Notes on Chinese Base in Djibouti

 Agence Djiboutienne de Développement Social, “Eclairages publics en panneaux solaires – Des visites de terrain [Public lighting with solar panels - Field visits]”, (November 20, 2013). http://www.adds.dj/eclairages-publics-en-panneaux-solaires-des-visites-de-terrain-1949.html

• China donated new solar powered public lighting to Djibouti. The Chinese ambassador, Fu Huaqiang, was present and congratulated on the donation and Chinese developmental aid in all fields.
• This follows previous donations on the part of China in 2012, where the government received additional photovoltaic lighting for use in the capital.

Agence Djiboutienne de Développement Social, “Mairie de Djibouti/Ambassade de Chine: Des éclairages publics en panneaux solaires [Mayor of Djibouti / Embassy of China: public lighting with solar panels]”, (November 19, 2013). http://www.adds.dj/mairie-de-djiboutiambassade-de-chine-des-eclairages-publics-en-panneaux-solaires-1952.html

• China donated a number of photovoltaic lights for use in the capital and the city of Balbala. Present at the ceremony were several prominent mayors, the Chinese ambassador, and the head of the Djibouti Social Development Agency (ADDS).
• The Chinese Ambassador ties this gift in with other examples of Sino-Djiboutian cooperation, including: The Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, water supply infrastructure, and renovation of major ports.

Conseil Régional de Obock, “Investissement étranger: Touchroad signe un mémorandum d’entente avec Djibouti [Foreign investment: Touchroad signed a memorandum of understanding with Djibouti]”, (January 28, 2014). http://www.region-obock.dj/investissement-etranger-touchroad-signe-un-memorandum-dentente-avec-djibouti-704.html

• Touchroad, a private Chinese firm with strong roots in Africa, has decided to create regional headquarters in Djibouti to run all of their many East African operations.
• He was received at the Republican Palace by the Prime Ministry and President.
• Touchroad is also the company responsible for creating the new shipyard in Obock.
• Djiboutian press states that: “Ce mémorandum d’entente avec cet important investisseur chinois illustre parfaitement l’excellence des relations entre la République de Djibouti et la République populaire de Chine, un pays qui, depuis plusieurs années déjà, accompagne notre pays dans sa marche vers le développement”. [This memorandum of understanding with this important Chinese investor perfectly illustrates the excellent relations between the Republic of Djibouti and the People's Republic of China, a country that for many years, accompanies our country in its march towards development].

Lu Rucai, “He Liehui: My Home in Africa”, China Today, (August 26, 2013). http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/zhuanti/2013-08/26/content_563210.htm

• Mr. He is a pretty cool guy. He seems to understand many of the grievances between Africans and Chinese companies and has tried to address them in his policy.
• He encourages the employment of native workers before those of Chinese and actively tries to encourage employment and skill transfer in the areas in which he works. He even employs African administrators!

Conseil Régional de Obock, “Djibouti-Chine : Le président de la CCECC en visite à Djibouti [China-Djibouti: President of CCECC visiting Djibouti]”, (January 19, 2015). http://www.region-obock.dj/djibouti-chine-le-president-de-la-ccecc-en-visite-a-djibouti-862.html

• The President of the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) visited Djibouti to discuss the new railroad his company is responsible for and place the headstones of two new airports that his company constructed.
• He was joined by the Minister of Transport, and the Director of the Djiboutian Railway Society.
• The CCECC is responsible for constructed the new Addis Ababa-Djibouti City railway, the new Hassan Gouled Aptidon de Bicidley Airport, and the new Ahmed Dini Ahmed de Syan airport.

Banque Centrale de Djibouti, “Signature d’une convention de financement de 339 millions de dollars US entre Djibouti et l’Exim Bank de Chine [A financing agreement of US $ 339 million between Djibouti and Exim Bank of China was signed]”, (September 11, 2013). http://www.banque-centrale.dj/presses/197?rubrique=10

• A $339 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China is funding a water supply project between Ethiopia and Djibouti.
• The signing ceremony took place between the Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Agriculture, the Chinese Ambassador, and the Deputy Director of the Exim Bank.
• This project will increase the supply of water in Djibouti from 20,000 to 100,000 cubic meters.
• The Exim Bank of China has apparently concluded four other projects in Djibouti, totally an investment of over $3 billion.

Banque Centrale de Djibouti, “Le port de Djibouti signe un protocole d’entente avec Sinotrans [The port of Djibouti signed a memorandum of agreement with Sinotrans]”, (November 17, 2014). http://www.banque-centrale.dj/presses/335?rubrique=10

• A memorandum of understanding has been signed between the Port of Djibouti Port Authority and a consortium of Chinese companies concerning efficient use of infrastructure and providing logistics services.
• Present where officials from the Port of Djibouti, SinoTrans, China Merchant Holdings International, and China Investment Corporation.
• The press statement uses the term “gagnant-gagnant” [win-win] on numerous occasions, demonstrating the influence of Chinese government rhetoric on Sino-Djibouti relations.

Conseil Régional d’Ali Sabieh, “Electrification de la nouvelle ligne ferroviaire Djibouti-Addis : EDD et Shanghai Electric prennent des engagements forts [Electrification of the new railway line Djibouti-Addis: Shanghai Electric and EDD take strong commitments]”, (28 December, 2014). http://www.region-alisabieh.dj/electrification-de-la-nouvelle-ligne-ferroviaire-djibouti-addis-edd-et-shanghai-electric-prennent-des-engagements-forts-796.html

• An agreement has been signed making Shanghai Electric responsible for the electrification of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway on the Djiboutian side. The total cost of the contract is $24 million.
• The signing was attended by the CEO of Shanghai Electric, Minister of Energy, Minister of Transport, and Minister of the Economy and Finance.
• China has become the single-largest trading and economic partner for Djibouti. Most development and construction projects are now financed by the Chinese. 

