Notes on the Relationship Between Hamas and Hizballah

 al-Mughrabi, Nidal. “After Syria fall-out, Hamas ties with Iran restored: Hamas chief”. Reuters, 28 August 2017. [online]Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-hamas-iran/after-syria-fall-out-hamas-ties-with-iran-restored-hamas-chief-idUSKCN1B81KC

• Yehya al Sinwar, the new head of Hamas in Gaza, reported that Iran has again become Hamas’s largest backer in arms and money. It has nromalized relationships with Hamas.
• This financial support had previously been reduced due to Hamas’s refusal to support President Bashar al Assad in Syria. What money was still given to Hamas between 2011 and 2017 was directed to the Qassam Brigades, not Hamas’s political projects.
• Al Sinwar has also invite to Fatah, led by Mahmoud Abbas, to created a unity government for all Palestinian territories, responding to blackouts after Fatah slashed support for electricity in Gaza.
• Fatah has said that they will not removed sanctions on Gaza until Hamas relinquishes control of the city.

 

Zilberfarb, Asaf. “Hamas’ Double Standard on Syria”. Al-Arab, 25 June 2018. [online]. Available at: http://www.themedialine.org/new-from-the-arab-press/hamas-double-standard-on-syria/

• Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas, has described the Syrian government as a “guardian of Palestinian rights”, despite failing to protect Palestinians at the Yarmouk camp from ISIS attack in 2015.
• Hamas’s decision to ally with Iran and Syria has lead to its diplomatic isolation from both the West Bank and the global community at large.

 

Cafiero, Giorgio, and Peter Certo. “Hamas and Hezbollah Agree to Disagree on Syria”. Huffington Post, 31 January 2014 [Updated 2 April 2014]. [online]. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/hamas-and-hezbollah-agree_b_4698024.html

• Hamas and Hizballah are both supported by Iran and Syria and were both created to fight Israel. Its alliance was cemented in the early 1990s, when Hamas’s leadership was forced out by Israel and took up residence in Lebanon.
• Hamas and Hizballah have been supporting different sides of the Syrian Civil war, but have decided to not totally separate. Instead, much of their strategic relationship remains.
• Hizballah and Hamas originally took no formal position on the Syrian conflict in 2011, with Hizballah suggesting peace talks. This suggestion was rescinded, likely under Iranian pressure.
• In December 2011, Hamas decided to move their political bureau from Syria, in which it had been moved in 1999, to Qatar. The official reason was that Hamas had only supported Syria when it was actively fighting Israel, but in February 2012, Ismail Haniyeh announced in Cairo that Hamas supported the struggle of the Syrian people against the Assad government.
• Hizballah send fighters into Syria in Spring 2013 to dislodge Syrian rebels from Qusayr, although the town had been occupied since July 2012.
• A Hamas leader in Egypt criticized Hizballah for this move and demanded that they withdraw and keep their focus on Israel.
• There have been allegations from Hizballah and Syrian loyalists that Hamas assisted the Syrian rebels, including by giving them Iranian tunnelling technology. There are also accusations that Hamas fought against the Assad government in the Yarmouk camp near Damascus.

• Hizballah called out Hamas for abandoning the Syrian government, with Hassam Nasrallah pointing out that in 2006 and 2008, Syria had provided the Palestinians with weapons while the Gulf States did nothing and no longer supported the Palestinian struggle.
• Hizballah and Hamas leaders met in Beirut in Summer 2013 and agreed to continue a strategic relationship. In September 2013, it was announced that ties were also reformed between both groups and Iran.
• This alliance is continued on the basis of common opposition to Israel, which remains a dangerous neighbor for all states.
• Some elements of Hamas urged the leadership to not do anything that would sever ties with Iran. Marwan Issa, a military commander, and Mahmoud al Zahar, urged Khaled Mashal to keep a line open with Iran, likely because most of Hamas’s weapons come from Iran.
• In 2013, a coup toppled the Egyptian government, weakening Hamas’s position as the new military government resealed the border. Moreover, Qatar has been unwilling to provide Hamas with direct military assistance.
•  Hamas has changed its position on Syria because the forces it backs have lost out to Assad, its faction has declining support in the Middle East, and the opposition has become increasingly dominated by radical jihadists.
• As the opposition has become more radical, Hizballah has become a stronger backer of the Assad government. Moreover, even if Hizballah had second thoughts, Iranian pressure would keep the group involved.

 

Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “Hamas and Iran Closest They’ve Been Since Syrian war, Senior Official Says”. The Jerusalem Post, 28 March 2018. [online]. Available at: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-and-Iran-closest-theyve-been-since-Syrian-war-senior-official-says-547353

• Musa Abu Marzouk, a Hamas official, said that relations between Hamas and Iran were the strongest since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011.
• Hamas had been subject to criticism for allying with Shia Iran and by other Palestinian groups for allowing foreign interference in Palestinian affairs.
• Musa Abu Marzouk sought to deflect anger from Hamas supporters by saying that the battle in Syria had been practically won by the Assad government and that Hamas was in need of Iranian military and economic aid since it lacked other allies.
• Iran took President Trump’s decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem as an opportunity to reiterate its support for the Palestinians.
• Qassam Soleimani, a Revolutionary Guards commander, met with both Hamas’s military and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to express Iranian support for the groups’ actions.

 

Fahmy, Omar, and Nidal al-Mughrabi. “Hamas ditches Assad, backs Syrian revolt”. Reuters, 24 February 2012. [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-palestinians/hamas-ditches-assad-backs-syrian-revolt-idUSTRE81N1CC20120224

• Hamas publically turned against President Bashar al Assad on 21 February 2012, endorsing the revolt at a prayers speech in Cairo and a rally in Gaza.
• This comes after a year of tensions, including a recent incident in 2011 when Hamas was refused permission to organize protests in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria.
• Khaled Meshaal and other Hamas political leaders have stayed away from Syria for months prior to the split.
• Hizballah and Hamas were previously allied due to their joint conflicts with Israel. Although, Hamas did not coordinate attacks on Israel in 2006 nor Hizballah in 2008 and 2009.
• Hamas has still tried to maintain some ties with Iran, despite its split on the issue of Syria, as Ismail Haniyeh visited Iran in early February 2012 to shore up ties.

 

Channel 4 News. “Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal on Palestine, Israel and Syria”. YouTube video, 6:27. Posted 30 May 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A67a0a0i4Zc

• Khaled Meshaal said that the demands of the Syrian rebels were legitimate.
• Previously, Khaled Meshaal lived in Damascus for over a decade, only moving to Qatar in 2012.
• Hamas claims that their movement to Doha is not intended to favor sides in the Syrian war nor to be a political statement. Overall, answers like a lily-livered pussy.
• The Emir of Qatar became the first head of state to visit Gaza during a visit in October 2012.
• Khaled Meshaal alleges that he advised the Syrian government in 2011 not to use a military response to the protests, but to accept opposition demands as legitimate.
• Hamas claims that it does not supply the Syrian rebels with arms or financial aid.
• Hamas still receives funding from Iran, or at least it still does in May 2013.

 

Napolitano, Valentina. “Hamas the Syrian Uprising: A Difficult Choice”. Middle East Policy Council, Vol.20, No.3 (2013): 73-85.

