Notes on the Asian Century

Breslin, Shaun. "China’s Global Goals and Roles: Changing the World from Second Place?". Asian Affairs, Vol. 47, No.1 (2016): 59-70.

• Many foreign policy reports on China are focused on two questions: when will China surpass the USA as the leading global superpower, and is China responsible enough to take on that role? Whereas the idea that China was irresponsible and would abuse this power was initially dominant, now there is a growing belief that China will be a responsible superpower (59).
• The movement towards a more multipolar system can be seen in the increased range of independent action demonstrated by countries such as China, which created the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank [AIIB] to the exclusion of the USA. It is also indicated by broader participation in these initiatives not supported by the superpower, as seen in the participation of European states in the AIIB (62).
• Multipolarity is also demonstrated by a lack of cohesion among opponents of the superpower, as they develop into multiple poles rather than an opposing singular pole. This can be seen in the continuation of tensions between China and India even as they both challenge American supremacy (62).
• The shift towards multipolarity is further demonstrated through the continuation of good relations between the hegemon and its competitor, as demonstrated by continued cooperation between the USA and China on a number of issues in which they share common interests (62).
• China sees the transition from a unipolar order to a multipolar as an opportunity for China is assert its own position and gain concessions and power as one of the new poles. This has propelled China, since the 21st Century, to play a more active role in global politics and be more assertive in its demands (63).
• China recognizes that the post-Cold War international system has greatly benefitted it and does not seek to disrupt this system. Instead, China mainly advocates for a greater role in the system, as it feels that its current role is not befitting of its power and status (64).
• Chinese strategists recognize that, if the USA is in decline, it is decline from an incredibly powerful geopolitical position and China will not be able to challenge the US or the American order for a considerable period of time. This recognition means that China is not trying to overturn or fundamentally change the American world order (64).
• America has been reacting to its decline by attempting to construct new organizations to maintain its supremacy, however, like the TPP. These new structures are designed specifically to frustrate the power ambitions of rising powers like China. This forces rising powers to respond by creating their own competing structures (64).
• China claims that it makes demands for a more democratic and less hierarchical international system on behalf of a number of unrepresented rising powers. These claims serve Chinese interests because they present China at the head of a coalition, while it actuality, China is the second most powerful country on Earth and its demands give it more power (64-65).
• One of the methods that China will likely use to reform the global system towards its interests are existing international organizations. This is demonstrated in proposed changes to the voting power in the IMF, which has finally approved by the USA in December 2015 after years of frustrating refusal (66).
• When there is too much pushback from the USA on structural reform, China is also willing to create its own alternative structures. Examples include BRICS, the SCO, the AIIB, and the One Belt-One Road initiative. These last two, in particular, challenge Western narratives about good governance and investment, and thus represent an alternative way of thinking about development and aid (66).
• These initiatives have not totally excluded or rejected the US-led global order and often, as in the case of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, continue to uphold American ideals (67).

 

Acharya, Amitav. "Can Asia lead? Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the Twenty First Century’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2011): 851-869.

 

• Asian nations, including both middle powers like Singapore and Malaysia alongside the major players of China, India, and Japan, are demanding a larger role in international affairs. This greater role has not seen Asian countries, even major powers, take on additional global governance responsibilities, with these states instead being concerned with their own national ambitions (851).
• Ambitions to make larger contributions to global governance are limited for each of Asia's major powers. In Japan, its constitutional limitations on power and an utter lack of regional legitimacy or popularity; in China, a Third Worldist outlook; and in India a Third Worldist outlook and a dearth of necessary resources (852).
• These policy orientations are not necessarily permanent, however, as they all already represent significant deviations from Japanese, Chinese, and Indian foreign policy goals during the 1950s (852).
• Asia lacks a cohesive continental identity, as Europe has generated. So all Asian states put further distinctly national foreign policies, meaning we cannot talk about an 'Asian foreign policy' (852). 
• Most Asian states, and all of its major powers, have remained firmly in a self-interested mindset that has rejected playing a larger regional or global role. Asian foreign policy ambitions do not encompass the sort of responsibility that qualify as global governance (867).
• The independence leaders of most Asian nations were concerned with expelling the last traces of European colonialism and establishing independent economic and political systems. This led Asian states to focus on 'defensive sovereignty', an outlook which colors their international policies and may continue to do so as Asia rises in power and influence (851).
• The lack of unity in the foreign policy outlooks of Asian states prevents the creation of any grand political projects in the region, as demonstrated by the failure of Japan's wartime East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. These different outlooks explain why there is not a common Asian foreign policy (855).
• The situation for Asian regional unity and multilateral improved significantly following the end of the Cold War, as all the major powers adopted economic policies based on capitalist development. The period was also seen the growth of groups like the East Asian Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, through which all three major powers have accepted multilateral norms and moved towards a conformist position as status quo actors (855-856).
• This movement towards common foreign policy outlooks has not, however, produced great cooperation among Asian countries, and competition between India and China remains particularly intense. There also remain considerable disputes among the rest of Asia over the values of international integration or democracy (856).
• China is the most active of the great powers in theorizing about the future international system, largely because it is the most powerful of these countries and has an interest in making sure that China's effect on the global order is positive. The initial Chinese position was that a multipolar world would develop in which China would play a significant part (856-857).
• China began to reconsider this multipolar position as soon as the US victory over Iraq in 1991, and changed its foreign policy to focus more on the idea of China's 'peaceful rise' (857). It has also altered its regional foreign policy is stress cooperation and harmonious coexisting among different states (859).
• The greater Chinese involvement in upholding and participating in the global international order has not, however, seen a commensurate increase in Chinese leadership. This because of China's desire to protect its sovereignty, diverse domestic interest groups, and its recognition that other countries are threatened by it. This all means that China has been reluctant to take global leadership roles, as it refused to do during the 2008 financial crisis (859-860).
• This reluctance to assume global leadership position has not been reflected in Chinese regional foreign policy, in which China has taken leadership roles. It is undoubtedly a leader in the SCO or the East Asian Community, but even there it is careful to avoid the impression of dominating these bodies (860).
• Since the end of the Cold War, and demonstrated by the publication of 'Blueprint for a New Japan' in 1993 by Ozawa Ichiro, the head of the Democratic Party of Japan, Japan has sought to reclaim its status as a 'normal country' able to use create a military and deploy it in UN-sponsored operations. Under Prime Minister Koizumi in the early 2000s, this goal became an attempt to guarantee Japanese security in the event of an American withdrawal from East Asia (860).
• Japan has historically been an avid participant in regional politics and a major force pushing for cooperation in the Asia Pacific. It was the leader behind Asian Pacific economic development from the 1950s through the 1980s and created institutions that underpinned this order. It also played a major role in coordinating post-Cold War security cooperation, including organizing conferences of Defense Ministers through ASEAN starting in 1993. Further Japan-led cooperation has only be lessened by American opposition to some projects, like the Asian Monetary Fund, that would have challenged the American role in the region (861).
• Japan remains primarily a conformist power, as its international efforts seek to build up and support the existing international order rather than create an alternative order. This was demonstrated in the 2008 financial crisis, when Japan sought to assist IMF relief plans rather than pursuing its own course or taking a leader in developing solutions (862).
• At least since a major 2005 speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, there was been talk about India as a global power and loud endorsement of the concept by the Indian press and public (862). India foreign policy has moved away from its non-aligned and Nehruvian roots to embrace a realist geopolitical perspective that emphasizes India's power as a country in the Asian heartland and a counterweight to China. India desires expansive powers in its region and the Indian Ocean (862-863).
• India has not expressed an interest in a greater role in global governance, instead seeking an enhanced role in regional politics on the basis of its economic growth and nuclear capabilities. These ambitions have been thus far rebuffed, as India has been repeatedly denied a larger role in regional affairs or global governance, as seen by repeated rejection from the UNSC and the Nuclear Club (863).
• Leadership of the Asian continent depends on political will, resource capability, and regional legitimacy. No major power has had all three. After the Second World War, India had high legitimacy and political will, but no capacity for leadership, whereas Japan had the capacity for leadership but neither the political will nor the regional legitimacy. At the time of the Communist victory in the civil war, China had neither the resources, political will, nor legitimacy to lead Asia (863).
• Japan, China, and increasingly India now have the resource capacity to lead Asia, but all lack the necessary legitimacy: due to memories of Japanese imperialism, fear of China, and the arrogance of India. Moreover, their mutual rivalry prevents any one state to become the regional leader (863-864).
• Regional leadership thus rests with the minor states of Asia, collectively represented in ASEAN. This organization cannot, however, manage to dominate Asia as it includes none of its major powers, who between them have massive economies and nuclear capability (864).
• The 2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent creation of the G20, has given Asian states new opportunities to become involved in global governance. Although the G20 membership was decided by the US Treasury Department the German Deutschesbank, it included seven Asian countries: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, China, Japan, and India (864).
• Participation in the G20 is seen by many Asian countries, including middle powers like South Korea and Indonesia, as a way to advance from Asian regional politics directly to impacting global politics. To this end, they often support distinct national positions (866).
• These Asian participants, although many of them attended the 1955 Bandung Conference together and consider themselves developing nations, are not alike in their foreign policies. In fact, the lack of unity among the Asian members of the G20 have allowed American and European powers to set the agenda (864-866).
• These divisions occur even among nations with similar positions, as China and India share on climate change. Both states resist attempts to sharply limit carbon emissions, since they consider these emissions essential to economic development. They have still taken slightly different stances and, with short exceptions, broadly rejected cooperation (866).
• Relations have more broadly remained competitive, as seen in the unwillingness of China to support UNSC seats for either Japan or India. This extends beyond the great powers, as minor Asian powers resent each other’s regional initiatives or the status given to G20 countries (866-867).

