Enayat, Hamid. "The Concept of the Islamic State" In Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century, by Hamid Enayat. 69-110. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Enayat, Hamid. "The Concept of the Islamic State" In Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century, by Hamid Enayat. 69-110. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

• The destruction of the Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk prompted a change in the political goals of more traditionalist Muslims towards the idea of an Islamic state. Although originally vague on details, the detail of an Islamic state became more developed, particularly by the Fundamentalists of the 1920s, including both the Salafists and the Wahabbists (69).
• Arab nationalists originally encouraged the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, seeing it as a step towards returning the title to the Arabs. After WWI, however, the only candidate for Caliph was Sharif Husayn of Mecca, whose connections with the British delegitimized him to most Muslims. As a result, when Sharif Husayn declared himself Caliph in 1924, only Hejaz, Iraq, and east Jordon recognized him, with Egyptian and Indian Muslims explicitly rejecting him as a British agent (70).
• This transition from a spiritual government led by the Caliph to a political organization under an Islamic state was robustly explained by Muhammad Rashid Rida, a Salafi theologian and student of Muhammad Abduh, who was a major influence on the Muslim Brotherhood as a member of the Syrian emigre community in Egypt (69-70). 
• Muhammad Rashid Rida was, like many contemporary writers, torn between his commitment to the Caliphate and his belief in Arab nationalism. He spoke out strongly against racism and tribal divisions for undermining Muslim unity, but was also a strong advocate of Syrian nationalism, serving as President of the Syrian National Council in 1920 and elected Faisal bin Hussein as King (70).
• He attacked the Caliphate for its corruption and immorality, arguing that, while Muslims had a duty under religious law to obey a just Caliphate as had existed under Mohammed and his immediate successors, there was actually a religious obligation to resist an immoral Caliph if feasible (71-72). He believed that the contemporary Caliphate had been debased and used to serve political interests, thereby making it illegitimate (73).
• This opinion weighs in on important philosophic ground in Islam: the morality of revolt. Revolt against injustice and oppression is legitimate, but not when it will lead to anarchy and suffering. Therefore, Islam only permits revolt under certain circumstances. Muhammad Rashid Rida is thus controversial when he legitimizes revolt against the Ottoman Caliph (72-73).
• Muhammad Rashid Rida also notes the practical barriers to the recreation of the Caliphate, namely the lack of suitable candidates. Sharif Husayn is dismissed the basis of his despotism, lack of Quranic learning, and British sympathies. Turks are excluded on the basis of their secular government. He asserts that only Imam Yahya of Yemen is fit to occupy the office, but could never become Caliph because he was Shiite and would never be approved by the consensus of Sunni Muslims (74).
• He then discusses the impossibility of choosing a capital of the Caliphate. He praises the Turks for their military strength and openness to reform and the Arabs for being the traditional core of Islam, then asserts that a true Caliphate needs both characteristics, an impossibility due to lack of cooperation between Turks and Arabs. He thus dismisses his suggestion of Mosul as the seat of the Caliphate as an impossibility (74-75).
• Having demonstrated that it would impossible to recreate the Caliphate in its traditional form, he instead advocates for its replacement with a solely religious institution; a very similar solution to that adopted by Turkey in the following years (76).
• In his discussions of an Islamic state, Muhammad Rashid Rida argues that the assumption of most contemporary Muslim writers that the principle of consultation between the ruler and the ruled guaranteed democracy for Muslims was flawed because Muslims could only revolt and enforce their consultative rights in limited circumstances. The current system thus did not check tyranny or guarantee freedom for Muslims (77).
• Muhammad Rashid Rida and his fellow Salafis rejected the idea of modern legal codes, especially those borrowed from the West, as the result of an erroneous belief that sharia law could not govern a modern society. He asserted that the flexibility of sharia law made it fit to remain the sole source of law because the Quran and centuries of legal ruling from multiple schools could be borrowed to litigate on any issue (77-78, 80).
• On this basis, Muhammad Rashid Rida proposes that legislation should be developed by individual countries on the basis of their own traditions, not borrowed from the West, and that these laws should be judged and adjudicated on the basis of sharia law (79).