• Iran and Hizballah both materially support the Assad government and have soldiers fighting for Assad in the conflict. They justify this intervention on the basis of maintaining the ‘axis of resistance and refusal’ (73).
• Hamas first moved to Syria in 1993, when they opened an office in Damascus alongside other Palestinian groups to oppose the Oslo Accords. They moved their external headquarters to Damascus in 1999 after being expelled from Amman by Jordan (73).
• This arrangement gave Hamas an ally after they were isolated following the Oslo Accords and gave the Syrian government a role in Palestinian struggles, from which it had been largely excluded after the Accords, and thus regional prestige as the defender of the Palestinians (74).
• This was especially important for Syria in 2000 as it allowed Bashar al Assad to cement his authority and Arab nationalist credentials as a new leader (74).
• When Hamas moved its head offices to Damascus, it had to check its rhetoric in the country to avoid repression or being associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (74).
• Hamas was often the group supplying welfare and services to Palestinian camps in Syria, as they had been marginalized by the government since the 1980s and other Palestinian groups like the PLO or Fatah had abandoned them in previous decades (74).
• Hamas’s presence in the camps was mainly for propaganda purposes and to portray itself in a certain light; it did not actively recruit from this refugee population (74).
• Hamas had a neutral and mixed stance to the Syrian Civil war, arguing that the rebel demands were legitimate, while also remaining neutral and trying to remain minimally involved (75).
• This stance was informed by the dependent position of Palestinians in Syria. They both viewed Syria as an important ally and wanted to avoid repercussions for Palestinian refugees there, as had happened when the PLO supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, resulting in the expulsion of 300,000 Palestinians (75).
• Syria tried to force Hamas to pick sides, spreading misinformation and accusations to force it to respond. It particularly tried to spread rumours that Hamas had sided with the Syrian government (76).
• In Summer 2011, Hamas began mending ties with other power. It signed reconciliation accords with Fatah in May 2011 (75). It also reached out to Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan. Qatar hosted a Hamas office, the Morsi government in Egypt loosened restrictions on Gaza and allowed Mousa Abu Marzouk to establish an office there, and Jordan talked with Hamas for the first tme in January 2012 (76).
• Hamas believed that if it supported the Assad government, as Hizballah had done, it risked losing its popular support, ruined possible friendship with Syria after the expected revolution, and alienated all the Arab states that supported the rebels (77).
• Hamas was under popular pressure from Palestinians in Gaza and Syria to support the revolution. In Syria, it was accused of failing to protect Palestinians from the Syrian government (77-78).
• Hamas was criticized by Palestinians in Syria for its initial lack of reaction to Syrian government attacks on refugee camps (82).
• Hamas first began moving towards the rebels in Decemeber 2011, when it declared support for the Syrian people in a report on explosions near the Yarmouk camp. The full break occurred in February 2012, when Ismail Haniyeh announced in Cairo that Hamas had moved from Syria to Egypt, Qatar, and Gaza (78).
• Following this, there were incidents of violence against Hamas members in Syria, including the torture and murder of Kamal Ghannage in June 2012 and the murder of Ahmad Qounita in December 2012 after he was accused of organizing rebel groups (78).
• The sudden victory of the other Arab Spring movements, especially a Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, led Hamas to reorient itself away from Syria and adopt a stance like that of the Brotherhood, its parent organization (78).
• Despite the break with Syria, Hamas still tried to maintain relations with Hizballah and Iran (78). Spectres of disunity were raised, including the expulsion of Hamas from Dahye, in Lebanon, but in July 2013 Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran met to settle the dispute (79).
• Syria actively tried to divide Hamas and Hizballah, releasing statements accusing Hamas of fighting against Hizballah in the county and training rebels (79).
• Palestinian refugee camps are located in the poorest periurban areas of Syria, exactly where the revolution started. This explains why they were targets of early violence (79). Buthaina Shaaban, one of Bashar al Assad’s advisors, blamed the Palestinians for starting protests in Daraa and Latakia (80).
• The Palestinians were never super friendly with the Assad governments, as the Syrian army intervened against the PLO in Lebanon in the 1970s and acted against Palestinians groups there. They were also subject to standard repression like Syrians (79).
• Palestinians camps participated in the Syrian revolution as both sites of protest and recruits for armed groups. They were subject to military reprisals, including the partial destruction of the camp in Daraa, bombardment of the Latakia camp in August 2011, and assault on Homs in February 2012 (80).
• Underground Fatah organizers were arrested in the Yarmouk camp and elsewhere, while in Aleppo there are reports of PLA fighters being killed for refusing to suppress protests alongside the Syrian army (80).
• The situation turned really bad in Yarmouk in July 2012, as security services killed 10 Palestinians while dispersing a protest. Enraged that a public memorial was then organized, the Syrian government attacked the camp shortly afterwards (80-81).
• Palestinian refugees were deeply upset with the complicity of some Palestinian groups in the Syrian repression, and in Summer 2011 PFLPGC offices and personnel were attacked in Yarmouk for their full support of the government (81).

 

El Husseini, Rola. "Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran, and Syria". Third World Quarterly, Vol.31, No.5 (2010): 803-815.

• The predecessor to Hizballah was Harakat al-Mahrumin, the Movement of the Deprived, founded by the Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr in March 1974. Musa al-Sadr had immigrated to Lebanon in the 1950s on the invitation of Shia clerics in Tyre, where he was given a position of prominence among the Islamic community. The movement was an outreach of his broader attempts to mobilize the Shia community of Tyre in the 1960s and 1970s. As Lebanon shifted towards civil war in the mid-1970s, Musa al-Sadr added an armed wing to the Harakat al-Mahrumin in 1975, called the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya [Lebanese Resistance Brigades or AMAL] (806).
• After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a faction of AMAL seceded to establish their own militia to fight against the Israeli occupation. In February 1985, the group named itself Hizballah and published a manifesto. The 1985 manifesto divides the world into oppressors and oppressed, and blames US imperialism as the underlying force supporting the Israeli oppression of Muslim Lebanese (806).
• The Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 left many issues unresolved, including Israeli refusal to return Lebanese POWs, supply Lebanon or Syria with maps showing the location of land mines, or reliquish occupation of a 15-square-mile border area known as Shebaa farms. In response to Israeli intransigence, Hizballah argued that the war was still incomplete and that more violence was needed to force Israel to complete its withdrawal. There was a dispute with the organization after Israeli withdrawal in 2000 about whether to impose imperialism more broadly, to focus more specifically on Israel and Palestine, or to abandon armed struggle. With the blessing of Ayatollah Khamenei, Hizballah elected to continue fighting Israel as a special enemy (808).
• Many other political parties, especially Christians and Sunnis, saw Hizballah's continuation of war against Israel as a political ploy to avoid losing support after the cessation of the war. The claim that the occupation of Shebaa farms justified continued war was seen as weak by many Lebanese audiences (808).
• Despite this dedication to keep the conflict alive in Lebanon, as well as rhetoric calling for the liberation of Jerusalem, Hizballah has taken no real moves towards fighting Israel. Hizballah has not serious attempted to wrest territory from Israel or inflict serious losses on Israel within its own territory (811).
• Conflict between Israel and Hizballah flared up again during the Summer of 2006, when Hizballah kidnapped an Israeli soldier. Israel responded with a massive military retaliation, killing over 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and displacing over 1 million people. The war recatalyzed Lebanese support for Hizballah and between 80% and 90% of Lebanese supported Hizballah's actions during the war, including Sunnis and Christians. Hizballah emerged from the 2006 war with massively increased public support in Lebanon and the admiration of Islamists elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly among Palestinians (808-809).
• Hizballah has a very strong relationship with Iran, ascribing to the idea of wilayat-e faqih created by Ayatollah Khomeini, receiving millions of dollars in funding from Iran, and recognizing the Iranian Supreme Leader as the head of the organization, with all matters that cannot be decided by the party's governing council being referred to the Supreme Leader. Iran has provided military trainers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the 1980s, which was invaluable to making Hizballah an effective fighting force against Israel; this training has continued and as recently as 2007 around 500 Hizballah recruits were sent to Iran for military training (809-810).
• Iran does not directly control Hizballah, although it does exercise a large amount of control over the organization and has been critical in Hizballah's success. Much of Iran's control over the organization is informal and based on the benefits of Iranian patronage and common ideological outlooks among Hizballah leadership and the Iranian government (810).
• Both Hizballah and its predecessors AMAL and Harakat al-Mahrumin recognized Alawites as true Shias and backed the al-Assad government in Syria. Syria's support for Iran during the 1980 Iran-Iraq War cemented ties between Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. Syria's main role in Hizballah has been as important partner in smuggling Iranian weapons and funds to the group and as a mediator between Hizballah and other Shia militias, especially AMAL. Syria and Hizballah do not actually like each other very much, but the al-Assad government views Hizballah's as essential for maintaining legitimacy among Shias and having some control over Lebanese politics, while Hizballah needs Syria to access Iranian smuggling networks (810-811).
• Hizballah has been a consistent supporter of Hamas. This alliance began in the 1990s, when Hizballah trained exiled Hamas members as suicide bombers and arranged their return to Israel. Major Hamas initiatives, like the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, were enabled by Hizballah support, and most Hamas attacks depend on Hizballah assistance in acquiring weapons. This relationship exists because, despite the Shia-Sunni divide, both groups are opposed to Israeli and American influence in the Middle East (811-812).