 

Sinha, Aseema, and Jon Dorschner. "India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?". Polity, Vol.42, No.1 (2010): 74-99.

• Indian economic growth in the 21st Century has attracted increased international interest and respect for the country, especially due to its status in the BRIC nations. This has led to expectations that India will play a larger role internationally in the future (75-76, 80, 82). India itself sees its economic growth as intimately connected to its global status (83-84).
• The Indian economy is mainly internally focused, with relatively few international connections and most growth driven by internal investment. This means that Indian economic strength has not generated coercive economic power over other states, nor does this economic power help India accomplish its foreign policy goals (80, 83).
• India's massive and growing population creates a natural and sustainable potential for economic growth that underlies hopes for Indian 'great power' status. Scholars hope that the increased involvement of India in international trade in the future will result in the expansion of Indian power and influence (81).
• The transformation of economic power into diplomatic power is not natural, but requires direct action. Other aspects of power, namely a clear vision for the future, are needed to turn raw power into great power status (84).
• India is not prepared, either developmentally, political, nor foreign policy-wise to be a 'great power'. Western pipe dreams of a strong India countering Chinese influence and Indian economic growth have generated unrealistic expectations of Indian power that India cannot fulfill. Indian foreign policy lacks any coherent strategy, and is instead led by a general commitment to non-alignment and lack of meaningful participation in international institutions, both of which undermine any significant role it might play in international politics. It will fail to become either a strong ally or a responsible international stakeholder (77-78).
• Any Indian attempts to become a great power will be crippled by a lack of domestic capacity, endemic poverty, shoddy infrastructure, high inequality, and intense caste, regional, and religious conflicts. Domestically, India needs to muster all of its resources just to provide for its poor and burgeoning population, prevent an imminent ecological collapse, and deal with a number of powerful insurgencies, including those by Maoists (97-98).
• Indian regional foreign policy will also prevent its rise to great power status, as its obsession with Pakistan both prevents it from engaging in a meaningful leadership role in South Asia and distracts India from any broader foreign policy goals it might pursue (98).
• The scholarly community is divided on whether the world order will be multipolar or unipolar, centered around the US (78).
• Parag Khanna, Fareed Zakaria, and others argue that the strength of China, the EU, India, and Russia -- particularly the first three -- will create a multipolar world in which power is balanced and shared between multiple great powers. These changes are expected to be driven by economic growth in India and China (78-79).
• Other scholars, like Charles Kupchan, argue that the declining rates of economic growth in Europe and Japan during the 1990s, combined with the immense power of the US military will ensure that no significant challenges emerge to the US-led international order. Additional challenges to this order will emerged, but no replacement will develop (79-80).
• "India today lacks great power in that, [...] it cannot make other important states comply with Indian demands. Nor can India obtain all that it desires in the international arena. It cannot compel or persuade technology suppliers to ignore non-proliferation strictures and supply new power reactors to the country, nor can it alone win preferred trade terms in World Trade Organization negotiations. India cannot persuade others to isolate Pakistan and probably cannot gain a permanent seat on the United Nations council [..]. Yet, India does have the capacity to resist most if not all demands placed upon it by the other states, including the recognized major powers" (80-81, original quote from Pekrovich, George. "Is India a Major Power?". Washington Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1 (2003): 129).
• India has a considerable military force compared to its South Asian neighbors, but it is still weak by global standards. Although its military influence in Southeast, South, and East Asia are recognized, India's military is not generally seen as one of the factors making it a great power (81).
• Jawaharlal Nehru, and a select number of Indian leaders after him, have had a fully developed strategic vision for India's role in the world. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh articulated some element of a vision that sees India as a democratic market-economy, projecting peace and stability in South Asia and not expanding beyond the region (84-85).
• The essential element of a great power is a coherent vision of what to do with its power on the global stage. India lacks this element. It wants to have a permanent UNSC seat for prestige, but does not have any plans for what it would do with this newfound power (84).
• India is poorly prepared to implement any foreign policy goals or strategy that it does develop, as its foreign service is poorly managed and underfunded, its think tanks and universities fail to produce quality research, and its other institutions, including businesses and the media, are poorly educated about international affairs (85).

 

Kohli, Harinder S., Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood (eds.). Asia 2050: realizing the Asian century. Singapore: Asian Development Bank, 2011.

• Continued economic growth in Asia would mean that by 2050, Asia would account for half of global GDP, trade, and investment, and have per capita income equal to that of Europe (xiii, 1).
• The Asian Century is defined by Asia again become the predominant economic power (1).
• This rise is driven by India, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, who account for 78% of Asia’s population and 87% of its GDP. They are expected to be 45% of global GDP by 2050 (2).
• To realize the Asian Century, Asia needs to sustain high growth rates, address inequality, limit environmental damage, avoid the middle income trap, and mitigate climate change (12-13).
• The authors predict two possible scenarios: the Asian Century and the middle income trap (2).
• The Asian Century requires: for the eleven strongest Asian economies to continue to growth for the next forty years; and for around 40% of the low growth or poor economies to reach strong growth by 2020 (8).
• The middle income trap would involve the strongest Asian economies falling into the middle income trap and the low growth nations not achieving high growth (8).
• Asian economies fit into three groups: high income developed nations (Japan, Brunei, Hong Kong, Korea, Macau, Singapore, and Taiwan); fast growth developing countries, like China and India; and slow growth developing nations (29-30).
• The larger economic role of Asia in the Asian Century implies an increased role in global leadership. This is particularly important in issues such as finance, the global commons and its protection, and avoiding threats to others (45).
• This is particularly true in finance, since Asia in the Asian Century will account for as much as 45% of all global financial assets. This means that Asia will increasingly set global financial trends and practices, making its governance practices important and the success of this sector globally significant (55).
• This includes specific initiatives in which Asia will create global financial institutions and infrastructure. This includes joining the global currency reserve system (57).
• An expanded role in the financial system would also include regional bodies, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, the Chiang Mai Initiative, or other financial organizations (62).
• Its position in the center of the global economy will make the global commons, based on global free trade, stability, and rule of law, increasingly important to Asia. Since it has the main stake, Asia must take a large role in defending this order if it wants to prosper (115-116).
• To play a greater role in role in the global order and global governance, Asia will need to be increasingly proactive in international organizations. This includes pursuing a unified regional stance in international bodies and being able to give proposals to America and other great powers (117).

 

Masahiro, Kawai. “Will the 21st Century Be an Asian Century?: A Global Perspective”. Discussion papers, No. 1702. Niigata, Japan: ERINA - Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, 2007.

