Kohli, Atul. "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.56, No.2 (1997): 325-344.

Kohli, Atul. "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.56, No.2 (1997): 325-344.

• India has experience numerous bouts of ethnic nationalism, three of which are explored in this article. Ignoring the violent active insurgencies in the Northeast, the article looks at Tamil nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, Sikh nationalism in the 1980s, and Kashmiri muslim nationalism in the 1990s (325).
• The rise and decline of ethnic nationalist movements are affected by internal group-level factors as well as political context. Well established central authorities willing to share power and resources with regional groups tend to have the best success with separatist movements, as opposition leaders are co-opted and incorporated into government (325-326, 329).
• This paper applies specifically to the Indian context, and it should be noted that vary alternative factors are necessary to predict the success or failure of other nationalist groups. Some forms of nationalism may be better suited to mobilization than others, and international contexts also affect governmental reactions (326).
• The introduction of democracy is developing countries often exacerbates or creates new tensions and conflict between power groups. The West in general did not experiences these issues to such a degree because democratization came after development (326).
• The introduction of democracy across a large undeveloped state bring numerous social changes within a previously stratified social structure, as democracy allows underrepresented voices to gain political power. This encourages the mobilization of previously suppressed identities and ideologies. Traditional elites displaced by the new power structures form reactionary movements, also through popular mobilization, leading to conflict (327).
• Developing states, because of low levels of capital among most of the population, are by necessity involved in most important economic functions. This means that government positions are valuable and attract power-hungry individuals. Furthermore, government control over the economy means that socio-economic divides are immediately politicized and form points of mobilization (327).
• Democracies in developing states tend to be new, with weak formal institutions. This means that power is often concentrated in individuals. These forms of personalized politics tend to lend themselves to communal violence and mass mobilization between opposing elite groups (327-328).
• The introduction of democratic processes and mass suffrage in developing countries produces an instant expectation of substantive reform and political change. Most developing countries, however, rely on a small technocratic group of experts for economic policy, leading to a clash between economic necessity and political expectations (328).
• The institutionalization of state functions and the willingness of the contemporary government to accommodate the demands of nationalist movements were the two critical factors in producing different results to nationalist movements. Well-institutionalized and accommodating governments placated demands after mobilization; accommodating weakly-institutionalized governments peacefully divided into separate states; unaccommodating, but well-institutionalized governments repressed demands as they repeatedly arose; and unaccommodating poorly-institutionalized governments broke down into chaos and violence (329-330).
• This article focuses on the results of nationalism within a well-institutionalized state with accommodating elites. The pattern of political power here looks like a horseshoe, as nationalist demands rise with the processes of democratization, but decline as the state responds by both setting limits on political action and addressing some of the core grievances in the movement (329).
• In the 1950s, India was a well organized and institutionalized polity, especially compared to the rest of the developing world. It had a robust civil service, a large professional military, an independent judiciary, a free press, and a political party which enveloped many state functions (331).
• In the 1960s, India still had well-functioning institutions, although some weakness was introduced as the Congress party lost its monopoly on political power. In the 1970s and 1980s, Indian institutions were badly damaged by several powerful leaders, including Indira Gandhi, as core institutions were carved out for political gain (331).
• During the period examined in this article, India had four prime ministers who ruled for significant periods of time and represented major government positions: Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and Narasimha Rao (332).
• Mr. Nehru, who ruled from 1947 to 1964, was fairly accommodating, partially because of his personality and partially because of his immense personal power within India. His daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, ruled from 1966 to 1977 and from 1980 to 1984 and was the most unaccommodating of the politicians, as her monopoly on power rested partially on populist mobilization of poor Hindus against threats from minority groups (332).
• Indira Gandhi's son, Rajiv Gandhi ruled from 1985 to 1989 and was between his mother and grandfather. The early parts of his term were accommodating, but less so in the last two years. Mr. Rao, who served from 1991 to 1996, was a flexible and accommodating leaders who responded to public demands (332).