Conseil Régional d’Ali Sabieh, “Lancement des travaux de mise en œuvre du projet transfrontalier d’approvisionnement en eau : Hadagala ou le château d’eau de Djibouti [Launch of the implementation work of the cross-border water supply project: Hadagala, the water tower of Djibouti]”, (23 March, 2015). http://www.region-alisabieh.dj/lancement-des-travaux-de-mise-en-oeuvre-du-projet-transfrontalier-dapprovisionnement-en-eau-hadagala-ou-le-chateau-deau-de-djibouti-810.html

• Grand opening of a new water supply pipeline between the water-rich Hadagala in Ethiopia and Southern Djibouti, including the capital. This will supply 100,000 cubic meters of water per day to dry Djibouti and end the constant specter of thirst.
• The ceremony was attended by the President, the First Lady, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the Chinese Ambassador, the Ethiopian Ambassador, the Ethiopian Minister of Finance, a representative of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, the CEO of a major Ethiopian sugar company, and the CEO of the CGC Overseas Construction Group (CGCOC), and various government ministers.
• Of the three speeches quoted in the official government statement, they came from the President, the Minister of Agriculture, and the CEO of CGCOC.
• The fact that Djibouti is totally dependent of Ethiopia for this project is emphasized by the speakers as a voluntary show of the trust and brotherhood between the nations.
• The pipeline is being constructed by a Chinese firm, CGCOC, and is being financed by the China Exim Bank.
• The CEO of CGCOC has promised that his company is committed to Djibouti and Africa and is also going to constructing a road network from Dire Dawa to Dawanleh and from Dawanleh to Djibouti City.
• The President of Djibouti thanks both Ethiopia and China in his speech and make reference to China’s reliability as a partner.

Conseil Régional de Tadjourah, “Santé : Une décentralisation des services hospitaliers au nord [Health: A decentralization of hospital services in the North]”, (15 September, 2014). http://www.region-tadjourah.dj/sante-une-decentralisation-des-services-hospitaliers-au-nord-852.html

• China has promised to build a new hospital in Tadjourah, with full facilities and a 100-bed capacity. This will only be the second hospital outside of the capital.
• The statement was given at a meeting between the Minister of Health, the economic attache of the Chinese Embassy, and a team of Chinese civil engineers.

Aaron Maasho,“Ethiopia signs Djibouti railway deal with China”, Reuters, (17 December, 2011).  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/17/ethiopia-railway-idUSL6E7NH07M20111217#bp1pPUsevpJFMfhv.97

• The China Exim Bank, Development Bank of China, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China are funding the construction of a railway from Djibouti City to Addis Ababa. The construction for the project is the responsibility of CCECC and the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC).
• This project is extremely important to both nations, as 70% of all trade exported through the Port of Djibouti comes from Ethiopia. Ethiopia is similarly dependent of Djibouti as a means of import and export.

RTD, “Signature d’un accord de coopération militaire entre le chef d’état-major de l’armée Populaire de Libération de la Chine et le commandant de chef des Forces Armées Djiboutiennes [Signing of a military cooperation agreement between the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China and the Chief Commander of Djiboutian Armed Forces]”, RTD, (November 8, 2015). http://www.rtd.dj/index.php/politique/638-signature-d-un-accord-de-cooperation-militaire-entre-le-chef-d-etat-major-de-l-armee-populaire-de-liberation-de-la-chine-et-le-commandant-de-chef-des-forces-armees-djiboutiennes

• The Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Fang Fenghui, met to consolidate military bonds and cooperation with key officials in Djibouti.
• At the meeting was the Minister of Defense, the Commander of the Armed Forces of Djibouti, Chief of Staff for Defense Forces, Chief of Staff of Gendarmerie, Chief of Republican Guard, Director of the National Police, and several other high-ranking Djibouti military figures.
• They signed an official agreement of some sort looking at further cooperation on regional issues and security threats. During the meeting, General Fang received the title ‘Commander of the National Order’.

RTD, “Le président Guelleh reçoit le chef d’état-major de l’armée Populaire de Libération de la Chine [President Guelleh receives Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army of China]”, RTD, (2015). http://www.rtd.dj/index.php/16-activites-presidentielles/640-le-president-guelleh-recoit-le-chef-d-etat-major-de-l-armee-populaire-de-liberation-de-la-chine

• In addition to being Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, General Fang is also a member of the Military Commission of the Communist Party.
• General Fang met with the President and discussed topics including possibilities for increased military cooperation between China and Djibouti.
• Also at the meeting was General of the PLA-AF, General de corps Zhang Jianping, Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng Chief of Staff of the Chinese navy, the Director General of Information, General Chen Guangjun, Head of Infrastructure Division, Deputy Director of the Operation Department, Head of the Foreign Office Ministry of Defense and several senior members of the Liberation Army of China. Also that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf M. and the Chinese ambassador in Djibouti, Mr. Fu Huaqiang.

État-Major des Armées, “Visite à djibouti du chef d'état major chinois [A visit to Djibouti from the Chinese Chief of Staff]”, (November 9, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/visite-a-djibouti-du-chef-detat-major-chinois/

• During a 48-hour visit to Djibouti, a large Chinese delegation met with a number of important persons concerning military cooperation between China and Djibouti. 
• The Chinese delegation consisted of Deputy commander of the Chinese Air Force, Zhang Jianping, Vice Admiral of the Navy, Qiu Yanpeng, Head of State -Major the Chinese Navy, and other generals like General Director of Information, General Chen Guangjun, the head of the Infrastructure Division, the Deputy Director of the Operation Department, the Bureau Chief of Foreign Affairs the Ministry of Defence and other senior military representatives of important departments of the hierarchy of the People's Liberation Army of China.
• The Chinese delegation met first with General Zakaria Cheik Ibrahim, the Chief of General Staff of the Djiboutian Army, the Chinese Ambassador to Djibouti, General Osman Nour Soubagleh, Head of Staff of Defence, General Hassan Ali Kamil, CEMGA adviser, General Mohamed Taher Ali, Deputy Chief of Staff of Defense.

The Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie, Colonel Zakaria Hassan Aden, Commander of the Republican Guard, Colonel Mohamed Djama Doulaeh, the acting director of the National Police, Colonel Abdurahman, and other senior members of the Djiboutian Army.