• The conditions for realizing the ADB’s ‘Asian Century 2050’ are that Asian countries, especially India and China, continue to experience high economic growth. They predict that this can be achieved through technological innovation to improve productivity, avoiding financial crises, reducing inequality, protecting the environment, and improving public sector governance (7).
• The author considers two situations were Asia will not realize its optimal growth rates and the Asia Century does not occur: middle income trap and conflict:
• The middle income trap assumes that middle and poor countries will not progress to rich status and see declining growth rates due to reduced competitiveness, lack of innovation and declining or stagnating productivity, financial crisis, and/or political instability (9).
• The ‘Asian conflict’ scenario is that a military conflict between Asian countries or with the USA occurs. It would severely reduce growth prospects in Asia (10).
• Different regions of Asia need to do different things to realize their growth goals under the Asian Century (12-13):
• China needs to protect the environment and guarantee resource supplies, reduce their corporate debt burden, improve governance accountability, increase innovation and investment efficiency, reduce inequality, and reform the financial sector.
• India needs to reduce social and economic inequality, protect the environment, invest in infrastructure and human capital, improve governance accountability, increase productivity, and reform the financial sector.
• ASEAN needs to become regionally competitive and innovative, narrow gaps between its members, sustainable development, maintain financial stability, invest in infrastructure and human capital, and improve governance accountability.
• During the Asian Century, Asian countries, particularly China and India, will need to supply international public goods. Their participation in the Paris Agreement is encouraging, and China’s creation of the AIIB and Belt and Road Initiative is a good step forward towards Asia’s greater role (16).
• The American Century was built not only upon America’s economic power, but also its technological, political, military, and cultural hegemony over huge parts of the globe. Asia does not have the common vision to make the ‘Asian Century’ analogous to the American Century because it lacks military and political power. If Asia only has economic power, then the west will continue to dominate in global governance (17).
• Even in the case of significant political power for some Asian countries, they will likely not coordinate and pursue different political and military agendas. This division will allow the USA and Europe to retain a major role in global politics (20).
• The most likely political nature of an Asian Century will be multipolarity. Asia will not turn into economic predominance into concentrated political or military power. So an ‘Asian Century’ will be multipolar (26).
• If an Asian Century in economic growth is realized, then China and India will dominate the global economy. This raises the possibility of either China alone dominating the era or China and India jointly dominating the economy (18).
• Cooperation between China and Japan will be an important sign of the Asian Century as it will see two of Asia’s most powerful actors create joint institutions for the region (22-25).

Mahbubani, Kishore. "The case against the West: America and Europe in the Asian century." Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2008): 111-124.

• The West has still maintained control of key institutions of global governance, including the UNSC, IMF, World Bank, and G8, despite its claims to be open to change. It will need to recognize that it will not be the main global problem solver in the Asian Century (111).
• Western foreign policy failures, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, were the result of the West being unable to recognize that it is no longer the epicentre of global power (111-112).
• Asia has benefitted from the current global order and doesn’t want to upset it. They seek to replicate the American system, not overthrow it (113).
• The West didn’t really help Asia during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, showing their weakness as global economic stakeholders and leaders. This lack of commitment to the ideals of economic leadership and free trade is demonstrated by the failure of the Doha Round (119).
• Asian Century will not see the replacement of fundamental principles of global governance, like rule of law, democracy, and social justice (121). Asian countries will increasingly become the guardians of this order (124).

Aoki, Keith. "The Yellow Pacific: Transnational identities, diasporic racialization, and myth(s) of the Asian century". UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 44, No.3 (2010): 897-952.

• The term ‘Asian Century’ encompasses the political dominance, not of Asia, but as individual countries like China (903). The specific country referenced in the term has changed over time: it was Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s (904), China (904-905), and/or India (905).
• The idea of an ‘Asian Century’ ignores significant disagreements and conflict among Asian countries that would prevent cooperation (905-906).

 

Chander, Anupam. “The Asian Century?”. UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 44, No.3 (2010): 717-734.

• The American Century predicted by Henry Luce in 1941 on the basis of American leadership in economic governance, like trade and freedom of navigation, innovation and cultural exports, an active global role, and a dedication to a set of national ideas that shaped its global foreign policy (719-720).
• Since these values defined the American Century, an Asian Century could mean a decline in the values of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties (723).

 

Abramowitz, Morton, and Stephen Bosworth. "America confronts the Asian century." Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (2006): 147-152.

• Asia, with the exceptions of Japan and Singapore, has not sought to make a major impact on the world stage and does not substantially participate in international activities, although China is beginning to because of its economic interests in the Middle East and Africa (147).
• The Asian Century will see increased power among East Asian countries, making them less dependent on the USA. Their decisions will thus no longer defer as much to American policy (151-152).

 

Kurlantzick, Joshua. "The Asian century? Not quite yet". Current History, Vol. 110, No. 732 (2011): 26-31.

• An Asian remains unlikely because Asia is much much poorer than the USA and because Asia lacks institutional ties similar to those of the EU, meaning that India, China, and Japan are more competitive than cooperative (26).
• Asian countries have also failed to create ideas that inspire other countries. This soft power was an essential element of American dominance (27).
• China now trains around 15,000 foreign officials annually, teaching them elements of the China’s economic and political model, including state invention in the economy. This is one sign of the ‘China Model’ growing in global popularity (27).
• There no big ideas in this model, however. Whereas the American model features ideas about freedom and democracy, China cannot offer a competing political or economic vision (30).
• Some observers see trade deals in Asia and basic security organizations as the start of early unification, like the EU during the 1950s. They predict that this will start in ASEAN and expand (28).
• These seems unlikely considering nationalist tensions in Asia, even within ASEAN. These tensions including security threats, as between China and India or China and Vietnam. They also include intense resistance to immigration (29).
• The USA is still the unchallenged superpower, as its economy is three times that of China’s, it is the second most competitive country, and it has unsurpassed military dominance (30).
• Moreover, American dominance in education and innovation means that the best and brightest of Asia still come to the USA to get rich. This gives America access to continued talent pools (30).
• China refuses to take on a larger leadership role, even on issues like climate change, trade issues, North Korea, or freedom of navigation. It consistently claims that it is poor and developing, and thus cannot take on leadership roles (30).

 

Sommer, Theo. "Is the 21st century going to be the Asian century." Asien, No. 100 (2006): 70-78.

• The economic rise of Asia has not contributed to economic losses in the West, instead economic growth in Asia has driven growth elsewhere (74).
• The next century will witness a massive power shift, similar to the emergence of Japan and the USA as global powers in the 1900s. The rise of China and India will fundamentally change the global order through their existence (75).
• Asian internationally organizations are extremely weak, with even the weakest of European groups, like the OSCE, being more effective. This raises the prospect of regional conflict and reduces chances of regional cooperation (77).

 

Hicks, George. "The myth of the Asian century." The Asian Wall Street Journal, 26 October 1995, p.6

• The ‘Asian Century’ is an idea mainly generated in the West and is rejected by most Asians because they recognize the significant barriers they still face.
• One of the issues with the idea of an ‘Asian Century’ is that Asia is a colonial construct rather than a country. Asia is rife with tension, including military ones, and peace and development have only come about as a result of the American security umbrella.
• Asian economic development was made possible by catching up, accessible technology, American free market policies, and a surplus of international capital.
• Moving beyond this catching up phase requires genuine technological innovation.

 

Buruma, Ian. "What Happened to the Asian Century?". New York Times, 29 December 1999, p. A25.

• In the 1980s, there were warnings that Japan would soon dominate the world and outstrip the USA, often on the basis of unique cultural traits.
• In the late 1990s, these ideas now seem foolish and nonsensical. America remains dominate and the smartest and most innovative Asians moved to and work in California.
• Continued economic growth in other parts of Asia will presumably drive similar conversations in the 21st Century.
• The idea of an ‘Asian Century’ is vague and unhelpful, especially because only Singapore and Malaysia have really embraced the ‘Asian’ identity.

 

Bajrektarevic, Anis H. "No Asian Century Without the Pan-Asian Institution". Geopolitics, History & International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011): 196-207.

• Many claims of the ‘Asian Century’ have been on the basis of its economic power (196).
• Asia is full of conflicts and potential conflicts (200-201), while almost no security institutions comparable to the Helsinki basket and OSCE to manage these conflicts (203).

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Jamaica. “Premier Wen Jiabao Meets Press”. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Jamaica, 14 March 2006 [online]. Available at: http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t240775.htm

• On a visit to India on 14 March, Premier Wen commented that strong bilateral ties between China and India would, “usher in an Asian Century”.

Chinese Embassy in India. “Speech by Ambassador Le Yucheng in Jawaharlal Nehru Univesity”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 February 2015 [online]. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1234724.shtml

• The Asian Century will be realized through cooperation between India and China, an idea reinforced by a recent meeting between President Xi and Prime Minister Modi. This Asian Century implies Asia getting more recognition and attention from the world.

 

Chinese Embassy in India. “China’s Security and Diplomatic Doctrine in a Globalized Era – Remarks by Mr. Liu Jinsong, Charge d’Affaires of the Embassy of P. R. China in India”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 22 July 2016 [online]. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1383538.shtml

• Rise of ‘Asian Century’ is impossible for just one country. The Asian Century requires the rise of the both China and India and their mutual cooperation.
• China wants to include India in its initiatives, does not view it as a threat, and seeks to include India in plans like ‘One Belt One Road’.