• An Islamic state, as envisioned by Muhammad Rashid Rida, is led by an elected Caliph whose power is checked by a powerful body of jurists choosen on the basis of their intellectual prowess and Quranic learning. These jurists, who must enjoy popular support, legislate on all matters not directly pertaining to religion. These decisions must be informed by sharia law, but are still legitimate even when they go beyond the explicit scope of sharia law. The Caliph should be selected by the four schools of Sunnism, as well as the Twelver, Ibadi, and Zaydi Shiites, and needs to respect their doctrinal differences. The Caliph must rule in accordance with the Quran and the common good and anyone may legitimately resist his rule on those grounds. Muslims should enjoy freedom of worship so long as they justify their believes on the basis of the Quran. Christian and Jews are allowed to practice their own faiths and may perform activities prohibited in Islam without punishment (81-82).
• The system proposed here by Muhammad Rashid Rida is very similar to that created by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The primary differences between these systems are, in fact, that Muhammad Rashid Rida accepts this system as permanent, whereas the Iranians believe that the system exists temporarily until the return of the Mahdi (82-83).
• The system of parallel religious and political institutions proposed by Muhammad Rashid Rida, with its heavy emphasis on the impracticality and immorality of forcing religious practices on diverse Muslim beliefs, was abandoned over the course of the 1920s and 1930s as Salafis became more radical and began to demand the total domination of religious institutions in political life (83).
• The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, was a response to disunity in contemporary Egyptian politics, characterized by the rivalry of the Wafd and Liberal Constitutionist parties, and the rising trend of liberalism and secularism in Egyptian intellectual life. Hasan al-Banna viewed his movement originally as a way to rally Muslims in defense of their religion against liberalism, secularism, and communism (84).
• As the Brotherhood expanded, it bumped heads with other political forces in the country and become more radical in its goals. The Brotherhood thrived under conflict with other political organizations, especially with the British occupation forces in the Middle East (84).
• The Brotherhood's transition from a pious social club into a political organization was a result of its fundraising for Palestinians during their revolt against British occupation and Jewish settlement from 1936 to 1939. The success of this campaign convinced Hasan al-Banna to transform the organization, which in 1939 adopted a political agenda. Its political goals were to become an international movement dedicated to the liberation of the entire Muslim world, not only Egypt, from foreign control, and to establish a government based on the principles of Islam in Egypt and all other liberated countries (85).
• The Brotherhood's involvement in the 1947 partition of Mandatory Palestine and the Arab loss in the subsequent was against Israel further radicalized the group. It convinced the Brothers that violence was necessary to achieve liberation and meant that the Muslim Brotherhood led the charge in using violence to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy, resulting in its banning in Egypt in December 1948 and Hasan al-Banna's assassination in 1949 (85).
• Participating in the first Arab-Israeli War, particularly the Battle of al-Faluja, placed the Muslim Brotherhood in contact with the Free Officers. The Brotherhood indoctrinated many rank-and-file members of the Free Officers, and the Officers provided military training to the Brotherhood (86).
• When the Free Officers overthrew the monarchy in 1952, many Brothers assumed that they would now implement some of the Islamic ideals advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The unwillingness of the Free Officers to institute these reforms created tensions between the groups, particularly angering the rank-and-file Brothers. Angered by the Free Officers' lack of commitment to Islamism and the willingness of the Brotherhood's leadership to wait for gradual change, radical Brothers attempted to assassinate President Nasser in 1954, resulting in the re-illegalization of the Brotherhood that year and the arrest or execution of many of its members (86).
• The Arab defeat in the Six Day War has as devastating for the Nasser government as it was beneficial for the Brotherhood influence in Egypt. It discredited the ability of secular Arab government to challenge imperialism in the Middle East, lending credence to the Brotherhood's assertion that Arab weakness was caused by turning away from Islam. The Egyptian government relaxed its policy towards fundamentalist groups and released hundreds of Brothers from jail in April 1968 (87).
• Under Hasan al-Banna's leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood always sought to gain power by electoral means if possible. The unsuccessful war against Israel in 1948, combined with deepening repression by the Egyptian government, led the Muslim Brotherhood to adopt violent tactics, which remained its primary method of political action throughout the Nasser administration (87-88).
• During the 1950s, the Brotherhood's commitment to Islamism became increasing entwined with its opposition to Israel and the West. It claimed that all Western designs in the Middle East were motivated by the same anti-Muslim mentality of the Crusades and that an Islamic state should therefore be established as the ultimate enemy of Western imperialism (88-89).
• The Muslim Brotherhood's actual plans for an Islamic state were unclear, but the use of sharia law in every sphere of life and jurisprudence was emphasized; there was no need for legislation outside of sharia. While the state and religious authorities were technically separate, the assumption was that the requirements of enforcing sharia law would bring the state and religion into alignment (89).
