Spechler, Dina Rome & Martin C. Spechler. "The foreign policy of Uzbekistan: sources, objectives and outcomes: 1991–2009". Central Asian Survey, vol.29, no.2 (2010): 159-170.

Spechler, Dina Rome & Martin C. Spechler. "The foreign policy of Uzbekistan: sources, objectives and outcomes: 1991–2009". Central Asian Survey, vol.29, no.2 (2010): 159-170.

• The chief objective of Uzbekistani foreign policy since 1991 has been the preservation of the internal stability of its super-presidential, authoritarian regime. In these terms, Uzbekistani foreign policy has been majorly successful (159).
• "Facilitating internal stability have been Uzbekistan’s docile general population, corrupted elites, and the government’s willingness to use force when necessary. Modest economic growth based on the export of agricultural and other commodities has financed strong state bureaucratic control of both internal development and limited external activities" (159).
• A potential obstacle to future success of these initiatives is President Karimov's unwillingness to name a successor or put a proper democracy in place (159).
• Uzbekistan enforces strict border controls, even with ethnic Uzbek villages on its borders, but many areas are still porous to smuggling and drug trafficking (160).
• During the period of early independence Uzbekistan had shaky relations with all of its neighbors, thing are improved considerably, however, since 2006. During that time, Uzbekistan has signed a treaty of cooperation with Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan's new President has not been as harsh on ethnic Uzbeks (160).
• The new relations with Kazakhstan may represent the domination of national interests over the personal feud between Karimov and Nazarbayev, which has been going on since before independence (162).
• Much of the current government revenue base is made up of heavy taxation on exports of cotton, natural gas, and oil. These profits go towards support strong social services, support for 'strategic industries', and considerable -- but classified -- expenditures on security services (160).
• Especially compared to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has a fairly diversified economy that remains sustainable despite fluctuations in global markets. Economic stability has been greatly helped by government efforts to create autarky in energy and grains, which prevents trade imbalances during times of low-export and high-import costs (161).
• Imports in general are limited by tight controls on currency exchange -- and in many areas the difficult of acquiring hard cash of any kind. The lack of cash credit further limits the ability to import, leading to the further development of internal markets (161).
• High growth rates (5% to 10%) in Uzbekistan depend on a favorable exchange between key exports -- i.e., gold, gas, and cotton -- and machinery and industrial imports needed for industrial expansion and growth.  In recent years, this rate has been stable and allowed Uzbekistani industries to diversify and expand (161).
• Uzbekistan receives very little foreign investment. Although the country has welcomed European, American, Korean and Russian investors in key industries, almost all development has been financed by international institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (161).
• Foreign direct investment (FDI) was $879 million USD as of 2007, a tiny fraction of the amount invested in Kazakhstan and equivalent to the amount invested in far less populous, isolationalist Turkmenistan (161).
• Foreign aid totaled $172 million USD in 2005, far less than even the amounts invested in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and only $7 USD per capita (161).
• "As a result of several years of good export results, Uzbekistan’s government has accumulated an estimated US$2.7 billion in its Fund for Reconstruction and Development, which it will use to finance infrastructure and basic industries". The industries and employment generated with this investment are hoped to employ many of the immigrants returning from Russia and the Middle East as the Great Recession leads to job loss in those areas (162). 
• It is technically possible to convert so'm into USD or other foreign currency, but restrictions make it difficult and bribes make it costly. The government has mostly allowed the exchange rate to depreciate as inflation has increased at the same high rate as the economy, but the black market rate remains around 30% lower than the official exchange rate (162).
• With about 2% of its GDP devoted to the military, the country fields some 56,000 soldiers, plus about three times that number in ‘alternative service’ [potentially meaning reserve forces?] (162).
• The internal security forces are well-paid and given good benefits. The competition between the various agencies and personalities also seems distracting enough to prevent any internal threat from emerging to challenge President Karimov (162).
• The officer corps is almost entirely native Uzbekistani and has received Western training and equipment since joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The armed forces have also inherited base structures and armaments from the Soviet Union following independence (162).
• After forcing American aviators to leave Qarshi-Xanabad airbase in 2005, the only foreign forces remaining on Uzbekistani soil are a small German force based in Termez supporting the ISAF force in Afghanistan (162).
• "President Karimov was re-elected to the presidency in 2007 without significant opposition. His open-ended rule is similar to that of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Lacking a vice-president or any designated heir to the office, succession will be fraught with uncertainty. But since the Uzbekistani elite have privileges that would be at risk in any violent struggle over power, a relatively peaceful and brief transition is quite possible. Soviet Russia, Communist China, and Turkmenistan have provided examples of authoritarian succession without bloodshed" (163).
• Almost all aspects of state function can be directed by the Office of the President. This includes the appointment almost all key figures and the setting of official wages and prices, allowing the President to control discontent in times of paid shortages (163).