China Through a Lens. “A New International Order Should Be Established with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as Norms”. China Information Center, 21 December 1988 [online]. Available at: http://china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103340.htm

• “In recent years people have been saying that the next century will be the century of Asia and the Pacific, as if that were sure to be the case. I disagree with this view. If we exclude the United States, the only countries in the Asia-Pacific region that are relatively developed are Japan, the ‘four little dragons’, Australia and New Zealand, with a total population of at most 200 million. Even if we include in the region the far eastern part of the Soviet Union and the West of the United States and Canada, the population is still only about 300 million. But the population of China and India adds up to 1.8 billion. Unless those two countries are developed, there will be no Asian century. No genuine Asia-Pacific century or Asian century can come until China, India and other neighbouring countries are developed. By the same token, there could be no Latin-American century without a developed Brazil”. – quote of Deng Xiaoping from talk with Rajiv Gandhi

 

Dutta, Sweta. “Old friend, dear friend declare: Asian century here”. Indian Express, 17 December 2010 [online]. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/old-friend-dear-friend-declare-asian-century-here/

• At their latest meeting, Premier Wen declared that the Asian Century had arrived, while Prime Minister Monmohan Singh said that the Asian Century was unfolding and that cooperation between India and China would be its cornerstone.

 

Sharma, Ruchir. “Ruchir Sharma: The Myth of the Asian Century”. Newsweek, 10 February 2007 [online]. Available at: https://www.newsweek.com/ruchir-sharma-myth-asian-century-103671

• Growth in Asia is really concentrated in China and India, with many other parts of Asia struggles or, in the case of Japan, stagnating. The rest of East Asia and Southeast Asia also continues to experience much lower growth than it did prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
• Moreover, these growth rates are often less than Europe and the USA, meaning that Asia will not meet the economic growth conditions for an ‘Asian Century’.
• These economies, especially in Southeast Asia, tend to be dedicated towards export growth rather than internal markets. This means that they are dependent on either American or Chinese markets for success and growth.

 

Bowring, Philip. “What Asian Century?”. International Herald Tribune, 18 May 2011.

• The assumption that first China and then India will follow the stellar economic trajectory of Japan, Taiwan, and S. Korea, has motivated ideas of the ‘Asian Century’. Asian growth is likely to slow and stagnate soon.
• Massive aging in East Asia and Singapore will lower workforce participation and productivity and thus slow or even depress these economies.
• China, alone among the middle income Asian countries, has been doing a good job encouraging education and technological innovation. However, it has severe issues with corruption, poor governance, and economic inequality.
• All of these issues exist in other Southeast Asian states, as well as Latin America, in addition to poor public education. This is likely to result in the middle income trap.
• The poorest states in Asia, including India, are doing very badly in terms of education and human development. This is particularly true for India, which outperforms even poor Bangladesh on these indices.

 

Greenway, H. D. S. "An Asian Century?". International Herald Tribune, 29 January 2008.

• America was seen as in decline after repeated military misadventures in the Middle East, the slow response to Hurricane Katrina, and its leading role in causing the 2008 financial crisis.
• In this atmosphere, people have started calling for Asia to have a larger institutional role in global governance, including economic governance.

 

Sachs, Jeffrey. “Welcome To The Asian Century By 2050, China and maybe India will overtake the U.S. economy in size”. Fortune Magazine, 12 January 2004 [online]. Available at: https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/01/12/357912/index.htm

• American power, including not only economic might but also all other aspects of its predominance, is based on technology. This technology is increasingly available and so the US will decrease in prominence as India and China grow. The slowing of this growth will be gradual and still allow them to catch up to the USA.
• China and India both benefit from the economic advantages of catching up and their economies and likely to grow much more rapidly than America’s.
• The American economy is nearly twice the size of China’s and almost three times the size of India’s. America, however, has a much smaller population, giving it a per capital income of eight times China and eleven times India.
• This Asian economic growth will be enabled by stronger regional links between Asian nations as they set old animosities aside and cooperate for mutual gains.
• The Asian Century means that the US will have to settle with being an important country among many rather than the world’s superpower. This will be increasingly clear as fewer countries will follow the American example.

 

Pei, Minxin. “Bamboozled: don’t believe the Asia hype”. Foreign Policy, No. 173 (2009): 32-36.

• Asia is undoubtedly experiencing rapid and sustained economic growth that is increasing its economic and military power, but its economies are still relatively small compared to the USA and its military capabilities combined are still under a third of the USA by spending (33).
• At current growth rates, the average Asian will reach the USA per capital income in 77 years; it will take China 47 years and India 123 years. At current growth rates, the combined Asian military budget would also reach American levels in 72 years (33).
• Asia will approach the USA is total economic power, with China surpassing the USA in 2027 and India by 2050 (33).
• Asia is a divided entity, with its largest powers constantly fighting amongst themselves (33). Asia is unlikely to achieve any kind of political unity soon (36).
• Asia lacks the same ideas and soft power as the USA had during the American Century. Its greatest ideal, the Asian model of development, does not lend itself to export and does not have the same ideological grip that American liberalism, idealism, and free markets did (33).
• Asian economic growth faces challenges ahead, especially its rapidly aging population. The only country that is an exception to this trend is India. Other economic challenges include environmental damage, climate change, political instability, and the lack of domestic markets (33).
• Asian financial growth is unpinned by good fundamentals: playing catch up, high savings rates, free markets, and educated workforces. These advantages can only take them so far and do not guarantee future domination, as illustrated by Japan (34).
• Moreover, Asia still trails the USA in innovation and education. Its emphasis on rote learning discourages innovation. Moreover, India and China have generally weak educational system that do not produce high quality graduates (34).
• China is unlikely to dominate Asia as a hegemon because it faces rivalry and competition from Japan, Russia, the USA, and India. Support for China is also limited, with only 10% of Japanese, 21% of S. Koreans, and 27% of Indonesians feeling comfortable with Chinese leadership over Asia (35).
• Support of the USA is still strong in Asia, with 69% of Chinese, 75% of Indonesians, 76% of S. Koreans, and 79% of Japanese believing that US influence in Asia has risen during the 21st Century (36).
• Moreover, many Asian states look towards the USA to remain involved in Asia as a counterweight to China (36).

胡奎文 [Hu Kuiwen]. "中国新闻周刊透析中印关系: 怎样的 '亚洲世纪" [China News Weekly Dialysis Sino-Indian Relations: What is the 'Asian Century']. 新闻周刊 [Newsweek], No. 23 (2003): 21-25. 4 July 2003 [online]. Available at: http://ent.chinanews.com/n/2003-07-04/26/320878.html

• On 31 May 2003, Hu Jintao and Indian PM Vajpayee met and declared that an alliance between India and China would make the 21st Century into the Asian Century.
• Hope were high for this cooperation during Premier Hu’s trip, as many landmark decisions, such as Indian recognition of Chinese control over Tibet, were made.
• Chinese basis on an ‘Asian Century’ is understood as cooperation between China, India, Japan, S. Korea, ASEAN, and SCO, particularly in terms of economic ties. Based on peace, cooperation, and economic development in Asia.

 

Mahbubani, Kishore. "America's Place in the Asian Century". Current History, Vol. 107, No. 709 (2008): 195-200.

• In 2001, a study by Goldman Sachs predicted that in 2050 the largest economies would be China, India, the USA, and Japan. Now, it is expected that India will surpass the US earlier, in 2043 (195).
• This shift of economic power away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific means that Asia will once again be home to the world’s largest economies and most powerful nations, making it the ‘Asian Century’ (195).
• Asian peace and prosperity since the 1970s is the result of active efforts by China and ASEAN (195).
• ASEAN has been the driving force of Asian integration and cooperation. Its efforts to bind Asia together have been the force behind a cohesive Asian Century (198-199).
• China’s leadership believes that it rising power means it deserves more recognition and involvement from the rest of the world. This does not mean that China needs to impose its views on other states and it will not (196).
• Asia’s success was enabled by the American world order established after ww2. Moreover, almost all East Asian states have good relations with the USA (197).

 

Scott, David. "The 21st century as whose century?". Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007): 96-118.

• The idea of an Asian Century was coined in the 1980s following the rapid economic growth in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and S. Korea. It was assumed that Asia’s economic rise would result in it playing a dominant strategic role (104-105).
• This included a prediction by Lee Kuan Yew in 1993 that East Asia would become the economic center of the world by the 2010s (105).
• Asian economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s was massive and did fundamentally change the structure of the global economy as Japan and other countries became massive creditor nations, sources of investment. This period also saw trade within Asia eclipse transpacific trade (105).
• There was still discussion in the 21st Century of a strategic movement of power to Asia away from the west. These economic expectations are based on the performance of India and China (106).
• During this period, in the mid 2000s, the ‘rise of Asia’ translated to the possibility of India and China surpassing the power of the USA and being three global poles alongside it (106).
• Prime Minister Vajpayee has echoed this belief, saying that Asia is becoming the economic center of the world, making it dominant in global politics and economics (106-107).
• China, under Wen Jiabao, has also been keen to embrace the idea of a unified Asian Century incorporating both China and India (107).
• The Asian Century was often discussed as if the USA did not play a role in it: as if it was a decision between an Asian Century or another American Century (107). This is conceptually different from the ‘Pacific Century’, which explicitly included the USA (108).
• The shift towards an Asian Century is seen in the exclusion of the USA from many regional frameworks, such as the East Asian Summit, symbolizing a shift from Pacific structures including the USA to Asian/ East Asian structures that exclude the USA (108).
• The global economy has and will continue to shift towards the Asia Pacific and India, but this Asian economic dominance will not translate into hegemony, because the USA and the EU will remain important economic actors (109).

