Notes on the Third Wave of Democracy in Asia

 Heo, Uk, and Sung Deuk Hahm. “The third wave of democratization and economic performance in Asia: theory and application”. Korea Observer, Vol.43, No.1 (2012): 1-20.

• Follows the ‘third wave’ rubric of Samuel Huntington, with that third wave beginning in 1974 and spreading to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia (2).
• The affected countries were India in 1977, Sri Lanka in 1983, Philippines in 1987, S. Korea in 1988, Pakistan in 1988, Thailand in 1990, Mongolia in 1990, Bangladesh in 1991, Nepal in 1991, and Taiwan in 1992 (11).
• The authors argue that the ‘confucian’ culture of S. Korea has impeded democratic consolidation because its core values emphasis hierarchy and stability rather than plurality. Conversely, Protestantism is well suited for democracy (7).
• Two possible explanations for the Third wave: gradual transition to democracy as expanding middle class demands rights, or revolution due to economic crisis (9-10).
• Democratization is Asia reflects both trends: gradual democratization in S. Korea and Taiwan, and sudden change in Philippines and Thailand (12).
• Democratization in Philippines failed to bring significant change or economic growth, contrary to expectations. Politics was still corrupt and power concentrated in a few hands (13).
• Democratization in Taiwan has failed to address slowing growth and growing economic inequality. Instead, it has exacerbated the power of major industries and politicized cross strait economic exchanges (15).
• Despite high rankings, S. Koreans distrust and dislike their government and do not feel that it is democratic enough. This distrust is most concentrated among older people and the highly educated (15-16).

Shin, Doh Chull. “The Third Wave in East Asia Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives”. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol.4, No.2 (2008): 91-131.

