Luck, Edward. "Principle Organs", In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Sam Daws and Thomas G. Weiss. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Luck, Edward. "Principle Organs", In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Sam Daws and Thomas G. Weiss. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

• "It [the UN] has lurched from crisis to crisis not only in the agendas of world problems it seeks to ameliorate, but also in terms of recurrent questioning of its orientation and priorities, of the fairness and efficacy of its decision‐making structures, of its funding and fiscal management, of its operational techniques and readiness, and of the quality and integrity of its Secretariat and leadership" (653).
• The drafting process of the UN reflected the great power politics of the post-war era, as the main provisions of the UN were crafted in private by the delegates of the USA, UK, USSR, and the Republic of China, and presented in relatively complete form to the rest of the world at the San Francisco conference. None of the negotiations were easy and conflict over core issues that have not been resolved was present at the beginning (654).
• Largely to placate dissatisfied allies, the great powers agreed to include Article 109 in the document, which call for a conference to review the UN Charter by the 10th anniversary in 1955. The Cold War made such a conference unlike, and in 1955, the UNGA delayed the conference until ' auspicious international circumstances'. The conference has still not been organized (654).
• The UN Charter has only been changed three times, all relatively uncontroversial adjustments to ECOSOC or the size of the UNSC. The UNSC was increased from 11 to 15 members in 1963, and the mandate of ECOSOC was twice expanded to reflect different aims (654-655).
• The establishment of the UNGA was uncontroversial, although many resisted the restriction of its binding power to internal budgetary issues, the selection of non-permanent security council members, and the appointment of the Secretary-General. Whereas the League of Nations failed to distinguish the responsibilities of its bodies, the UNGA has clear jurisdiction over all matters not regarding peace and security (656).
• "The Assembly's core strength, of course, lies in the virtual universality of its membership. But its strength has also been its weakness. In terms of the efficiency and coherence of its decision‐making, its universality has proven to be a very difficult hurdle to overcome. With size comes inertia. [...] the Assembly has proven unable to set priorities or make choices. It has something for everyone, but rather little for anyone" (657).
• Although the UNGA has no official hierarchy, states often organize themselves into blocs on position based around regional leadership, in the same way that regional representatives are selected for many voting procedures. Some powerful states, like the USA, find these regional blocs frustrating (657).
• The UNGA produces a huge amount of paperwork. Despite numerous efforts to reduce the volume of resolutions, they still hover at around 250 to 300 per year, most of which are adopted by consensus. Many of these documents simply reiterate a previous issue and guarantee that it remains on the agenda. Furthermore, many of the issues are dealt with by other organs, creating more duplication and pointlessness (657-658). 
• The UNGA was given the power to create subsidiary bodies to perform specific functions, but these often duplicated the mandate of other bodies and become relatively pointless. At current count there are 57 subsidiary bodies, not including the six original committees, many of thought to be underperforming or useless (659).
• "The slow pace of General Assembly reform appears to reflect [...] not a fundamental political divide among the member states. Indeed, the perennial debates on Assembly reform suggest, if anything, a remarkably broad agreement on what is wrong with the Assembly" (659).
• The dispute over the powers of the UNSC has existed since the San Francisco conference of 1945, as some states argue that the disproportionate power of the P5 is unfair, while other contest that this disparity of power is what has allowed the UNSC to function with far more efficiency than other UN bodies (660).
• The reform of the UNSC in 1963 was the result of bitter disagreements between the industrialized and developing powers, as the latter resented the domination of the UNSC by American or Soviet client states. Despite the objections of all P5 countries except the Republic of China, an expansion bill passed the UNGA in December 1963. The USSR changed its vote first to attempt to get on the good side of developing nations, followed by the British and French under pressure from their former colonies. Eventually the US agreed. having lost all support (660-661).
• Although calls for UNSC reform had never ended, they certainly renewed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping missions. These efforts, though valiant, all threatened to reduce the power of at least one nation and failure, with Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India arguing for expansion, and other regional powers opposing it (661-663).
• Although not official, the UNSC has adopted a number of reforms to make it function better. Under the Arria formula, UN officials frequently have informal meetings and take retreats where decisions can be made without public scrutiny, and have special meetings to deal with special issues so that work can be prioritized (664).
• Despite its lack of public recognition and limited powers, ECOSOC has been the subject of two reforms, being expanded to twice its original 18 members; this has not improved its role in the UN. Its larger size actually causes problems, making it too large for efficient decision-making and too small to be truly representative (665).
• The powers of ECOSOC were limited by consensus of the P5, who all agreed that its powers be small and its membership limited. Accordingly, it is subordinate to the UNGA, has no powers of enforcement on any issue, and does not control its own budget (665-666).
• Although many expectations for ECOSOC obviously fall outside the mandate envisioned by the P5, it has also consistently failed to fulfill its actual responsibilities of coordinating the activities of the many independent agencies underneath it. There is hope that future reforms will focus on this responsibility (666-667).
• Originally, ECOSOC was responsible for the activities of the UN Commission on Human Rights, but after a series of divisive years featuring major human rights offenders gaining seats on the UNCHR, in 2006, the UN eventually agreed to move the responsibility to the Human Rights Council under the UNGA (667).
• The Trusteeship Council, originally responsible for the administration of trust territories and managing decolonization, faced unique issues in decided what the Council's responsibilities should be following the success of its initial mission. In 1994, Palau was granted independence, leading Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to call for its abolition. Malta had suggest its transformation into a trustee council for the global commons of the atmosphere and oceans, but this view was a minority until Secretary-General Annan came into office in 1997 (669).
• With member states unable to agree on what, if any, new responsibilities the Trusteeship Council should have, the Trusteeship Council stopped meeting in 2005. However, because its abolition would require the reform of the UN Charter, it has yet to be formally eliminated by the UNGA (669).