• The Chinese delegation then met with the Minster of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
• The visit culminated in a meeting between the Chinese delegation and the President of Djibouti.

defenseWeb, “Djibouti displays Chinese tank destroyer for the first time”, (June 30, 2015). http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39716:djibouti-displays-chinese-tank-destroyer-for-the-first-time&catid=50:Land

Jeremy Binnie, “Djibouti parades Chinese tank destroyer”, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, (June 28, 2015). http://www.janes.com/article/52608/djibouti-parades-chinese-tank-destroyer

Oscar Nkala, “Djibouti Air Force receives MA60”, (June 25, 2014). http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35222:djibouti-air-force-receives-ma60&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

• At a military parade commemorating independence, Armed Forces of Djibouti displayed a new Norinco WMA301 tank destroyer acquired from China.
• Considering the vehicle’s current service in Chad and Nigeria against Boko Haram, it could be deployed in Somalia or as protection against Eritrean forces.
• In 2014, Djibouti received a Xi’an Aircraft Corporation MA60 transport aircraft from China for use in peacekeeping operations.
• Chinese officials distanced themselves from comments made in 2009 by a rear admiral, Wu Shengli, urging the nation to set up navy supply bases overseas for the anti-piracy fight. Wu is now China's naval chief, demonstrating the growing influence of these thoughts.

Republic of Djibouti, The President of the Republic, “Loi N°40/AN/14/7ème L portant approbation de l'accord de prêt signé entre la République de Djibouti et la Banque Export-Import de la République Populaire de Chine pour le financement du projet de construction des infrastructures d'adduction d'eau extraterritoriales [Act No. 40/AN/14/7th L approving the loan agreement signed between the Republic of Djibouti and the Export-Import Bank of the People’s Republic of China for financing the construction project of supply infrastructures for offshore water]”, (Djibouti: President of the Republic, 2014). http://www.presidence.dj/texte.php?ID=40&ID2=2014-02-06&ID3=Loi

• This law recognizes the contract between the China Exim Bank and the Republic of Djibouti for the construction of water supply infrastructure between Djibouti and the Shinile region of Ethiopia.
• The total loan is $332,050,000 USD, given to Djibouti for 20 years, with a 7 year grace period, with an annual interest rate of 2%, plus 0.5% management fee to be paid in total to the China Exim Bank.

Republic of Djibouti, The President of the Republic, “Arrêté n°2001-0909/PR/MEN accordant un complément de bourse aux étudiants poursuivant leurs études en Chine [Order No. 2001-0909/ PR/MEN granting an additional scholarship to students studying in China]”, (Djibouti: President of the Republic, 2001). http://www.presidence.dj/texte.php?ID=2001-0909&ID2=2001-12-11&ID3=Arr%EAt%E9

• This executive order establishes a special fund for Djiboutian students studying in China, indicating that educational cooperation is of interest to the Djiboutian government.

Ouyang, “Djiboutian President meets with PLA chief of general staff”, China Military News, (November 9, 2015). http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-11/09/content_6761210.htm

• The Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Fang, met with the President of Djibouti, Ismail Guelleh.
• The full delegation of meeting included talks between Foreign Minister Yusuf, Defense Minister Hassan, General Zakaria, chief of staff of the Djibouti Armed Forces, and Chinese Ambassador to Djibouti Fu Huaqiang, the PLA Air Force Deputy Commander Zhang Jianping and Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy Qiu Yanpeng.
• China specifically appreciates Djiboutian adherence to the One-China principle and support for Chinese integrity in Tibet and Xinjiang.
• Chinese forces have used the Port of Djibouti previously for resupply during escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Coast, as well as for evacuating Chinese citizens from Yemen earlier in 2015.

Infinity Cargo Express Limited, “China Merchants buys control of Djibouti's Red Sea container terminal”, (2013). http://www.infinitycargo.com/index.php/en/careers/104-news-and-events/news/641-china-merchants-buys-control-of-djiboutis-red-sea-container-terminal

• China Merchant Holdings International has announced that it has purchased a 23.5% share of the Port of Djibouti from DP World for the price of $185 million.
• This purchase includes a 2/3 stake in the port’s Doraleh container storage. This storage facility has an annual capacity of 1.2 million TEU, and claims to be the most advanced in East Africa.
• The CEO of China Merchant Holdings has said that “This acquisition, together with earlier investments in west Africa - in Lagos and Lome - strengthens the group's position in the increasingly affluent African market. It is also consistent with the group's long-term development strategy to gradually roll out its international footprint”.

Capital, “Chinese company to construct oil, gas pipeline stretching from Ethiopia to Djibouti”, (January 14, 2014). http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3925:chinese-company-to-construct-oil-gas-pipeline-stretching-from-ethiopia-to-djibouti-&catid=54:news&Itemid=27

• GLC Poly Petroleum has signed a deal in 2013 to extract gas from Ethiopia’s Ogaden Region. It has recently confirmed that this gas, and any oil reserves developed later, will be transported by pipeline to the Port of Djibouti.
• Some Djiboutian sources has informed the newspaper that GLC Poly Petroleum has also planned to build a liquification plant, gas refinery, and storage facilities in Djibouti.

Adualem Sisay, “Djibouti embarks on $9.8 billion mega projects”, (December 10, 2014). http://www.africareview.com/News/Djibouti-embarks-on-mega-projects/-/979180/2551052/-/8bom5jz/-/index.html

• With Chinese assistance Djibouti is embarking on a series of 14 ‘mega-projects’ totaling $9.8 billion USD in investment, more than six-time the nation’s GDP!
• Djibouti is currently constructing four $804 million USD ports. One multipurpose, one for livestock, one for potash, and one for industrial salt.
• As of this article, December 2014, the Djiboutian government has received 58% of the funding required for the fourteen projects.
• The funding is mainly from China Exim Bank, China Merchant Holdings, and other investors in the country.
• The other mega projects include new airports, national shipping company and an airline, crude oil terminal, development of business districts and $3 billion natural gas refinery.
• Most of Ethiopia’s exports and imports arrive through the Port of Djibouti, and the government believes that it could capitalize on this and provide export-import services for South Sudan and other countries in that region.

