment, but has limited influence because of its organizational indecisiveness. There is a large gap between perceived security threats to Russia and those to the Central Asia members, with the exception of terrorism, which has been the only major area of cooperation for the CIS in Central Asia (47).
• NATO, through the Partnership for Peace initiative, has promoted regional security cooperation in Central Asia, but many of its project have had limited success. The Central Asian peacekeeping battalion, for example, because functionally obsolete after Uzbekistan lost interest as the Tajik Civil War concluded. NATO influence has remained largely bilateral, as the Central Asian states do not see the organization as reflecting their security needs. NATO activities have also received pushback from Russia and China (47-48).
• Increased bilateral ties between the Central Asian republics and America has actually increased regional tensions by created suspicion in Russia and China. Moreover, increased bilateral ties by any outside power raises fears in others that the region is moving towards an unfavorable hegemony, leading to a preference for international organizations which no one state is capable of dominating (49).
• The OSCE has done major work in conflict prevention and regional security in Central Asia, despite its EU sponsors being much weaker militarily than America or the NATO alliance. The OSCE has done some good work professionalizing law enforcement and promoting cooperation, but its larger institutional aims to create peace by fostering open societies and democracy have failed entirely, even in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic (48).
• The track record of international organizations in Central Asia shows that cooperation is much more successful when involving external powers, namely the success of SCO initiatives with Chinese and Russian backing. This demonstrates the deep lack of trust between the Central Asian republics, requiring foreign states to act as neutral arbiters (49, 51).
• Conflict resolution mechanisms in Central Asia are overwhelmingly concentrated on crisis management with severely underdeveloped preventive capabilities. This is because there is no overall coordinating body for issues of common concern, due to a deep-seated fear that any strong international organization would be used to violate national sovereignty (51).