• The Third wave in Asia began with the collapse of the Philippine dictatorship in 1986 and covers Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, S. Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (92-93).
• Democratization in E. Asia has been shaped by economic development and ‘confucian’ cultural values, and driven by political elites (93-94). This meant that democracies could not champion themselves on economic merits and that Confucian elites refused to fully embrace the chaos of liberal democracy (96).
• Unlike populations in Latin America and Europe, Asians experienced major economic growth under autocratic regimes and had fewer economic reasons to abandon autocracy than their counterparts elsewhere (94).
• ‘Confucian’ values, sometimes called ‘Asian values’ were common throughout E. Asia and even non-Confucian SE. Asia. They traditionally framed the duties owed by subjects to rulers and have shaped and impeded democratic growth by favoring hierarchy, consensus, and collectivism over individualism and freedom. This has led some leaders, like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore or Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia to coin ‘Asia democracy’ emphasizing authoritarian practices (94-95).
• Even in democratic countries, Confucian norms and values trump democratic ones, as in S. Korea, when Kim Dae Jung secretly gave money to N. Korea to smooth over peace talks, prioritizing good works over law in a very Confucian way (96).
• The Third wave started in 1986, when Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown in the Philippines. In 1987, S. Korea ended military rule and held free elections, and Taiwan abrogated martial law and ended the Guomindang’s party rule. In 1990, Mongolia abandoned Communist dictatorship, Cambodia held elections after the 1991 Paris Accord, and the Thai military government fell in 1992. Suharto’s dictatorship finally ended after mass protests in 1999 (96-97).
• Most other Asian countries have not come closer to democratization and both Cambodia and Thailand have reverted to authoritarian rule. Philippines has also approached the edge of democracy due to the continued assassination of leftist politicians and activists. Only Japan, S. Korea, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Taiwan have become established democracies (97).
• Most of these transitions were not ideological, as only Cambodia went from being a Communist state to a capitalist one (104).
• E. Asia has experienced very little governmental change since WWII, let alone democratic change. Singapore has been under the Peoples’ Action Party, Japan under the Liberal Democrats, Malaysia under the United Malays, Indonesia under Golkar from 1967 onward, and Taiwan under the Guomindang (97).
• Many scholars attribute the presence of one-party states in Asia to Confucian values that emphasis stability and hierarchy (97).
• Ferdinand Marcos was the only E. Asian dictator to be forced out, forced to flee to Hawaii in 1986 by massive public protests against his run for a fourth term as president (100-101).
• Protests in June 1987, months before the Seoul Olympics, put intense pressure on the Chun government. Under pressure from the US and Olympic Committee, Chun Doo Hwan signed an agreement on 29 June that set forth the roadmap to a peaceful democratic transition (101).
• Inspired by successes in Philippines and S. Korea, opposition leaders in Taiwan illegally founded the Democratic Progressive Party in September 1986 to challenge martial law and the Guomindang dictatorship. Unwilling to repress the protests under intense US pressure, Jiang Jingguo lifted martial law on 14 July 1987. Now able to legally protest and organize, opposition parties challenged the Guomindang, leading to a series of constitutional amendments and eventually free parliamentary elections in 1992 and free presidential elections in 1996 (101-102).
• General Prem, head of the Thai military government, liberalized rules on opposition in 1986 and allowed free parliamentary elections in 1988. This government, under General Chatichai Choonhaven, was overthrown in 1991 by a new junta that violently crushed all opposition. When protests continued in the wake of significant violence, the military agreed to sign an agreement with the civilian opposition to minimize military control and election of a civilian prime minister in May 1992. This civilian government blossomed into a more democratic 1997 constitution, although this system was toppled by a military coup overthrowing Thaksin Sinawantra in 2006 (102-103).
• In October 1991, the Khmer Rogue, Vietnamese-allied Communists, royalists, and liberal republicans all signed an accord to establish an independent and democratic Cambodian government. Parliamentary elections in May 1993 created an unstable coalition government and in July 1997, the pro-Vietnam Communist Hun Sen led a bloody coup. The original democratic transition was imposed by the UN and not organic (103).
• Democratization in Indonesia began with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, leading to Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998 and hand power over to his vice president. The authoritarian Golkar Party negotiated with the opposition and the military to hold free elections for parliament in 1999 and the presidency in 2004 (103-104).
• Fitting with literature on democratization elsewhere, transitions managed by old regime elites tend to result in stable democracies (104). This theory clearly does not apply in E. Asia (105).
• The lack of such a transition in Philippines has manifested itself in unstable democracy marred by attempted coups and mass protests (104).
• Most E. Asian democracies have been unstable or weak despite being negotiated. Indonesia, S. Korea, and Taiwan have all seen major scandals and impeachments, and the Cambodian and Thai governments were overthrown (104-105).
• The US was a major player in supporting dictatorial regimes in E. Asia during the Cold war, but also important in prevent those governments from using armed force to destroy democratic movements. The US absolutely played a role in facilitating democratic change in S. Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines (105-106).
• Civil society organizations, whose growth was facilitated by economic development, were important in organizing democratic protests. In S. Korea, churches played a role in promoting human rights, while in Taiwan and Thailand, middle class civil society groups played a major role in democratization (106).
• Most Chinese view their government as a democracy, demonstrating a minimal understanding of what democracy entails among Chinese (123). China’s government is supported by both the middle class and capitalists, turning usual candidates for regime change into supporters of the government (122).
• Singaporeans likewise believed that their government was democratic and did not see a need to change it. To the author this shows an utter lack of education about democracy (124-125).
• E. Asia has been remarkable resistant to the third wave of democratization, with even democratizing regimes moving slowly and illiberalism remaining dominant in regional politics (126).
• Most democratic transitions in E. Asia did not come as a result of external pressures, but instead in response to domestic reform movements. If these do not exist, democratization will not occur (127).
• Even democratic governments still have undemocratic and illiberal norms of conduct and governance. Moreover, support for liberal democracy remains low among E. Asians compared to illiberal democracy or dictatorship (127).
• Asians have different values that privilege illiberal aspects of democracy compared to Western democracies. This means that further democratization is unlikely to occur in the near future (129).

 

Hao, Shinan, and Qiqi Gao. "East Asian Pathways toward Democracy: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of ‘the Third Wave". Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol.16, No.2 (2016): 239-260.