  

Mohns, Erik, and André Bank. "Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?." Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2012): 25-35.

• In 2011, the Arab world was divided between a prowestern camp of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and an antiwestern camp of Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. Turkey and Qatar played a conciliatory role (25).
• The alliance between Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizballah is called the ‘resistance axis’ or jabhat al-muqawama. It is structured around shared opposition to the current regional order, especially the role of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (26).
• Syria and Iran are not perfect allies and often disagree, over Israel, over Iraq, and, historically, over Lebanon. Their alliance has only become more robust after 2010 (26).
• Syria and Hizballah were united in the 1980s and 1990s because of a common policy on Israel, with Syria supporting Hizballah and Hizballah mostly following Syrian orders. This cooperation continued after the 1989 Taif Agreement, when Syria used its hegemony to secure Hizballah’s continued possession of arms (27).
• Syrian support of Hizballah has allowed the government to shore up its credentials against Israel and portray its control over Hizballah as necessary for stability to Lebanon (28).
• The relationship between Hizballah and Syria has changed since Hizballah’s victory in the 2006 war versus Israel. Hizballah is now largely independent of Syria, as Syria no longer exercises hegemonic control in Lebanon, but still strongly supports the group for that glory (28).
• Syrian support for Hamas and other groups that rejected the 1993 Oslo Accords has gotten it mad cred from antiIsrael groups, including among the Syrian population. Support for Hamas also gives Syria a role in Palestinian affairs (28).
• Hamas remains under tight surveillance in Syria, as it is still an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was never allowed to govern Palestinian refugee camps in Syria (28).
• Hizballah has placed most the Arab Spring revolts as a continuation of the 1979 Islamic Revolution against corrupt and despotic regimes. In Syria, it did not take a strong stance (30).
• Hizballah shifted to full support of the Assad government in Summer 2011 after the conflict started to militarize and some groups started to ask for foreign intervention (30).
• Statements by Hassan Nasralla in February 2012 indicate that he does not believe that there is likely to be a rapid rebel victory in Syria (30).
• Its support for the Syrian government was caused some dissent within Hizballah, who argue that the group should stay true to its social justice roots (30).
• A rebel victory in Syria would likely result in a Sunni Islamist government in Syria, which would be a direct threat to Hizballah’s interests in Lebanon (30).
• President Assad’s fall would also mean Hizballah losing major weapon supply lines, an area of operability, and an important ally against Israel (31).
• The Syrian civil war has already polarized parts of Lebanon, as refugees have clashed inside of Lebanon and parts of Sunni Lebanon have been turned into bases for the Syrian rebels (31).
• In May 2011, the Syrian government pressured Hamas to publically endorse the Syrian government, which they refused to do. They said that their alliance with Syria was against Israel and they would not intervene in Syria’s domestic issues (31).
• Iran was putting increased pressure on Hamas at the same time in late 2011, either halting or reducing financial support for Hamas (32).
• The involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian revolution, as well as previous attacks on Palestinians camps in Latakia, raised concerns among Hamas of their safety in Syria. This led the leadership to leave the country in late 2011, even before they had opened offices elsewhere (32).
• Hamas signed an agreement reconciling with Fatah, apparently under pressure from Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar. With Qatari support, Hamas re-established ties with Jordan in February 2012 (32).
• There is no chance that a revolutionary Syrian government would end Syrian opposition to Israel, as all opposition groups agree that Syria and Israel are enemies as long as the Golan Heights remains occupied (33).

 

Bronner, Ethan. "Tensions rise as Hamas refuses to take sides in Syria." The New York Times, 3 May 2011.

• Hamas was accused of moving to Qatar in early May 2011, although it denied this.
• Senior Hamas official said that, “The Syrian government said to is, whoever is not with us is against us.”
• All Hamas officials mentioned say that Hamas tried to remain neutral as they didn’t want to become involved in Syrian internal affairs.
• Syria values having Hamas in the country because they give the Syrian government legitimacy. This means that the government was angry about the reconciliation with Fatah signed in late April 2011.
• Qatar wants to support Hamas as part of its own struggle against Iran.

 

Mitnick, Joshua. "Hamas Removing Staff from Syria." The Wall Street Journal Eastern Edition, 7 December 2011.

• Under pressure from Turkey and Qatar, Hamas has announced that all of its staff need to depart from Damascus by next week, 14 December. Hamas was apparently shamed by Turkish and Qatari officials in November 2011 for failing to leave Syria.
• Iran had told Hamas not to relocate from Syria throughout 2011.
• Hamas will now have offices in Cairo and Doha.
• Successful reproachment with Egypt and Jordan has given Hamas more freedom to move its members out of Syria. This emigration has been occurring for a number of months.
• Hamas is important to Iran because it gives Iran a tool to attack and challenge Israel. Iran, thus really wants to remain friends with Hamas.
• Over the past months, Hamas had been selling off its business interests and real estate in Syria, as well as closing out its bank accounts.

  

Bradley, Matt, and Charles Levinson. "World News: Hamas Leader Backs Syria Rebels --- Longtime Partner of the Damascus Regime Switches Sides on Egypt Visit; Scrambling of Alliances Cracks 'Resistance Axis." Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2012.

• Hamas announced opposition to Syrian government at al Aqsa mosque in Cairo during the time of the Brotherhood’s control, firmly aligning themselves with the symbols of the Brothers.

 

Coughlin, Con. "Iran Rekindles Relations With Hamas." Wall Street Journal, 22 April 2015.

• Over the past few months of 2015, the Revolution Guards Corps has transferred tens of millions of dollars to Hamas’s military division, the al Kassam Brigades. Kasem Soleimani has also approved an annual budget for Hamas’s military operations.
• These funds are mainly used to help Hamas rebuilt its tunnel networks after they were destroyed by Israel in Summer 2014, and buy new missiles.
• Iran had supplied Hamas with weapons and funds for over a decade prior to 2012. This led to a split between the parties, with Qatar replacing Iran as the group’s patron and promising a billion dollar rebuilding fund in 2014.
• There are tensions with Hamas, especially between Khaled Meshaal, who likes the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military wing of Hamas.
• Iran supports Hamas because it gives them an important ally on the southern border of Israel for their common goal of destroying Israel.

DeAtkine, Norvell B. "Hamas in Transition." American Diplomacy, 21 March 2012.

• Hamas has a good thing going with Iran and it worries that, despite very friendly relations with the Morsi government in Egypt, a split with Iran would result in them being unable to make up the money elsewhere.

 

Smith, Lee. "The Road From Damascus." Tablet Magazine, 29 February 2012.

• Khaled Meshaal left Damascus in January 2012.
• Hamas first established itself in Syria in 2001 after it was thrown out of Jordan in 1999 for trying to undermine the Jordan Israeli peace treaty. It was welcomed by the Assad government, which saw it as a way to boost its Arab nationalist credentials.
• Hamas’s friendship with Syria was based on mutual interests, especially weapons and funding from Syria and Iran. This meant that, since only Qatar offered to support and host Hamas in March 2011, Hamas stayed silent as the Syrian government killed Muslim Brothers and navally bombarded a Palestinian refugee camp in Latakia in August 2011.

 

Tracy, Marc. "Hamas Smartly Departing from Damascus." Tablet Magazine, 21 December 2011.

• Hamas is seeking to relocate its offices elsewhere. Before leaving, Khaled Meshaal sought an audience with Bashar al Assad and was refused.
• Iran ended in funding of Hamas sometime during 2011.
• Khaled Meshaal met with Hassan Nasrallah to urge him to speak sense to Bashar al Assad about compromising. Instead, Hizballah met with Bashar al Assad and established a united front.

 

"Hamas Urges Hezbollah to Retreat from Syria." MEED Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 57, No. 25 (2013): 19.

• On 17 June 2013, Hamas called on Hizballah to withdraw from Syria and refocus on fighting Israel. It said that Hizballah’s presence in Syria would stoke sectarian tensions.
• Hizballah publically announced support for the Syrian government in May 2013.
• Hamas never formally announced that it would cut ties with Iran.