• Looking at the speeches and opinions of President Karimov can provide insight into the workings of Uzbekistani foreign policy. He espouses an ideology of national independence [mustaqillik] with a focus on the inculcation of moral values [ma'naviyat] within a multi-national population. This ideology is strongly opposed to Western consumerism, radical Islam, and ethnic nationalism (163).
• "The so-called ‘Asian values’ of hierarchy, respect for authority and seniority, and desire for social order are espoused in Uzbekistan" (163).
• Uzbekistan has promoted regional cooperation in public, but neither it nor other the Central Asian republics even followed up on these plans. In reality many disagreement have to be solved bilaterally or through independent action (163).
• Since independence, Uzbekistan has changed its foreign policy orientation a number of times, always retaining maneuverability. Uzbekistan had distanced itself from other post-Soviet states and dropped the rouble currency by 1993. Uzbekistan has allied itself with Russian or American strategic interests during the Tajik Civil War and the NATO intervention in Afghanistan respectively (164).
• By 2003, Uzbekistani expectations of an alliance with the US had been disappointed. The republic received little funding from NATO, and Western partners were becoming more pushing about human rights and democratization. Western support for the 'color' revolution in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic led to distrust, and after the Andijon Incident American forces were expelled from their airbase amid allegations that the West wanted to destabilize Uzbekistan (164).
• That same year, following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Uzbekistan expelled itself from GUUAM, for similar reasons of worrying about destabilizing influences from former partners (164).
• After the expulsion of American forces in 2005, Uzbekistan extended cooperation with Russia in energy production and gas export. However, they made sure to keep options open and have expanded ties with Chinese firms and the Chinese government (165).
• At the time of writing [Spring 2010], the author suggests that Uzbekistan favored cooperation with the CSTO, which it had recently rejoined. Increased connections with the SCO where rejected at the time b/c China wanted to press into a military and economic bloc, rather than its current anti-terrorist and crime fighting incarnation. Trade is also more direct towards Russia than China (165).
• Uzbekistan keeps good trade ties with a number of countries and readily accepts trading partners. In addition to Russia and China, high-level cooperation and trade exists with Japan, South Korea, and India. Cooperation with the US and EU has also reopened following the cessation of some of the sanctions imposed after the Andjion Incident, and Uzbekistan seems ready to pursue them (165). 
• Because of its relative isolation from the global financial market and lack of any domestic credit infrastructure, Uzbekistan fared well in the 2008 global recession. The effects of the economic downturn have come to Uzbekistan through greater effects on its trading partners. Demand for cotton fell by 1/3 since the crash, leading to lose in domestic revenue, however gas and gold exports remained strong (166).
• Cotton, gas, and gold likely make up roughly 10%, 20%, and 20% of Uzbekistan's export revenue annually, bringing in the majority of foreign currency used to finance domestic industries (166).
• The largest and most dangerous effect of the global economic recession on Uzbekistan has been the flood of returning migrant workers, and the decline in remittances. The Uzbekistani economy will struggle to accept more young workers, and the million Uzbekistanis abroad make up around 8% of GDP. Loss of jobs abroad and devaluation of currencies such as the Kazakhstani tenge and Russian rouble will decrease the net value of remittances sent back home (166).
• In response to the 2008 global economic recession the government has increased funds for social services, restructured loans, and increased investment in basic industries which should increase employment. The money from a relief and stability fund has helped significantly, as President Karimov reported that the economy has grown by 8.1% in 2009 despite retractions elsewhere (167).
• Even with floods of unemployed workers returning to Uzbekistan it is difficult to organize meaningful opposition to the regime. Required population registration in the capital and police barricades within the country prevent large numbers of unemployed men becoming idle in the main cities, leaving little of the opportunity for revolt as exists in the Kyrgyz Republic (167).
• The downturn in demand for Uzbekistani export goods has lead the government to seek new routes of export, especially for gas and oil. So far they are looking towards China as the provider of new and more stable demand for Uzbekistani exports (167).
• The goals of Uzbekistani foreign policy have been greatly successful, in that Uzbekistan has had no trouble finding partners against its enemies, like the Taliban or IMU, without incurring much criticism or action against its human rights record (167). Uzbekistan has partnerships in certain sectors with the US, Germany, China, Russia, and others, and has good -- if not great -- relations with all of these countries, leaving open pathways to future cooperation (168).
• "Most impressively, Uzbekistan has managed latent conflicts with its direct neighbours despite personal rivalries and the inability of its weaker neighbours to control their own territories from would-be terrorists and troublemakers. The few armed conflicts have been contained, and borders are now almost all demarcated. The ethnic mix in the Fergana Valley has not caused as much trouble as was expected" (168).
• Although the legacies of Islom Karimov's authoritarian rule have been mixed, his handling of Uzbekistan's foreign affairs can be considered one of his great achievements. Whether this legacy will continued is to be seen, as the author considers elite and popular support for President Karimov to be grudging and generally unreliable in the long term (168).