da Silva Relva Teles Fazendeiro, Bernardo. "Keeping face in the public sphere: recognition, discretion and Uzbekistan's relations with the United States and Germany, 1991–2006". Central Asian Survey, vol. 34, vol.3 (2015): 341-356.

da Silva Relva Teles Fazendeiro, Bernardo. "Keeping face in the public sphere: recognition, discretion and Uzbekistan's relations with the United States and Germany, 1991–2006". Central Asian Survey, vol. 34, vol.3 (2015): 341-356.

• Tashkent’s international engagement defies conventional narratives. It is characterized by an unusual tendency for breaking off relations (341):
• In 2009, Turkish nationals saw several of their economic interests in Uzbekistan nationalized.
• In 2005, American military personnel were evicted from the Qarshi-Qanabad airbase, otherwise known as Camp Stronghold Freedom.
• Tashkent exited some of its key, Russia-sponsored organizations, such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
• Source mine of perspectives on Uzbekistani foreign relations on page 341: Fumagalli 2007; Cooley 2008; Cooley 2012; Collins 2009; Anceschi 2010; Deyermond 2009; Pikalov 2014.
• The author argues that Uzbekistani foreign policy is strongly influenced by conceptions of self-reliance and independence/sovereignty [mustaqillik], and that relations are strongly influenced by conceptions of insult and infringement of sovereignty, to the point that criticism and rhetoric can led to rapid deterioration of relations (342).
• The author argues that the difference between Uzbekistani-American relations and Uzbekistani-German relations is due to differences in the recognition of the roles which President Karimov plays in national politics. Whereas German managed to develop policy which recognized Karimov's totality and public proclaim Uzbekistani pluralism and democracy, the US mishandled itself in both areas and faced a resulting decline in relations as it damaged Karimov's reputation (342).
• Recognition and respect are important elements of foreign policy relationships with Uzbekistan. Even if a power inequality actually exists, presenting a mutual and equal partnership to the public is a necessary 'rule of the game' within Uzbekistani politics (343).
• This entire paper is an amazing source mine for resources explaining different dimension of Uzbekistani foreign and domestic ideology and policy.
• The ideology of Uzbekistani foreign policy is characterized by mustaqillik [independence], ma'naviyat [morality], and tenglik [equality]. These traits are the expectations for any relationship which Uzbekistan enters into, and must be displayed by the partner, or the relationship will be rejectioned (345).
• The lack of respect for tenglik and mustaqillik was the primary reason for Uzbekistan's self-ejection from the CTSO, as Russia threatened to reassume the 'big brother' relationship it had enforced during the Soviet era (345).
• The situation for Germany and the US in Uzbekistan was difficult, as they had to keep inline with Tashkent's emphasis on equality on international relations, but were prevented from public praising Karimov's regime due to domestic concerns about human rights, democracy, and economic liberalization (345).
• Germany was willing to work within the rhetorical constraints imposed by Tashkent, resulting in generally positive relations with Uzbekistan, whereas the US was unable or unwilling to restrain public criticism and faced a consequential decline in the quality of its relations with Uzbekistan (345).
• From the early 1990s, German recognized the value of Uzbekistan's stability and maintained high-level relations w/ the nation, taking advantage of economic investments in a stable environment. The US, on the other hand, immediately stressed economic liberalization and human rights, fiercely criticizing Tashkent and ignoring Karimov while developing strong relationships with 'reformists' in Qozoqiston and the Kyrgyz Republic (346).
• As civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan escalated, the US began to see more of the value of Uzbekistan's stability, esp. after Uzbekistan joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in 2004. The US recognized Karimov as a leader, inviting him to the White House in 1996, but the relationship still maintained a dimension almost entirely of security (347).
• The relationship between Berlin and Tashkent was strong precisely b/c German recognized the importance of cooperation w/ Uzbekistan in non-security fields. They supported investment and economic cooperation, the protection of Uzbekistani Germans, and in return Uzbekistan supported Germany's advancement to the Security Council (348).
• As human rights concerns in Uzbekistan became more public, calls for both economic and political reform became common among American politicians. Despite recognition of its necessity to regional security, America endangered their partnership w/ Uzbekistan by offering open criticism (348).
• The mass repression and anti-corruption purges of regional cliques following the 1999 Tashkent car bombings caused concern by both the Germans and Americans. The differences in their response, however, is telling. Whereas the Americans publicly denounced Uzbekistan, the German Chancellor made the same opinions clear in private meetings with Karimov, allowing him to keep face domestically (348).
• After the beginning of the War on Terror and NATO involvement in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan became more important to the American security agenda, and tied the nations together, but the same tensions remained as Uzbekistan refused to meaningfully reform and American continued criticized its lack of progress. The new framework for cooperation, despite providing military assistance for Tashkent, presented diktat for reforms, and was reviled by the Karimov administration (349).
• After 2004, Secretary of State Collin Powell cut Uzbekistan's congressional funding, leading to a major breakdown in relations as Karimov upped rhetoric against Western hypocrisy in their continued support of more oppressive regimes in Egypt and Pakistan (350).
• The Department of Defense has able to salvage a situation which the State Department had fouled, mainly be refusing to pull out military bases from the country. Some Defense officials also made statements in support of Karimov, but this did not fix the relationship (350).
• Continued German support for Karimov's regime faced a difficult decision following the Andijon Incident due to the highly publicized nature of the event. Some German officials criticized the government, but the official response was a muted call for inquiry into the exact details. This likely reflected trust in Karimov's government and its version of events, but faced criticism from anti-Uzbekistan persons such as former UK ambassador Craig Murray (350).
• During this time, the American authorities seemed to recognized the importance of Uzbekistan to the war effort in Afghanistan, having Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice only call for respect of human rights, but the actions of a number of Senators demanding personal audiences with Karimov to rebuke him immeasurably damaged bilateral relations (350).
• The administration tried to salvage the infrastructure for the War in Afghanistan, with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld going so far as to block a NATO declaration condemning the 'massacre'. A lack of coordination within the American government led to enough criticism to spoil relations (350).
• The continued American criticism towards Uzbekistan and the general lack of deference towards Karimov by American representatives led to breakdown in relations which culminated in the expulsion of all American military personnel in June, followed by a closure of all American NGOs (351).
• The 'business as usual' approach of the German government resulted in strong and positive relationships despite increased suspicion of the West. German NGOs remained accredited and the airbase of Termez was allowed to remain operational. Even when Germany joined the EU in sanctions against Uzbekistani officials, those same persons greeted German delegations w/ favor and fanfare (351).
• The form of interaction, rather than its content, seems to have been the largest factor behind the differences in Germany and America's relationship with Tashkent. Whether the issues were addressed publicly or privately had a tremendous effect on relations, more so than differences in policy (351).
• The Americans came of as orientalist and condescending towards Uzbekistan, a fact compounded by the hypocrisy of America's support for authoritarian regimes elsewhere (352).
• To be fair, Germany had more ability to conduct relations with Uzbekistan w/o coming under international criticism, as it is not a global power, nor are its press releases in English. Any action by the US is exponentially more visible than similar actions by Germany (352).
• Great Karimov quote: "Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of radicalism. [ … ] We are against religious fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like, we are against democratic fundamentalism. We are for an evolutionary path of development" (349).