Lubin, Nancy, Sam Nunn & Barnett R. Rubin. "Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia". Vol. 4 of Preventive Action Reports. New York: Center for Preventive Actions, 1999.

Lubin, Nancy, Sam Nunn & Barnett R. Rubin. Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia. Vol. 4 of Preventive Action Reports. New York: Center for Preventive Actions, 1999.

• This report was funded by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Century Foundation. One of the authors, although not the principle author, was Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), an expert in nuclear non-proliferation and security studies who has since provided policy advice to the State Department and President Obama. 
• Information concerning the purpose and conduct of the working group is available from page ix to page xiii.
• There is a USAID program which connects former collectivized farms in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to state farm boards in the US. Currently several farms in Uzbekistan are in correspondence with the Kentucky Farm Board (88).
• Mingbulak tuman in Namangan viloyat has the largest oil reserves in the Uzbekistan (36).
• During the late Soviet era, the city of Margilan in Farg'ona viloyat emerged as the centre of organized crime and black market activities for the Valley and, to an extent, for the whole of Central Asia (43).
• US Policy towards Central Asia during this period is defined by the speech of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott: "If economic and political reform in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia does not succeed -- in internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare -- the region could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It would matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil. That is yet another reason why conflict-resolution must be Job One for U.S. policy in the region: It is both the prerequisite for and an accompaniment to energy development" (xv).
• There are a number of factors of instability that potentially affect the Farg'ona Valley, mainly driven by severe economic decline, competition over limited resources, organized crime, and proximity to regional conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (xvi). The Centre also selected the Farg'ona Valley b/c of previous incidences of violences in all three countries, including the 1990 Osh Riots (xvii).
• The Centre recommends the following measures: creation of cross-border institutions to coordinate economic development and information flow between government; support for human rights and civil society organizations; support for dialogue w/o constraints on free speech, especially in regards to religion; regional development programs; and support for DFI programs by encouraging Uzbekistan to relax border and currency controls (xviii).
• In particular American and Western policy should support the growth of indigenous organizations and institutions, such as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (xviii).
• Regional policy focusing solely to energy resources and stability is inadequate for Central Asia. A more comprehensive approach needs to include support for civil society and political reforms, increased free speech and human rights, and a focus on improving relations Iran and Russia to help resolve lingering violence (xix).
• Central Asia is key to an entire region and it is vulnerable to violence. US policy needs to act to prevent violence in a permanent solution through substantive reform. Right now Central Asia is imperiled by economic crisis in Russia, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, violence against law enforcement in Uzbekistan, and continued tensions and regional inequalities in Tajikistan (xx).
• A basic description of the Centre's mission to the Farg'ona Valley -- to Osh and several cities in Uzbekistan -- as well as the preliminary conclusions of mission are included from page 3 to page 10. The members of the mission interviewed Kyrgyz and Uzbekistani citizens on issues of ethnic conflict and religious fundamentalism respectively.
• The mission reported feelings of intense fear in both Uzbekistani and Kyrgyz portions of the Valley, with both groups concerned that violence might break-out. All parties feared shadowy forces, possibly foreign-backed, that might stir up ethnic or religious tensions.
• Nobody wanted violence, but they all feared the possible of renewed conflict that could spiral out of control and led to massive damage. A Kyrgyz man interviewed said that: "All you need is a spark to trigger it. You need just one maniac with a Kalashnikov, and they have a lot of Kalashnikovs" (9).
• In Chapter 2 -- from page 11 to page 30 -- the mission summarizes its suggestions for the region, stressing that the authorities have done a remarkable job retaining order and that these measures will strengthen a potentially dangerous situation, not set an alarm for imminent conflict. The mission stresses that regional approaches are necessary and that they have to be focused on involvement and cooperation with national governments. An peaceful solution will have to include the development of civil society; this and FDI are the two areas in which foreigners can most aid.
• Contemporary Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, outlines a policy towards Central Asia defined by the Euro-Atlantic expansionism particular of the George W. Bush administration (17).
• The historic background of the Farg'ona Valley, especially including recent conflicts during the post-Soviet period, is provided from page 33 to page 57. The colonial policy of the Soviet Union in terms of cotton production is explained, as are the various conflicts in the independent republics.
• For each of the republics approximately 5% of the land in the country is made up of the Farg'ona Valley, but those regions have around 20% of the total population. The vast majority of the Valley is Uzbekistani, but it also is home to a fifth of the Tajikistani population and half of the Kyrgyz population (35).
• The report catalogues the conflicts in the recent history of the Farg'ona Valley, beginning with the violence against Mesxetian Turks and Uzbeks in 1989 and including the 1990 Osh Riots, the takeover a administrative buildings in Namangan by the Adolat Islamic Movement in December 1991, revolts in Norther Tajikistan following the peace agreements, violence against law enforcement in Namangan during 1997 and 1998, and the 1999 Toshkent car bombings (45-55).
• Common threads among past incidents of violence include mobilization on ethnic lines, but the incident sparking violence has never been solely ethnicity, but rather competition among ethnic groups for limited resources. These tensions are exacerbated in the Kyrgyz Republic by new ethnic nationalism and feelings that the Uzbeks are economically privileged. None of the conflicts involved forces mobilized on religious lines (56).
