Russian A2/AD Capabilities in Syria

Background

Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War has been a point of considerable concern of the West, as the Russian vision of post-war Syria is very different than that of the Western coalition and there are fears that Russia may seek to use its direct military involvement in the country to act not only against Islamic extremists like ISIS, but also weaken the West’s position in the area. Although nominally both Russia, the West, and other anti-ISIS coalition members all have the same nominal goal in Syria – that being the eradication of ISIS as a political and military force in the region – it is clear that Russia, the US, Turkey, other NATO allies, and the Gulf States all have different goals in the Syrian conflict which they may try to advanced at the expense of other factions. Tensions are particularly high between Russia and NATO forces, both as a carryover of mistrust from Russian aggression in Ukraine, and very different visions for post-war Syria. The West has made clear that for them, Bashir al-Assad cannot remain in power in the post-war period, and several NATO members – most notably the US and Turkey – have funded and armed “moderate” non-ISIS opposition groups for the sake of this goal. On the other hand, Russia demands that any vision of post-war Syria must retain President al-Assad, and Russian troops have taken and assisted military actions in Syria directed against armed groups funded by the US or Turkey. The mutually exclusive visions for post-war Syria already generate tension between Russia and Western coalition members, which is only increased by generalized mistrust and involvement by both sides in support of conflicts between non-ISIS groups. 

On November 28, 2015 Turkish air defense forces near the Syrian border shot down a Russian fighter which they claimed had violated Turkish airspace. This action provoked an enormous diplomatic incident and worsened the already strained relations between Russia and NATO members. Only a day after the incident, Russia announced that it would be providing additional protection for its aircraft in Syria and begin the deployment of S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in the country. American air force assets in Syria and Iraq were already concerned about possible conflict with Russian aircraft over Syria, but the deployment of advanced Russian air defense systems in Syria posed a serious threat to the safety of NATO aircraft, and raises questions about the extend of Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in Syria. Already, and as a direct result of the deployment of the S-400 air defense system in Latakia, the US and Turkey have stopped air support operations in Northwest Syria following hostile radar tracking behavior from Russian air defense systems in the area. The non-ISIS opposition forces in that area are now struggling to repel both ISIS and pro-government forces. A further increase in the capabilities of Russian A2/AD systems in Syria could result in further strategic disadvantages for NATO forces or potential losses in the event of a combat situation between Russia and NATO members. Understanding the extent and capabilities of Russian A2/AD systems in Syria and NATO capacity to address these threats is thus important to the dynamics of Russo-Western interactions in Syria and the limits of NATO operations there. 

A2/AD Capabilities

Russian A2/AD capabilities in Syria are significant and manifest in a diverse variety of deployed systems with aerial, naval, and ground elements. Although the main purpose of Russian air force deployments in Syria has been attacks against anti-regime forces who are strictly ground-based, a number of Russian aircraft in the region have air-to-air combat capabilities which should be accounted for. Although the majority of the approximately 36 aircraft deployed at Russia’s Khmeimim airbase are primarily bombers with limited secondary air-to-air combat capabilities, Russia also deploys 4 Su-30SM Flanker-C and 8 Su-34 Fullback multirole and air superiority aircraft in that base. These aircraft have formidable air-to-air combat capabilities and represent a significant potential threat to any fourth-generation NATO aircraft operating within Syrian airspace. The majority of the array of air-to-air missiles (AAMs) carried by Su-30M and Su-34 fighters have a maximum range of between 80 and 130 kilometers, with both values allowing identification and engagement with targets across entire Syrian provinces. The number of advanced Russian fighter aircraft present in Syria presents a formidable threat to the security of US and NATO air assets within the same operational area. However, as Russian aircraft have heavily concentrated their attacks on anti-Assad armed groups operating in far Northwest, the US will likely be able to avoid situations of serious confrontation by maintaining its current policy of avoiding that area and continuing joint-coordination of aircraft movements with Russian command.

Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea and Caspian Sea do not present significant A2/AD capabilities against air force deployments currently engaged in Syria, however a number of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea possess significant ship-to-ship combat capabilities and their deployment in the region could potentially endanger the ability to NATO craft to safely enter areas of the Syrian coast in the event of conflict with Russian forces. Of the Russian vessels deployed in the Mediterranean, only the Slava-class cruiser Moskva has armaments with a range of beyond 25km – which would only threaten aircraft within coastal Latakia. The Moskva, however, is equipped with the S-300M, a maritime anti-aircraft system with advanced capabilities for tracking and targeting all but the most advanced aircraft. From a number of positions along the Syrian coast, the Slava-class cruiser can target and/or engage air assets including aircraft and cruise missiles in an arch from the Turkish border to the Lebanese border including Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and Homs. NATO aircraft have not been operating in this zone since Russian deployment in the region late in 2015, meaning the currently targeted areas are not a present threat to coalition air assets. Although the cruise missile strike on ISIS forces in Eastern Syria from the Caspian Fleet received a large amount of press coverage, the capability of forces in that area to have any impact on the conflict in Syria vis-à-vis NATO forces is minimal as they cannot pose any threat to NATO air assets. The larger threat posed by Russian naval vessels in Syria is to any NATO vessels on the Levantine Coast. Although Russian vessels in the region have been ordered to cooperate with French forces in the same area, in the advent of a conflict scenario, the Russian Navy could certainly threaten the limited NATO naval deployment in the region. 

The A2/AD capabilities of the Russian ground forces deployed in Syria are significant and represent a widespread and systematic challenge to any expression of NATO force in a number of key regions in Syria. The primary A2/AD systems being deployed in Syria are the S-400 air defense missile systems. This system is highly mobile and constitutes the most advanced air defense system currently deployed. Each system is able to track up to six independent targets and fire guided missiles at a range in excess of 190km with a celling of 3,450m, allowing the systems currently stationed in the Khmeimim Airbase in Latakia to engage with aircraft above all regime-held territory north of Damascus, in an arch from the suburbs of Aleppo downwards. In additional to being able to target aircraft at any altitude within the service capacity of most military aircraft, the S-400 also has limited capabilities to engage cruise missiles, essentially allow it to create a no-fly zone within which any possibility of attack from aircraft or remote non-ballistic missile is precluded. Russia currently has deployed four S-400 systems within the country, and although by last estimate they are stationed at Khmeimim Airbase, their highly mobile nature means that they could be moved within hours. From what is believed to be their current position, the systems could be moved using only secured and regime-held roads to frontlines in Aleppo in six hours, to Palmyra in four hours, and to Damascus in four hours. With this level of maneuverability, the S-400 systems could be deployed in a manner so that all of Syrian airspace East of Ar-Raqqa would be within range of the systems. In addition to the formidable S-400 systems, both Russia and the Syrian Armed Forces have deployed Pantsir S-1 – otherwise known by its NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound – air defense system at the Khemeimim Airbase and other strategic positions. The Pantsir system is designed to protect a small area of land from aircraft, with a limited range of 20km. Currently Russia has deployed two or three systems at the Khemeimim Airbase, but another 36 systems are the inventory of the Syrian Armed Forces and could be protecting strategic locations through-out regime territory. These do not possess the capacity to deny use of large swaths of territory, but they would prevent many NATO aircraft from approaching key regime positions in the advent of a conflict situation. The other important A2/AD system deployed in the region is the Krasukha-S4 electronic warfare system, currently one is though to be stationed at the Khmeimim Airbase in Latakia. This system is capable of jamming radar and other guidance systems used on both aircraft and ballistics, making effective navigation and targeting of nearby assets difficult without visual confirmation. In combination with other air defense systems, the Krasukha-S4 can further deny enemy forces and ballistics effective operational capacity in certain areas.