• Six countries in Asia experienced the Third Wave of democratization: S. Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand (239).
• Three ‘pathways to democracy’ exist in Asia, depending on the type of autocratic government (239).
• Autocratic and military governments dependent on personal dictatorial power were often toppled by mass protests, as in S. Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. They lack the mass support or organization to face down this challenge (250).
• Democratization in Taiwan and S. Korea occurred in the context of highly urbanized and economically developed societies allied with the USA. Both organized one-party states and military dictatorships can be overthrown this way, alongside American pressure to allow democratic opposition to grow (251).
• Mongolia is in its own category because it defies all other rubrics that typically explain democratic success (252).
• Democratization is more difficult in Communist and other one-party states, as party elites are able to plan better and resist popular protests. This explains the continuation of authoritarian governments in China, Vietnam, Laos, N. Korea, and Singapore (253). Those Asian one-party states that have democratized have only done so under external pressure, either economic or political from the US (254).

  

Neureiter, Michael. “Organized Labor and Democratization in Southeast Asia”. Asian Survey, Vol.53, No.6 (2013): 1063-1086. 

• Strikes and other labor agitation is more common in democracies than authoritarian government, and these worker mobilizations have been an important part in democratization (1083).
• Labor movements in Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore are extremely weak due to either authoritarian oppression or neoliberal deregulation. This has made them incapable of posing an effective challenge to dictatorial governments (1084).

 

Slater, Dan and Joseph Wong. “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia”. Perspectives on Politics, Vol.11, No.3 (2013): 717-733.

• Authoritarian political parties can actually remain in power after democratization if they do so on favorable terms and at the height of their power (722).
• The Guomindang in Taiwan remained the dominant Taiwanese political party following democratization, retaining a legislative majority and only losing the presidency in 2000, only to regain it in 2008 (722).
• The Democratic Justice Party in S. Korea continued to govern the country into the early 2000s after allowing democratic elections (722).
• Dominant political parties in Malaysia and Singapore could concede control and allow greater democratic competition without imperiling their political power, based on the examples of S. Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia (723).
• The Taiwanese Guomindang only conceded to democratization after their support in elections started to flag in the 1980s with more independent candidates winning seats. The decision to allow democracy was a strategic choice to perpetuate Guomindang control in Taiwan by leverage its lingering institutional support to win democratic elections (723-724).
• S. Korea tried to do a similar thing, but was less successful because the ruling party was in a much weaker position in 1987 than its Taiwanese counterparty (725).
• Trying to capture some democratic support in electoral democracy may have been part of the motivation for limited democratization in Myanmar in 2011, which occurred without the major protests of previous years (730).
• Just as E. European states based their democratic transitions on the model of W. Europe, so many Asian states may be basing their democratization on Japan. This could explain the predominance of conservative democracies (730).

Thompson, Mark. “Pacific Asia after ‘Asian values’: Authoritarianism, democracy, and ‘good governance”. Third World Quarterly, Vol.25, No.6 (2004): 1079-1095.

• Economic development was the foundation of politics in the Asia-Pacific for decades. Dictators argued that social and democratic progress were conditional upon economic development, and thus could be delayed as long as autocratic governments delivered rapid economic growth (1083).
• International organizations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, who had previously supported authoritarian governments in Asia due to their economic success began to criticize these governments after the 1997 crisis. The opinion had shifted from authoritarian values supporting economic growth to creating the corruption and cronyism that imperiled the regional economy (1079).
• Civil society groups across the Asia-Pacific also blamed the economic crisis on the corruption and nepotism of autocratic governments and advocated for democratic reforms in the name of 'good governance' (1080).
• The notion that democracies would benefit economic growth was quickly disabused, as Philippines and Indonesia saw their economic growth become sluggish after decades of rapid growth (1089).
• The Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia collapsed as a result of popular protests, called the 'reformasi movement', about its mishandling of the 1997 crisis. Once favored by international financiers for its strong economic growth, Indonesia was forced to accept stringent reforms imposed by the IMF in exchange for loans. Suharto was finally removed from power several months later, in May 1998 (1080).
• Most of the authoritarian or quasi-democratic states of East and Southeast Asia have remained financially successful in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, whereas the region's democracies have struggled. China and Vietnam have both experienced very high growth rates and been extremely successful in reducing poverty rates, for which they have been praised by the IMF and other international financial organizations. Malaysia has returned to high rates of growth and foreign investment following the removal of Prime Minister Mahathir and his capital controls. Singapore remains, thanks partially to its strict laws against labor organization, the wealthiest nondemocratic state without oil reserves (1080).
• Political economy in the Asia-Pacific has been focused on economic growth controlled by the government through control of labor and business. Under state management, this economic growth largely occurred without an increase in business profits or worker wages. This situation, although strange and manufactured, appears natural to the middle classes of the Asia-Pacific (1084).
• Attempts by the IMF, World Bank, and other international organizations to shift discussions about Asian-Pacific economics from 'Asian values' to 'good governance' failed to loosen the grip of authoritarian governments. Instead, middle-class groups in the new democracies of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have employed the rhetoric of 'good governance' to argue for a return to more authoritarian modes of governance (1088-1089, 1091).
• Calls for a return to technocratic and developmentalist government have been sparked in many places by the rise of labor politics and unions. Unionization, having been repressed for decades, scares the middle-class and threatens the interests of Asian-Pacific industry (1089).