  

Koss, Maren. “Flexible Resistance: How Hezbollah and Hamas Are Mending Ties.” Carnegie Middle East Center, 11 July 2018 [online]. Available at: https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/07/11/flexible-resistance-how-hezbollah-and-hamas-are-mending-ties-pub-76782

• Hizballah and Hamas both appeared in the 1980s as resistance organizations against Israel. Hizballah is an offshoot of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist ideology, while Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
• Hizballah was originally founded to resist Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which finally ended in May 2000. After the withdrawal, Hizballah still maintains legitimacy as a force deterring future Israeli aggression.
• Hizballah joined the Syrian civil war in 2013, a decision that Hassan Nasrallah justified as a fight against Salafi jihadi groups to preserve Lebanon’s stability.
• Hamas was originally founded in 1987, but toned down its rhetoric of resistance in 2006 to appeal to a broader swathe of Palestinians. They changed again after taking military control of Gaza in 2007, at which point their Kassam Brigades claimed to be the guarantee of Gaza against Israel and Fatah.
• Prior to 2011, Hizballah, Hamas, Iran, and Syria all cooperated. Hizballah trained Hamas militants and used its positions to promote Hamas’s perspective on Palestinian issues. Hamas had several offices in southern Beirut. Hizballah had power over Hamas as an important link between Hamas and Iran.
• Iranian support was particularly important to Hamas, which was internationally isolated following the embargo imposed on Gaza after 2006.
• The Kassam Brigades of Hamas were angry over the decision to leave Syria, as it endangered their supply of financial and military aid from Iran.
• The victory of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt caused Hamas to decisively break with Syria, as Hamas assumed that it would be in a much better position with a Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, whom it assumed would supplant its alliance with Syria and Iran.
• Hamas’s strategic calculus changed with the overthrow of the Morsi government in July 2013 and a subsequent crackdown on the Brotherhood. The new Egyptian government closed the Gaza border, making it very difficult for Hamas to sustain themselves economically.
• Hamas had been receiving support from Qatar since at least 2006, and Qatar is Hamas’s second biggest sponsor after Iran. Even with this help, Hamas was under tough conditions in Gaza after July 2013.
• After their split in early 2012, Hamas and Hizballah ended most contact and their leaderships criticized each other. Some low level contact continued.
• These bonds were repaired by early 2017, as leading officials have since met. For example, Hassan Nasrallah and Saleh al Arouri met in Beirut on 31 October 2017.
• Renewing ties with Hizballah has saved Hamas from international isolation and given it access to financing, especially important considering the desolation that exists in Gaza. Hizballah feels that alliance with Hamas gives it enhanced legitimacy and counters the narrative that it is a sectarian Shiite organization.
• Hamas now fears being too reliant on a single partner, and has also tried to improve ties with the UAE and the el Sisi government in Egypt.
• Hamas reconciled with Iran early in 2017 after Yahya Sinwar was elected head of Hamas’s political leadership in Gaza in February 2017. Yahya Sinwar is a hardliner who founded the Kassam Brigades and his personal ties made it earlier for Hamas to reconcile with Iran.
• Other personnel changes have also moved Hamas closer to Iran, as Ismail Haniyeh was elected head of Hamas’s political bureau in May 2017 and Saleh al Arouri was made deputy head; both men, especially Mr. al Arouri, have strong ties with the Kassam Brigades.
• In Summer 2017, Hamas moved their political bureau from Doha to Gaza.
• Iran wanted to repair ties with Hamas because Hamas is a great tool to fuck with Israel and controlling Hamas allows Iran to outmaneuver the Gulf States for influence.
• In June 2017, the Qatar Crisis broke out. Pressured to end support for Hamas, Qatar drastically cut their financial support. This pushed Hamas further towards Iran, and in August 2017, Iran and Hamas officially restored the relationship between their militaries. A Hamas delegation led by Saleh al Arouri went to Tehran on 20 October 2017.

 

Karmon, Ely. "Hamas in Dire Straits." Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2013): 111-126.

• In mid July 2013, a Hamas delegation led by Musa Abu Marzuq met with high ranking Iranian and Hizballah officials in Beirut. A Hamas official, Ahmed Yusuf, said that Hamas viewed Iran as a strategic partner and wanted to restore ties with Iran (111).
• The alliance between Hamas and Iran, Syria, and Hizballah was odd because of both the sectarian divide and the historical enmity between Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood (111).
• Hamas joined the ‘axis of resistance’ in 1992 after Israeli PM Itzhak Rabin expelled 415 of its members, including leadership, to southern Lebanon. This placed Hamas and Hizballah into direct contact and facilitated training and cooperation (111).
• Alliance with Hizballah and Iran was much more valuable following the 1993 Oslo Accords, which placed Fatah in control of the new Palestinian Authority. Hamas decided to reject the Accords and intensify resistance to Israel; alliance with Hizballah and Iran allowed Hamas the resource to start terrorist attacks, including bombings, only months after the Accords (111-112).
• Hamas’s close relations with Hizballah and Iran backfired within Palestine, as it was accused of being a Shia movement during the Second Intifada by Jaysh al Umma, a Salafi group in Gaza (112).
• The fall of the Mubarak government in Egypt in February 2011 presented Hamas with the chance to realign towards the Muslim Brotherhood. This new alliance would allow Hamas to challenge Fatah and Israel, with getting support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (112).
• By December 2011, Hamas had withdrawn its military and leadership from Syria and moved them to Gaza, Egypt, Qatar, and Sudan (112).
•  In October 2012, the Emir of Qatar visited Gaza and increased its aid to the area from $245 million to $400 million.
• Hamas was allowed to open offices in Cairo and the Muslim Brotherhood made several donations to the Gaza government (113), although President Morsi remained mum on the issue of Gaza and Israel (112-113).
• 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed in Sinai by jihadists from Gaza on 5 August 2012, leading Egypt to close the tunnels to Gaza. This triggered large protests against Egypt and Israel in Gaza by the end of September 2012 (113).
• This also exposed an essential tension in the relationship between Hamas and Egypt, as Hamas wanted to encourage jihadists to attack Israel while still ‘cracking down’ to satisfy Egypt (114).
• In November 2012, during the IDF Operation Pillar of Defense, Egyptian PM Hesham Kandil publicly embraced Hamas officials in Gaza. President Morsi then negotiated the peace process, getting a deal more favourable to Palestine (113).
• President Morsi brokered this deal to prevent an Israeli land invasion of Gaza, while still being careful to not provide Hamas with material support or become involved in the conflict (114).
• The Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Sheikh Mohammed Badie, called for a jihad to liberate Jerusalem and hoped that this would influence Egyptian policy in October 2012 (113).
• The relationship between the Brotherhood and Hamas sourced in March 2012, after Ismail Haniyeh blamed Egypt for the power shortages in Gaza because it controlled their fuel supplies (113).
• This realignment cost Hamas, as Iran stopped its military aid to Hamas, which for years had depended on Iran to smuggle heavy weapons to the group through Sinai and Sudan (112).
• Ghazi Hamad, the deputy foreign minister of Hamas, reported in May 2013 that relations with Iran had soured over Syria and that Hamas had lost a lot in military cooperation (112).
• Hamas military officials commented that money could not reply weapons. There was an active opposition to the transitioned authority in Hamas, led by Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Zahar (115).
• Iran warned Hamas to remain committed to confrontation, with Ayatollah Khamenei arguing against reconciliation with Hamas (114).
• Syria and Hizballah claimed that Hamas had trained Syrian rebels to manufacture and use rockets, and even passed on Hizballah combat strategies (114).
• The tension between Hamas and Hizballah were high during 2012 and 2013, with rumours, unfounded, in June 2013 claiming that Ali Baraka, Hamas’s representative in Syria, had been asked to leave Beirut after Musa Abu Marzuq called on Hizballah to withdraw from Syria and focus on Israel (114).
• In Summer 2013, Hizballah ordered Hamas military officials to leave Beirut and suspended all training, supply of weapons, and intelligence sharing (114).
• Despite public accusations that Hamas was behind car bombings in southern Beirut in August 2013 rocket attacks on Dahya in Spring 2013, Hamas and Hizballah allegedly repaired their communications (115-116).
• Hamas tried to actively cultivate relations with Iran beginning in at least mid June 2013, when it specifically did not attend an event in Cairo supporting the Syrian revolution (115).
• The military coup in Egypt on 3 July 2013 shocked Hamas, which was targeted in subsequent crackdowns. The military accused both Hamas and Hizballah of participating in a prison break of Muslim Brothers in 2011, and accused Hamas of training jihadists in build bombs (116).
• Between July and October 2013, the Egyptian military destroyed most of the smuggling tunnels to Gaza, around 90% (116).
• The Egyptian army has said that if northern Sinai continues to experience jihadist violence, the air force will bombard Gaza and target known militants there (117).
• Hamas has been forced into regional isolation. The siege of Gaza was never fully lifted under Morsi and is now more intense under the Egyptian military government (118).
• Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE are all supporting the el Sisi government and do not want to help Hamas any longer (118).
• In September 2013, King Abdullah of Jordan denied Hamas’s request to reopen its Amman office (118).
•  Hamas still received almost of all its funding in cash from Iranian smugglers, and private donors in the Persian Gulf cannot make up the shortfall (116-117).
• Qatar hosts Hamas after 2012, as it did in 1999 before its move to Damascus, and has given it grants and investment, but refuses to finance Hamas’s military operations (118).
• According to Ali Baraka, the Hamas representative in Lebanon, Hamas considers Syria to be a source of power and supporter of the Palestinian struggle. Hamas says it still agrees with Hamas on most issues and only left the country after being forced to pick sides (121).
• Hamas does not have a military presence in Syria and is not fighting in Syria (121).
• Communication with Hizballah never stopped and the Hamas office in Beirut never closed (121).
• Hamas hopes to repair relations and recreate the ‘axis of resistance’, which it hopes can be accomplished after the Syrian crisis ends (121).

