Ohlson, Thomas and Mimmi Söderberg. "From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States". Uppsala: Uppsala University. 2002.

Ohlson, Thomas and Mimmi Söderberg. From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States. Uppsala: Uppsala University. 2002.

• This paper examines the potential for democracy to create a situation of peace in weak states following civil war. It explores the factors effecting the outcome of democratization efforts and suggests policy recommendations for achieving a democratic peace in weak states in the future (1).
• Research has shown that states on a continuum between democracy and autocracy are more likely to collapse into civil war than either developed democracies or autocratic states. Although democratic peace is more stable than autocratic peace, the transition to democracy is risky (3-4).
• The authors define a 'weak state' as a state characterized by a, "lack of societal cohesion and consensus on what organizing principles should determine the contest for state power and how that power should be executed,  low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with minimum levels of security and well-being, high vulnerability to external economic and political forces, and a low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of state power by portions of the citizenry" (6-7).
• The Weberian definition of a state is the standard in social sciences. It defines a state by "unchallenged control of the territory within the defined boundaries under its control, monopolization of the legitimate use of force within the borders of the state, and the reliance upon impersonal rules in the governance of its citizens and subjects" (5).
• There appears to exist some social contract between the state and the population which makes strong Weberian states more legitimate than weak states lacking some Weberian characteristics. Legitimacy comes from limited and predictable state violence, state guarantees of minimal standards of wellbeing, and a measure of citizen control over governance and policy (5-6).
• Whereas a strong state has uncontested internal power and can rule by consensus, a weak state primarily focuses on domestic threats to security and therefore has to rely on force rather than consensus to rule parts of the country (6).
• The authors define two different forms of legitimacy possessed by states, vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy establishes the rights to rule between the government and institutions. Horizontal legitimacy is the relationship between cliques within the state and the degree to which political actors trust each other (7).
• "Vertical legitimacy is about responsible authority and voluntary subordination, horizontal legitimacy is about mutual acceptance and tolerance at elite and mass levels" (8).
• The difference between the actual legitimacy of the state and what level of legitimacy is required for the functions of the state in that country is the 'legitimacy gap', and a large gap can lead to civil war (8).
• Many states, especially in the post-colonial world, have elements of patrimonial authority. This refers to the blending of state and private interests, as is usually facilitated through the incorporation of patronage systems within a bureaucracy. In these systems, state legitimacy depends on patrimonial systems, which are prone to alienating exclusivity and corruption (9-10).
• Many patrimonial states did not survive the end of the Cold War, when the large sums of American or Soviet funding stopped flowing. They either collapsed in the late 1980s and 1990s, or reformed into 'false-democracies' which imitate democratic structure to continue receiving funding for their patrimonial systems of corruption (10-11).
• Many political actors within corrupt and disorderly patrimonial systems are personally advantaged by the lack of good governance and do not have an incentive to reform the system; even though the disorder is terrible for the population, it is a great opportunity for elites (12).
• Governments in weak states do not have the levels of legitimacy required to pursue the centralizing reforms required for a transition into a strong state. Furthermore, the instability of these systems favors short-term planning and suspicious of all non-state groups, neither of which increases long-term prosperity or trust levels (11).
• Even states entrenched in patrimonial structures have figures within government who advance national Weberian state interests. Furthermore, the level at which weak states will advance national or patrimonial interests in government varies with time and situation (12-13).
• Solving intra-state wars is extreme difficult if the issues at hand are ideological or rooted in the frustration of incompatible claims, such as distributive justice or independence. Whereas states can disengage, actors in civil war must live within the state political structure, usually leading to protracted violence (14).
• Even in deeply ideological conflicts during the Cold War, however, peace is reached a good amount of the time, and holds around half of the time. This brings new hope for the possibility of peaceful solutions to deeply ideological civil wars (14-15).
• Conflict resolution is generally thought of as a phased process, with the transition between phases accompanied by major changes in interaction between the groups. Generally three phases are delineated: a dialogue phases, where a peace agreement is drafted; an implementation phase, where a peace agreement is carried out; and a consolidation phase, where the new peaceful order is tested (15).
• The dialogue phase of the peace process is usually initiated when at least one side views the conflict to be deadlocked, when parties believe that unilateral victory is no longer achievable. The process is usually initiated by these realpolitik consideration, not by political goodwill (16).
• Warring parties can sometimes be forced into a situation where they are ready to accept peace by outside pressure, either by threat of invasion or diplomatic and economic sanctions. These measures make the continuation of conflict a bigger risk than peace settlements (16-17).
• The dialogue should lead to a peace agreement, which always contains limitation of armed groups, demobilization, reintegration into society, and the division of political power among warring parties (17).
