Neal, Andrew. "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX". Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.47, No.2 (2009): 333-356.

Neal, Andrew. "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX". Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.47, No.2 (2009): 333-356.

• The EU established the FRONTEX border service on 26 October 2004 to coordinate the policing of the EU's external border between countries  (333). 
• The EU responded to the 9/11 attacks by securitizing the issue of migration and the asylum system, centering border control as an important part of combating terrorism. (338-339). 
• The speech acts of European officials during this time period try to establish a dichotomy between a threatening outside and an internal EU that needs to be protected. This simultaneously securitizes borders, migration, and other interactions between the outside and inside, and constructs a unified European identity (339).
• Most accounts view the establishment of FRONTEX as part of a general securitization of migration in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The author disagrees with this view, instead claiming that FRONTEX was created because of concerns about risks related to migration due to the failure of securitizing migration (334).
• Interviews with officials involved in the creation of FRONTEX all agreed that an organization like FRONTEX would have come into existence without the 9/11 attacks and was just part of enhanced EU integration. They did not see the policy as related to security measures (344).
• EU securitization of migration following the 9/11 attacks was not successful, as they failed to capture a sense of urgency regarding migration and did not convince EU institutions or publics to adopt emergency measures. Instead, policy was created through regular channels and featured debate and compromise between EU bodies and member states (340).
• In 2001, the EU initiated a study on the possibility of an EU-wide border guard. Some states, like Britain, where opposed to this and ultimately succeeded in arguing that it was beyond the mandate of the EU. Instead, they endorsed a plan in 2002 to create a body to facilitate cooperation between national border guards (340-341).
• None of the urgency that politicians had communicated following the 9/11 attacks carried into EU policy. Instead, plans were trapped in bureaucratic discussions and really nothing happened until November 2003 (341-342).
• Surprisingly, the Madrid bombings in March 2004 did not influence discussions about EU border security. Statements on the Madrid attacks focused on enhancing law enforcement cooperation, while FRONTEX discussions did not recognize or mention the attacks (345-346).
• In November 2003, the Greek President of the European Council suggested the creation of an agency to coordinate the management of the EU's external borders. By this point, borders and migration were no longer considered primarily as a security issue in EU discussions. When FRONTEX was created in 2004, it was justified as a technocratic solution to save on resources (342-343).
• Since the 9/11 attacks, liberal democratic governments have used arguments of security to pass controversial legislation that has restricted civil liberties (335).
• Securitization cannot be reduced to speech acts with the intent to make something a security issue, it is also important whether they succeed in convincing an audience that something is a security issue. This requires using evidence and shared assumptions to convince the audience that something is a security issue (335-336).
• The EU is not a popular institution and speeches by its leading figures are not reported by mass media nor read by the public. This means that the EU doesn't have a lot of opportunities to securitize issues because it has such limited engagement with the public (336).
• The audience for EU attempts at securitization could potentially be other policymakers, but it is important to note that this securitization process would then by highly undemocratic since it would not involve engagement with the public (337). 
• Moreover, the EU consists of massively different audiences that do not experience the same problems. Whereas there is evidence to convince Greek populations that migration is a security threat, Swedish and Finnish populations have not had the same experiences and are unlikely to be convinced by the same securitization arguments (336-337).
• FRONTEX has a variety of responsibilities and is mainly a resource for individual countries to draw on. Its responsibilities can be collectively understood as managing risk (346-347).
• FRONTEX started out as a tiny agency with virtually no funds. Its budget has steadily grown every year, but it still depends on national border guards to contribute to its tasks (347).
• The large EU border, handled by separate countries, was seen as a risk to collective security as it could be penetrated at certain points that individual countries could not respond to. FRONTEX was designed to address this risk by distributing EU resources on the basis of current need and making sure that all border agencies were up to snuff (348-349).
• FRONTEX is not a securitized agency and its practices are neither exception nor extralegal. Instead, much of FRONTEX's work revolves around reducing securitization by getting member states to regulate their border control activities and operate within the context of the law (347-348).
• The remit of FRONTEX has begun to change since 2007 in response to increased calls from the member states for the empowerment of the agency. It has become more securitized, as it has created rapid-response border guard units since 2008 to respond to extraordinary circumstances (349-350).
• This transformation of FRONTEX from a risk management agency to a securitized agency is not complete. For the most part, FRONTEX sees its primary activities as regulatory and focused on risk management. Increased securitization has come at the request of individual member states, who seek to change the organization (351).
• The 'continuum of security' model of securitization is more useful to understanding FRONTEX than is the Copenhagen School's model. In this model, securitization has taken place through FRONTEX even without exceptional policies because regular, legal links have been developed between FRONTEX, asylum systems, and security forces, indicating that migration has been connected to conceptions of security (352-353).