 

Shie, Vincent H., and Craig D. Meer. "Is this the Asian century? China, India, South Korea and Taiwan in the age of intellectual capitalism". Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2010): 1-21.

• Although S. Korea, and Taiwan have produced a large number of patents and benefitted from the resulting economic advancement, they have not gained significant ground in their patent disparity behind Japan and, especially, the USA (18).
• Results for China and India are even more disappointing, as these countries have consistently failed to generated large numbers of patents or close the gap in innovation between themselves and wealthy countries, like Japan and the USA (18).
• This implies that many developing countries in Asia, and even regional powers like Taiwan and S. Korea, still lag behind the rich world in innovation and are unsuited to transition into a knowledge based economy (18).

 

Sengupta, Ramananda. “India Will Lead in the Asian Century”. Rediff.com, 20 March 2006. [online]. Available at: http://in.rediff.com/money/2006/mar/20asoc6.htm

• Minister of Industry, Ashwani Kumar, declared that the shift of economic power to Asia would make the 21st Century the Asian Century. It speaks broadly to economic power and success.
• India envisions the ‘Asian Century’ to be a multipolar one in which India will establish itself as one of the poles on the basis of its economic power and ‘soft power’.

 

Nag, Rajat M. “The Asian Century: Plausible but not Preordained”. Emerging Economy Studies, Vol. 1, No.1 (2015): 1-8.

• Asian rapid economic growth has prompted observers to declare that the 21st Century is likely to be the ‘Asian Century’ (1).
• Asia remains extremely poor, with 2/3 of the world’s poor concentrated in Asia. This poverty is seen by vast inequality both within and between countries (2).
• Meeting the conditions for the ‘Asian Century’ laid out in the ABD’s 2011 report will require considerable changes to how Asian states manage their economies. Unless changes are made, there will not be an ‘Asian Century’ (8).

 

Kim, Myongsob, and Horace Jeffery Hodges. "Is the 21st century an ‘Asian century’? Raising more reservations than hopes”. Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2010): 161-180.

• Most discussions of ‘Asia’ regarding the Asian Century focus on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Asia Pacific, or the Pacific Basin (163).
• Asian states have experienced massive economic growth. However, this growth has come alongside environmental degradation and massive and growth wealth gaps between maritime Asia and inland Asia (168).
• Asia matters militarily, primarily because of military conflicts between India, Pakistan, Israel, and N. Korea, and their neighbors. These are all nuclear states and that makes these conflicts globally important (169).
• Asia’s economic growth has enabled military expansion, including by both major maritime powers, China and Japan, and more minor inland powers, like Kazakhstan (169).
• There are not currently any international mechanism in Asia to prevent military competition and escalation. This is especially dangerous because of nuclear weapons in the region (170).
• Asia is home a diverse number of religions and cultures that will not necessarily share common values or identity. This could pose a threat to Asian cooperation and an ‘Asian Century’ (171-173).
• Asia lacks regional initiatives in solving its own problems, as indicated by the lack of institutional Asian responses to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (173).
• An ‘Asian Century’ cannot exist if Asia is not defined and if Asians do not consider themselves to be connected. This transition requires Asians to create their own international institutions and propose their own solutions to international crises and problems, not depend on the west for help (176).

 

Pan, Chengxin. "The Asian/Chinese century from the Chinese perspective". Griffith Asia Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013): 30-52.

• Discussions of an Asian Century in the USA stretch back to at least 1985, when members of the US Senate discussed the possibility of economic growth in Asia leading to an ‘Asian Century (31).
• Deng Xiaoping commented on the ‘Asian Century’ during a state visit to India in 1988, when he commented that an Asian Century would not occur until Asian countries were developed (31).
• Deng Xiaoping sought to downplay the idea of an Asian Century, and had China follow a policy of ‘keep a low profile and never take the lead’ (41).
• Chinese perspectives on the Asian Century are equally confident in it as a way to undo the ‘century of humilitation’ and sceptical as a response to concerns over perceived Chinese aggression (34).
• To Liu Mingfu, professor at China’s National Defense University, the ‘Chinese century/era’ constitutes a period of not only Chinese economic dominance, but also when Chinese culture becomes globally dominant (35).
• The concept of the ‘Asian Century’ or the ‘Chinese Century’ is not very popular in China, with most ignoring the idea. Even the most nationalist mainstream Chinese voices do not seek Chinese global leadership, only greater international respect for China (36).
• Some Chinese voices, including Tang Renwu, professor at Beijing Normal University, and Zhu Xiangyuan, member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, have doubted the ‘Asian Century’ by saying that it is not a fitting term to describe a multipolar international order (37).
• Chinese economic growth belies a lack of competitiveness, lack of innovation, and a lack of environmental sustainability. These will make it difficult for China to catch up to the USA (37-38).
• Asia is not a coherent political concept and it does not even have a common market. Efforts to create one have not yet succeeded, and may be blocked by US initiatives like the TPP (38-39).
• Becoming an ‘Asian Century’ requires more than just a strong economy. It also means Asia will be a larger global actor, more active in creating global rules, and its values will have greater international traction (39).
• The idea of an ‘Asian Century’ or an ‘American Century’ stems from an Enlightenment tradition in Europe and the USA that claims a linear and progressive history in which some set of nations will always play a leading role. The thought of being eclipsed by Asia is thus terrifying to the west, because it means that they would no longer be at the progressive forefront of history (43).

 

Carr, Andrew. "The Asian Century." In The Gillard Governments: Australian Commonwealth Administration 2010-2013. Melbourne University Publishing Limited, 2014.

• Asia will come to dominate the global economy. When it does so, this will result in a greater strategic position for Asia. Australia seeks to deepen its Asian alliances to better benefit from this reorientation (ii).
• Australia considers Asia to be defined as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and India; or Indonesia to Japan and the Koreas, as well as India (30).
• The USA is still very present in the Asian Century and is predicted to remain the dominant strategic actor in Asia for the foreseeable future (7).
• As Asian powers, particularly India and China, grow in economic strength, they are also likely to have a larger military presence and become more internationally ambitions. Australia believes this will change the global security environment (7, 74).
• An increase in Indian or Chinese security presence will be mitigated by their relative poverty, which will means that they’ll likely focus on domestic issues and development and try to maintain international stability (74).
• The increase of consumption in oil and energy products from the Middle East means that Asia, especially China and India, will have larger strategic interests there and in the Indian Ocean (74).
• China and India have tripled their share of the global economy between the 1990s and the 2010s. By 2025, Asia will account for almost half of global GDP (6).
• Asian economic success was enabled by the free trade system created and maintained by the USA, as it allowed the Asian states to take full advantage of their advantage in cheap labour. American security guarantees also played a large part in this development (40).
• This was further facilitated by regional initiatives, like APEC (40).
• Asia is now a net exporter of capital investment, while also maintaining the major of the world’s foreign exchange reserves, of which China alone accounts for 1/3 (43).
• Asian nations have greatly increased their research output and innovation, as measured by patents, over the past decades, but remain uncompetitive. India produces only 3.5%, in 2010, of the world’s research papers, and China in 2007 had roughly the same total amount of researchers as the USA, and less than 20% of the per capital researcher ration of Taiwan and Singapore (45).
• Asia has begun playing a larger role in global governance, as demonstrated by the G20 and changes to the IMF structure to better account for Asian interests. Asia has also demonstrated its own policy initiatives, such as the East Asian Summit organized by ASEAN (46).
• Economic productivity in Asia is still relatively low, with China sustaining productivity roughly 20% of US levels, with India and Indonesia operating at roughly 10% American productivity (54). However, Asia’s size means that even low growth and low productivity still means Asian economic dominance (56).
• These productivity levels have been steadily increasing, as they did after Chinese entry into the WTO (56). 
• Relatively low productivity levels create a danger of falling into the ‘middle income trap’ after the advantages of catch up are lost. Since the 1960s, only 13 of the world’s 103 middle income countries have avoided this trap (56).
• Asia’s rise means that more of the global economy will flow to Asia, changing production and trade patterns (60), these countries will also develop larger internal consumer markets (62). Asians will also be much wealthier and demand different goods (65). Rising wealth will also means that Asia will become a major capital exporter and investor (66-67).

 

Nye, Joseph. “Is the American century over?”. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 130, No. 3 (2015): 393-400.

