Olcott, Martha. "Central Asia on Its Own". Journal of Democracy, Vol.4, No.1 (1993): 92-103.

Olcott, Martha. "Central Asia on Its Own". Journal of Democracy, Vol.4, No.1 (1993): 92-103.

• Abduhrahim Pulatov, the contemporary leader of Birlik, believes that democracy will not become realized in Central Asia during his lifetime and that the transition will not occur without violence. He frames the paradigm of democratization in terms of a conflict between 'democrats', opposition forces like himself, and 'partocrats', the oligarchic interests of former members of the Communist Party (92-93).
• Abduhrahim Aka believes that the next generation of opposition figures in Uzbekistan will be both more peaceful and strongly linked with political Islam. He believes that these changes are the result of restrictive policies on freedom of association which leave mosques as the only place for opposition forces to gather (93).
• The author believes that Abduhrahim Pulatov places too much faith in the abilities of the ruling elites in the Central Asian republics, vis-a-vis the opposition. While Dr. Olcott agrees that the opposition is inexperienced, the elites are as well. The presidents of the Central Asian republics were unprepared for independence, and did not build the institutions required for full sovereignty until political realities forced them to become fully independent states (93-94).
• Whereas the Baltic republics, former Yugoslavia, or other parts of the Soviet Union all developed institutions of independence, when the Central Asian republics became independent they had no currency, no economic system, declining revenue, and no control over their borders (94).
• Independence brought new opportunities for investment and economic interactions prohibited under the Soviet Union, but Western assistance proved more difficult and less valuable than originally expected (95). 
• "Central Asia's presidents had all faced (or were about to face) the electorate. Even though some of these men had not completely refrained from using shady tactics to tilt the democratic process in their favor, each was probably the most genuinely popular politician in his country" (95).
• The unequal and non-autarkic construction of the Central Asian economies precipitated economic collapse and a massive decline in standards of living, especially in some areas of already poor Central Asia. This humanitarian disaster prompted almost all Central Asian states to move away from free market capitalism by 1992, as all states recognized the necessity of some price control to prevent mass impoverishment or starvation (96-97).
• Many Central Asians blamed their economic predicament on Moscow, both for constructing the Soviet system which had collapsed and for using economic power in the independence period to create trade deals which heavily disadvantaged the former Soviet Union (96). Russia soon grew to dominate the post-Soviet institutions, like the CIS and the CSTO (97).
• Most Central Asian leaders have tried to compensate for economic collapse and political weakness in their republics by establishing institutions to promote nationalism, with themselves at the center. This exists in variations, from President Niyazov's Stalinist cult of personality (97-98), to the centrality of President Karimov within Uzbekistani politics (98).
• Language has become a popular target for promoting nationalism within the new republics, especially taking action against the dominance of Russian in public spaces. Oftentimes this has been somewhat ironic considering the inability of both Sapurmurad Niyazov or Islom Karimov to speak their national languages at the time they became elected (98).
• Any full linguistic nationalism is dangerous, however, especially in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, as all Central Asian countries have large ethnic and linguistic minorities. A difficult balancing act is required between promoting the national language as a form of identity versus guaranteeing the rights of a significant linguistic minority (99).
• Since the collapse of the Maxkamov administration in September 1991, Tajikistan has edged closer towards its present state of civil war, prompting analysts to question why the state has collapsed there, but not elsewhere. The two most common theories are a racist view of Tajikistan as barbarous and warlike, and a belief that the war is an expression of a power struggle between a number of 'clans' trying to control the country (101). President Karimov has also suggested a third theory, that the opposition is funded by Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan and elsewhere, who have hijacked the opposition (102).
• The author provides a number of other claims about the strength of clans in the governance of Central Asia, all unfortunately without provided sources: "Turkmenistan also has three powerful tribally based groups. Uzbekistan has four or five major regional (and partially kin-reinforced) groupings, and seven families are said to control the political and economic life of its capital city, Tashkent. In Kazakhstan, two clans have dominated both old nomenklatura lists and post-independence political appointments" (101).
• The danger which radical political Islam poses to Central Asia is difficult to determine, but contrary to Islom Karimov's claims, the banning of the Islamic Renaissance Party does not seem to have had any baring on the stability of Uzbekistan (102). Banning islamic opposition, however, risks radicalizing believers and strengthening the case that the current government are working against the will of Allah (103).
• "The next several years will be difficult ones for Central Asia. Whether or not radical economic reforms are embraced, the regime's economies will certainly continue to falter in the short run. Those currently in charge may indeed be the most fit to rule, but they are not up to the tasks that they face. Moreover, even the most popular among them lack the deep-rooted political support that someone who actually had led his nation to independence would enjoy. A "struggle for national self-determination" is more than just a slogan. It is a process in which leaders prove themselves, alternative political elites gain experience, and the goals of the elite and the masses become melded together. This helps new nations get through the difficult transition periods that they inevitably face" (103).