Conseil Régional de Tadjourah, “Djibouti-France – L’ambassadeur Mucetti participe à l’inauguration de la pêcherie de Tadjourah [Djibouti-France - Ambassador Mucetti attended the inauguration of the fishery of  Tadjourah]”, (October 21, 2015). http://www.region-tadjourah.dj/djibouti-france-lambassadeur-mucetti-participe-a-linauguration-de-la-pecherie-de-tadjourah-985.html

• The French military forces in Djibouti renovated a fishery in Tadjourah, rehabilitating premises and adding new equipment – including an ice machine.
• Government statements indicates that, “Cette action, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre des activités civilo-militaires n’est pas la première du genre” [This action, which is part of civil-military activities is not the first of its kind].

EU Navfor, “EU Naval Force Officer Lieutenant Commander De Saint Sernin Is Honoured By Djiboutian Prime Minister”, (April 23, 2013). http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-officer-lieutenant-commander-de-saint-sernin-is-honoured-by-djiboutian-prime-minister/

• Lt. Commander Sernin is given the rank of the National Order for his service to Djibouti and in particular its coast guards during his time in Operation Atalanta – the EU anti-piracy mission of the East African coast.

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Public Affairs, “Navy Surgeon General Receives Djibouti's Highest Honor for Navy Medical Research”, (November 15, 2010). http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=57205

• Vice Admiral Adam Robinson receives the rank of the National Order for his work to enhance capacity to detect infectious disease within Djibouti.

État-Major des Armées, “FFDJ-FAD: Mission Beldweyne”, (February 23, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/ffdj-fad-mission-beldweyne/

• French forces in Djibouti provide the air transport and logistics support to ferry Djiboutian soldiers to and from their peacekeeping base in Somalia.
• This action is part of a much larger cooperation between France and Djibouti, where the two countries regularly train and exercise together. This training is one of the main activities of the French base in Djibouti.
• The cooperation exists in the context of a military cooperation agreement signed in 2011.

État-Major des Armées, “FFDJ: visite du sémaphore rénové de maskali [FFDJ: visit to the renovated semaphore Maskali]”, (June 28, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/ffdj-visite-du-semaphore-renove-de-maskali/

• The Djibouti coast is surveyed by three semaphore towers on strategic locations. These towers were build by the French between 2001 and 2009. The French have also finished repairing and upgrading one of these towers.
• Effectively all maritime surveillance activities on the Djiboutian coast are facilitated by French construction and investment.
• The new facility was official visited by Mr. Mucceti, the French Ambassador, Commodore Montocchio, the head of FFDJ, the head of the Djibouti Navy, and the head of the Djibouti Coastguard.

État-Major des Armées, “Le commandant Daher Hassan prend les rênes [The commander Hassan Daher takes the reins]”, (March 23, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/camp-cheick-osman-des-fad-le-commandant-daher-hassan-prend-les-renes-2/

• The new commander of Camp Sheikh Osman, Com. Hassan, received training in both France and the US. This demonstrates some sort of advantage for Djibouti through cooperation in terms of officer training opportunities.

État-Major des Armées, “Force armée djiboutienne forces US [Djiboutian Armed Forces-US Forces]”, (September 13, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/force-armee-djiboutienne-forces-us-2/

• 103 Djiboutian soldiers participated in a 5-month long logistics management training course organized by US Forces in Djibouti.
• The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ibrahim, noted that the engineer corps in particular has always received US assistance and this is all part of a larger system of military cooperation.
• The US military has donated over $9 million of equipment to the Armed Forces of Djibouti.
• The stated purposes of this transfer is to help the Armed Forces of Djibouti better tackle terrorist threats and better combat Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

État-Major des Armées, “Force armée djiboutienne-forces américaines [Djiboutian armed forces-American forces]”, (June 9, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/fadforces-americaines-le-commandant-de-la-garde-nationale-du-kentucky-en-visite-a-lamia-3/

• The Commander of the Kentucky National Guard, Maj. Gen. Edward Tonini, visited the main training facility for military and law-enforcement officers in Djibouti to inspect the join facilities in light of upcoming cooperation.
• He gave speeches and interacted with recruits at the facility, and met with the head of the training facility.

État-Major des Armées, “FAD/force US: signature d'un partenariat étatique [ADF / US forces: signature of a partnership agreement]”, (June 16, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/fad-force-us-signature-dun-partenariat-etatique/

• The Armed Forces of Djibouti and the Kentucky National Guard signed an agreement of cooperation, by which they will train together and build capacity. This will especially focus on training the Djiboutian forces on disaster response, which the National Guard is highly experienced in.
• This initiative began in 2014, with a meeting between President Obama and President Guelleh. Djibouti will be the 11^th African state to take part in this partnering program.
• American-Djiboutian cooperation is framed in terms of the war on terror, to which Djibouti claims to be a strong ally.

État-Major des Armées, “Le mot du ministre de la defense [A message from the Minister of Defense]”, (June 27, 2015). http://www.armeedjibouti.dj/le-mot-ministre-de-la-defense/

• The following is the Independence Day address of the Minister of Defense to the people of Djibouti.
• The Minister makes three main points on security in the Republic of Djibouti: the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and CAR, the border situation with Eritrea, and increased cooperation with American forces.
• Djibouti and the US have started a major annual bilateral summit, which had its first meeting in 2015. The meeting was between the US Secretary of Defense and the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Economy from Djibouti.
• This demonstrates a mainly military focus to the American relationship with Djibouti.
• Djibouti now believes that this relationship will involve an expansion of training with American forces and increased access to military equipment.
• The agreement with the Kentucky National Guard is part of this, although the Djiboutian government expresses hope that it will also led to cultural exchanges and academic transfers between hospitals.