• In general, peace agreements are more likely to succeed if they including all nations party to the conflict, a not signed under duress from foreign powers, and address the grievances considered greatest by the warring parties rather than those issues of importance to the international community (18).
• The implementation phase of the peace process comes after the peace agreement is signed. It depends heavily on guaranteeing the military security of parties and increasing horizontal legitimacy (18). Implementation is successfully carried out by supplying material and political benefits during peacetime which disappear should conflict start again. Positive behaviors are ingrained by these benefits, and parties should learn to coexist in a political environment (19-20).
• The mechanisms of rule following implementation should be constructed to minimize risk rather than increase efficiency. If the mechanism malfunctions or is manipulated, power should be decentralized enough that parties do not need to resume hostilities to retain power (20).
• The consolidation phase is long and consists of normalizing politics in a way that will prevent future conflicts. During this phase, increases in vertical legitimacy are most important as the population must be shown that the new system provides tangible benefits (20-21).
• The resolution of all conflicts depends primarily upon the behavior of the domestic actors, but in weak states the influence of third-parties can be considerable. Third parties can facilitate communication and built trust between parties, provide technical assistance during implementation, and apply pressure to force a cessation of conflict (21-22).
• Third parties have three roles in the solution of intra-state wars: increase the costs of sustained conflict, to reduce fears about the political settlement, and to identify, co-opt, or alienate extremist actors who are spoiling the peace process. These goals can be accomplished with diplomacy or resource-based coercion (22-23).
• The most successful mediation by Third Parties are performed by current or previous supporters of the primary actors. These supporters already had a role in shaping domestic actor conception of the conflict, so they are uniquely situated to positively shape the outcome of the conflict (23).
• Third parties can also significantly increase the chance of peace during the implementation phase by providing security guarantees to one or both parties. Whereas parties depending on each other for security will be reluctant to disarm, having the Third Party support means less trust is required (24).
• "It is vital to [...] ponder the normal state of affairs in a post-war weak state: devastated agriculture, destroyed infrastructure, worthless currency, no commerce, no exports, no foreign investment, no jobs. To this can be added fear and dislike between groups, an abundance of arms and unskilled youths and soldiers floating around, no firm lines of political authority, no instruments of law and order and no legitimate government. It should also not be forgotten that the negotiated peace agreement is, at best, only the second preferred outcome among the formerly warring parties. If anything, these are conditions that start wars or lead to authoritarian rule, instead of ending wars and generating democratic governance" (24).
• Democracy is by its nature a radical and revolutionary process, requiring a transition from one system of power holding to another, which will have different figures in the new power structure. This will lead to upheaval, which a weak state may not be able to withstand (25).
• "The paper suggests that prescriptive democratization, using the constitutional engineering methods and political institutions of strong states as role models, often means that a political structure becomes superimposed onto a political culture that may have no intrinsic relationship to this structure. Yet, strong states are strong in part because their political structures do reflect the deeper political culture of their societies. Such harmony, it can be argued, generates political legitimacy, vertical and horizontal. If there is too much of disharmony between culture and structure, the transition may therefore fail" (26).
• In their role in conflicts, the authors recommend that Third Parties act as, "Comprehensive, Cohesive, Capable and Creative Coalition of Peace Custodians". Meaning that their support must be inclusive and non-biased, share similar outlooks about the conflict, possess necessary resources, flexible to changing circumstances, and work alongside other Third Party actors to pursue the goal of peace (26-27).
• Western donors and countries pay too much attention to particular forms of political organization, often imposing foreign institutions and parliamentary systems. The focus should be on peace, legitimacy, and democratic norms as results, not institutional specifics (27-28).
• Moving too quickly to multiparty elections can be dangerous for the peace process, instead talks among previously warring parties should lay out some guidelines over how the country is to function. Unarmed actors should also participate in a process which is domestically dictated, and immune from foreign meddling (28-29).
• Decentralization is usually a good plan to increase legitimacy in a weak state, however for it to have this effect the services being decentralized must be effective and funded. Donors can help with these improvements (30).
• Donors must also be sure that their gifts do not reinforce the negative aspects of patrimonial systems. Whereas most programs focus on poverty relief through corrupt systems, the unequal distribution of gains increases conflict, meaning that political reform decreases conflict more than economic development (30).
• Increasing the pay and social status of soldiers and policemen is necessary to producing long-term reform of the security sector and turning predatory armed forces into a protective security force (31).
• Third Party states can make set policy changes which have dramatic benefits on the lives of those in war-torn weak states. These including enforcing codes of conduct for companies operating abroad, or making exceptions in protectionist agricultural policies. These changes allow domestic economies to become more self-sufficient (31).