• Lack of media freedom and government transparency make the sources of any conflict difficult to discover. This makes conflict prevention and resolution more difficult, as past fault lines are not easily determined (57).
• The social and economic tensions, and the reforms in these sectors currently being implemented are explored in Chapter 4. The tensions and issues are detailed from page 59 to page 78, and include high population density, economic decline, competition for land and water resources, high unemployment rates, corruption, organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and gaps in social service provision. The reforms -- or lack thereof -- are detailed from page 78 to page 95.
• Economic decline has exacerbated social issues in the Farg'ona Valley, with many residents just scrapping by. The economic collapse in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic was exceeded half of total GDP and the recovery is still incomplete in any country during this period. Uzbekistan fared better, but a severe drought in 1996 and 1997 severely hurt agriculturalists (60).
• In the Kyrgyz Republic the dismal economic situation has also widen regional and ethnic rifts. The Kyrgyz accuse local Uzbeks of being economically advantaged and clanish about their wealth. Additionally, the South of the Kyrgyz Republic as a whole feels disadvantaged in favour of Northern companies and issues (62).
• Competition in the Farg'ona Valley over land has reached new highs. Current population distribution is roughly 1/10 hectare of land per individual, less than half of the 1940s distribution. In Uzbekistan it has created poverty, in Tajikistan the damage in limited by industrial jobs, and in the Kyrgyz Republic, both the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are divided into different collectivized farms meaning land conflict takes on an ethnic character (63).
• Land reform in all three republics has been limited by certain obstacles. In Uzbekistan the state monopoly on sale and input products means farms are only private in name. In the Kyrgyz Republic, land is such a charged issue that local authorities fear ethnic conflict will result if reforms are continued, while Tajikistani reforms lack legal underpinnings (85).
• Water scarcity and difficult negotiations between the national governments on the issue creates further conflict in the Valley as it both exacerbates poverty and creates potential cross-border feuds between communities (64).
• Current Western recommendations for reform are targeted at water-pricing schemes, but these threaten to bankrupt many farms unused to a capitalist economy. It is unclear with long term benefits will outweigh short-term costs (88). 
• Employment remains a contentious issue across all states bordering the Farg'ona Valley. It creates large populations of idle youth with severe grievances, an issue worsted by the absence of the youth and after-school programs ubiquitous during the Soviet era. In the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbeks and Tajiks accuse the Kyrgyz of monopolizing employment in the public sector (66).
• Unemployment benefits and job-training programs have been created in all the states, but they do not function. Most services are not actually provided, and a lack of cash means benefits are delivered months late. Even FDI programs cannot absorb all the surplus labour in the Valley (90).
• Corruption corrodes societal relations in the Farg'ona Valley and raises tensions by decreasing governmental capacity to solve problems, and increasing perceptions of unfairness (68).
• Drug trafficking is common in the Kyrgyz parts of the Farg'ona Valley, mainly from opium and narcotics grown in Afghanistan and transported through Gorno-Badaxstan, as it provides low-skill employment in poor areas (70). These criminal networks undermine governments and work against strengthening institutions (71), including law enforcement and the Russian soldiers stationed in Tajikistan (72).
• Actions against drug trafficking have focused on West-funded training programs and supplying equipment, however local corruption and impunity undermine reforms. Often corrupt officials purposefully ignore training when in the field (91).
• Declines the quality and available of public services have exacerbated tensions in the Farg'ona Valley, especially when groups feel that services are distributed unequally; which occurs for Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz Republic, and Xujandis in Tajikistan (73, 75).
• The difficult of any trans-border trade with Uzbekistan fuels resentment in neighbouring countries, increases poverty in border areas, and could increase ethnic tension when Uzbekistani officials favour co-ethnics during customs (77).
• The basis of economic reforms in each republic are described in this chapter. The Kyrgyz Republic is discussed on page 79, Uzbekistan on page 80, and Tajikistan on page 83.
• The Kyrgyz Republic is wracked by crises, including the collapse of the largest savings bank, Kyrgyzelbank, accounting for half of all capital savings; reform in Uzbekistan has been largely virtual, and Tajikistani reform has been a result of central collapse, rather than coordinated effort.
• Several attempts have been made at creating regional frameworks for cooperation, but Uzbekistan has vetoed most efforts at cross-border economic integration in the Farg'ona Valley. Some infrastructure -- such as the Andijon-Osh-Kashgar road -- may link the Valley, but generally poor relations between states and difficult borders mean contemporary integration is minimal (93). 
• Chapter Five -- from page 97 to page 118 -- explored the role of domestic political factors in the three republics in creating or determining conflict. The chapter looks at the role of religion, ethnicity, and regional identity as potential fault lines for conflict mobilization. Also examined are the roles of human rights and freedom of information in managing conflict, and potential effects of regional military blocs in stirring or preventing conflict.