Joseph Giogorno,“U.S. donation of patrol boats beefs up Djibouti’s navy”, Stars and Stripes, (June 16, 2006). http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-donation-of-patrol-boats-beefs-up-djibouti-s-navy-1.50402

• The US has donated five new 44-foot long patrol boats to the Djiboutian Navy. They nearly double the size of the fleet and vastly increase its capabilities.
• These are the only extended-range craft of the Djiboutian forces, with a range of ~350 miles offshore. Previously Djibouti had only colonial-era craft for harbor patrols.
• The craft should allow for Djibouti to effectively patrol the Gulf of Aden within its territorial waters and deal with criminal activities and piracy in a way it previously could not do.
• The US military is also helping to build pier facilities in Obock, allowing for a base on the Northern coast and direct access to the Bab al-Mandab.

Daily Sabah, “Turkey, Djibouti sign defense cooperation deal”, Daily Sabah, (June 12, 2014). http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/06/12/turkey-djibouti-sign-defense-cooperation-deal

• The Turkish Defense Minister and the Djiboutian Defense Minister met to discuss cooperation between their nations in East African security.
• It was also indicated that this deal would include Turkish equipment being supplied to the Djiboutian armed forces, as the deal primarily benefits Turkish military contractors.

“Djibouti Armed Forces receives 26 donated Land Cruisers”, (January 15, 2014). http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33205:djibouti-armed-forces-receive-26-donated-land-cruisers&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105

• The Armed Forces of Djibouti have received a donation of 14 Land Cruisers and 12 Pick-up Trucks from the US government to assist in logistics in their mission against Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
• Djibouti has been the recipient of American assistance before, as in 2013 they received two Metal Shark 28 Defiant high-speed aluminum coastal security boats for patrolling coastal waters for piracy and smuggling.

Office of the Spokesperson of the U.S. State Department, “U.S. and Djibouti Launch Binational Forum of Cooperation”, (March 2, 2015). http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238107.htm

• This celebrates the first high-level talks between officials from Djibouti and America following their inauguration in a meeting between Presidents in 2014.
• The meeting primarily discussed the importance of increased military cooperation, including Djiboutian actions against Al-Shabaab, the new program between the Djiboutian military and the Kentucky National Guard, and the importance of the US military base in that country.
• This meeting announced the implementation of the ‘Djibouti First’ program, which will give Djiboutian companies preference in goods and services contracts at Camp Lemonnier and other US bases.
• There was another meeting on four key areas of economic cooperation in US aid to energy, education, and workforce development,
• The Forum included high level officials from several government agencies, including on the U.S. side: the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the National Security Council. The Djiboutian delegation included the following high level officials: H.E. Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; H.E. Hassan D. Houffaneh, the Minister of Defense; H.E. Ilyas M. Dawaleh, Minister of Economy and Finance; H.E. Roble Olhaye, the Djiboutian Ambassador to the United States; Mr. Aboubaker Hadi, the President of Djibouti Ports and Free Zone Authority; Mr. Youssouf M. Dawaleh, the President of the Djiboutian Chamber of Commerce; Secretary General Haroun Omar Aden of the Ministry of Education and Professional Training; Secretary General Hibo Osman Ahmed of the Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Mohamed-kadar A. Guedi, Director of Taxation, Ministry of Budget; and Lt. Colonel Fouad Waiss of the Djiboutian Armed Forces.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Deputy Secretary Bob Work's Visit to Djibouti and Qatar”, (November 27, 2015). http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/631420/readout-of-deputy-secretary-bob-works-visit-to-djibouti-and-qatar

• Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, visited Camp Lemonneir in Djibouti to thank service members for their dedication during Thanksgiving. 
• He stressed the importance of the task-force’s mission to provide regional support in the fight against Al-Shabaab.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's meeting with Djiboutian Ministers” (February 25, 2015). http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605399/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-ash-carters-meeting-with-djiboutian-ministers

U.S. Department of Defense News, “Carter Meets at Pentagon With Senior Leaders From Djibouti”, (February 26, 2015). http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604174/carter-meets-at-pentagon-with-senior-leaders-from-djibouti

• The Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, met today with Djibouti Minister of Defense Hassan Darar Houffaneh, Foreign Minister Mahmood Ali Youssouf, and other senior Djiboutian officials at the Pentagon.
• In a 30-minute meeting they discussed military cooperation and counter-terrorism operations. The Djiboutian dedication to combating Al-Shabaab was especially lauded.

Nathan Maysonet, “Djibouti, Kentucky National Guard sign historic partnership agreement for East Africa”, (June 4, 2015). http://kentuckyguard.com/djibouti-kentucky-national-guard-sign-historic-partnership-agreement-for-east-africa/

• The Chief of Defense of Djibouti said that he hopes this agreement between the Armed Forces of Djibouti and the Kentucky National Guard, itself a result of bilateral meetings, will start a, ‘considerable expansion of our defense and security cooperation’.
• The Djiboutian Armed Forces already have a strong relationship with the personnel at the CJTF-Horn of Africa mission in Camp Lemonneir, and this should expand on that cooperation.
• Both parties hope that there can also be a civilian relationship between the nations, with civil society groups and universities in Djibouti and Kentucky becoming more involved.
• The Kentucky National Guard should be able not only to help train Djiboutian soldiers in military activities, but also provide instruction to police and firefighter in how to dealing with disasters and emergency situations.
• The partnership would also allow for Kentucky state funds to be used for military and security operations in Djibouti, providing another source of potential funds.

