Oomen, Barbara. "Vigilantism or alternative citizenship? The rise of Mapogo a Mathamaga". African Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (2004): 153-171.

Oomen, Barbara. "Vigilantism or alternative citizenship? The rise of Mapogo a Mathamaga". African Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (2004): 153-171.

• At the end of 1996, in response to crimewave throughout the neglected northern province of Limpopo, a vigilante group called Mapogo a Mathamaga formed to punish known criminals through corporal punishment or execution. The organization now involves more than 70,000 members and its symbol of two tigers is displayed along the east coast of South Africa (153).
• Mapogo was formed on 25 August 1996 in response to the violent murder of six businessmen in Nebo, Sekhunkhune. The vigilante group sprang up in response to widespread crime in the impoverished and drought-stricken area, where the few businessmen present faced frequent assault and robbery (155-156).
• Violence against business-owners and entrepreneurs occurred in many forms in Sekhunkhune, both in violence murders and robberies, and also organized communal violence. Accusations of witchcraft were often directed against the wealthy who did not share wealth with relatives or the community (159).
• They originally were an advocacy group which demanded government action, but when the response was limited, local groups began to carry out vigilante violence by November. They numbered 3,500, mainly business owners and large farmers, by August 1997. Violence had become common, with criminals being beaten and either turned over to the police or killed by the vigilantes (156-157).
• The vigilante group also developed out of a deep mistrust of the state and police force, largely due to the continuity of police staff and practices from the apartheid era (156).
• "How could it be that the 1990s in South Africa provoked “grandmothers to incite murder, and middle-class family men to don balaclavas and whip their own workers'? That 'people, decent and law-abiding by their own estimation', imagined they had the 'right to terrorise a newly legitimised South Africa in the name of justice?'. Part of the answer lies in South Africa’s rampant crime rates and the ANC’s refusal to make security a central concern. Many Mapogo members joined the organisation out of sheer exasperation, from direct experience of violent crime and the police’s incapacity to deal with it" (161).
• The name Mapogo actually refers to several different groups attempting to claim membership in the original organization. The initial organization is discussed in this article, whereas criminal gangs and private security forces who have taken the name are not associated with the original groups (154).
• The Mapogo existed not only as a vigilante group, but also presented an alternative conception of social order and morality, named 'Sepogo', based in traditional conservative institutions and values rather than the neoliberal South African constitution. It enforces its own norms through violence, but also support for local community centers and churches, and sponsorship of cultural and sporting events (154).
• Mapogo has been so successful because it combined a charismatic leadership, a tight administrative structure requiring members to pay dues in order to register branches, and its effectiveness in curbing crime. Locals report feeling safer due to the actions of Mapogo (157-158).
• Mapogo drew its base of support from a number of conservative organizations seeking to assert an alternative social order. The main constituency had been businessmen who wanted to end violence against themselves and their businesses, but also included chiefs, Afrikaners, churches, and 'parent associations' of socially conservative older persons (159-161).
• Chiefs had been given large amounts of authority in South Africa since 1951, including enforcing Apartheid laws. Anger against the chiefs for complicity in apartheid became so intense by the 1980s, that riots resulting in the arson of thier palaces and forced many chiefs to flee the district. Many chiefs were able to reassert traditional power in the late 1990s with the support of Mapogo (159).
• Church organization also mobilized in support of Mapogo, often claiming that the Bible endorsed corporal punishment and self-defense of these groups. The church membership also included other conservative groups which supported Mapogo, such as 'parents' associations' and Afrikaners (159-160).
• Afrikaners supported Mapogo in response to the same crime wave that victimized businessmen. White-owned farms were victimized by theft and murder regularly, despite being essential fortresses, and local authorities often refused to help them. Many Afrikaners also responded positively wealth of the businessmen of Mapogo (160).
• Schools and 'parents' associations' of concerned older members of the community have also been major supporters of Mapogo, agreeing with the 'school-based nature' of corporal punishment. Women and the elderly are the main supporters of these groups, seeing Mapogo as a bulwark against youth violence, including predation by their own children, and a buttress for traditional age relations (160-161).
• Mapogo did not just passively introduce its new conception of citizenship and morality in South Africa, but also actively argued against the government-supported definitions of citizenship. The rights-based language of the Constitution was scorned and derided as protecting people like criminals, who were publicly perceived as having forfeited their rights. It was also mocked for being too 'Western', and failing to account for 'traditional' African social norms (161-162).
• Mapogo also argues in favour for 'traditional' and 'cultural' values, expressed as support for hierarchies of age, obedience to parents and chiefs, and respect for the elderly. These discussions of 'tradition' are reminiscent of those employed by local authorities during the apartheid era, and enforce notions of cultural difference popularized under apartheid. Despite claims to 'tradition', many Mapogo practices, terminology, and ideas are a continuity of conservative and pro-government ideologies under apartheid (162-163).
• The government response to Mapogo activities has been ambivalent, if somewhat supportive. In August 1997, Mapogo entered an agreement with the Limpopo government to turn over criminals to the police in return for public support. Mapogo flagrantly violates these agreements, by beating or killing criminals, but the government does not punish these transgressions (163).
• Part of the government refusal to punish Mapogo is a result of general support for the organization among both police and politicians, who agree with its use of corporal punishment, its invocation of 'African values', and its critique of the police. Police and politicians are sometimes active members. Mapogo was even contracted to protect the Mpumalanga parliament from attack (163).
• The government occasionally did press charges, usually in cases of serious assault or murder, against Mapogo members, but access to superior lawyers and general lack of political will meant that most defendants were acquitted. This only changed in 1999. when a prominent leader, John Megolego, joined the United Democratic Movement, resulting in a temporary crackdown on Mapogo activities by the African National Congress government (164).
• The dynamics of violence in Sekhunkhune in particular were focused around divides between the youth and the older population, which had been present for decades. During the anti-apartheid protests of the 1980s, violence was mostly perpetrated by youth against chiefs and the elder; during riots in 1986, youth burned down the chiefs' palaces, killed a number of pensioners accused of witchcraft, and shouted slogans directed against older people (164-165).
• Youth in the context of Limpopo refers to a broader category overlapping with, but not defined by, age. While all young people are 'youths', older persons of lower social status, especially those without wealth or an education, are also considered 'youth' (165).
• Mapogo takes a clear stance against empowerment of the 'youth', who it blames for violence and crime following the collapse of apartheid-era institutions. Youth perceive the group as oppressing them and unfairly targeting an already disadvantaged young population. There is a clear correlation between age and levels of support for Mapogo (165-166).