• Importantly, the Brotherhood did not believe that the application of sharia law alone could secure an Islamic state, as it remained critical of Saudi Arabia's government. Instead, it argued that the principles of Islam needed to be established to governance and society before the specifics of sharia penal codes should be applied (90).
• Many members of the Brotherhood in the 1950s showed an envy of Israel's incorporation of Judaism into its politics, law, education, and society. They wished that Islam held the same position in Muslim countries (87-88).
• Early Islamists, including Qasim Amin and Muhammad Rashid Rida, advocated for the promotion of women's place in society, seeking to end the isolation of women and their general lack of education -- lack of Quranic learning among women specifically troubled Muhammad Rashid Rida (90-91).
• During the decades between the turn of the 20th Century and the 1940s, however, urbanization had severely weakened family structure and led many young people to diverge from traditional social expectations. The fear of total family disintegration and female promiscuity led to a backlash against female empowerment. This force was captured by the Muslim Brotherhood, which suggested that women be cloistered away from corrupting influences and only educated to the degree necessary to be good Muslims and homemakers (91-93).
• The Iranian version of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Devotees of Islam فدائیان اسلام, were one of the victorious factions in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The group became prominent following WWII and were important in mobilizing support in Iran for the Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (93).
• Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere, the group never achieved a mass following and remained a small group of zealots advocating violence to promote their political ends (93). Their founder, Sayyid Mujtaba Navvab Safavi, was charismatic, but never a widely respected authority on Islam. The group's main claim to fame was a series of political assassinations carried out between 1945 and 1963 (94).
• In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood provided one of the few sources of reliable Muslim authority not compromised by cooperation with the state, as al-Azhar was forced to toe official lines. A much more diverse Islamist environment existed in Iran and the Devotees were always overshadowed by other political figures, first by Ayatollah Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani and then Ayatollah Khomeini (94).
• The Devotees never developed a strong following or theoretical underpinnings for their position. This was largely due to the doctrinal fanaticism required during the period of severe persecution from 1951 to 1979, a lack of intellectual innovation exacerbated by lacking an intellectual leader between the execution of Navvab Safavi in 1956 and the emergence of Shaykh Sadiq Khalkhali during the Islamic Revolution (95).
• The Devotees were important in running Islamic courts in the aftermath of the Revolution, thus shaping the corpus of Iranian jurisprudence. They charged offenders with vague crimes taken directly from the Quran, especially 'fighting God and His Prophet, and corrupting the Earth' (95-96).
• The Devotees' use of these particular Quranic laws is contested, as Islamic scholars have long recognized the potential for these vague laws to be misused by tyrants. They have thus limited the circumstances under which it can be applied (96).
• The clearest case of its appropriate application is against highway robbers, those who attack public places, and those who destroy grain. It can be legitimately assumed that these individuals are either infidels or apostates (96-97).
• Islamic scholars in the 20th Century, including Muhammad Rashid Rida, took a broader view of the passage and applied it to any act using force to harm a Muslim's life, property, or honor. Muhammad Rashid Rida defends the harsh punishments for these crimes in the Quran by arguing that all states employ harsh justice to deter future criminals; Islamic states would do the same, but their punishments would be just (97).
• Since convicting a diverse group of offenders -- including embezzlers, armed rebels, and sodomites -- of 'waging war against God' would be difficult, the Devotees' courts instead functioned on the premise that guilt of 'corrupting the Earth' implied 'fighting God and His Prophet' and that all such crimes were thus punishable by death (98).
• This application of sharia law is not in accordance with most contemporary Muslims, as both other Shii theologians and Sunni scholars, like Muhammad Rashid Rida, advocated mercy on repentant offenders. The Devotees responded to these rebukes by accusing their critics of limit themselves to the literary basis of the Quran condemning bandits and not apply the doctrine to the larger goal of protecting public order (98-99).
• Jamaat-e-Islami was a major Islamist movement in first British India and then Pakistan. Its ideas about the creation of an Islamic state had a significant impact on early Pakistani politics (100).
• Islam is the basis for Pakistani identity, as this Muslim identity, separate from the Hindu majority of South Asia, motivated the creation of Pakistan (100).
• The centrality of Islam in political life in Pakistan has been reconfirmed in the 1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions, each created after a period of conflict with India. The Islamic character of Pakistan has only affected specific laws, such as prohibitions on usury and alcohol, and is mostly expressed in vague declarations that no law may be repugnant to Islam (100-101).