Kirk Hilbrecht, “Kentucky plays host to Djibouti delegation”, (September 23, 2015). http://kentuckyguard.com/kentucky-plays-host-to-djibouti-delegation/

• A large delegation visited Kentucky to celebrate the new partnership between the Armed Forces of Djibouti and the Kentucky National Guard. They essentially gave a tour and visited various National Guard facilities.
• The group included the U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Muhamed Ali Houmed, Djiboutian ministers of health, foreign affairs, chambers of commerce, and the University of Djibouti. The military delegates included chiefs of defense, Air Force, logistics, military education and materiel.

defenseWeb, “Djibouti displays Chinese tank destroyer for the first time”, (June 30, 2015). http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39716:djibouti-displays-chinese-tank-destroyer-for-the-first-time&catid=50:Land

Jeremy Binnie, “Djibouti parades Chinese tank destroyer”, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, (June 28, 2015). http://www.janes.com/article/52608/djibouti-parades-chinese-tank-destroyer

• Djiboutian Armed Forces received 10 155mm M109A1 Howitzers from Italy in 2013, and 12 Force Protection Cougars from the US in 2013.
• The Cougars will serve very well in Somalia or any other desert operation, but the Howitzers seem to have a purely conventional warfare role, possible against any future conflicts with Eritrea.
• Other recent acquisitions by Djibouti include ten RG-33 armoured personnel carriers acquired second hand in 2014, two second hand Shorts-360 transport aircraft acquired from the United States in 2014 and seven Iveco Puma armoured vehicles (armed with Chinese W85 12.7 mm machineguns) delivered second hand from Italy.
• All of these weapons came from America or Western allies. They are all suitable for expanding peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The Italian weapons are also more general usage, potentially securing against Eritrea.

“Djibouti to receive ex-US C-23 cargo aircraft”, (January 7, 2015). http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37448:djibouti-to-receive-ex-us-c-23-cargo-aircraft&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

• Djibouti will receive a donation of two C-23 cargo airplanes after their retirement from the Coast Guard. This is part of a larger donation of the fleet to allied nations including Philippines and Estonia.

Con Coughlin, “China deal threatens only American military base in Africa”, The Telegraph,  (July 21, 2015). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/djibouti/11752759/China-deal-threatens-only-American-military-base-in-Africa.html

• Camp Lemonneir, which hosts 4,500 military personnel and is the main center for coordination for African operation and the fight against Al-Shabaab and AQAP, is extremely important to the American presence in Africa and the Middle East.
• Camp Lemonneir also hosts the majority of American drones needed for counter-terrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia.
• Unnamed Pentagon officials and intelligence officers fear that the expansion of the Chinese navy base and military cooperation between China and Djibouti will “compromise their own [American] intelligence-gathering operations in the country”.
• The belief comes from a fear that American intelligence is too close to Chinese bases and might be at risk of interception.
• The author believes that Djbouti’s lean towards China began following Congress’s criticism of his autocratic regime. 
• China has taken a $185 million stake in the Port of Djibouti, in addition it is now administering the Port of Djibouti, having taken over from DP World.
• China has promised to spend $400 million developing Djibouti’s port facilities.
• An unnamed senior American official has stated that, “There are fears that if President Guelleh gets too close to China then he may be tempted to impose restrictions on US access to the base, which would seriously affect the West’s attempts to collect intelligence on Islamic State and al-Qaeda”.
• The Presidential elections are next year, and there are concerns that the West will not support Mr. Guelleh’s reelection to an unconstitutional third term. This is cited as a possible reason for a pivot towards non-judgemental China.

South China Morning Post, “Chinese military base in Djibouti necessary to protect key trade routes linking Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe”, South China Morning Post, (December 1, 2015). http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1885396/chinese-military-base-djibouti-necessary-protect-key-trade

• China was sold its new naval base in Djibouti as a ‘resupplying station’ for naval vessels participating in anti-piracy operations in East Africa.
• A white paper earlier in 2015 outlined Chinese intentions to become a global maritime power, and this certainly seems to be a step in that direction. It certainly makes a split from the previous approach towards territorial defense.
• There are a number of reasons for China to select Djibouti as a location for its first military base:
• Djibouti is located on the Bab al-Mandab, through which billions of dollars of trade heading to and from China travels, and a key choke-point for oil resources bound for China.
• Djibouti has experience hosting foreign bases, currently home to American, French, and Japanese facilities.
• China has enormous strategic interests in Africa, as far as protecting investments and trade from the continent. Given the importance of this area being protected and free from piracy, the naval base is necessary to Chinese interests.
• The author references the over 1 million Chinese citizens in Africa as a reason for the necessity of an African military base, demonstrating the increased expansion of Chinese interests to include protecting nationals abroad.

Al-Jazeera, “China 'negotiates military base' in Djibouti”, (May 9, 2015). http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/05/150509084913175.html

• China is already funding over $9 billion USD of infrastructure in Djibouti, mainly connecting it to its Ethiopian neighbor.
• President Guelleh said in a press statement that: “France's presence is old, and the Americans found that the position of Djibouti could help in the fight against terrorism in the region. The Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy - and now the Chinese also want to protect their interests, and they are welcome".
• China took over administration of Port of Djibouti in 2014, after the Dubai-based DP World was accused of corruption.
• China first received permission to use the Port of Djibouti for military vessels in February 2014, for resupplying ships carrying-out anti-piracy exercises.
• China aims to install its military base in Obock, on the Northern coast of Djibouti.

allAfrica, “Djibouti and China Sign a Security and Defense Agreement”, (February 27, 2014). http://allafrica.com/stories/201402280055.html

Jeremy Binnie, “Djibouti, China agree ‘strategic partnership”, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, (March 5, 2014). http://www.janes.com/article/34970/djibouti-china-agree-strategic-partnership

• The Chinese Ministry of Defense and the Djiboutian Ministry of Defense signed an agreement under which Chinese troops and vessels are able to use Djiboutian military facilities, including the Port of Djibouti.
• “Defense Minister Houffaneh said that in exchange Djibouti had asked for military co-operation to be expanded in order that the operational capacities of the Djiboutian armed forces could be built up. Minister Houffaneh laid emphasis on building up the capacities of Djibouti's navy, which, he said, lacked patrol boats, and the capacities of the air force which would soon acquire Chinese aircraft. Djibouti also asked for China's "assistance with surveillance, including radar, and more training through the provision of additional places at China's military training centers and colleges in the aviation, maritime, armaments, logistics and engineering sectors.

