Lieber, Keir. "The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory". International Security, Vol.32, No.2 (2007): 155-191.

Lieber, Keir. "The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory". International Security, Vol.32, No.2 (2007): 155-191.

• World War I is really important in IR theory, with its mechanics being the source of concepts such as the security dilemma, offense-defense variables, and a security spiral (155, 163, 189).
• From the late 1960s to the 1980s, defensive realist IR theory looked for analogies between the situation preceding WWI and the arms buildup between the USA and USSR. They applied concepts like the security dilemma and the conflict spiral to the contemporary situation based on lessons drawn from WWI (163-164).
• Defensive realists view the path toward WWI as a security dilemma resulting from the fact that the alignment of France, Britain, and Russia in the Triple Entante in 1907 was seen as threatening by the Germans, resulting in them increasing their arms production, further raising international tensions and perceptions of threat (164-165).
• The belief that offense was dominant over defense also contributed to the start of war since, under these conditions of first strikes having an advantage, even states that preferred the status quo would act aggressively to prevent being caught off guard by war (165).
• Defensive realists argue that Germany was trying to increase its own security in WWI and that any aggressive behaviors it engaged in were the result of pressures created by an offense-dominant security environment in which aggression was preferable to being attacked by France or Russia (165).
• Offensive realist IR theorists assert that Germany actively tried to gain continental hegemony in Europe because doing so was seen as the best way to maximize its own security in the long term (165-166).
• The new understandings of the causes of WWI from recent scholarship tend to support the opinions of offensive realism rather than defensive realism, as the German general staff was fully cognizant of the potential costs of a European war and choose to conduct an aggressive war anyway (191).
• In light of the fact that much of the historical scholarship that these concepts in IR theory are based on are incorrect and have been updated in more recent works, IR scholars should probably reconsider many of their arguments and understandings of concepts and theories elaborated from WWI (190-191).
• The older assumption that WWI was an accidental blunder as a result by separate policy decisions of many states has been replaced by a general consensus that Germany was a key actor in the outbreak of war. New evidence supports this view, providing backing to claims that Germany knowingly provoked a long and bloody general European war for the deliberate goal of dominating Europe (156).
• The traditional assumption is that Germany felt compelled to start WWI because of the threat posed by French and Russian mobilization, that German politicians did not resist war because of pressure from the military, and that Germany tried to avert war once it realized that Britain would not remain neutral (183-184).
• New evidence suggests that this is not the case and that Germany took advantage of the opportunity provided by the July crisis to provoke a general European war that it wanted anyway (184).
• Although Germany officially requested British neutrality on 30 July 1914, there was no expectation that it would be given. By 1911 or 1912, Germany was near certain that Britain would become involved in any continental war and made its military plans accordingly (185).
• Rather than scaring the German military establishment, news of French and Russian mobilization was celebrated as part of a plan to goad France into attacking, as a technically defensive war was seen as more justifiable to the German public (185-186).
• French and Russian mobilizations did not propel Germany into war, as Germany was actively preparing for an aggressive war prior to these mobilizations (187).
• Although the German general staff did strongly advocate for war and hide many of their objective and plans from civilian leadership, the existing civilian leadership shared many core assumptions with the military staff. The civilian government fully endorsed the belief that European war was inevitable and that Germany would be at its most competitive in war in 1914 (187).
• At the outbreak of WWI, all major powers published their own explanations for initiating the conflict that blamed the opposing side and justified their own actions. In 1919, Germany was forced to renounce this previous explanation and accept full responsibility for the war under the Treaty of Versailles (157).
• Challenges to the Versailles narrative of exceptional Germany guilt appeared almost immediately, especially from the USA, where Sidney Fay argued that no one country was to blame for the war and Harry Barnes contended that French and Russian aggression had caused the conflict. These scholars had fierce debates over German guilt, especially with Bernadotte Schmit, throughout the 1920s and 1930s (157-158).
• By the 1930s until the 1950s, the opinion that the European powers accidentally slid into war, as articulated by Sidney Fay, was predominant. This view was accepted because it allowed Europeans to see Hitler as exceptional rather than symptomatic of Germany, which in turn facilitated the easier incorporation of the Bonn Republic into NATO, because it had the backing of the German government, and because it allowed people to believe that no one really desired war (158).
• This consensus was challenged in the 1950s through 1970s by historians such as Luigi Albertini, A. J. P. Taylor, Barbara
  Tuchman, and Gerhard Ritter. This group argued that German decision-making had been marred by severe miscalculation and militarism, eventually leading to a war that no one wanted, although they also assigned blame to other countries for escalating the July crisis (158-159).
• In the late 1960s, Fritz Fischer published two books that shattered the previous consensus, since the late 1950s, that Germany was responsible, but that war was still not intentional. Mr. Fischer argued that German leaders intentionally started a world war to consolidate their domestic political power and dominate Europe (161-162).
• These views became dominant during the 1970s, although Mr. Fischer lacked evidence to support many of his claims that Germany desired European or global domination (162).
• The argument that the Schlieffen plan was a major cause of WWI is common, but there are numerous disagreements on whether this means that Germany bears responsibility (159).
• The initial defense of the Schlieffen plan, as developed by a number of former German military officers, was that the plan would have worked has Helmuth Johannes von Moltke not modified several elements of it after taking over command of the general staff from Alfred von Schlieffen. Therefore, it was General von Moltke in particular and not the Schlieffen plan itself that could be blamed for the First World War (159-160).
• The original documents for the Schlieffen plan were thought to be lost during British firebombing of Potsdam in 1945, but in 1953, West German historian Gerhard Ritter found Schlieffen's original plans and exposed them as flawed and reckless. This discredited the previous arguments about the Schlieffen plan and found that guilt had to be born not only by General von Schlieffen, but by all politicians who had approved such a risky and aggressive plan (160-161).
