Enayat, Hamid. "Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism" In Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century, by Hamid Enayat. 111-159. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Enayat, Hamid. "Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism" In Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century, by Hamid Enayat. 111-159. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

• Early nationalism in the Muslim world appeared in the 19th Century as Muslim polities were exploited and conquered by Western powers. Early writers -- such as Rafah Rafi al-Tahtawi, Abd Allah Nadim, and Shaykh Husayn Marsafi -- understood nationalism primarily as a patriotic desire to defend one's homeland, a cause specifically encouraged by the Prophet Muhammed (112).
• Islam is not a faith particularly conducive to nationalism because it does not distinguish in the Quran between different racial, ethnic, or linguistic groups. All people are referred to by the same term and given full rights and equality in the political and social community following conversion to Islam (127-128).
• Whereas nationalism as a form of anti-colonialist patriotism was fully compatible with Islam, the forms of distinct nationalism that developed during and after WWI created a controversy within the Muslim community over the compatibility of nationalism and the universalist doctrine of Islam (112).
• Arab nationalism proved particularly divisive since it was very popular and brought to the fore the historical connection between Islam and the Arabs. Arab identity had always been very closely connected with Islam, so there was a division between Arab nationalism who tried to demonstrate that Arab nationalism and Islam were totally compatible and those who attempted to preempt the Muslim identity of the Arabs with attachment to Arabic or other Arab cultural institutions (112).
• Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz, who went on to serve as Iraqi prime minister from 1965 to 1966, claimed that Arab nationalism and Islam were automatically compatible. He argued that, unlike other religions, Islam was both a personal faith and a system of law and government. Although Arabs had a unique language and cultural institutions to justify separate states, Abd al-Bazzaz contended that their unique status in Islam was the ultimate basis of Arab identity and thus any Arab nationalism would automatically be Muslim (112-113).
• Arguments about Arab nationalism and Islam normally rested on the claim that Arabs had a special role in the Quran above other faithful. Although heretical, this view was widespread and was used to paint many Muslim rules, especially the Umayyad dynasty, as heroes of Arab nationalism (114).
• This aspect of Islamic identity actually underpinning and supporting Arab chauvinism is unique to Arab nationalism. In most other nationalisms, such as in Iran or Turkey, nationalism actually runs in opposition to a trans-national and universal Islamic identity (114-115).
• Arab nationalism also operated under a number of practical obstacles, namely that the Arabs had not been unified since the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258. Creating an Arab state then required not only overthrowing several different colonial and imperial governments, including the British, the French, and the Ottomans, but then also unifying these territories (120-121).
• Anti-nationalist and universalist beliefs were originally the conservative positions in Islamist discourse, as they supported the Ottoman Empire's continued domination of the Middle East. This changed with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as the resurrection of a multiethnic Muslim state became a radical proposition (115).
• These former conservatives responded to the creation of Muslim nation-states by arguing that the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural foundations of their national identities were not a legitimate basis for independence, since nationalism was only sanctioned as a way to rally support against foreign occupation and Islamism was capable of doing that without recourse to cultural or linguistic nationalism (115).
• Nationalism has usually been restricted to a small portion of the literate and educated population, usually from the middle classes. In most cases, nationalism has only been adopted by the poor and rural populations in its most basic anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forms. Islamism, on the other hand, enjoyed instant support in the countryside, giving Islamists a consistent base in the countryside (116-117).
• The scholars of al-Azhar, represented by the rector, Muhammad Abul-Fadl al-Jizawi, and the Mufti of Egypt, Abd ar-Rahman Qurrah, strongly opposed the nationalism that emerged during and after the First World War. They argued that Islam opposed any specific ethnic nationalism and that national identities could only rest upon Muslim unity (117).
• al-Azhar's transition from supporting Islamic internationalism to Arab nationalism in 1952, when they gave their full support to the Free Officers and their government. al-Azhar felt that the Free Officers were a major power and that without the influence of al-Azhar they might turn Egypt into a secular or atheist state. It also attached Islamism to the popular cause of Arab nationalism, which was riding high after the 1952 coup and the loss to Israel in 1948. Adopting Arab nationalism allowed al-Azhar to protect itself from repression and generate popular support and political influence (117-119).
• This switch to supporting Arab nationalism was justified by arguing that Arab nationalism had always supported the cause of Islam and supporting the Arab nations would assist in strengthening Islam (119).
• Iranian nationalism was mainly focused on anger at the backwardness and weakness of the contemporary government, accompanied by demands for democracy and the rule of law. Nationalism was almost entirely a liberal cause, with Islamic scholars denouncing it as undermining Muslim unity (121). Imams overwhelmingly supported pan-Islamism (121-122).
• Shiism actually places more of an emphasis on the exceptional position of the Arabs in Islam than does Sunnism, by elevating the status of the Arab family of the Prophet Muhammed (121).
