Cohen, Joshua. "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy". Ethics, Vol.97, No.1 (1986): 26-38.

Cohen, Joshua. "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy". Ethics, Vol.97, No.1 (1986): 26-38.

• This article is written as a response to Liberalism Against Populism by Dr. William Riker, which assess these two different concepts of democracy and concludes that Populism is incoherent, a conclusion which Dr. Cohen disputes.
• The description of populism provided by Dr. Riker is the view that the opinion of the majority must be respected and endorsed. The popular will must be followed in a democracy, with the assumption that this popular will is expressed through the process of voting (26-27).
• In his book, Dr. Riker objects to the claim that voting represents a popular will, showing through severely unstable patterns of public opinion, that the public will does not exist in a strong enough form to be followed (27).
• Dr. Cohen rejects the interpretation of the general will provided by Dr. Riker, arguing that the version he constructs is purely procedural, whereas most populists only see the popular will as something to be determined roughly from popular votes (29).
• Dr. Riker makes additional arguments against populism, claiming that its acceptance of majoritarianism undermines the institutions which guarantee regular and competitive elections, therefore undermining the security of the liberties it claims to defend (27).
• The author critiques Dr. Riker's arguments as being based on a definition of populism which would not actually be endorsed by any populist. Both historical and contemporary populists argue theories substantially more complex than simple majoritarianism (27-28).
• Dr. Riker also makes a claim that liberal or 'Madisonian' democracy survives his stimulations for coherence. The conditions for this, however, are minimalistic, demanding only that elections be able to remove officials from office, which the obviously are capable of doing (29).
• Dr. Cohen argues that the minimalist restrictions imposed on liberal democracy are too lenient, and that to pass inspection liberal democracy must be proven to be a more effective control on state power than other systems, like military coups or revolutions (30).
• The interpretation of voting in epistemic populism asserts that there exists an independent standard of correctness about an issue separate from its popular support, that people vote based on their interpretations of correctness rather than pure self-interest, and that decision-making takes into account both facts and beliefs (34).
• According to epistemic populism, the independent standard of correctness in voting is the general will, which is a common ground between all members of a community with shared goals, social equality, and shared knowledge about relevant facts (34).
• Epistemic populism claims that democratic elections provide a good impression of the general will, because experiments with concordat juries have shown that most individuals are actually good judges and make political decisions based on their judgements of the right (35).
• The conditions for this to be true depend on political institutions. Institutions must be in place which allow for the distribution of information so that voters are good judges, and a plurality of opinions can develop (35-36).
• Another challenge to this perception of voters is the assumption that 'good judges' will vote based on their judgements rather than personal gain. Structural factors within the voting process may led to more people pursuing selfish interests, and these must be countered (36-37).