 

Hokayem, Emile. “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War.” Adelphi Series, Vol. 54, No. 447–448 (2014): 39–70.

• The breakdown of relations with Hamas has left Iran exposed to claims that it is a sectarian Shia power and reduced its support in the Sunni and Arab world. This has cost Iran power at the expense of Saudi Arabia (57).
•  The fall of the Syrian government would have been very costly for Iran, as it would have simultaneously lost Iran’s strongest Arab ally, leaving it less exposed to criticism as Shia and Persian, and left Hizballah, its greatest ally, isolated (53).
• Iran and Hizballah were most concerned about events in Syria leaving Hizballah isolated and this concentrated on preserving control of key infrastructure in eastern Syria (59). They didn’t care that much about northern or eastern Syria (60).
• In October 2011, Hizballah told Iran that the Assad government have poor chances to win due to large scale defections. Hassan Nasrallah met with Ayatollah Khamenei and told him that Assad would fall, to which the Ayatollah replied that Iran and Hizballah needed to help the Syrian government (54–55).

 

Tuastad, Dag. “Hamas-PLO Relations Before and After the Arab Spring.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013): 86-98.

• Hamas and Fatah both feared that they could be toppled in the Arab Spring, leading them to sign reconciliation agreements in April 2011 in Cairo and agree to new elections (86).
• Hamas concluded its own leadership elections in April 2013, leading to the reelection of Khaled Meshaal and the exclusion of Mahmoud al Zahar from the politburo (94-95).
• This decision was made to distance Hamas from armed conflict and promote diplomatic solutions, which were seen as more important following Hamas’s improved international position following the Arab Spring (96).

 

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. “Why Does Iran Need Hizbullah?”. The Muslim World, Vol. 106, No. 1 (2016): 127–140.

• Hizballah remains true to an ideology directly informed by Iran and its Islamic Revolution, with Hassan Nasrallah reaffirming in 2015 that he recognizes Ayatollah Khamenei as his religious leader (130).
• Iran is really and truly committed to the expulsion of the Israelis from Jerusalem and has funded Hizballah on this basis, supplying it with finances and weapons to fight Israel in Lebanon (131–132).
• According to Sheikh Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary General of Hizballah, Iran has helped Hizballah significantly improve their rocket technology, as well as supplying them with broader training (132–133).
• Hizballah is considered part of a broader mechanism of Iranian defense and deterrence, with an attack on Iran resulting in massive retaliation against Israel by Hizballah (133–134).
• Both Hizballah and Iran have justified their involvement in the Syrian civil war as a means of supporting an important ally against Israel. They reject the sectarian nature of the war, claiming their only interest is preserving an anti-Israeli Syrian government (139).

 

McDonnell, Dylan. “Extreme Realism: An Analysis of Hamas through Its External Relationships”. Master’s Thesis. University of Utah, 2010.

• Hizballah is not a competitor to Hamas, as Hamas recognizes that almost all of Hizballah’s supporters are Shia, therefore not a competitor for Sunni Palestinians (32).
• Hamas and Hizballah help each other in time of stress. When Israel prepared a massive military operation rescue Gilad Shalit in 2006, Hizballah captured a number of IDF soldiers to distract Israel, instigating the 2006 war. Israel is thus unable to deal with Hamas and Hizballah as isolated actors (34).
• As a party that consistently rejects Israel’s right to exist, Syria has common interests with Hamas. This support has thus far been limited to hosting Hamas in the country, with the Syrian government taking security measures to make sure no armament or training is going on inside the country (77–78).
• Syria has previously given financial support to Hamas, taking money from civil servant salaries in 2005 to support the group (78–79).
• Syria has expressed concerns in the past that its relationship with Hamas could provoke Israeli retaliation or attack. The Syrian government has repeatedly urged Hamas leaders to keep a low profile within Syria (79).
• Iran had always sought a relationship with the Palestinians and had originally cultivated ties with Yasser Arafat, but became distant from the PLO following the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war. Iran began funding Hamas in 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (82).
• Iran is alleged to pledged $30 million per year to Hamas, making up around 10% of Hamas’s total annual budget in the 1990s. Funding increased in the 21st Century, and Hamas received an additional $50 million from Iran in 2006 after the embargo (82–83).
• The actual scale of Iranian funding is unclear, with estimates ranging between $3 million and $200 million a year. It is likely, however that Hamas’s average annual funding from Iran is under $20 million (84).
• Hamas used to receive most of its funding from Saudi Arabia, which constituted 50% of funds prior to 2001, and Iraq. These sources of funding have since dried up, leaving Hamas more dependent on Iran (84).
• Hamas is actively aware that its relationship with Shia Persian Iran is unpopular and seeks to emphasize that the relationship is purely strategic (83). Hamas tries to keep both Iran and its supporters happy by avoiding discussion of controversial or sectarian issues (84).

 

Lawson, Fred H. “Implications of the 2011-13 Syrian uprising for the Middle Eastern regional security complex”. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, on Behalf of Its School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2014.

• Syria originally made peace overtures to Israel in 2006, but Israel rebuffed these offers, accusing Syria of supplying Hizballah with the rockets, logistics, funding, and weaponry used in its attacks.
• The Syrian government exerted a lot of influence in 2011 to convince Hamas to pledge support for the Assad government, as Iran and Iraq had. Hamas refused to intervene in Syrian internal affairs and left the country.
• Hamas began searching for new regional allies apart from Syria, finding friends in the Morsi government in Egypt, which facilitated a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in February 2012.
• After the Egyptian coup in July 2013, Hamas lost its support in Egypt, which blamed Hamas for jihadist violence in Sinai.
• Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas scared Israel and it became more aggressive towards Gaza, starting a brief war in early November 2012. After this conflict, Iran announced it would be supplying Hamas with financial aid and weaponry, including missiles.

 

Clark, Michael David. “Understanding the contrasting policies of Hezbollah and Sadrist movement towards the Syrian Civil War”. Discussion Paper. Durham University, HH Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah Programme, 2018.

• Hizballah has consistently given its full support to the Syrian government, whereas it supported the Arab Spring elsewhere. Hizballah underreported the unrest and violence in Syria during the first few months of the revolution, instead focusing on the general support for the Syrian government (4-5).
• Hizballah claimed that previous Arab Springs overthrew pro-Israel and pro-USA governments, whereas the Syrian government was already against Israel. Therefore, protection of the Syrian government was legitimate. Syrian rebels were often cast as Israeli agents (5-6).
• Hizballah made a number of statements connecting Syrian stability to Lebanese security (7).
• By late 2011, Hizballah had upped its rhetoric to connect the Syrian conflict to a larger scheme by Israel, the US, Turkey, and their allies to destroy Syria and crush all resistance to Israel (9-10).
• Hizballah does not conceive of the Syrian conflict as a solely domestic affair, but as an international conflict that could potentially destroy the ‘axis of resistance’ to Israel (23).
• Hizballah forces have been fighting in Syria since at least May 2013, when Hassan Nasrallah officially confirmed their presence following the recapture of al Qusayr by Hizballah forces. Since then, Hizballah has deployed forces throughout Syria, playing a major role on the Lebanese border and around Homs (11).