• In 1999, Terence Zuber, an American army officer and military historian, published a thesis claiming that the Schlieffen plan never existed in the form of a legitimate military plan, but was instead a fabrication of General von Schlieffen in 1905 to get more money and expand the army by presenting the German government with the plan that would only work if the army was expanded and its funding increased. His work is based off material held in East German archives and only available after reunification in 1990. (167-168).
• Alfred von Schlieffen had consistently argued for an increase in the size of the German army, as Germany had a smaller force than France despite having a larger population and needing to fight a two-front war. However, the Germany government was resistant to the cost of significantly expanding its mobilized peacetime forces (168-169).
• In his 1905 Schlieffen plan, Alfred von Schlieffen envisioned the deployment of not only the entire German army and reserves, but also several hypothetical units needed to hold a front between the Rhine and Paris. The plan was meant to demonstrate that, at current troop levels, Germany could not even reliably fight France, let alone France and Russia (169).
• Mr. Zuber further argues that General von Moltke's modifications of the Schlieffen plan after 1911 represented not a belief that it was meant to serve as an actual military battleplan, but a reuse of the plan for the same resource as Alfred von Schlieffen had created it, to get the German government to fund army expansion (169-170).
• Mr. Zuber argues that if General von Moltke had really been interested in using the Schlieffen plan as a battle plan, he would have modified immediately after becoming chief of staff in 1906, not wait until 1911. Waiting until 1911 to modify your main strategic plan would be very odd for a military commander in a tense diplomatic atmosphere (170).
• The preparation of the army under General von Schlieffen further suggests that the Schlieffen plan was not meant to be used, since no war games of the plan were ever attempted. Instead, the only war games performed were for the defense of German borders from French attack. Moreover, the plan contained units that not exist even in 1914 and cannot have been expected in any realistic military plan (170-171).
• The idea that Germany would transfer its entire army to France also seems unrealistic considering that Germany had a realistic and formidable threat assessment for Russia in 1905. Moreover, this part of the plan was never implemented, as Germany 38 divisions against Russia, or roughly half of its army, in 1914 (171).
• The documents of the Schlieffen plan were also not treated in the same way that other military planning documents are, but instead like one of General von Schlieffen's personal papers. It stayed with him after his retirement and was given to his daughters after his death. It was not given the military archives until 1931 (171-172).
• Assuming that the Schlieffen plan did not reflect actual German battle strategy, Mr. Zuber argues that Generals von Schlieffen and von Moltke actually intended to wait and repel a French attack into Elsass-Lothringen, then invade through Belgium to disable French fortification if no such attack materialized. The intend of this strategy was to force the French to engage in unfavorable offensive, while allowing the Germans to concentrate on counter-attacking against Russia (172).
• Mr. Zuber argues that this battle plan developed into a campaign resembling the Schlieffen plan because the Germans had unexpectedly resounding victories against the French in both Belgium and Elsass-Lothringen in August 1914, leading them to abandon their initial defensive plans in France and instead pursue French forces deeper into the French interior (173).
• Even at this point, Mr. Zuber argues that the forward deployment of Alexander von Kluck's First Army at the extreme right flank was not intended to encircle Paris, but to provide a strong cover for other parts of the right flank to break the French fortress line (173).
• Claims that the Schlieffen plan was the basis for German offenses in August 1914 came into existence only after the war, as German military officers attempted to hide their failure in the Marne Campaign by claiming that their plan had been perfect and that it was only ruined by Helmuth Johannes von Moltke, Richard Hentsch, and Karl von Bülow -- all dead when the accusations were made (174).
• Critics argue that Terence Zuber's arguments go too far in undermining the authenticity of the Schlieffen plan, and argue that the Schlieffen plan was not entirely a political fabrication. These critics contend that the Schlieffen plan still reflected many important German war aims that were retained in other military plans (175-176).
• Many historians argue that European powers between 1890 and 1914 believed that offense was dominant over defense, despite the presence of numerous technologies, like machine guns, repeating rifles, and accurate artillery, that made defense predominant in reality. This belief is often cited as a major factor behind the outbreak of WWI (177-178).
• New evidence, particularly that unearthed by Stig Förster, indicates that the German military was well aware that fighting would be bloody and protracted and that initial aggressive battle plans, like the Schlieffen plan, were designed to gain maximum ground before a long and protracted war of attrition (178).
• This attitude was seen in the writings of Helmuth Karl von Moltke, who saw the development of rapid rail transit as signs that all countries would have the advantage of rapid deployment enjoyed by Germany in 1871 and that defense would have a definite advantage. General Helmuth Karl von Moltke saw it as extremely improbable that any nation would repeat Germany's rapid victory over France in 1871 (178-180).
• General von Schlieffen and his staff shared many of Helmuth Karl von Moltke's concerns about the grueling nature of modern warfare (180); similar concerns were certainly shared by Helmuth Johannes von Moltke (181). Already his actual military plans were unclear, the history of his wargames indicates that General von Schlieffen never found an effective strategy of aggressive war to decisively defeat France (181).
• Internal documents indicate that the general view among senior members of the military staff was that if victory was not achieved rapidly, then the war would deteriorate into massive and prolonged battles of attrition that would cost enormous amounts of money and human lives (181-182).
• German strategic planning reflected the belief among military officers that the war would likely be protracted and costly. This is seen in the German decision to not invade the Netherlands, as having a neutral neighbor was seen as important to maintaining access to necessary goods and oceanic commerce (182).
• The knowledge that any future European conflict would be bloody and protracted did nothing to stop German military officers from advocating for war. Indeed, the officers best appraised of the likelihood for conflict to become long and costly were also some of the most active in calling for aggressive war (183).