• Islamist opposition to Iranian nationalism only began to wane during the reign of Rida Shah, when that government exalted Iran's pre-Islamic history and culture and punished or censored those who spoke out against his nationalist project. This period of repression of pan-Islamism was followed by popular anger at the Allied occupation of Iran during WWII, causing some imams to support nationalists to evict the foreign occupiers (122).
• The coalition established between the nationalists, led by Mohammad Mosaddegh, and the Islamists, led by Ayatollah Kashani, collapsed shortly after Mohammad Mosaddegh's election in 1951. After their common goals of evicting the British and nationalizing Iran's oil reserves were completed, the factions started to squabble about the creation of a Western democracy. Prime Minister Mosaddegh's supporters accused the Islamists of cynically supporting and enabling British imperialism (122).
• In the aftermath of the monarchy's restoration in 1953, Islamists and pro-Mosaddegh nationalists were both repressed. but the Islamists retained their political influence through mosques, allowing them to retain political influence. The monarchy readopted Rida Shah's secularization policies, leading the clergy to become increasingly critical of the government and pre-Islamic Iran in general (122-123).
• One of the major critics of the cultural nationalism promoted by Mohammad Reza Shah was Murtada Mutahhari, a professor at Tehran University and later a leader in the Islamic Revolution. He founded a center in Tehran to instruct youth in the tenets of 'true Islam'; it was later shut down by the government. He refuted claims that Islam had been imposed on Iran by force, contending that Iran's robust history of Islamic scholarship showed genuine popular interest in the faith, and that Islam was foreign to Iran, by noting that the same was true of Christianity in Europe and Communism in Russia (123-124).
• His scholarship necessarily conflicted with claims made by Iranian nationalists, who attempted to craft a mythicized form of pre-Islamic history to support their distinction from other Muslim states. These claims usually rested on an unsure factual basis (124).
• The same movements for nationalism in the Muslim world during the 20th Century were accompanied by demands for increased democracy and accountability of governments (125).
• Whereas conflicts between nationalism and Islam were the result of Islam's specific emphasis on universalism, Islam's relationship with democracy is similar to that of other religions, because Islam asserts a set of unquestionable truths and principles not subject to popular contestation (126). 
• The primary challenge to Islamic democracy is the existence of sharia law, which is divinely inspired and therefore supersedes any man-made law. This is not, however, an insurmountable obstacle, as sharia is subject to broad interpretation so that its scope could be determined democratically (129).
• Islamic discourse on democracy is made difficult by the fact that there is no agreed upon definition of democracy, only broad principles. The degree to which an Islamic society is democratic, therefore, cannot be determined without defining democracy (134-135).
• Islam is potentially compatible with democracy, while it is fundamentally incompatible with dictatorship, as sharia law forbids the concentration of unrestricted power under a single individual (128). The Quran states that the Prophet and his rightly-guided successors consulted with their advisors and supporters, which has been translated in Islamic jurisprudence into a general requirement that rulers consult with and acquire the consensus of their subjects (129).
• Some critics have argued that Islam is undemocratic because it denies non-Muslims equal political rights and social status. Islamists challenge this view by arguing that anyone can convert to Islam at any time and thus gain full political and social rights (128). Additionally, Muslim societies have historically shown greater tolerance for other religions than Christian countries, indicating democracy should not be impossible due to religion (130).
• Many Muslim advocates for democracy, such as Humayun Zahiruddin Kabir, tried to show that democracy and Islam were naturally compatible. Humayun Kabir argued scientific progress, democracy, and Islam were based on the uniformity of the universe and the value of individual effort. All three also declared the fundamental equality of all experiences, including human experience, under common laws, both natural and divine (130).
• Muslim writings on democracy have been influenced by autocratic domestic political conditions, and argue about the Islamic foundations of democracy as a means of advocating for liberal political change (131). 
• One of the ways that Muslim democrats argued for individual rights and freedoms was through appeal to the liberal aspects of sharia law. Ahmad Shawqi al-Fanjari, an Egyptian writer, compiled a list of liberal laws derived from the sharia demands for consultation, justice, and equality (131).
• He argues that freedom in the Quran is defended under the label of 'mercy' and democracy supported under the label 'mutual kindness' (131). From this basis, he derives basic human rights, the equal status of women, freedom of speech, and prohibitions on torture from the Quran (132-133). 
• Many of Ahmad al-Fanjari's justifications are tenuous and use Quranic verse outside of its appropriate context. They are, thus, very open to criticism by other Muslims (133).
• Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba, an Iranian theologian, argued that the supremacy of Islamic law means that Islam is only able to operate in a democracy to the degree that laws are just. He contends that Islam's emphasis on social welfare satisfies many popular demands. Moreover, any popular will that would disagree with the Quran would be unjust (135-136).
• In contradiction to views of the Quran as wholeheartedly endorsing personal freedom, Sayyid Tabataba argues that Islam imposes restrictions on personal action, although it does protect freedom of thought and speech (136).
• According to Sayyid Tabataba, Islam grants a large degree of human discretion and freedom, but this can never change the fact of religious law. There can never be a debate about religious law because it is divine and beyond human politics. This is thus the limit of politics (136-137).