 

Løvlie, Frode. “The institutional trajectory of Hamas: From radicalism to pragmatism—and back again?”. Doctoral Dissertation. The University of Bergen, 2015.

• Hamas backed the rebels in the Syrian civil war and was subsequently expelled from Damascus and had its support from Iran cut. This decision was made because it thought that the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt would become Hamas’s main patron (323).
• The Muslim Brotherhood did not provide the expected support and could not replace Syria as a benefactor. This plan was further foiled by the 2013 coup in Egypt that saw the military government reimpose isolation on Gaza (323). The military closed the tunnels and outlawed Hamas (325).
• The Morsi government was preoccupied with domestic issues and did not fundamentally change Egyptian policy towards Gaza (325).
• The Egyptian coup triggered an economic downturn n Gaza and cost Hamas their political support. Hamas then sought to reconcile with Fatah as a way of passing off some responsibility and trying to refocus on rebuilding support. This was derailed by the start of Operation Pillar of Steel (324).
• Hamas signed an agreement with Fatah on 27 April 2014 that essentially gave up control of Gaza and agreed to recognize Israel; it was a massive defeat (326). The Hamas government officially stepped down on 2 June 2014 and handed power to the Palestinian Authority until elections in December 2014 (327).
• Israel was deeply upset at the unification of the Palestinian groups and imposed sanctions on the Palestinian Authority for associating with Hamas (326-327).
• On 12 and 13 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped from the west Bank. Israel invaded the west Bank on 14 June, arresting many Hamas officials in west Bank, blaming Hamas for the kidnappings (327). Hamas retaliated with rocket fire into Israel, leading to an Israeli invasion of Gaza on 8 July 2014 (328).
• Hamas officials originally denied the charges, but Saleh al Arouri claimed responsibility for the Kassam Brigades in late August 2014 (327).
• Hamas gained in popular support following its resistance against the Israeli bombardment and invasion, which ended on 26 August 2014 (329).
• Unrest in Gaza after the July 2013 coup in Egypt prompted a growth of the Palestinian Salafist movement, presenting a potential challenger to Hamas’s authority (325).

  

Shalabi, Samir. "Hezbollah: Ideology, Practice, and the Arab Revolts-Between popular legitimacy and strategic interests." Bachelor’s Thesis. Lund University, 2015.

• Hizballah’s interests in Syria are that Syria is an important part of the ‘axis of resistance’ and serves as the base to transport Iranian weaponry to Hizballah. Losing this weapons supply would jeopardize Hizballah’s ability to defend against Israel (38).
• Syria is the main route by which Hizballah receives weapons and cash from Iran. Syria also provides Hizballah with locations for training and weapons storage (38).
• Syria has played an important role in Lebanese politics and Syrian support for Hizballah therefore allows that movement to maintain political control in Lebanon (38).
• A rebel government in Syria would likely not allow Iranian transport through Syrian territory. It would also likely be a Sunni government hostile to Hizballah’s sectarian interests (38).
• Hizballah is closely tied to the Iranian Islamic Revolution and follows its dictates. Syria is Iran’s most important Arab ally, so there has been a lot of Iranian pressure on Hizballah to support the Syrian government (38).
• Hizballah had rhetorically positioned itself on the side of the Arab Spring and supporter of the oppressed. Supporting the Syrian government was therefore predicted to cost Hizballah popular support and legitimacy (37).
• Hizballah is ostensibly an anticapitalist and revolutionary organization, meaning that its support of the Syrian government goes directly against its core beliefs, as the Syrian government is oppressive, corrupt, and neoliberal capitalist (51).
• Hizballah released their first statement on Syria on 25 May 2011, over two months since the start of the Syrian revolution in Daraa in March 2011. Hassan Nasrallah declared Hizballah in support of the Syrian government on the grounds that it was an ally against the USA and Israel (39).
• Hizballah spoke about the conflict in Syria weaken an ally against Israel, meaning that the Syrian civil war benefitted Israel and the USA (39).
• Hassan Nasrallah denied that Hizballah had been fighting in Syria until April 2013, when he confirmed that Hizballah was involved in Syria (40).
• He said that Hizballah had become involved to retake Qusayr, which was on the Lebanese border and thus posed a security threat to Lebanon, and to defend the shrine of Sayyida Zainab from takfiri jihadists (41).
• In May 2013, Hassan Nasrallah rephrased Hizballah’s involvement in Syria as part of a global struggle against the USA and its regional allies. Losing in Syria would thus result in Israeli and American aggression in Lebanon and the destruction of the Palestinians (41).
• Hizballah justified their support of the Syrian government on the basis that it was necessary to advance the Palestinian cause, as Syria was a major ally of the Palestinian struggle against Israel (44).
• This is basically bullshit, as Syria has not been and is not a friend of Palestinian interests, if anything it currently represses the Palestinians. It is fighting in Syria to preserve its own interests as a sectarian and hegemonic force (49).
• Syria has had a mixed relationship with the Palestinian movement, as its 1976 intervention in Lebanon was meant to crush the PLO there, and it also facilitated a massacre of Palestinian refugees there (44).
• The Syrian government has bombarded the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp since 2012, an offensive that was only intensified since ISIS took control of the camp in April 2015. This is alongside other war crimes and repression of Sunni Palestinians in Syria (45).
• Contrary to Syrian and Hizballah statements, most Palestinian groups, with the major exception of PFLPGC, oppose the Syrian government and support the rebels, including Hamas, the PLO, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (44).
• Hizballah’s legitimacy, especially among Palestinians in Lebanon, has slipped as its role in Syria has expanded following 2013. Its expanded military presence weakens its initial argument that it only intervened to protect Lebanon (47-48).
• This lose of legitimacy has not significantly hurt the group’s popularity among the Lebanese Shia, who continue to sign up to join the organization and support its interventions in Syria and Iraq (48).

 

Ospina, Mariano V., and David H. Gray. "Syria, Iran, and Hizballah: A Strategic Alliance." Global Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2014): 27-36.

• Syria, Iran, and Hizballah are allied because Syria is Iran’s only Arab ally and one of Hizballah’s two state backers (27). The basis of the relations is and always has been common defense and opposition to Israel (30).
• Syria has been used to ferry necessary supplies to Hizballah from Iran for years. This support has been essential for Hizballah’s success in Lebanon (29).
• By allying with Hizballah, Syria gained an ally that was dominant in Lebanon and was able to give Syria an important role in Lebanese politics (29). This mutually beneficial relationship was formalized in the 1989 Taif Agreement (30).
• Syria and Hizballah have not always been easy allies and had many disagreements in the 1980s. In 1982, Syria threatened to expel all Iranians from Lebanon after Hizballah kidnapped the head of the American University in Beirut, and in 1987 Syrian soldiers shot 27 Hizballah fighters after they disobeyed a Syrian officer (30).
• Syria and Hizballah are not ideological partner, but strategic allies. Syria still controls almost all weapons flows into Lebanon, meaning that it could cripple the group by complying with UNSC Resolution 1702 and cutting off this supply. Hizballah thus need to remain friendly with Syria to maintain this flow (31).
• Maintaining this flow of weapons to Hizballah is in the interests of both Hizballah and Iran, so they are strongly incentivized to keep the Assad government in power (32).
• Iranian and Hizballah assistance is what is keeping the Assad government in power, as most military authorities predict it would have fallen without their assistance. These forces are mainly trained by Hizballah and funded by Iran (32, 34).
• Burham Ghalioun, the former chairman of the rebel Syrian National Council, said that any revolutionary government would reconsider ties with Iran and Hizballah, and definitely cut off Iranian weapons supplies to Hizballah. This confirms Hizballah and Iranian fears (32-33).
• Iranian and Hizballah involvement in Syria was confirmed in May 2013, although it had existed before then, after Israeli attacks on Hizballah in Syria. This was used by both Iran and Hizballah to justify their support of Syria as part of a struggle against Israel (33).
• There has been some pressure, mainly from lower ranks, on Iran and Hizballah to end support for Syria because of their revolutionary spirit, but the concrete interests of these parties in Syria means that they haven’t (33-34).