Pei, Minxin. “The puzzle of East Asian exceptionalism”. Journal of democracy, Vol.5, No.4 (1994): 90-103. 

• The lack of democracy in E. Asia can be explained by a historical lack of American or Japanese support for transition and the severe underdevelopment of civil society groups (93-94).

  

Thompson, Mark. “The Limits of Democratization in ASEAN”. Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.3 (1993): 469-484.

• Democratic change in Asia was inspired by the ‘people power’ movement in the Philippines, contributing to democracy movements in Pakistan, S. Korea, Taiwan, and failed movements in China and Myanmar (469).
• These protests did not spread to other ASEAN countries, largely due to an impression that the Philippines was not a country worth copying. Overall, ASEAN has been able to resist the spread of democratic movements better than the rest of Asia (469).
• Authoritarian governments remained in power in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia largely because they maintained popular support and legitimacy (470). This was accomplished through outstanding economic growth with relatively low inequality, claims that authoritarian models were just a ‘different kind of democracy’, appealing to the possibility of disunity or ethnic conflict, and good relations with the West through capitalist markets (471).

 

Mah, Jai S. “Globalization, Democratization and Economic Growth of East Asia”. International Area Studies Review, Vol.14, No.3 (2011): 91-105.

• There is no evidence to support that economic growth was linked to democratization in either S. Korea or Taiwan (103). At the same time, there is nothing to support authoritarian claims that lack of democracy contributes to economic growth in the Asia Pacific (102).

  

Sidel, John. “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited: Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia”. Comparative Politics, Vol.40, No.2 (2008): 127-147. 

• An independent and organized bourgeois, capable of withdrawing support from national governments, is necessary for the establishment and success of democracy, but it does not guarantee democratic success on its own (129).
• The continued domination of the state in finance and major industries in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam bodes ill for the successful establishment of democracies in those countries (133).
• In Singapore, the predominance of foreign rather than domestic capital has left the national bourgeois weak in comparison to the government’s international clients. They are thus unable to effectively challenge the government (134).
• Brunei is an oil sheikhdom whose economy is dominated by state-owned oil companies. Domestic bourgeois, where it exists, exercises almost no control over the economy as a whole (134).
• Democratization has been more successful in Philippines and Thailand than in Indonesia and Malaysia, the two other SE. Asian countries with an economy dominated by organized and political private bourgeois, because the, mainly Chinese, bourgeois class in Indonesia and Malaysia is maligned, alienated, and thus separated from political power. They are thus unable to exercise the political power towards democracy that their Thai and mestizo Filipino counterparts are (142).

 

Rahim, Lily. "Economic Crisis and the Prospects for Democratization in Southeast Asia." Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.30, No.1 (2000): 17-45.