• Measured by being the world’s largest economy, the American Century lasted from at least the 1910s to either the early 2000s or the early 2020s, dependent on PPP or gross measurements (394).
• However, economic strength does not necessarily translate into power. This is why the USA was not a superpower in 1900, but instead only became a major power after its economic strength was turned into military strength by Presidents TR Roosevelt and Wilson (394-395).
• To surpass the USA, China would need not only a superior economy, but also to surpass the USA in terms of military strength and soft power (395).
• The American Century, declared by Henry Luce in 1941, saw American global leadership at the fore. Since its victory in the Second world war, the USA built NATO in 1949, the Marshall Plan in 1948, supported military interventions, and led the first UN intervention, in Korea in 1950. Moreover, the USA was and remains the primary security provider in Europe and East Asia (396).
• This period of ‘American hegemony’ was not, however, either complete nor unchallenged. The USA was balanced by the USSR and roughly half the global population, in China, India, Indonesia, and the USSR, rejected the American Century (398).
• In terms of military power, the USA is unchallenged. Its navy is as large as those of the next 17 nations combined. Its air force is superior to the entire planet combined against it. Its military budget accounts for nearly half the global total (396-397).

 

Huang, Yiping, and Bijun Wang. "From the Asian Miracle to an Asian Century? Economic Transformation in the 2000s and Prospects for the 2010s". In RBA Annual Conference Volume. Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011.

• Risks in the Chinese economy include over investment, high reliance on export markets, large current account surpluses in trade, income inequality, and low production efficiency (23).
• Risks in the Indian economy are extreme inequality, terrible labour laws, a complex and inefficient tax system, and a lack of infrastructure (23).
• Risks in the ASEAN economies are a lack of investment, as average investment levels are still 10% less than they were in 1997 prior to the financial crisis. They also need to avoid the middle income trap (23).
• Asia has made some progress in terms of free trade agreements and the Chiang Mai Initiatives, but substantial integration outside of ASEAN has been limited. Asia lacks something similar to the EU, NAFTA, or MERCOSUR (25). Further integration is likely to be limited outside of basic free trade agreements (28).
• The greatest regional role played by Asian countries has been in the G20 (25).
• Some of suggested that Asia will follow the EU’s path of creating a common currency, perhaps based on the yuan (26).
• In the coming decades, Asia should remain a major consumer of commodities, although these growth rates should slow, and it is likely to become a major investor and capital exporter (27).
• Asia has not made significant reforms since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its survival of the 2008 financial crisis was only the result of national policies. In the case of China, its stimulus during this period created a large amount of nonperforming debt held by local governments. Asian capacity to repeat this resilience in the case of another crisis is minimal (28).

 

Madhur, Srinivasa. "Asia's Role in Twenty‐first‐century Global Economic Governance". International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (2012): 817-833.

• Economists generally assume that Asia will play a larger role in global economic governance as its economies grow, but this is not necessarily the case (818).
• Asian economies are export oriented and thus depend on markets elsewhere for continued growth. This has weakened their bargaining position in global trade negotiations. This will only change if Asia develops an internal market (823).
• One of the best ways to do this would be to create a fund dedicated to Asian infrastructure development (824).
• To play a larger role in global economic governance, Asia should play a larger role in regional economic governance (827).
• This has taken place to a limited extent following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, through the Chiang Mai Initiative for currency swaps and foreign currency reserve fund, a regional economic surveillance body, the Macroeconomic research office, under ASEAN+3, and the ASEAN economic community (827).
• Asian economic institutions are still weak overall. They should focus on establishing a regional free trade area, an Asian Monetary Fund, and a financial dialogue between Asian governments (827).
• Right now Asia does not coordinate its positions in the G20 beforehand. Doing this could considerably increase its power, as could using SAARC, the East Asian Summit, ASEAN, or ASEAN+3 to empower Asian G20 members to speak on behalf of multiple countries (828).
• The formal Bretton woods institutions of global financial governance have been steadily replaced by informal multilateral organizations in the 1970s after the end of the gold standard. The first was the G5 (US, Japan, Bonn Republic, France, and UK) in 1973, which was expanded to the G20 in 1999, which was then empowered in 2009 with the creation of the Financial Stability Board (819).
• Asia benefits from the current system of financial infrastructure and would benefit from strengthening it. This could be done by implementing new rules on financial regulation, managing currency accounts surpluses, and initiating new wTO negotiations (820).
• Canadian PM Paul Martin predicted, during a G8 meeting, that either global governance institutions would expand to include India and China or these massive power would establish their own institutions (821).
• Asian countries are underrepresented in the Bretton woods institutions, particularly in regarding to their voting shares in the IMF and other groups (821).
• Many feel that the lack of Asian power in these institutions, particularly the IMF, was responsible for that organizations slow and lacklustre response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (822).
• The G20 has made reform of the IMF a key part of its agenda, succeeding in implementing some reforms in 2010 (822). This has increased the shares held by India, S. Korea, Japan, nearly doubled China’s, and slightly decreased Indonesia’s (822).
• No single Asian country has the power or legitimacy to lead Asia alone. The possible form of leadership is collective Asian leadership among Japan, China, India, Indonesia, S. Korea through the G20. Such leadership, however, would require cooperation between these states (829).
• Asia does not seem to want to lead the globe. Asian countries generally seek to keep and strengthen the current system of global governance, not take a leading role or construct a new one (830).

 

Auslin, Michael R. The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World's Most Dynamic Region. Yale University Press, 2017.

• Discussions of an ‘Asian Century’ have existed at least since Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1970s (1). The rise of Asian economies and wealth, as well as its growth compared to stagnation elsewhere, has led many to assume that Asia will dominate the future (2).
• America will remain involved in Asia as Asian become more powerful, and thus more important to American interests (10). America is only likely to leave Asia if Asia crashes and thus becomes unimportant. Otherwise, more Asian countries will continue to welcome an American presence in the Asia Pacific (11).

 

Dollar, David. “Asian Century or Multi-Polar Century?”. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007.

• Many predict that Asian economic growth will result in an ‘Asian Century’ in which Asia dominates economically, politically, and culturally (1).
• The rise of Asia actually better translate to the rise of China, and possibly India. Moreover, they will not totally eclipse the USA. Instead, the world order is likely to be multipolar, including both the USA and some Asian powers (27-28).
• The rise of Asia has not been consistent, with most growth actually being generated by China. India has done okay, as have Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam, but the rest of Asia has only performed slightly better than the global average (1-2).
• As coastal China gets wealthier, its advantage in labour wages decreases. This will lead to the most labour intensive work getting moved elsewhere (11).

 

Connors, Michael K., Rémy Davison, and Jörn Dosch. The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific: Conflict and Cooperation in the Asian Century. Routledge, 2017.

• The idea of an Asian Century is driven by the rise of Asian economies, especially China and India, the nuclearization of the continent, and the rise of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and associated institutions to challenge the USA (Chapter “Asia’s Great Game?” by Remy Davison).

 

Mahbubani, Kishore. “The new Asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East”. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

• The vast majority of Asian countries aspire to be like the west and hold western values and aspirations (8).
• There are four possible candidates for global leadership: the USA, the EU, China, and India (236).
• The USA is the strongest candidate because it is already the global leader and it created the global institutions in 1945 that still define the modern world (236). However, America is increasingly isolationist and may not play this part (237).
• The EU has a negligible international presence, even in the Balkans or N. Africa. It serves the interests of individual members states and lacks a cohesive or visionary foreign policy (237).
• China has the economic power to take a leadership role (238), but it is not interested in taking a leadership role. China seeks to be a key international stakeholder, but they want to focus on solving domestic issues (239).
• India is by far the weakest economy of the four ‘superpowers’ and has massive developmental issues (239). Like China, India often seeks to prioritize its domestic issues (240).

 

Acharya, Amitav. “The End of American World Order”. London: Polity Press, 2014.

