Cronin, Audrey. "The 'War on Terrorism': What Does it Mean to Win?". Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.37, No.2 (2014): 174-197.

Cronin, Audrey. "The 'War on Terrorism': What Does it Mean to Win?". Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.37, No.2 (2014): 174-197.

• The US military has achieved its major goals in the war against Al-Qaeda, a once formidable group in control of Afghanistan has been devastated, its military capacities severely reduced, its leadership killed, and its base of popular support largely destroyed (174).
• Unlike previous wars, the 2001 declaration of war against the Taliban government of Afghanistan did not name the ends of the war, only that the President was authorized to deploy military forces. The conflict is certainly organized, approved, and funded like a war, but had very unclear boundaries and objectives (175).
• The unconventional nature of the War on Terror has placed US politicians and military commanders out of traditional legal, moral, and strategic frameworks for action. The limits of the war, in terms of financing, use of lethal force, geographical jurisdiction, and time, have not been defined (176).
• Despite incredible US tactical victories, such as the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the lack of grand strategy or defined ends in the war mean that these tactical victories do not result in overall victory. Attempts to create a grand strategy have thus-far failed, meaning day-to-day operations continue without contributing to an overarching plan (176).
• The decision to determine that Al-Qaeda as an international organization, not as part of the contemporary government of Afghanistan, was crucial. This laid the path for the expansion of the American war in Afghanistan to a global war with all Al-Qaeda affiliates worldwide. It also allowed the conflict to transform from preventing further attacks on the US into actively combating all Islamic extremist groups which could potentially pose a threat (178-179).
• The means of waging war in democracies are, by necessity, controlled by the public attitude towards the conflict. In the case of terrorism, the intense outrage of the American public demanded the fullest possible military response against Al-Qaeda. The maximum means of conducting warfare only made matching those means to the ends more difficult since the carte blanche approach to warfare made matching means to ends unnecessary for military planners (180).
• In particular, the massive increase in the intelligence capacity of the US military and security forces has not been done effectively, resulting in too much data to effectively organize. This leads to situations where senior officials will instead resort to bias, rumor, and personal connections to make decisions since data is too unwieldy to utilize (181).
• In an endless war, like that against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, tactics take the place of strategy, which fails to materialize (183). In the American case, these tactics have been the use of drone strikes to target key enemy leaders; the precision and ability to conduct these strikes has increased dramatically during the Obama administration, but they are not connected to a larger strategic purpose designed to end the war (184-186).
• The expansive powers given to the US military and CIA to conduct operations against Al-Qaeda have reduced the ability of Congress to have effective oversight over military operations. Covert military operations, including assassinations, kidnapping, and tracking of terrorists across the world occur outside known legal frameworks and without Congressional oversight, potentially recreating the same circumstances which allowed the Iran-Contra Affair in the 1980s (186-188).
• The American war effort against Al-Qaeda has established the unrealistic war goal of entirely eliminating the threat of terrorism. The fixation on this impossible task has hindered the development of actual hope for ending the War on Terror (189).
• The author argues that the US has been remarkably successful in destroying the capacity of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in carrying out terrorist attacks on the scale of the 9/11 bombings. In light of this the war should end, since the other goal of ending all threats of any attack is impossible and will lead to a never-ending war (190-191).
• The author asserts that the goal of the War on Terror should be the elimination of Al-Qaeda as an effective organization and the discrediting of radical Salafism as an ideology. She then recommends several ways to accomplish this (192):
• There needs to be a serious reassessment of continuation of the 2001 authorization of military force, as the war powers it has given the presidency have been extensive and are not likely to be otherwise terminated. These powers may still be warranted, since a return to the law enforcement method of combating terrorism may be insufficient, but Congress needs to review this as an issue (192).
• The legal and moral implications of drone warfare must be seriously considered. The extrajudicial killing of terrorists has been justified under the laws of war as killing enemy combatants, but should the 2001 declaration of war be terminated, the legal status of drone strikes will be highly questionable. The US should also be careful, since it could set a negative precedent of China or Russia also using drone strikes to kill their enemies abroad (193).
• The military focus of the US campaign against Al-Qaeda has come at the cost of other methods of combating terrorism, in particular the US has neglected the development of law enforcement and intelligence capacities of partner countries and underfunded relevant State Department programs (193-194).
• The US government should confront the disparity of costs of the War on Terror and the current risks of attack. Although small attacks will continue, terrorism no longer poses an existential threat to the United States, and the American people should be told this by the President (194).
• The US needs to prioritize its military responses to terrorism in light with its broader strategic goals. The value of continued operations in Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen must be evaluated in light of US realignment towards the Pacific and other broader strategic goals (194-195).