Dadabaev, Timur. "Securing Central Asian Frontiers: Institutionalisation of Borders and Inter-state Relations". Strategic Analysis, Vol.36, No.4 (2012): 554-568.

Dadabaev, Timur. "Securing Central Asian Frontiers: Institutionalisation of Borders and Inter-state Relations". Strategic Analysis, Vol.36, No.4 (2012): 554-568.

• The Russian Revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia raised important questions about the creation of administrative divisions in Central Asia. Whereas the Tsarist regime held all of Central Asia in one group with the exception of the autonomous Xanates of Xiva and Buxoro, the Soviet regime sought to break the power of a potential pan-Turk movement by dividing the area into national republics, each purposefully constructed with large elements of another's nationality inside the borders (555-556).
• In the reality of life in the Soviet Union, the complexity of administrative barriers did not pose a substantial impediment to life, as all the republics existed within a single unitary state (556). Because issues of ethnicity and security were not paramount within the USSR, changes in barriers only occurred purposes of economic expedience where swapping land would be easier than changing regulations -- this resulted in much craziness later (557, 560).
• The administrative sense of the exclaves created for economic reasons broke down following independence, when borders actually began to be enforced and customs were required. This left several areas stranded into the territory of another state in ways that made no sense (560). Examples of this batshit insanity are provided from page 560 to page 561.
• Immediately following the collapse of the USSR, the states of Central Asia agreed to maintain the status quo in terms of having transparent and open borders with their brother states, as confirmed by documents such as the Minsk Agreement, Almaty Declaration, and the CIS Charter (557).
• The scenario encouraged by these documents and the CIS would have been beneficial economically and politically rational, as formal demarcation and securitization of inter-republican borders would have put additional costs on foundering states. It also would put political pressure to solve the border disputes of the previous period, a political task requiring more investments where no such capital existed (557).
• This consensus of the period immediately after independence broke down due to concerns about the spillover effect of the Tajik Civil War into other states should borders not be protected, uncontrolled migration of refugees in tense regions, increased movement of religious extremists and terrorists, limitations in controlling smuggling and drug trafficking, and the impediment unclear borders posed to developing natural resources (557-558). 
• The order eventually broke down during the mid to late 1990s, when increased terrorist activity and crime spreading from Tajikistan threatened the security of neighboring states, especially Uzbekistan. The 1999 Toshkent Bombing finally caused a policy shift, as Uzbekistan stated that the benefits of transparent borders were outweighed by the difficulties of intercepting terrorism and the IMU with open borders (558).
•  Through out the Tajik Civil War and its aftermath, border security became more important in Central Asia, largely driven by a breakdown of trust between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Uzbekistan constantly accused Tajikistan of allowing IMU terrorists to operate within its borders, and responded with damaging violations of Tajikistani borders by Uzbekistani forces, eventually leading to the autonomy of Xunjand in 1998 under the Uzbekistan-supported military government of Maxmud Xudayberdiev (559).
• Uzbekistan was the driver of much of the securitization of Central Asian borders, being responsible for mining its borders with Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and refusing to share the maps with those countries out of a deep suspicion that they were supporting anti-government groups (559). The Kyrgyz Republic was similarly distrustful of Tajikistani state capacity, mining its borders without informing the Tajikistani government and blowing up remote mountain passes (560).
• During the negotiations over border disputes following independence, the Central Asian republics invoked historical ties and agreements from previous periods. The negotiations between Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic involved rival delimitations, with Uzbekistan preferring original documents from 1924-1928, while the Kyrgyz Republic suggested those from a 1955 commission (561). The Kyrgyz Republic argued that the 1920s documents were not specific enough, while Uzbekistan protested that the commission had only received the support of the Kyrgyz SSR, not the Uzbek SSR (562).
• The period of the negotiations, taking place in the early 2000s, was also played out in popular newspaper in both countries. It led to another bout of distrust, where mutual animosity and claims of dangerous nationalism torpedoed a deal to exchange some exclaves and connect Sox to the Uzbekistani mainland (562).
• Unilateral action is generally the rule for border disputes in Central Asia, with security measures being undertaken before and conterminous with joint commissions on border demarcation. This has only further eroded trust and damaged the processes in place to come to a complete settlement on borders (563-564).
• Along the Uzbekistani-Kazakhstani border, ethnicity has also been in issue in border demarcations. Two villages, those of Bagys and Turkestanets, are ethnically Kazakh, but within the administrative domain of Uzbekistan. The locals see this issue as pointless and demand unifications with Kazakhstan, but neither state is willing to give in. On this case and similar disputes on the border, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have each taken a village and provided aid to those wishes to relocated to the village in their country of preferred nationality (564).
• The lack of defined borders and peaceful border relations has undermined other important areas of cooperation, especially in the Farg'ona Valley. The NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 has help calm a great deal of these issues, as the campaign has destroyed much of the IMU's operational capacity in Central Asia, removing one of the great fears causing the discussed tensions (565).
• All states involved in Central Asia can also help by encouraging these partners to invest in cross-border infrastructure and business projects. This will improve economic development, and reduce tensions, additionally provide a platform for cooperation between Russian, Japanese, Chinese, Iranian, and Western governments and businesses (565-566).
• "In terms of regional undertakings, several initiatives can be cited that might serve as good examples. In particular, on 16 October 2003, the heads of the Border Guards Agencies (the State Border Committees) of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a protocol on refraining from using weapons against border violators unless the lives of border guards or other people are threatened. In a separate development, the government of Tajikistan decreed to establish trade zones in the cross-border areas with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These will include trading markets in the Isfarin, Matchin, Nausk, Kanibadam, Sogd and Murgab regions, as well as in the Gorno-Badakshan autonomous region, the Djirgatal region and in the city of Tursun-zade. Several reports also reflect on the need for similar freer trans-border trade agreements between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and poverty reduction programmes in bordering areas, in order to stop illegal border crossing and trade" (566).