  

Michelon, Romana. "Zealotry and Pragmatism: Hamas, Hizbullah, and Syria." E-International Relations Students, 5 March 2013 [online]. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/05/balancing-zealotry-and-pragmatism-hamas-hizbullah-and-the-syrian-crisis/

• Hamas abandoned its support for the Syrian government because supporting Syria was extremely unpopular among the Palestinian community, it did not want to make the same mistake as Yasser Arafat in 1990 when his support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait had financially and diplomatically isolated the PLO, and because it believed that the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt gave it additional options for support.
• Hamas was aware that supporting the Syrian rebels would cost them support and it was an active decision to exchange alliance with Iran and Syria for alliance with the Morsi government in Egypt.

  

Coelho, Sandra Cristina Rodrigues. "Hezbollah e Hamas: estudo comparativo entre duas organizações terroristas islâmicas [Hezbollah and Hamas: A comparative study of two Islamic terrorist organizations]." PhD dissertation. University of Lisbon, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2016.

• It is estimated that Iran funds Hizballah at around $700 million annually. This cash, as well as weapons, including sophisticated artillery and rockets, is all moved through Syria to Hizballah bases in the Bekaa Valley (40).
• If anything, Syrian support for Hizballah has increased since the election of Bashar al Assad, as he has allowed more and more sophisticated Iranian weaponry to pass into Lebanon and increased Syrian political support for Hizballah (41).
• By supporting Hizballah, Syria guarantees an ally in Syria and prevents an anti-Syrian political faction from emerging in Lebanon (41-42).
• Iran and Syria are Hamas’s primary backers in terms of financing, logistics, material. Their assistance has massively increased Hamas’s operational capacity (74).
• Cooperation between Hamas and Iran and Syria began in 1998, when Hamas moved to Damascus. In Syria, Hamas planned terrorist attacks, received funding from the Syrian government, and allegedly trained Hamas operatives in explosives (74-75).
• Hamas also maintains training camps in Sudan and receives financial support from the Sudanese government (75).
• Hizballah does demonstrate considerable scope for independent action, as its abduction of two Israeli soldiers in 2006, starting a war with Israeli, was done without consultation of Syria, Iran, or the Lebanese government. Moreover, Hassan Nasrallah admitted as much in public (89).
• Hizballah began providing logistics and advisory support of the Assad government as early as 2011, only becoming directly militarily involved in early 2013 as it deployed soldiers and took over the training of pro-Assad forces (91-92).
• Hassan Nasrallah justified Hizballah’s involvement in Syria as necessary for the security of Lebanon from takfiri jihadi forces in Syria, who pose a threat to religious minorities in both Syria and Lebanon (92).
• Hizballah has been criticized for its involvement in Syria, which has even led to attacks on Hizballah within Lebanon (92).
• Hizballah’s involvement in Syria leaves it vulnerable to a potential Israeli attack as its main forces are distracted (92-93).
• Tannous Mouawad, a Lebanese brigadier general, claims that while Lebanon could rebel a small or short Israeli attack, its ability to fight a long campaign against Israel is absolutely dependent on Syrian and Iranian support (95).
• After Hamas condemned the Syrian government, Iran significantly reduced its funding of the group, precipitating a financial crisis. Iran and Hizballah had both been in favor of retaining ties with Hamas prior to this split (98-99).
• The Assad government put Hamas in a very difficult position by forcing it to actively support the Syrian government or be associated with the rebels. It choose to just leave Syria physically, despite the cost this would incur on its relationship with Hizballah and Iran (99).
• Its broader support of the Arab Spring, including in Syria, won Hamas support among the Palestinian population because it asserted its Arab nationalist and Islamist credentials (100).
• Preferably, Hamas wanted to maintain relations with both the Sunni Arab bloc and the ‘axis of resistance’, as it ideologically agrees with Sunni powers, but depends on Iran, Syria, and Hizballah for financing and weapons supplies (117).

 

van der Hulst, Lisa. "Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s sense of interconnectedness before and since the Syrian War: succumbing to sectarianism or unity in resistance?". Master's Thesis. Leiden University, 2015.

• The general opinion in media and academia is that Hizballah’s support of the Assad government has made the movement look hypocritical and forfeited its credentials as a voice of the oppressed (3).
• The relationship between Hamas and Hizballah started in 1992, when Israel deported hundreds of Hamas members to Lebanon in retaliation for the assassination of an Israeli policeman. Hizballah then started to provide protection for Hamas members in Lebanon (4).
• Prior to this, ties between Hizballah and the Palestinians were weak, as many Lebanese blamed the PLO for starting the Lebanese civil war by attacking Israel and provoking its invasion (4).
• Hamas also established ties with Syria and Iran in the early 1990s, receiving training from Iran and getting cash and weapons from Iran through Syria. The bonds between all four parties grew after the Second Intifada and the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections (4-5).
• Some cooperation between Hamas and Hizballah and Iran continued after the split on the issue of Syria. A document from December 2012 declares that Iran still supports Hamas financially and with military equipment as a matter of strategic interest (14).
• Hamas and Hizballah do not consistently assist each other. Hamas did not help Hizballah during the 2006 Israeli invasion, nor did Hizballah help Hamas during the Israeli invasions of Gaza in 2008, 2009, November 2012, or Summer 2014 (14).
• Hassan Nasrallah claims that Hizballah’s training and weapons means that Hamas is capable of fighting its own battles without direct support from Hizballah. In this context, not assisting in fights against Israel cannot be viewed as a change in relations between Hamas and Hizballah (15).
• Hizballah’s support of the Syrian government cannot be reduced to Shia unity, as Hizballah makes it very clear that it supports a cross-confessional struggle against Israel, as demonstrated by its alliance with Christian groups within Lebanon (19).
• There are disputed accounts of Hamas’s decision to distance itself from Syria, with some claiming that it was a minority decision made under heavy international pressure to distance itself from Syria and Hizballah (20).
• Hamas was divided on this issue; the split were between the politburo and the military wing and between the Gaza leadership and the offices abroad (22).
• The military leadership, represented by men like Mahmoud al Zahar, opposed the alliance switch because it endangered Hamas’s weapons supply, which came from Iran and could not be exchanged for financing by other states (23).
• The Hamas leadership outside of Gaza likely supported the rebels, whereas the Gazan Hamas leadership viewed the ‘axis of resistance’ as more important (25).
• This is enabled because the restriction of Hamas’s leadership in Gaza means that the military wing, the Kassam Brigades, often act independently without the permission of the political wing (22-23). The wing always maintained good relations with Hizballah and Iran throughout the crisis (25).
• From July 2014 onward, when they were attacked by Israel, Hamas leaders, including Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Khalil al Hayya, recognized that the move away from Iran had been bad idea and wanted to restore relations with Iran (23).
• Funding, training, and weapons supplies from Hizballah and Iran to Hamas was slowed or stopped during the tensions, but restored around the July 2014 war between Gaza and Israel (25).

 

Chehab, Zaki. “Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies”. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

• The actions of Hamas are restricted by their being based in Syria, with senior leaders, including Khaled Mashaal, being under the watch and threat of Syrian intelligence officers (226).
• Hamas played an important role in the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon by rallying the Sunni world behind Lebanon and thus facilitating cross confessional opposition to Israel (226).
• Example of a Hizballah and Iranian weapons shipment to Hamas was the shipping vessel intercepted in 2001 by the Israelis. The boat was procured by Syria and given to Hizballah in Lebanon, then filled with Iranian weapons, including missiles, anti aircraft missiles, RPGs, anti tank grenades, mortars, mines, small arms, and ammunition. It was piloted by Hizballah members, who intended to dump these weapons in barrels off the Gaza shore (168).
• Iran had initially supported the PLO and cultivated ties with Yasser Arafat, but felt betrayed when the PLO backed Iraq in its war against Iran in 1980, during which Iran assumed that the PLO would support the Iranian underdog. The PLO then started peace talks with the USA, to Iran another betrayal (140).
• This alienation of the PLO was demonstrated in Iranian coverage of the 1987 Intifada, which highlighted the role of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and downplayed the PLO’s contributions (140).
• In October 1991, Iran invited the heads of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to a conference in Tehran to support the Intifada. This was the start of Iranian cooperation with these groups (141).
• Iran’s relations with the PLO decisively ended in October, when students broke into the PLO Embassy in Tehran, called the PLO Israeli and American agents and trashed the place. Iran did jack all to prevent this, so the PLO Ambassador got the message and left (141).