• Modernization threat cannot explain democratization in SE. Asia, as extremely industrialized and wealthy Singapore continues to be autocratic (30).
• Many authoritarian governments in SE. Asia are popular and legitimate, largely on the basis of successful economic growth and nationalist or anti-communist credentials (33-34).
• Economic crisis, like that in 1997, can disrupt this legitimacy and led to the kinds of protests that eventually topple dictatorships (34).
• The People Power movement in the Philippines in the 1980s inspired other democratic movements in S. Korea, Taiwan, Myanmar, Indonesia, and China. These groups sometimes phrased their demands in reference to successful democratization elsewhere in the region (34).
• Debt crises in SE Asia in the 1980s led to some turmoil in the region, but this was minimized because the economy bounced back to rapid growth by the late 1980s. This recovery, matched by mass detention of activists and opposition organizers and closure of opposition newspapers, allowed the Malaysian and Singaporean governments to remain in power (34).
• In Malaysia, the government has implicitly threatened Chinese and Indian opposition groups with race riots if they supported democratic opposition movements (34-35).
• Democracy again spread throughout SE Asia in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis and the fall of the Suharto government, despite Malaysian attempts to dismiss protests against the Indonesian dictator as a foreign plot (35-36).
• Schisms within the Malaysian government at the time were exacerbated by the example of Indonesia, which was referenced by reformers within the ruling party (36). The government has held on through increasingly autocratic methods dependent upon the security forces (37).
• In 1998, some members of the ruling party in Singapore spoke out against film censorship and criticized the government response to the financial crisis. Overall, the 1997 Crisis signaled greater challenges to the authoritarian model of governance in Singapore (37-38).
• The Financial Crisis also exacerbated tensions within ASEAN over treatment of the Myanma junta, petty border issues between Singapore and Malaysia, and the lack of a coordinated response to the crisis. The group evidenced little of the solidarity it had previously demonstrated (38-39).
• Many autocratic SE Asian governments based their legitimacy on economic performance, so their failure to handle the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis severely weakened their popular support (40).

  

Thompson, Mark. “Late industrialisers, late Democratisers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific”. Third World Quarterly, Vol.17, No.4 (1996): 625-648.

• Unlike in Latin America, which had an active labor movement and powerful business elite, the labor movement and business organizations inherited in the Asia Pacific were weak. This meant that their power was broken by the developmental state, particularly through the destruction of unions, limiting challenges to government power and authoritarianism (632-633).
• The destruction of unions and other workers’ groups across the Asia Pacific meant that the lower classes were politically disorganized and could not effectively challenge the government. This explains why the lower classes played only a marginal role in democratic revolutions (634).
• The business elite were also tightly controlled, either through the use of foreign capital in Singapore, exploitation of ethnic tensions in Malaysia, or extreme dictatorship in Taiwan and S. Korea (635-636).
• Democratization in Philippines was fundamentally different than in Taiwan or S. Korea, as it followed the traditional pattern of business interests and labor movements uniting with opposition after an economic and debt crisis (637).
• Democratic movements in S. Korea and Taiwan depended heavily on middle class civil society that developed as a result of industrialization. As Singapore and Malaysia demonstrate, however, the existence of an industrialized middle class society is not sufficient for democratization (644).

 

Lee, Junhan. "Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths." Asian Survey, Vol.42, No.6 (2002): 821-837.

• The Third wave of democratization in Asia lasted from 1986 to 1999 and includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, S. Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (821).
• Of these transitions, only Philippines and Indonesia were preceded by the traditional inflationary economic crisis. Most Asian countries democratized during periods of normal or high economic growth (825).
• The democratic transitions in Philippines, S. Korea, and Taiwan were all closely intertwined. There were fewer connections between other democratic protest movements (835).
• There is no clear connection between economic development and democratization, as some of the region’s poorest states have become democracies and some of its richest remain autocratic (823-824).
• Claims of a common culture based in Confucianism, or of ‘Asian values’ are baseless. There is nothing cultural bonding the Asia Pacific together. Based on religious divides, Buddhist countries tend to be least democratic, Muslim countries the most democratic, and Confucian countries split (826-828).
• The idea that the colonial experience gave countries experience with democratic institutions cannot be applied to Asia Pacific, where most former British and French colonies are not democratic (829).
• Democratization in Asia Pacific was started by mass protests (830), usually organized by university students and consisting mainly of the middle classes (832-833).

 

Lee, Junhan. "Asian Democratization at a Crossroads: An Update". Korea Observer, Vol.36, No.1 (2005): 143-166.

• Third wave of democratization in Asia began in 1986 in Philippines and expanded to include Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, S. Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Thailand (144).
• Democratization in Timor Este should be considered separately because it only became independent in 2001 (145).

 

Azad, Abul Kalam. "Determinants of Asian Democratisation (1981-2005)". PhD dissertation, Auckland University of Technology, 2009.

