Lewis, Julian. "Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-first Century". International Affairs, Vol.82, No.4 (2006): 667-673.

Lewis, Julian. "Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-first Century". International Affairs, Vol.82, No.4 (2006): 667-673.

• In conventional bombing during the Second World War, bomber raids could result in a variety of possible outcomes: from the complete destruction of selected targets to the failure of the raid due to air interdiction. Nuclear bombs are different because massive destruction is an absolute certainty; as a result, they are an effective deterrent because going to war with a nuclear war risks unavoidable destruction (667).
• Similar proclamations that war was now too destructive to contemplate had been made at other points in history, including upon the invention of long-range bombers and by Alfred Nobel after the invention of dynamite, but the invention of nuclear weapons was different because destruction was now assured (668).
• The invention of nuclear weapons posed an ethical conundrum because the use of a nuclear strike to instantly kill tens of thousands of people is seen as making the possession of nuclear weapons immoral (668).
• The counter-argument to this is that nuclear weapons are an effective form of deterrence and that nuclear armament will prevent both the future use of nuclear weapons and the destruction caused by wars with conventional weapons (668-669).
• Wars are frequently unexpected and failure to prepare for wars can have negative consequences on the ability of nations to fight those wars. Thus, it makes sense to have a prepared peacetime military. The Trident program should be maintained under the same logic of not knowing when it might be needed (669-670).
• There have been a number of claims that the end of the Cold War, the rise of American power, and the decline of conventional state threats means that the Trident system is no longer necessary (670).
• The collapse of the USSR has removed the threat posed by Soviet nuclear weapons, but only so long as Russia remains a democratic country. The potential for armed conflict between the democratic United Kingdom and a democratic Russia is minimal, but a nuclear conflict is possible if Russia were to become authoritarian again (671).
• Britain's possession of a nuclear deterrent is important for Britain's capacity to respond to threats unilaterally, as it did in the Falklands War. With a nuclear deterrent, Britain can engage nuclear enemies whereas this would be too great a risk if it did not have nuclear weapons (671).
• Possession an independent nuclear program makes British nuclear deterrence more believable. Whereas the commitment of the USA to launch a nuclear strike in response to an existential attack on Britain is debatable, the willingness of the UK is unquestionable (671).
• There are a number of rogue states that either possess nuclear capabilities or on close to acquiring them. The disarmament of Britain will not result in the disarmament of these rogue states, so it is necessary that Britain retains its deterrent (671-672).
• The Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] demands that all signatories not engage in nuclear arms races, dedicate themselves to the principle of achieving nuclear disarmament, and support an international regime for compliance with these terms. The UK has never engaged in an arms race and thus its possession of nuclear weapons does not violate the NPT (672-673).
• The author argues that the Second World War occured because democratic nations chose disarmament over deterrence, while the Cold War remained peaceful because democratic nations focused on nuclear deterrence (673).
• "The purpose of the British nuclear deterrent remains what it has always been: to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass destruction weapons. It is not a panacea and it is not designed to forestall every type of threat. Nevertheless, the threat which it is designed to counter is so overwhelming that no other form of military capability could manage to avert it" (673).