• Using the characteristics of the four primary figures in Indian politics during the time, the periods of history can be broken into categories for analysis. The Nahru administration was well-institutionalized and accommodating. Indira Gandhi's government was halfway institutionalized and unaccommodating. Both Rajiv Gandhi's government and the Rao regime were partially institutionalized and partially accommodating (332-333).
• Despite the full integral nature of the modern state of Tamilnadu in India, in the 1950s and early 1960s, there were serious calls for independence or greater autonomy within India. Tamils are a linguistically defined group, however contemporary Tamil elites argued that there were a distinct nation which had been oppressed by 'Northern Aryan' Brahmins (333).
• The lower percentage of Brahmins in Tamilnadu, combined with high rates of urbanization among all castes, quickly eroded the legitimacy of the Brahmin-led Congress Party. Since WWI, non-Brahmin elites had formed the anti-Brahmin Justice Party in an attempt to ally with Britain to promote Tamil interests. The public opposition to domination by Northern castes allowed caste and ethnic mobilization to coalesce against the Congress Party (333-334).
• The Tamil movement's demands began as autonomy and increased following independence, arguing for the linguistic reorganization of the Indian Union, and then the possible independence of 'Dravidistan' for the Dravidic peoples (334).
• In the 1950s, the Nehru government was extremely nervous about devolving any power following the turbulent experience of partition with Pakistan, but -- as the Tamil movement became more violent and anti-Indian -- calculated that accommodation was the best strategy. He reorganized the state system in 1956 along linguistic lines to give the Tamils a separate state, which received a limited number of powers from the central government (334).
• Following the creation of Tamilnadu, originally called Madras, the focus of the Tamil movement turned to ousting the Congress Party from state politics. Nationalists formed the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [DMK] Party, which adopted policies of land reform and destruction of the caste system (334).
• Following Jawaharlal Nehru's death, the Indian government attempted to impose Hindi as a national language, leading to massive riots in all minority states, but also violence in Tamilnadu. After a few months of escalating violence, the government backtracked on its decision and gave Tamil equal language status to Hindi and English in the state (335).
• In 1967, following their victory on language rights, the DMK won a majority in the state legislature, and has defeated Congress every since. Brahmins are no longer the main government officials, as power has gone to the intermediate castes of the DMK. As the party experienced success, it mellowed and abandoned many socioeconomic plans (335).
• Sikhs make up around half the population of Punjab state in India, and during the 1980s demanded greater autonomy for their state or independence as 'Khalistan'. Indra Gandhi's government met these demands with brutal force, leading to militant insurgency funded by Pakistan that caused thousands of deaths into the 1990s, when the Rao administration devolved some powers to the state government and allowed peaceful movements (335).
• Prior to the violence of the 1980s, intermarriage between Sikhs and Hindus was common and the two groups were more divided along caste lines than ethno-religious boundaries. Since the 1960s, a Sikh interests party known as Akali Dal had been campaigned, but was in competition with Congress for control of government and use Sikh nationalism to encourage larger public support (336).
•  Akali Dal had some electoral success in the past and frequently swapped power with Congress. In 1966, Akali Dal had succeeded in pressuring the government into creating a separate Punjab state where the language was spoken, but they will competed with Congress for power. During Indira Gandhi's administration, Congress took more aggressive measures, prompting Akali Dal to raise the stakes and lobby for complete independence (336).
• Prominent Sikh politicians and Akali Dal members were targeted by Indira Gandhi's government, with many more labeled as seditious and arrested during the Emergency. When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, Sikh politics were decimated and the Congress Party had a clear majority (336-337).
• Indira Gandhi's government sought to exploit cleavages between moderate and militant Sikh nationalists, and behaved aggressively during the 1980s. Armed by Pakistan, Sikh militants got involved in escalating conflict with the state and mobilized on the concept of a holy war. Moderates were sidelined by the conflict, a situation exacerbated by the government's refusal to compromise on minor issues like water rights and state control of the capital (337).