NATO Capacity for Action

The array of A2/AD systems currently deployed in Syria present an almost insurmountable challenge to the exercise of force by America and Allied nations in large areas of Syria in the advent of a conflict situation. Western dependence upon air power as the primary method of force projection faces a particular threat from Russian forces deployed in Syria, as Russia and pro-regime Syrian forces have constructed a multilayered system of anti-aircraft defenses over practically all non-ISIS areas of the country. The air defense provided by the S-400 systems alone could conceivably destroy any NATO air assets within its range save the F-22 Raptor and B-2 Spirit. The US has drawn out plans for disabling or destroying S-400 systems using strikes from F-22 Raptors or B-2 Spirits, possibly in conjunction with electronic warfare attacks on radar and other targeting equipment using systems like the EA-18G Growler. However, such attacks would be risky and require the deployment of advanced military hardware that might not be readily available for deployment in Syria, meaning that even if the forces could be mustered to successfully disable the S-400 systems there would likely be a delay in doing so, leaving the US unable to safely access certain areas of Syrian airspace for a period of time. Several senior pilots note that the S-400 is the most serious challenge the air force currently faces and that disabling it would be extremely difficult, even with 5^th-generation aircraft, such as the F-22 or B-2. With this comment in mind, there is a sincere chance that the US would be unable to safely access large areas of Syrian airspace without having to deploy ground forces to disable the S-400 air defense systems. Russia has deployed four S-400 systems within the country, adding to the maritime version on the cruiser Moskva, meaning that key areas of regime control around the coast could not be accessed by American or allied aircraft without the destruction of all five systems operating within the country. The situation for aircraft is further complicated by the presence of advanced Russian jet fighters and Pantsir S-1 air defense systems, which provide additional protection for the      S-400 systems and make transit within air space controlled by the Syrian government difficult even ignoring the S-400 systems. Russian deployment of the Krasukha-S4 electronic warfare system presents an additional challenge to US or NATO aircraft operating with Syrian airspace, as the ability of those planes to operate effectively within certain areas of Syrian airspace is greatly diminished. If deployed alongside the S-400 system, the Krasukha-S4 could conceivably disrupt targeting for strikes against the system, making any attempt to destroy or disable the   S-400 system even more difficult. Due to the extreme and acknowledged difficultly of destroying or disabling the S-400 systems, there is a significant chance that within hours of a conflict situation, all Syrian airspace West of Ar-Raqqa could be effectively closed to American and NATO aircraft. 

Currently the Russian naval force deployed in the Mediterranean has some capacity to limit American and NATO access to areas of the Syrian coast, but difficulties with logistics and the overwhelming power of Western navies means that this A2/AD capacity is unlikely to be a significant deterrent to American or NATO forces wishing to operating near the Syrian coast. Currently the guided Slava-class cruiser Moskva, the Kashin-class destroyer Smetlivy, and the Krivak-class frigates Pytlivy and Ladny are stationed at the Russian Naval Base in Taurus. Additionally, at least one Kilo-class submarine is active in the Mediterranean, although more could certain be in that area. All of these craft have significant capabilities in ship-to-ship warfare, however, they are vastly outnumbered by vessels of similar or higher ability in the surrounding area, as the Mediterranean is surrounded by NATO member states with significant naval capabilities. If naval operations along the Syrian coast became of tactical importance to America or NATO, Russia likely could not provide an effective deterrence to such action. In the advent of such a scenario, Russian logistics would also be challenged to continue supplying their forces, as current supply lines run through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and could be closed by the Turkish naval. Moreover, unlike the situation in Syrian airspace where Russian deployment have effectively forced NATO to stop operations in certain areas due to the threat posed by Russian air defense systems, the Russian naval deployment in Syria has been ordered to cooperate with French and allied vessels nearby, meaning that the naval area of operations is not presently restricted by the Russian presence.

— Eunice Noh, January 2016