• The Post-Soviet legacy of power and politics in each republic has tied economic and political power in a way that increases disenfranchisement for the poor (97). The super-presidential systems in all the contemporary republics make laws more arbitrary and policy-creation less predictable, especially in Tajikistan which also suffers from the collapse of legal order (98).
• Islam does not divide the ethnic groups to any great degree, but the division in each state between official Islam and 'parallel' Islam creates a potentiality for anti-regime mobilization. The influence of radicalism from Afghanistan deepens this fear, although many people interviewed view non-official Islam with great stigma, while retaining strong religious fervour about state-sponsored moderatism (100).
• Ethnicity does not appear to be a potential fault line in Uzbekistan due to strict measures against behaviours or organization on ethnic grounds. In the Kyrgyz Republic, however, ethnic fault lines are common, with common perceptions that the Uzbeks are unfairly wealthy and that the Kyrgyz monopolize political power. Fears about Kyrgyz dominance are especially pronounced following the exodus of Russians from the country following the collapse of the USSR, since they were mostly replaced by Kyrgyz from the North (105).
• Regionalism may be a motivating factor for conflict in all three republics, but particularly in Tajikistan, where most Xujandis feel that they have been unfairly excluded from their traditional position of power since the Civil War. In the Kyrgyz Republic, most Southerns feel that President Akayev ignores Southern concerns in favour of the North and Bishkek, while many Uzbekistani residents of the Valley note a similar neglect by the central government in Toshkent (108). 
• The dearth of press rights, freedom of information, and dismal human rights contribute to a situation where action against the government is more likely and more difficult to predict due to absence of civil society or public mobilization (110). The specific human rights situation in the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are explored on page 110, 112, and 113 respectively.
• In August 1996, President Karimov made suggestions for increased media freedom, but they cracked down on media freedom immediately afterwards (113). He said: "The press and television carry no profound analysis or serious political, economic, or international reviews; there is no debate ... Many journalists are still bound up in the old ways of thinking ... We must fundamentally alter our attitude to criticism in the press ... We must do everything to encourage those who help us rid ourselves of our shortcomings ... You [officials] should know that if there is criticism in the press and you come down on it the next day, then you won't be in your job for long [emphasis Dr. Lubin]" (112).
• Within Central Asia, most of the other republics are scared of Uzbekistani domination, compounded through the interventions and militarism of President Karimov's regime. Most of the states have been involved in military blocs through the CIS or CSTO, but actual cooperation has been limited w/ the exception of joint peacekeeping in Tajikistan. In the event of conflict, intervention by these systems is unlikely, especially if it occurs in the Uzbekistani portion of the Farg'ona Valley (115).
• One Kyrgyz interviewed notes fears about Uzbekistani nationalism, saying: "Why are the Uzbeks celebrating Timur? The Germans don't celebrate Hitler!" (115).
• The effect of various regional and global powers on conflict and stability in the Farg'ona Valley are discussed in from page 119 to page 136 in Chapter 6. The continuing conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan threatens to destabilize the region, whereas Russia, China, and the US are the major players in building stability. The US in particular is involved in improving state capacity.
• The anarchy and chaos of the Afghan Civil War exports weapons, drugs, and radicalization to the surrounding region. The ideologies of the conflict may potentially destabilize the Valley, while the criminal groups that have proliferated in the region damage nearby institutions (119).
• The lack of negative peace and sporadic violence of Tajikistan also contribute negatively to stability, mainly through the disenfranchisement of Xujandis within the national government. Former fighters might also cross borders, leading to the expansion of violence (121, 124).
• Refugees from the conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan remain a source of instability in the Farg'ona Valley. In the Kyrgyz Republic this is especially true as locals often harbour resentment about refugee access to services they do not have. Political asylum seekers in the Kyrgyz Republic might raise tensions, as locals resent that dissent Tajikistani and Uzbekistani groups use their country to organize (126).
• In Uzbekistan, the situation is utterly unclear, as the government has not registered many refugees and refuses to divulge information on their numbers or status. Most will likely be declared citizens through shade backroom methods (128).
• Russia remains a major force in Central Asia, particularly through support from the Kyrgyz Republic and what is now a solely Russian peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan. Further incorporation into the Russian sphere has been halted by Uzbekistan's refusal to accept a relationship of dependence with Russia (130).
• All of the Central Asian states have supported the expansion of Chinese interests in the area, especially Uzbekistan -- which considers China to be a potential counter-balance to Russia. There are some concerns that China may be sensitive to increased cooperation, due to worries about its own Uyghur population becoming restive (132).
• Contrary to Western predictions, Iran has not become a major player in the region outside of economic investment. The Muslims states with the most influence are Turkey and Saudi Arabia, mostly through the construction of mosques and distribution of religious literature through charities linked to government activity (133).
• The United States needs to broaden its policies towards stability in Central Asia. So far American policy has focused primarily on Uzbekistan to the detriment of other states in the region, even while the region continues to be neglected compared to the rest of the former Soviet Union. All efforts towards reform need to be focused towards the improvement of domestic situations through progress in civil society, government, and economics to create a situation of positive peace. Current policy is too focused on stability as status quo, which in the Farg'ona Valley will not led to a long-term or sustainable peace (135).