• When Rajiv Gandhi was elected in 1985, he promised to make a number of concessions to the Akali Dal party and announced state elections. The Akali Dal won a majority, but found it impossible to implemented all aspects of their deal with the central government. Rajiv Gandhi's later administration was uncompromising, and saw a rise in violence where secession was prevented mainly be extensive use of armed force (337-338).
• The Rao government called new elections for Punjab state in the 1990s, which, despite Akali Dal boycotting the elections, resulted in a majority controlled by the Sikh-led wing of Congress. The integration of the Sikh has been successful, and even Akali Dal has participated in continuing elections (338).
• Since 1989, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has been engulfed in militant violence between anti-Indian Muslim groups and the Indian security forces. The government appears to be trying a strategy similar to that in Punjab, where militants are targeted militarily, while political leaders are co-opted into government (338-339).
• Ever since the Partition of India, Kashmiri has been a point of dispute as the Hindu prince decided to join the Indian Union against the will of his majority Muslim population. Ethnic and religious nationalism in Kashmir has kept low until the 1980s, as Jammu and Kashmir received a number of special rights and funds from the central government (339).
• Several important changes occurred in state politics during Indira Gandhi's second term, as her policy of flirting with Hindu nationalism coincided with the succession of Farooq Abdullah to head the Kashmiri interests National Conference Party. Mr. Abdullah campaigned on a platform of Kashmiri autonomy, which, despite Indira Gandhi personally visiting the state, won the National Conference Party a majority in the 1983 elections (339-340).
• Although Mr. Abdullah had hoped to join with other non-Congress parties to form a loyal opposition calling with decentralization, Indira Gandhi viewed him as a threat and appointed Jagmohan, a tough loyal aide, as the governor of the state. Jagmohan encouraged National Conference members to defect to Congress, and then dismissed Mr. Abdullah from his position without evidence (340).
• Despite his dismissal, Mr. Abdullah ran again in 1987 and formed a coalition with the Congress Party, delegitimizing him in the eyes of many Muslims and urban youth. A number of Muslim interests parties formed the Muslim United Front and ran in opposition, where they were repeatedly harassed by security forces. The Conference-Congress coalition won the election in circumstances of widespread claims of fraud and sporadic violence (340).
• In the aftermath of the elections, violent riots and crackdowns led many Muslim youth to flee to Pakistan, where they were trained and armed as insurgents before returning to India. An active armed insurgency began, with abuses by Indian security forces increasing public resentment. The Muslim opposition successfully boycotted the 1989 elections, marking the elections as illegitimate and corrupt (340-341).
• As the insurgency progress, factionalism within the militant groups became increasingly pronounced. The most popular group is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front [JKLF], which argues for a sovereign Kashmir based on the borders of the princely state. The other main group is the Hizbul Mujahideen, who seek the transfer of the territory to Pakistan and have the full backing of the Pakistani government (341).
• Although sympathetic, Indian muslims have generally refrained from expressing support for either group, fearing communal violence and BJP victory in the rest of India would follow. As a result, India is trapped in a political stalemate at the time this paper was written (341).
• The author suggests three potential answers to the questions of why the insurgency in Kashmir and Jammu is ongoing. The first would be that Islam has some special ability to mobilize populations, but this would not explain the geographic and temporal limits of the Kashmir insurgency. The second argues that Pakistan support has prolonged the conflict. The third contends that it is too soon to make judgements, because the situation is in flux (342).
• The experience of India suggests that ethnic conflicts should be best thought of as a sub-set of power conflict where the dividing line is along ethnic boundaries as opposed to class or ideology. Ethnic conflict are not permanent or unavoidable, but reflect competition over unequally distributed resources and power (342-343).
• While the importance of accommodating governmental leadership is stressed as critical to resolving conflicts peacefully, nationalist movements will always trend towards violence and unaccommodating positions. Since they are less institutionalized than governments, more radical voices will gain power as the violence escalates (343).