• The founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, Abul Ala Maududi, was -- unlike Hasan al-Banna or Navvab Sayyid -- closely connected to leading Muslim political and religious figures in colonial India and held views that approximated the mainstream of Islamist thought during that time. The only significant points of disagreement were over the role of women in politics and the accountability and devotion of rulers (101). 
• Abul Ala Maududi's political career started in 1937, when Muhammad Iqbal, the head of the Muslim League, asked him to assist in codifying Islamic jurisprudence. In 1938, he then became the head of two theology departments in Lahore and began a monthly newspaper on the exegesis of Islam. In between periods of arrest for harassing liberal opponents, he continued activism work and participating in the drafting of a constitution in 1956 (101-102).
• Abul Ala Maududi originally opposed the creation of Pakistan for undermining the ideal of a universal Muslim state, but later decided to support Pakistan as an opportunity to elevated Islam to the position it deserved in society (102).
• Abul Ala Maududi argued that any Islamic state would collapse due to the immorality of its citizenry, therefore the precondition for a viable Islamic state is a successful Islamic revolution that transforms the moral character of society (102-103).
• He provides the example of the Prophet Muhammed and his companions as the proper means to instigate a societal revolution. Through willpower, moral excellence, and constant opposition, the Prophet gained the support of a hostile populace and transformed the moral basis of society. Abul Ala Maududi recommends that current revolutions take similar steps (103).
• Although Abul Ala Maududi does not forbid violence in the cause of an Islamic revolution, he does not believe that it is necessary. Instead, he points to the relatively sparse violence of the Prophet -- only around 1000 people died in all Mohammed's combined wars -- and advocates the power of moral character, devotion, and public example as tools for bringing about societal change (103-104).
• The revolution preceding the establishment of an Islamic state is meant to create a mass movement in society that supports Islamic values and morals and demands their incorporation in governance. Politicians, with popular support, would thus rule accord to divine law rather than popular will. Since society has already undergone a revolution, every segment of the population would be committed to the same basic principles and assumptions (104).
• Abul Ala Maududi based his opinions on the application of sharia law on verses 23 and 26-39 in the Surah al-Isra (105). These verses reinforce that Islamic law comes directly from God and should be subject to human interference, family life and respect for parents must be forced and enforced, charity is required, economic inequality should be limited, birth control is a crime, adultery and all flirtatious behavior that might create temptation are criminal, orphans should be protected, promises and contracts should be honored, everyone should be given the benefit of the doubt, people should behave without arrogance or vanity, and capital punishment is only acceptable in cases of murder, war against Muslims, opposition to the Islamic order, adultery, or apostasy (106-107).
• The fact that both social behaviors and legal matters are discussed in these passages underline Abul Ala Maududi's belief that an Islamic state was impossible without an Islamic society. Thus, an Islamic state is also responsible for making sure that all of society conforms to Islamic values (107-108).
• Abul Ala Maududi defended the brutality of many Quranic punishments, arguing that horrific crimes demanded horrific punishments. He then argued that stringent judicial requirements meant that these punishments would only be applied to the truly guilty (109).
• Jamaat-e-Islami was also an anti-communist movement that sought to avoid any kind of total revolution, arguing that the abolition of private property and the destruction of traditional family structure were contrary to human nature, and thus contrary to Islam because Islam is totally compatible with human nature (108).
• Although he strongly condemns economic inequalities, Abul Ala Maududi believed that some inequality has inevitable and always argued against the collectivization of property. For him, the Islamic revolution would change the morals and character of society, but not its institutions (108).
• Jamaat-e-Islami and Abul Ala Maududi did not believe that multiparty democracy was possible in an Islamic state. Some mechanism of accountability to the popular will was certainly required of politicians in an Islamic state, but electoral competition would imply that ideologies other than the implementation of divine law would be legitimate, which they clearly aren't (109-110).
• Abul Ala Maududi, like most Islamic Fundamentalists, wanted to impose a number of social restrictions on the behavior of women and bar them from political positions. He was stricter than most contemporary fundamentalists about veiling, but more willing to let women hold political power when they were the best available option (110).
• Sharia law does not constitute a set basis of laws, since it is based on interpretation of the Quran and traditions. This means that sharia law could alternatively support liberal, socialist, or reactionary viewpoints and ethos. Advocating for the establishment of sharia, therefore, cannot be the sole political vision, since defining sharia is itself a political question (99).