• The two most important global institutions of the emerging powers are BRICS and the G20, coming to prominence after 2008, but founded in 1990 and 1999, respectively (64).
• The BRICS have a number of internal divides, including competition between China and India. BRICS membership is more of a status symbol than a real society, as its membership disagrees on almost all major issues (65).
• Collectively, the G20 represents 80% of global population, 90% of GDP, 90% of finance, and 80% of global trade (65). The G20 has pushed for the reform, and thus secured the longevity of Brettons woods institutions, including a voting share reform of the IMF (66).
• There is significant discord with the G20, not only between the G8 and the rest, but between developing nations. Competition among developing countries is so strong that they will favor G8 leadership over that of their rivals (66-67).
• Europe is still overrepresented on the G20, giving it an unfair advantage. G8 meetings also happen before G20 meetings, giving the rich countries a chance to strategize before these meetings (67).
• This does not imply a total divide in the G20, however, as in 2010 the USA supported India, Brazil, and China against Europe in an effort to decrease European power in the IMF (68).
• The actually effectiveness of the G20 is questionable. It really hasn’t done that much to solve major global problems (67-68).
• Asian members of the G20, such as China and India, do not represent their regions or continent. Instead, they only represent themselves. Moreover, their position on the G20 makes them less likely to cooperate (72). Even Indonesia doesn’t consult other ASEAN members on its G20 positions, using its G20 seat to instead lobby for its own national power (73).
• The emerging powers are unlikely to accept the American world order, but are not strong or coordinated enough to create their own alternative systems (78). Regional organizations have been founded as the basis for stability after American hegemony ends (90).
• In Asia this process of regionalism has been impeded by the norm of non-intervention, and distrust among China, India, and their Asian neighbours (90).
• Regional hegemonies forming, including South Asia under India or East Asia under China, are unlikely because these states all lack regional legitimacy and their neighbours dislike them (102).
• Fear of Indian domination has prevented SAARC from doing anything important (104).
• China has mainly played a responsible and constructive role in East Asian regional bodies. If it were to dominate these organizations they would falter (104). China does not seek to evict the USA, and knows that many Asian neighbors, including Japan, Vietnam, India, and S. Korea, view it with suspicion (105).
• The most important part of this development is just the end of the American Century and of American dominance and hegemony. It will return the USA to being one among many great powers (112).

 

Beeson, Mark, and Li Fujian. “What consensus? Geopolitics and policy paradigms in China and the United States”. International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2015): 93-109.

• Chinese and American economic strength depends on each others, with Chinese exports depending on American consumption and the American economy depending on Chinese consumption (99).
• The Washington Consensus is broadly associated with American free market ideas, represented by the Bretton woods institutions, and later by neoliberalism. Many Chinese scholars believe that this consensus was developed to further American capitalist interests at the expense of countries like China (101-102).
• It is very questionable whether either a Beijing Consensus or a China Model ever existed (102-104).
• Unlike the Washington Consensus, the ‘China Model’ does not represent a recognizable brand or style of economic ideology that could be exported to other states (108).

 

Womack, Brantly. “China and the future status quo”. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2015): 115-137.

• China is not replacing the USA as the hegemonic power because the world is entering a period without a hegemon. Instead, the current transition is to a period where both China and the USA are great powers (116).
• Chinese foreign policy is defined by seven aims: maintaining Communist rule, high economic growth, societal stability, defend territorial unity, increase Chinese power for multipolar world order, maintain favourable regional conditions, and avoid other states perceiving China as a threat (121).
• Chairman Xi has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s policy of keeping a low profile, and has instead pursued a more activist foreign policy (123).

 

Fidler, David P. "The Asian century: Implications for international law." Singapore Year Book of International Law, No. 9 (2005): 19-35.

• The common feature of the ‘Asian Century’ is that Asia is expected to have a much greater impact in international relations (25).
• For Asia, mainly China and India, to enjoy the continental hegemonic domination as Europe did in the 19th Century, would require both the collapse of America power and the internal weakening of the EU. Not only is this extremely unlike, but Asian countries would not be willing to use the military force employed by Europe (26).
• The decline of American power to the degree that a single country, either China or India, could dominate it and the globe is also extremely unlikely. America is likely to remain a great power (26-27).
• Both China and India lack the ideological basis to be a transformative hegemon. India has totally bought into the American model of free market capitalism, while China still has too many internal ideological disputes to project its own ideological model outwards (27).
• Ideas of ‘Asian values’ underpinning an Asian Century are ludicrous. Asia lacks the ideological and political cohesion that Europe developed in the lead-up to the 19th Century. (27-28).
• It still isn’t clear that the 21st Century wouldn’t be another American Century, as it still created the global ideology and has the most power (28).
• One of the biggest changes of the Asian Century will be that things that happen in Asia will be more important, meaning that these solutions will also become more globally important (30).
• “The Asian century will not be remembered because countries in Asia lay down the law to the rest of the world, or because China or India becomes a hyperpower. If the 21 s" century is the Asian century, it will be because Asia will host the next great challenges for, and experiments in, the governance of human affairs” (31).

 

Hopewell, Kristen. "Different Paths to Power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization". Review of International Political Economy, Vol.22, No.2 (2015): 311-338.

• The international institutions developed after WWII here based heavily on US power, reflected in the fact that the WTO, IMF, and World Bank have been dominated by the interests of the US and other wealthy industrial states. This system has typically excluded developing nations from the decision-making process (312).
• As developing countries like China, Brazil, and India grow richer and more powerful, they have gained influence in international economic institutions. The G20 was recognized as a major body for coordinating responses to the 2008 financial crisis, the voting rules at the IMF and World Bank are being reformed to give developing countries more influence, and all three countries have emerged as major players in WTO negotiations (312).
• In discussions of the growing power of developing countries, China is normally viewed as a the central player and main power. Brazil and India are also part of this transformation, but they are secondary players to China. This is a reflection of the fact that Indian and Brazilian economic growth rates have typically been lower than Chinese ones and their economies both remain a fraction of the size of the Chinese economy (313).
• Brazil and India have exercised new international power in distinctly different ways than China. Whereas China's economic power has allowed it to emerge as an independent international actor, India and Brazil have both exercised considerable international influence in the WTO through their positions as leaders of coalitions of other developing countries. Moreover, Brazil and India had a far more significant historical influence in the WTO than China in terms of breaking the US-led hegemony of developed states (314-316).
• Whereas Brazil and Indian were extremely active during the Doha Round and sought to build coalitions, strategize, and outmaneuver developed countries, China only reacted to initiatives by developed countries and actively sought to diminish its leadership role in the negotiations (332).
• In the wake of the Uruguay Round of trade talks that led to the establishment of the WTO, developing countries were dissatisfied with their gains in negotiations and the unequal decision-making process. Pressure to redress these grievances led to the calling of the Doha Round in 1999, at which a new coalition of developing countries emerged (316).
• At the state of the Doha Round, negotiations were still centered around Japan, Canada, the USA, and the EU. This only began to change at the 2003 Ministerial in Cancun, when India and Brazil worked together and established an coalition of developing countries to oppose the decisions of 'the Quad' of developed nations (318).
• Prior to the Cancun Ministerial, the USA and EU created a joint proposal about agriculture, which would force developing countries to lower their tariffs without developed countries making similar concessions. This was similar to the Blair House Accord that had shaped the outcome of the Uruguay Round of talks (318).
• Fearing a failure similar to the Uruguay Round, Brazil proposed to the Indian delegation a plan to collectively oppose the USA-EU plan. The two countries succeeded in forming a coalition of developing countries that constituted half of the global population and 2/3 of all farmers, and got this coalition to back a Brazilian proposal that would have slashed US and EU farm subsidies (318-319).
• Although other developing country coalitions existed at the Cancun Ministerial -- the G33, the Cotton-4, the Core Group, the ACP Group, the Least-Developed Countries group, and the SVE group -- the fact that the G20, led by Brazil and India, came to the meeting with a proposal flipped the power relations at the meeting and led to the failure of the meeting, marked by the decisive rejection of the US-EU plan (319).
• The ability of the G20 to both take the agenda-setting initiative from the Quad and block the US-EU proposal fundamentally changed the dynamics of the WTO, making gaining the assent of India and Brazil a necessary step in reaching any future deals; this change was marked by the replacement of Japan and Canada with Brazil and India within the Quad (319).
• The original dynamic of the Doha Round was supposed to be disputes between the USA trying to force the EU and Japan to reduce their agricultural subsidies. Instead, the US found itself defending its subsidy schemes against the G20 group led by Brazil and India (319-320).
• Brazilian-Indian cooperation continued at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, when the two countries collectively led the G110 coalition of developing countries in opposition to the changes proposed by the wealthy industrialized countries (324).
• The relationship between Brazil, India, and other developing countries began to degrade during the 2008 Geneva Ministerial, when other developing countries objected to Indian and Brazilian concessions during Green Room meetings (327).
• China was first invited to Green Room meetings in 2008, on the initiative of the USA, who wanted to include China so that access to the lucrative Chinese market could be discussed specifically. They also believed that China would side with the USA and EU, thus alienating India, whom the US viewed as the major impediment to progress with the Doha Round (329-330).
• The US strategy to break Indian opposition by including China in the Green Room meetings failed. Rather than backing the USA, China defended the interests of its large peasant population by opposing US agricultural plans and siding with India. China also resolutely refused to concede on any of the liberalization plans specifically directed at its market. The Geneva Ministerial ended in unmitigated failure (331).
• The WTO, and its predecessor the GATT, function through series of talks between countries until consensus is reached. These voting structures are remarkable compared to the IMF and World Bank, which had weighted voting systems and reserved veto powers for the USA (317).
• Despite its democratic voting structure, the varied economic weight of different countries has empowered a small number of countries to create a fait accompli, then forcing other countries to accept the decision. A small number of states, usually led by the USA, the EU, Canada, and Japan, conduct 'Green Room meetings' until they come to a consensus, then force the rest of the GATT or WTO to accept this decision (317).
• This arrangement of Green Room meetings meant that for most the GATT and WTO, developing countries have been excluded from the decision-making process. Accordingly, agreements were weighted in favor of developed nations (317).
• The voting structure in the WTO changed considerably during the Doha Round, as by 2003, Brazil and India became parties to the Green Room meetings, while Japan and Canada were largely excluded. In 2008, China joined these meetings as well (318).
• The alliance between Brazil and India during the Doha Round was unexpected because they have conflicting policy positions on agriculture. As one of the world's largest agricultural exporters, Brazil has sought to open up new agricultural markets, particularly seeking to destroy protectionist measures in the developed world, winning two landmark cases against US cotton subsidies and EU sugar subsidies. India, on the other hand, has a very weak agricultural sector and has sought to prevent WTO negotiations from opening agriculture or any other new sectors to global competition (320-321).
• India had been left isolated in previous GATT and WTO negotiations, often being the lone objection to US proposals, eventually causing it to cave under diplomatic pressure. India strongly opposed the beginning of the Doha Round and sought allies so that it would not suffer losses in the Doha Round similar to the Uruguay Round (322).
• There was little trust underpinning the G20 coalition, as a previous coalition -- the G10 -- had collapsed during the Uruguay Round, as all countries expect India, including Brazil, defected. India thus sought to develop other alliances besides the G20, in case Brazil against defected (323).
• India was the main country behind the creation of the G33, a group of 46 developing countries that specifically sought to prevent the opening of agricultural markets during the Doha Round. Through the G33 group, India secured the inclusion of special exemption on agricultural goods as part of the final Doha Round deal (323).
• The G33 was actually instrumental in the failure of the 2013 Bali Ministerial, as US opposition to the legalization of emergency tariffs on foodstuffs led to a breakdown in the meetings (324).
• India also has a lead member of the Core Group, which was organized to oppose the expansion of WTO regulations to cover state procurement, investment, and competition laws. Using the Core Group, India forced the removal of these issues from the agenda at the Cancun Ministerial (324).
• China only joined the WTO in 2001, after 15 years of difficult negotiations requiring a significant number of domestic reforms. Despite becoming a member right before the Doha Round, China did not actively participate in the trade negotiations (327-328). 
• Although China was a member of the G20 and G33, China deliberately took a backseat position during the negotiations. China sought to hide its true interests and avoid taking a leadership position in negotiations (328).
• As one of the world's largest exports of manufactured goods, China has a major incentive to open other markets to its exports, while still retaining some domestic protections. The Chinese leadership believes that endorse this radically liberal position could scare markets and alienate other countries, so China seeks to remain quiet in negotiations, benefiting from liberalization, but not making enough noise to be specifically targeted by liberal reforms (328-329).
• After being directed involved in Green Room meetings in 2008, China sought to return to its previous inconspicuous place within the WTO. This has been largely unsuccessful due to US concentration on Chinese markets, but oh boy does China keep trying (331).