• Democratization in Asia was driven by high levels of economic development, low levels of income inequality, and activity by democratic political movements. Although democracies were more common in developed countries, high economic development is not a guarantee of democracy and there are many wealthy autocracies (271).
• The comparison of Singapore and Taiwan shows that democratization only occurs as a result of political action. It requires a popular movement advocating for democracy (272, 283).

 

Chu, Yun-han, “Third-Wave Democratization in East Asia: Challenges and Prospect”. ASIEN, Vol.100 (2006): 11-17.

• Third wave of democratization only included Philippines, S. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Mongolia. Unlike waves elsewhere, these democratizations were only loosely related: economic crisis in Philippines in 1986, popular protests in S. Korea in 1987, protests in Taiwan in 1988 and then the death of Jiang Jingguo, fall of the Warsaw Pact in Mongolia in 1989, and violent street clashes against the military in Thailand in 1992 (11).
• Asia defies modernization theory, as many of its most developed countries are autocracies (12).
• There were no major powers in the Asia Pacific that supported democratization. The US was too cautious to promote democratization, China actively resisted democratization, and Japan had no interested in promoting democracy (12).
• This trend has only increased since the 1990s with the rise of Chinese power, as the regional order of E. Asia now revolves around a nondemocratic country (12-13).
• Autocracy has significant legitimacy in E. Asia, often until the title ‘Asian values’ and remains a competitor against democracy. It is one of the few regions where authoritarianism has popular legitimacy (13).
• Support for democracy remains very low in E. Asia and most respondents do not believe that democratization has solved core societal issues of corruption, social inequity, or accountability (15).
• The populations in E. Asia most likely to support democracy, the educated middle classes, are skeptical of it and often have nostalgia for authoritarian governments (16).

 

Adolf, Robert George. “Do Economic Globalization and Political Freedom Go Together?”. Asian Politics & Policy, Vol.3, No.4 (2011): 569-609.

• The strong connection of large business interests to national governments is negative for democracy, with liberal democracies only forming in countries with an independent class of small businessmen (599).
• This explains why Singapore and China have not democratized, but Thailand and Taiwan have (600).
• Economic liberalization and globalization cannot be used to predict democratization, as both the independent business owners that undergird liberal democracy and autocratic governments will promote these policies (604).

 

Huntington, Samuel. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

• Third Wave in Asia included India, S. Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Mongolia (14-15), and Taiwan (43).
• Democratization did not happen earlier in Asia because it is dominated by Confucian values that emphasis hierarchy and are anti-democratic (300). It only occurred in Taiwan and S. Korea because the rise of indigenous Taiwanese bourgeois, the spread of Christianity, and education all weakened Confucian culture. The legacy of Confucianism remains in other Asian countries that have democratized (302-305).
• None of the Asian democracies, except Philippines, have experienced a democratic transition of power, including Japan. Democracy, therefore, remains formal and disciplined as per Confucian values (304-305).
• Democracy is very common among Christian nations, but not among Confucian, Muslim, or Buddhist ones. S. Korea democratized because of the growth of Christianity in the 1960s and 1970s that rejected Confucian values (73-74).
• Dictatorship in Philippines, like many other Third Wave revolutions, fell in response to a crisis of legitimacy, poor economic management in the wake of the 1974 OPEC oil crisis (51-52), and military setbacks against Communist guerrillas (54).
• Third Wave democratization in Asia, as elsewhere, was led by the urban middle classes. Middle class professionals were the core of democracy movements in Philippines, Taiwan, and S. Korea (67-68).
• This occurred as a result of economic growth that created the middle class ability to demand political concessions – modernization theory (71).
• Under the guidance of Pope John Paul II and after the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church became an organization that aggressively fought authoritarianism and promoted human rights. This explains a wider trend of democratization in Catholic nations, including Philippines, where priests played a major role in the revolution (77-78, 80-85).

 

Friedman, Edward (ed.). “The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences”. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

• “No serious analyst locates Confucianism as an obstacle to […] democratization” (9).
• Democratization was slow to take root in E. Asia because it lacked a major force pushing for human rights. The Cold War meant that neither the US, Russia, China, nor Japan encouraged E. Asian countries to democratize (249-250).
• This factor has been removed since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, allowing for Japan and the US to promote democracy in the region (250-251).