 

Karmon, Eli. “Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas: A coalition against nature, Why does it work?”. Proteus Monograph Series, Vol. 1, No.5. National Intelligence University, 2008.

• Iran’s ability to project power in Lebanon and supply its allies there depends on the cooperation of Syria (20).
• Iran and Syria jointly created Hizballah, although Syria did not actually want either Hizballah or Amal to triumph in Lebanon and displace Syria as the primary actor there (20).
• Iran provided funding and training to Hizballah beginning in 1982. They were directed to infiltrate Beirut in early 1983, doing so with Syrian support (21).
• Between 1985 and 1989, Syria and the Lebanese Shia groups were in competition for domination of Lebanon. Hizballah also actively competed with Amal, creating a powerful military force with Iranian support (22).
• Syria became increasingly unhappy with Hizballah during this period, as its kidnapping of western journalists served Iranian interests, but worked against Syrian interests of attempting to demonstrate its capacity to control Lebanon. Hizballah also came into conflict with Syrian proxies, like Amal, the Communists, or the Social Nationalists (23).
• Syria decided to seize more direct control of Lebanon in early 1987, staking direct control of Beirut and killing 23 Hizballah members in the process. This tainted Syrian relations with Hizballah (23).
• Hizballah initially rejected the 1989 Taif Agreements, only accepting them after Syrian forces captured the rest of Beirut in October 1990 and ousted PM Michel Aoun. Recognizing Syrian dominance, Hizballah agreed to abide by the Agreements (23).
• Under the agreements, Syria allowed Hizballah alone to remain armed and attack Israel. However, these attacks had to be closely coordinated with Syrian officials. Syria also closely monitored Iranian arms transferred to Hizballah (23). Its political influence was also capped (24).
•  Iran was forced to recognize Syria’s predominant role in Lebanon and drastically reduced its forces there from 2,500 to around 200 by 1992 (24).
• Despite the strong ideological connection between Hizballah and Iran, Syria, not Iran, was the party overseeing Hizballah’s operational planning (35).
• The Israeli withdraw from Lebanon occurred only a month after the death of Hafez al Assad and the succession of Bashar al Assad to the Syrian presidency. Bashar al Assad was willing to cooperate with Hizballah on a move equal basis (35).
• Hizballah has been much more independent of Syria since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This is demonstrated by the fact that Syria was unaware of Hizballah’s raid against Israel on 12 July 2006 (58).
• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad also exists. It is also a member of the ‘axis of resistance’. It was inspired by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and always maintained ties with Iran (29).
• Iran’s relations with Hamas were marginal in the 1980s, with Hamas viewing Iran as a partial threat due to its support of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (29). In October 1991, Iran organized a conference to organize opposition to PLO peace talks with Israel, at which Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were attendees (30).
• In October 1992, Mousa Abu Marzuk led a Hamas delegation to Tehran, after which Hamas was permitted to open a Tehran office, was given $30 million a year from Iran, and Revolutionary Guards would train Hamas operatives in Iran and Lebanon (30).
• In 1994, Iran was estimated to provide around $3 million per year to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in addition to charity funds for families of suicide bombers and prisoners (32).
• Hamas and Syria never had great relations after Syria’s massacre of Muslim Brothers in 1982, and distrusted characterized this relationship into the 21st Century (32-33).
• Syria and Hamas developed a relationship in Summer 1994 as the Palestinian Authority was being set up. Hamas and Syria founded their strategic partnership then and in October 1994, Syria permitted Hamas to meet with Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon (33).
• Hamas was originally based in Jordan, but after that Kingdom signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994, it cracked down on Hamas, whose presence was an impediment to peace. In 1997, Mousa Abu Marzouk and Imad al Alami were expelled from Jordan, relocating to Damascus. In August 1999, more leaders were expelled, this time to Qatar, and Khaled Mashaal has led Hamas from Damascus since 2001 (33).
• Damascus has been the headquarters of Hamas’s military wing, the Kassam Brigades, and its main center for financial transfers since the mid 1990s (33).
• Syria and the Syrian occupied areas of Lebanon have the main routes for smuggling weapons and explosive to Hamas. Hundreds have Hamas operatives have been trained in these areas as well (33-34).
• Hamas operatives were trained in explosives, kidnapping techniques, communications, and intelligence work by Hizballah and PFLPGC in Lebanon (34).
• Hizballah instantly supported the al Aqsa Intifada in 2000, organizing a group of parties that rejected compromise with Israel. Hizballah then went on to training Hamas and other Palestinian groups as well as give them logistical and operational support (35-36).
• Hizballah’s domestic legitimacy in Lebanon depends on its resistance to Israel and the USA, so its support of Palestinian struggles helps to shore up its support in Lebanon (36).
• Hizballah has coordinated its attacks on Israel with the Second Intifada, capturing three Israeli soldiers in October 2000 and launching attacks on Israeli positions in Shebaa Farms during Spring 2002 (36).
• Syria and Iran both support Palestinian groups because they want to prevent a peace between the Palestinians and Israel. Such a peace would weaken the Syrian position to regain control of the Golan Heights and would lead to Iran’s international isolation of the issue of Israel (38).
• Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran all get along so well because they are all radical Islamists (81).
• Khaled Mashaal and Hassan Nasrallah had signed an agreement to resist Israel together. This resulted in Hizballah killing and capturing Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 in response to Israeli skirmishes with Hamas in Gaza (57).
• Hizballah and Hamas are parts of a larger strategic deterrence plan by Iran, as both groups have declared that they would attack Israel should it attack Iran or attempt to interfere with the Iranian nuclear program (58-59).
• In 2006, Hamas was split between three factions: a moderate faction under Khaled Mashaal, a rejectionist faction led by Said Siam and Mahmoud al Zahar, and an ultraradical faction led by Ahmed Jaabri, the head of the Kassam Brigades (62).
• The radicals and rejectionists clearly got their ways, since the Mecca Agreement fell apart and Hamas seized military control of Gaza from Fatah on June 2007 after months of fighting (62).

  

Qassem, Naim. “Hizbullah: The Story from Within (2nd ed.)”. London: Saqi, 2010 [2005].

• Hizballah leadership attached themselves to Iran because they saw it as the only state fully committed to ending the Israeli presence in the Middle East. They also shared beliefs on the vilayet-e fiqah, the virtues of republicanism, and the necessary of Manichean anti-imperialist struggle in the Middle East (388-389).
• Iranian support of Hizballah means that Iran shares in the glory and prestige of that group, which has been significant since it liberated southern Lebanon from Israel (390).
• Cooperation between Hizballah, Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian resistance, esp. Hamas, is on the basis of mutual opposition to Israel. They belief than any disunity among the Arabs and Muslims only strengthens the position of Israel and its Western allies (392-393).
• Lebanon’s instability historically presented a weak point of Syria, so they tried to avoid it being exploited by other foreign powers. It initially tried to do this by invading Lebanon in support of the Christian government against the PLO in 1976, but this Christian movement then invited Israel into the country in 1982, stabbing Syria in the back (394).
• In response to Israeli invasion, Iran announced its support for Syria on anti-Israeli lines and offered to end the Revolutionary Guard. Syria accepted and Iranian Revolutionary Guards started training the Lebanese recruits who would form Hizballah (395).
• After the Syrian army retook Beirut in February 1987, it clashed with Hizballah, including killing 27 Hizballah members in Beirut. Suspicions between Hizballah and Syria were high, as many worried that Syria would side with Amal against Hizballah(395-396).
• After June 1988, Hafez al-Assad organized meetings between Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Amal. These smoothed over the Hizballah-Amal divide and led to Syria lending its full support to Hizballah as the primary force of anti-Israeli resistance (396-397).
• After the 1989 Taif Accord, Syria had immense status and influence inside of Lebanon and Hizballah saw Syria as an invaluable partner because of these hegemonic position (397). They were also important allies against Israel (397-398).
• Syria was massively important in the creation and support of Hizballah, while Hizballah’s success allowed Syria to reassert control in Lebanon (395).