Naumkin, Vitalii. "Uzbekistan's State-Building Fatigue". The Washington Quarterly, Vol.29, No.3 (2006): 127-140.

Naumkin, Vitalii. "Uzbekistan's State-Building Fatigue". The Washington Quarterly, Vol.29, No.3 (2006): 127-140.

• The US and Uzbekistan originally formed an alliance out of a fear of the Taliban's global reach and a desire for stability in Central Asia. However when state-building in Afghanistan began and American priority switched to democracy promotion, Uzbekistan feared that Western influence might trigger a color revolution in the country and cut ties with the West in 2005. The author believes that this reflects internal instability in Uzbekistan, which may threaten the stability of the state (127).
• Despite several decades of forcible state atheism during the Soviet, Islam experienced a major popular revival under the perestroika reforms of the Gorbachev administration in both the indigenous Hanafi practice and some more puritanical strains of Salafi Islam. Networks of associated mosques were very popular during the transition period, with some Imams even assuming control over certain government responsibilities in the Farg'ona Valley (129).
• The Karimov administration has cracked down on many Islamist groups, especially in Farg'ona. This persecution only intensified following the 1999 Toshkent bombings (130). Following repression, some radical Salafi groups joined the Taliban in Afghanistan and participated in the Tajik Civil War. These men went on to become the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakat] (IMU), a terrorist organization (129). There was also a popular following of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a peaceful radical Salafi group (130).
• The Karimov regime has fought the forces of Islamic extremism by present itself as the sole defender of 'authentic Islam', embodied by the Hanafi practice of the official Imams inherited from the Soviet system (130). President Karimov's revitalization of the mahalla system also provided an effective system of distributing social goods and providing information about radicalization (131).
• The author introduces the concept of 'solidarity groups', the networks of patronage and mutual responsible which often characterize Central Asian politics. Dr. Naumkin then makes the claim that these have more diverse patterns of associations in Uzbekistan, as opposed to the 'clan' politics of Kazakhstan and the 'tribal' politics of Turkmenistan (131). These groups prevent the Uzbekistani state from fully implementing a national identity, weakening it in the long term (132).
• In an attempt to gain additional resources against domestic opponents, President Karimov established connections with power brokers in the region, beginning with the United States, but siding with Russia following a breakdown in diplomatic relations following the Andijon Incident (132).
• The author provides secret, and not necessarily reliable, intelligence about CIA operations within Uzbekistan around the turn of the century as part of a larger operation to hunt Osama bin Ladin. A former CIA operatives regards Islom Karimov as a reliable partner eager to assist in the war against terror (133).
• The 2005 Tulip Revolution in the Kyrgyz Republic marked a turning point in American-Uzbekistan relations, as the Karimov administration accused the US of having supported regime change and began to view the Americans as a security threat. This issue came to a head in May 2005, even relations with the West essentially shut down after the Andijon Incident (134).
• The author provides two versions of the narrative surrounding the Andijon Incident: one is the government version emphasizing the Islamist takeover of the prison facility (134), while the other turns the issue into a feud between cliques where a group of businessmen refused to turn assets over to the new viloyat administration (135).
• To avoid international isolation following the Andijon Incident, Uzbekistan established a security relationship with Russia following the withdrawal of American forces from Qarshi-Xanabad (135). The author locates a number of trade deals between Russia and Uzbekistan, especially over gas reserves, within the context of Uzbekistan sweetening the deal in exchange for Russian political support (136).
• The author further claims that Islom Karimov used Russian demands for economic reforms as an excuse to implement additional reforms that he had wanted but was unable to make due to significant internal opposition. Now outside pressure, from a non-Western power, gave him the political capital to make these reforms (137).
• Dr. Naumkin makes the claim that authoritarianism in Uzbekstani politics is not a whim of the Karimov administration, but an integral feature of the Uzbekistani political culture based on patronage systems. The regime largely survives by claiming that if more liberal democracy was instituted, it would result in a victory for radical Islam (138).
• The author argues that to create a democratic system in Uzbekistan, there needs to be widespread support for gradual reform working alongside the current regime. The fundamental systems of administration need to change, something that requires a transition to a market economic, followed by the introduction of numerous basic civil liberties (139).