Murtazashvili, Jennifer. "Coloured by revolution: the political economy of autocratic stability in Uzbekistan". Democratization, vol.19, no.1 (2012): 78-97.

Murtazashvili, Jennifer. "Coloured by revolution: the political economy of autocratic stability in Uzbekistan". Democratization, vol.19, no.1 (2012): 78-97.

• This paper seeks to understand why Islom Karimov's regime in Uzbekistan continues to be so stable, as most sources give the half-assed explanation of liberal application of violent force, but this does not explain Uzbekistan's stability compared to nearby authoritarian regimes (79).
• Typically three categories of Post-Soviet state have been suggested to exist: democratizing, relapsing dictatorship, and hybrid regime. Uzbekistan does not fit evenly into any of these categories, as it has never shown any tendency towards democratizing or hybridization by the author's definition. Dr. Murtazashvili instead terms the political arrangement "authoritarian resilience" (80).
• The typical conflict-oriented narrative of Uzbekistan focuses on mechanisms of repression directed against opposition, specifically enforcing a dichotomy between Islamist opposition and government repression. This narrative has been unreliable in the face of the Andijon Incident, as opposition in restive areas with external support mobilized by Islamist organizations still failed to spark an actual challenge to the regime (81).
• These narratives also ignore the actual economic situation of Uzbekistan. Whereas, they frequently mention high unemployment and rural poverty as reasons for insurgency to mount, this ignores the fact that Uzbekistan actually has a fairly successful economy with strong growth, especially compared to its neighboring states (82).
• Another prevalent model of regime change in the former USSR focuses on the agency of social groups and civil society, however in cases of rigid authoritarianism the necessary transparency does not exist to conduct analysis. It also fails to account for systemic factors (82).
• The third mainstream approach to authoritarian stability looks at structural factors, namely ties to the West and the strength of the rule, in explaining stability. It does not explain Uzbekistan, as the country has remained strong regardless of its contemporary relations with the West (83).
• The rational choice tradition of political economy provides insight into regime analysis for Uzbekistan, as it involves both the 'sticks' of Uzbekistani repression and the 'carrots' the regime gives to loyal citizens (83). The obvious benefits offered by the Karimov administration are economic growth with minimal inequality, being spared the repressive mechanisms of the state, and social benefits provided by the state -- rather than groups outside of the state (84).
• Despite frequent prediction of collapse by Western think-tanks and international financial institutions, Uzbekistan remains one of the strongest economies in the former USSR, with the smallest decline following independence and the most rapid return to growth (85). President Karimov's gradualist approach to economic reform originally started from a concern over the impoverishment of some as an effect of rapid liberalization, it has allowed the country to maintain economic growth, stabilizing diversification, and low levels of income inequality (86).
• "Furthermore, public opinion surveys in Uzbekistan illustrate that there is broader support for state ownership of industry in Uzbekistan than in any other former Soviet Republic. Uzbek citizens appear to believe that the state should maintain a strong role in the economy" (86).
• The willingness of the Karimov regime to use force to quash opposition certainly plays into the stability of the current government. The certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment following any transgression within Uzbekistan is such that organized opposition cannot effectively exist. Even talk of rival political movements can result in severe repression, exile, and harassment (87).
• Like most political scientists discussing Uzbekistan, the author chooses at this point to ignore the limited pluralism of Uzbekistani politics as a sham, rather than viewing it as an arena of dissent. Uzbekistan still remains a repressive system, but opposition politics does exist within a legal framework.
• The third major factor in the stability of the Karimov administration has been the state's domination of social service provision through the mahalla system. By inserting itself at the local level of basic service provision, the state has managed to impress upon the population its centrality in the guarantee of freedoms and benefits which do not exist in rural Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic (88).
• "These social programmes serve two distinct services: first, they enable the regime to maintain strict social control over its population; second, they enable the regime to engage in targeted redistribution to the population" (88).
• The combination of continued state control of the economy with direct participation in social service provision has allowed the government to maintain low prices for basic goods, high standards of education, and numerous guarantees of social security and healthcare (88).
• By decentralizing social service dispensation to the mahalla-level, the government also guarantees a more judicious and efficient use of limited resources, as officials can be depended on to dispense aid to the neediest based on local situations, rather than more informal and less nuanced distribution schemes used elsewhere (89).
• In addition to their function as distributors of public goods to the population, mahalla also act as the lowest level of state supervision. Most mahalla will elect a posbon, or officer whose job it is to report to the local government on potential anti-state activity. Reports indicate that mahalla officials frequently contact local authorities and are more paranoid than other levels of the state apparatus (89).
• Unlike leaders elsewhere, like President Askar Akayev of the Kyrgyz Republic, who intended to line their pockets, President Karimov is motivated by power and thus has designed a social and economic system perfectly designed to keep the regime intact through maximizing long-term regime gains (90)