 

 Kennedy, Scott. “The myth of the Beijing consensus”. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010):461-477.

• The idea of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ is misguided and an inaccurate assessment of China’s development experience. In short, the Beijing Consensus does not actually exist (462). The idea of ‘consensus’ within Chinese bureaucracy is itself non-existent (472).
• Moreover, much of China’s developmental policy has drawn from the recommendations of the Washington Consensus regarding liberalization. That said, Chinese economic thought does still diverge from that Consensus (470).
• The idea of a ‘China Model’ is similarly erroneous, as it implies that China has pursued a continuous developmental strategy and that this strategy has been and is excepted by the majority of the Chinese government (473, 475).

 

Dunn, Lauren, Peter Nyers, and Richard Stubbs. "Western interventionism versus East Asian non-interference: Competing ‘global norms’ in the Asian century." The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010): 295-312.

• There are two general perspectives on intervention. The norm in the west is intervention under the aegis of the ‘responsibility to protect’, while in East Asia it is non-intervention (296).
• These divisions are not totally clear, since Japan and Singapore both support the idea of the responsibility to protect (307).
• The East Asian perspective that privileges state sovereignty, sometimes called the ‘Beijing Consensus’, has been spread most actively by China and has been institutionalized in the SCO and, to a lesser extend, ASEAN (306).
• The rise of East Asian power will mean that the tension between these norms will become increasingly important in global politics (310).
• The UNSC has increasingly deferred to regional bodies, like ASEAN or the African Union, in their discussion of crises. This means that the norms of ASEAN, and China, on issues like Myanmar are more important (309).

 

Rachman, Gideon. Easternisation: War and peace in the Asian century. Random House, 2016.

• The movement of global power and economic might to the East means that the previously obscure politics and conflict of Asia will shape global political dynamics. It increases the impact that Asian politics, and especially tensions, have on the rest of Earth (247-248).
• Almost all of the Asia Pacific, including India, Japan, S. Korea, Australia, and SE. Asia, wants the USA to remain an active player in the region to balance against Chinese influence (249).

 

Chen, Weitseng. The Beijing Consensus? How China has changed Western ideas of law and economic development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

• Although China did not follow the Washington Consensus in terms of law and economic development, its own experience has been ad hoc and without a centring ideology. There is no predesigned ‘Chinese Model’, nor is the Chinese way of doing things historically unique to China (2-9).

 

Beeson, Mark. "Can China Lead?". Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2013): 233-250.

• It is not easy to transform economic might into political power, as demonstrated by Japan’s failure to do so in East Asia. Both Japan and China have limited their international ambitions voluntarily, under the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ and Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to ‘adopt a low profile and never take the lead’ (241).
• China foreign policy is characterized by recognition of US hegemony, attempts to cultivate regional friendships, and active participation in multilateral institutions, as well as other markers of good international citizenship (242).
• China still mainly attempts to negotiate disputes and leverage its power on a bilateral basis rather than through international institutions (244).
• China and Japan compete for power in East Asia, including through the design of regional institutions. China prefers the ASEAN+3 group, while Japan and Australia have both tried to propose other arrangements to limit Chinese power (244-245).
• The re-entry of the USA into the Asia Pacific will further constrain Chinese power and ambitions, as Asian Pacific countries pivot towards the USA (245).
• There is no hegemonic transition between China and the USA because there is no longer a global hegemon, as the world moves towards to multipolar orientation. Moreover, China has not presented any radical alternative vision of the global order that could or would underpin a new hegemonic order (245-246).

 

Chuang. “No Way Forward, No Way Back: China in the Era of Riots”. Chuang, No.1 (2016).

• Chinese industry is moving towards the interior, close to where the majority of Chinese workers live and historically migrated from. This is to attempt to reduce labor costs by transferring what were previously costs born by companies in the form of barracks and canteens onto workers through wages. So, factories moving inland because of higher labor costs.

 

Cho, Yoon Je. "What Do Asian Countries Want The Seat at The High Table For?: G20 as a New Global Economic Governance Forum and the Role of Asia”. Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, Vol.3, No. 2 (2011): 95-121.

• The global financial institutions and the rules that govern the global economic order were created by the USA, with Europe and Japan playing bit parts. The rest of Asia did not play a role in its creation (96).
• Despite having a seat at the G20 and major economic power, neither Japan nor China have seemed interested in shaping the global economic system nor presented a vision of how to do so (98).
• Asian countries seek to acquire more power and voice in global institutions, but neither seek to expand the capacity of these bodies nor make changes to their governance. Moreover, Asian states do not want to take the lead in global economic governance (115, 118).
• There is now a need to change the global economic order because whereas the previous engines of economic growth in Asia, Japan, S. Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, were allied with the USA, now the largest economic powers of India and China are there and not allied to the USA (97).
• To reflect this, and the inadequacy of prior global economic governance structures, the G20 was created, mostly replacing the G7 (97). The primacy of the G20 was demonstrated by its importance to the solution to the 2008 financial crisis (105).

 

McMahon, Dinny. China’s Great Wall of Debt: Shadow Banks, Ghost Cities, Massive Loans, and the End of the Chinese Miracle. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018.

Ramo, Joshua Cooper. "The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power". London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.

• Beijing Consensus exists and is an alternative to the Washington Consensus.

Fiang, Tian. "To join or not to join, Japan ponders its future role in AIIB". People's Daily, 17 January 2018 . Available at: http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0117/c90000-9316663.htm

• Japan ain't joined yet