• Socialism shares a number of core values with Islam, namely a commitment to brotherhood, egalitarianism, and social equality. Tensions between Islam and socialism typically arise when socialism attempts to enforce atheism or when Islamism defends private property rights as a part of Islam (139).
• Three broad versions of Islamic socialism have been developed in the Middle East: an official version, as created by the Nasser government in Egypt; fundamentalist Islamic socialism; and radical Islamic socialism, as proposed by many Iranian thinkers (139).
• Official Islamic socialism developed in Egypt after 1961 following the disbanding of the United Arab Republic [UAR] and Gamal Abdel Nasser's abandonment of Arab nationalism in favor of internally-focused socialism (140). It respected the position of religion and advocated against class warfare, while attempting to reduce economic and social inequality through large-scale nationalization (140-141).
• The Free Officer government had originally assumed that, under the framework of Arab nationalism, the interests of all classes were united around the nation; this was expressed politically through the creation of a unity government. After the split with Syria, the failure of the UAR was blamed on bourgeois elements in Syria and the Nasser government adopted the language of class struggle (140).
• While President Nasser was a devout Muslim, he believed that Islam only held public importance in Egypt as a constituent part of Egyptian nationalism -- views similar to those adopted by Mustafa Kamil (141-142).
• President Nasser really only turned towards Islamic identity during conflicts with his Communist critics in the late 1950s, during a period of tension with the USSR over its support for Iraq's Abd al-Qasim (141).
• Islamists in contemporary Egypt were dissatisfied with their positions which, while it supported the role of Islam, left them vulnerable and attached to a government that did not share their values (142). Prominent clerics, especially in al-Azhar, attempted to gain influence by arguing that Islamism provided all the same values as the official socialist line (144, 150).
• Islamists criticized the clergy for trying to attach themselves to socialism rather than advocating Islamism as a solution in its own right to challenge both socialism and capitalism (142-143).
• One of the most prominent defenses of the official line of Islamic socialism was 'The Socialism of Islam' by Mustafa as-Sibai, a Syrian academic and member of the Muslim Brotherhood (144). In it, Mustafa as-Sibai argues that Islam demands that the state provide for all members of society, guarantee human dignity, and control wealth in society, the same essential characteristics he identifies in all forms of socialism (145-146).
• Throughout this work, Mustafa as-Sibai contrasts communism with Islam, showing how Islam is compatible with socialism but diverges and surpasses communism. Namely, Islam prohibits class warfare, promotes creative freedom and innovation, and retains religious and moral values (145).  
• Mustafa as-Sibai also devotes much of his book to refuting the claim that Islam supports private property rights (145). He argues that all property is ultimately owned by God, and therefore all property rights are conditional on obedience to sharia. Quranic tradition demands that property be held through honest work and that the basic needs of life be made available to all persons, which to Mustafa as-Sibai limits private property rights to personal positions acquired through labor and justifies any nationalizations or redistributions to secure basic needs for all (146-147).
• He further argues that both the example of the Prophet and the rightly-guided Caliphs and the all-encompassing nature of Islam give an Islamic state wide discretionary powers to intervene in financial and economic matters to promote the wellbeing of the power and societal equality (147-148).
• Fundamentalist Islamic socialism is most closely associated with the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood during its period underground (150). His work supported a large role of the state in managing economic affairs and ensuring both economic equality and the provision of basic goods for all, but, unlike the official line, he did not believe that this necessitated a melding of Islam and socialism, but simply proved that Islam alone was sufficient (151).
• Sayyid Qutb criticized the official clerics for trying to tie Islam and socialism together, whereas he argued that Islam was separate and superior and that no other ideology was needed as the basis for government. All other ideologies adopted by the contemporary Egyptian government were corrupt and perverted the true path of Islam (151-152).
• Radical Islamic socialism was born out of dissatisfaction with contemporary nationalist governments in the Middle East and admiration of the USSR following Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel (152). It was most prevalent in Iran and attempted to combine Islam with traditional Marxist tenets (153).
• The most significant radical Islamic socialist group in the Middle East was the People's Mujahedin Organization سازمان مجاهدين خلق ايران, a guerrilla force created in Iran during the late 1960s. It argued that private property was the root of all social evils, and agitated for the overthrow of the despotic monarchy and the imperialist order (153-154).
• The Mujahedin Organization argued that God's path for humanity was the same as the Marxist line of historical progress, meaning that resistance to collectivization and the dictatorship of the proletariat amounted to resisting divine will and supporting a fundamentally disordered and un-Islamic order (154).
• Ali Shariati was another popular figure of Islamic radicalism in Iran, his views of the necessity of violence being very influential (155). He was also a radical Islamic socialist, arguing that the story of Cain and Abel represented the nature of history as dialectical struggle, specifically between producers and landowners -- an assumption he generated by arguing that, as brothers, Cain and Abel must have been alike in all way except economic status (156-157). Ali Shariati concluded that this dialectical tension could only be resolved through the return of the Mehdi and God's Kingdom on Earth (158).