David Brewster, “China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti likely to be a taste of things to come”, (December 2, 2015). http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/12/02/Chinas-first-overseas-military-base-in-Djibouti-likely-to-be-a-taste-of-things-to-come.aspx

• China has been involved in naval mission to the Indian Ocean since 2008 with 21 task forces totaling 60 vessels, and has consistently encountered logistic issues associated with the distance between China and Africa.
• Now that piracy off the coast of Aden has dwindled to insignificant numbers, it is clear that China is opening up the base to expand other capabilities, namely for military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya or Yemen.
• The deployment of Chinese forces to this region, in particular submarines, shows an interest in building up capabilities to deal with possible future restriction to freedom of navigation between itself and the oil-rich Gulf states.
• Interestingly, China denies the expansion of ‘military bases’, instead using the term bújǐ zhàn 
• [补给站],or ‘supply station’. It also denies allegations of building naval facilties in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
• In fact, China has not deployed an large naval presence in these areas, instead preferring to acquire refueling rights or transit rights in those locations. This requires less commitment and is not as threatening.
• Djibouti was a good choice to host China’s first overseas military base, as it has experience with hosting other facilities and is close to strategic locations. It should also dispel some fears about expansion, because Djibouti is dependent on multiple facilities, not just China.
• The new facilities are rumoured to be based in Obock, on the Northern coast, but these plans are subject to change.
• China has also been looking for other possible locations for military bases in Africa.

Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, “China military in talks for logistics "facilities" in Djibouti”, Reuters, (November 26, 2015). http://www.reuters.com/article/china-djibouti-idUSL3N13L2XH20151126#eGHbSelQPLUqBxGf.97

• The Chinese Foreign Minister has said that the ‘logistics base’ in Djibouti will mainly provide logistics services to resolve issues related to fuelling, rest of troops and food supplies.
• He noted that the new facility will help Chinese forces better participate in UN peacekeeping, provide naval escorts, and provide humanitarian assistance.

Adam Hartman, “Chinese naval base for Walvis”, The Namibian, (January 20, 2015). http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=132572&page=archive-read

• There have been rumors circulating about the possibility of a Chinese naval base in Walvis Bay in Namibia. Such reports have, however, been firmly denied by Chinese and Namibian officials.

Kevin Kelley, “Djibouti Base Could Be Start of U.S.-China Military Rivalry in EA”, The East African, (November 28, 2015). http://allafrica.com/stories/201511290009.html

• Some American officials do not view the expansion of Chinese military involvement in a negative light, as Peter Barlerin, an official in the State Department's Africa Bureau said, “We are quite optimistic about our co-operation and our engagement with China in Africa".
• Despite the State Department’s criticism of Djibouti’s human rights record, the US supplies President Guelleh regime with ample aid and rents.
• The US agreed to a $70 million annual fee for using Camp Lemonneir, and has spend some $250 million on infrastructural improvements in the past few years.
• Chinese involvement in Africa has been increasing economically and security-wise. China is an active participant in anti-piracy operations and recently deployed a peacekeeping force to South Sudan.
• One analyst, J. Peter Pham, noted that the increased operational range of Chinese naval vessels and aircraft in Africa and the Arab Peninsula would not be in the strategic interests of the West.

Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, “China’s Global Maritime Presence: Hard and Soft Dimensions of PLAN Antipiracy Operations,” China Breif vol. 15, no. 9 (2015), pp. 3-7. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43868&cHash=41e27d4081351e4e8e357eb95cce0294#.Vl7469_hDeQ

• There has not been a successful pirate attack off the Horn of Africa since 2012, and the world’s navies may soon begin withdrawing from that region. The EU and USA missions end in 2016, and there are not yet plans for what, if anything, will replace them.
• The anti-piracy missions have been important for China, as they not only helped secure trade between China and the world from piracy, but also gave the PLAN important experience in far-seas operations and logistics lasting up to 6-months.
• To date, over 8,000 ships have received escorts through the area from PLAN vessels.
• From this deployment over 30 warships—half the PLAN’s destroyers, frigates and helicopters; and nearly all its replenishment ships—have thus gained Far Seas experience. China has also used this opportunity to test submarines, which have accompanied anti-piracy missions.
• Anti-piracy operations have given Chinese forces an opportunity to interact and cooperate with dozens of foreign navies, usually through refueling. The PLAN has docked in foreign countries over 120 times in the past seventy-five months, including stops in Djibouti, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. China’s navy has also made return stops to countries including South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates.
• PLAN ships have been stopping mostly at facilities build using Chinese funds, indicating a possibility of these initiatives being part of a development into a true blue-water naval force.
• Although Chinese investment in ports could be explained through commercial incentives, if China were to develop blue-sea naval capabilities, it would be advantageous to have a set of fully-equipped naval bases pre-existing.
• Chinese vessels have also been able to use their positioning and experience to successfully contribute to other security initiatives, such as the evacuation of Chinese nationals – and the citizens of 10 other countries – from Yemen during the coup earlier in 2015.
• A naval base in the area is extremely valuable from a logistics standpoint, as it can take 10 to 14 days for a naval squadron to travel from a base in China to East Africa, making a roundtrip last almost a full month.
• There is a distinct possibility that to preserve the valuable experience and diplomatic benefits of anti-piracy operations, China may begin new efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, where oil wells and shipping have been repeatedly attacked by pirates.
• The actual scope of direct operations will likely be limited by the caution of the Chinese government, and may not result in a full-scale operation. It is more likely to including increased funding, equipping, and training of West African navies.
• Chinese warships have already taken part in training exercises with Nigeria, Cameroon, and Namibia in 2014.
• Sr. Col. Zhou Bo, liaison for task forces 3–17 and now managing the PLA’s non-traditional security portfolio, sees many opportunities for Sino-American cooperation over piracy in the future.
• Any Chinese aid or military assistance in West Africa, or Africa in general, still pales in comparison to the US, which consistently supports and funds all sorts of military initiatives across the continent.
• “As a rising naval power with high ambitions and external expectations, China will presumably look for additional ways to maintain a regular or semi-regular naval security presence in the Far Seas even after the conclusion of Somali antipiracy”.

Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China Retools Its Military With a First Overseas Outpost in Djibouti”, The New York Times, (November 26, 2015). http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/china-military-presence-djibouti-africa.html?_r=1

• China announced that it will be constructing its first overseas military base, breaking a long chain of rhetoric against copying the US strategy of maintaining overseas bases.
• The Foreign Ministry has refrained from referring to the new installation as a military base, only indicating that it would be a permanent establishment for the purpose of resupplying peacekeeping and anti-piracy forces.
• This turn-around in Chinese policy comes at the same time as a dramatic restricting of military command to centralize general staff. This demonstrates President Xi’s desire for the PLA to have new role in global affairs.
• Strategically, Djibouti is in a great position to protect Chinese oil supplies from the Gulf States. China also has strong economic interests there, helped by a compliant government.
• Shen Dingli, an international relations professor at Fudan University, has argued that the US has been expanding its military to protect its interests for 150 years, and now China is only doing the same. 
• Mr. Shen has stressed the importance of navigational freedom to this initiative; saying that “If whoever – pirates, or ISIS, or the U.S. – wants to shut down the passage, we need to be able to reopen it”.
• Some American military experts have expressed concern about the proximity of the new Chinese base to America’s Camp Lemonneir, although Chinese statements seem to indicate that the Chinese base would be much smaller than the sprawling American facility.

Mohamed Osman Farah, “Japan Opens Military Base in Djibouti to Help Combat Piracy” (July 8, 2011): http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-08/japan-opens-military-base-in-djibouti-to-help-combat-piracy

• Japan has announced that it will station 180 soldiers of the MSDF in Djibouti City. They will be staying at Camp Lemonneir, run by the US.
• Admiral Kenichi Kuramoto has noted an increased in the frequency of incidences of piracy as the reason behind opening this facility.

Jeune Afrique, “Total en eaux troubles à Djibouti [Total in troubled waters in Djibouti]”, (February 4, 2015). http://www.jeuneafrique.com/3444/economie/total-en-eaux-troubles-djibouti/

• Total Group, the French petrochemical company, is being sued by the Djiboutian Ministry of the Environment for pollution of the Port of Djibouti and inadequate clean-up causing soil pollution.
• This suit began in 2000 against Total Group, Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon-Mobil, but since then Total Group has bought out the assets of the other firms.
• In December 2014, the Supreme Court of Djibouti demanded that Total Group pay an indemnity of 150 million Euros for the damage they caused, only for the group to claim that they were bankrupt and could not pay the fine.
• The Djiboutian Supreme Court does not believe them, claiming that Total Group transferred funds from the local subsidiary to the parent company since the beginning of the suit to avoid paying fines. The head of the local subsidiary of Total has fled the country.

Paul Chambres, “Djibouti: Obama’s national security gamble”, The Hill, (October 21, 2014). http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/221289-djibouti-obamas-national-security-gamble

• Camp Lemonneir in Djibouti hosts more Predator drones than any site outside of Afghanistan.
• Despite how recently the lease was renewed and the planned $1.2 billion USD upgrade to the facility, the House Committee on Armed Services noted a “lack of clarity on the long-term plan to sustain operations and the infrastructure at this leased location”.
• The basis of Djibouti’s autocratic rule is narrow, as the nation’s two Presidents have not only been from the same powerful ethnic group, but also from the same aristocratic family. This leaves a hollow system without political opposition.
• As he ages, President Guelleh also seems to be becoming increasingly erratic and suspicious. When prominent businessman Abdourahman Boreh declared an intention to run for President in 2011, despite later retracting his nomination, he was accused of organizing a terrorist grenade attack and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
• He has since fled to the UAE, which refuses to extradite him. This resulted in the abrupt cancellation of the Emirati firm DP World’s contract with the Port of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Storage.
• In the recent years, Djibouti has more than quadrupled the rents for use of Camp Lemonneir and associated facilities. This is likely due to a more diversified market of foreign bases.
• After a series of drone malfunctions in September 2013, the government of Djibouti has requested that the US move all drone activity to Chabelley Airfield several kilometers from the capital. This new facility is much less well equipped that the airfield at Camp Lemonneir.

Ghana News Agency, “Djibouti changes course”, (October 21, 2014). http://www.ghananewsagency.org/africa/djibouti-changes-course--81149

• Djibouti’s Minister of Defense has requested that military cooperation between Djibouti and China be expanded and that China help increase the operational capacity of the Djiboutian Armed Forces “in order to safeguard security in the country and help consolidate peace and security in the sub-region”.
• The Chinese have built a multi-million USD library in Djibouti City, as a high-profile cultural investment in the country.
• Talks between the government and opposition parties in Djibouti failed in early October 2014, leading to concerns about the continued stability of President Guelleh’s autocratic government.
• A Nairobi-based analyst, who remains unnamed, expresses deep concern that Chinese influence in Djibouti will be directly counter to the will of the US and the West. He raises concerns that Djibouti is a zero-sum game and that Western militaries and companies will be driven out by the Chinese.
• He even blames the insolvency of Total Group in Djibouti on Chinese encroachment, despite the 15-year suit against that company.

Aaron Kovac, “Is Djibouti a Reliable Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism?”, (October 10, 2014). http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/10/10/djibouti-reliable-partner-terrorism/

• Camp Lemonneir is home not only to conventional combat operations and drone warfare, but also a huge number of surveillance and intelligence operatives key to the Western effort of the War on Terror.
• A doubling in rents for use of Camp Lemonneir and other facilities came after the meeting between President Obama and President Guelleh. It also featured an increase in economic assistance to Djibouti.
• Russia has also tried to negotiate a base in Djibouti, although Moscow’s offers were rejected by the Djiboutian government.
• During a meeting with President Guelleh earlier in 2014, National Security Advisor Susan Rice expressed deep concern about plans for China to construct a aero-naval base in Obock.

Ministére de la Défense, Armée de Terre, “5e régiment interarmes d'outre-mer”, (March 6, 2012). http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/presentation/organisation-des-forces/troupes-de-marine/5e-regiment-interarmes-d-outre-mer

• Contains information pertinent to the location of the French military installations in Djibouti.