Dadabaev, Timur. "How does transition work in Central Asia? Coping with ideological, economic and value system changes in Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.3 (2007): 407-428.

Dadabaev, Timur. "How does transition work in Central Asia? Coping with ideological, economic and value system changes in Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.3 (2007): 407-428.

• This study uses data from the Asian Barometer (AB) conducted by University of Tokyo and Chuo University to measure opinions about politics and the future in Asian countries in 2003, 2005, and 2007. This includes Uzbekistan, which this study focuses on specifically (408).
• Be skeptical of all results and conclusions presented by the author using this data. Although the data source is likely good, albeit with a strong bias towards urban areas which largely excluded the majority of the population, the author has not done any statistical analysis. He makes claims that may not be statistically significant, because no P-tests have been performed.
• Uzbekistan has inherited many of the positive infrastructural aspects of the Soviet Union. In the urban areas where the study was conducted, 100% had access to electricity, 99.5% to gas, 99.4% to the public water supply, and 78.6% to fixed line phones. However, interruptions in the provision of these services were common due to decrepit infrastructure (409).
• People in Uzbekistan generally own their own house or apartment, although in apartment complexes maintenance is payed for through mandator collective associations whereby residents pay fixed fees for the provision of utilities (409).
• Since independence, there has been increased demand and popularity of cable television -- with 59.4% of respondents owning this -- and mobile phones -- with 28.4% of respondents indicating possession. Mobile phones especially are still prohibitively expensive for most of the population as they cost close to the minimum monthly salary, but they are becoming cheaper and more popular (409).
• "Although the cable television fee represents a significant amount, the popularity of cable channels largely reflects the inadequate quality of locally-produced television programmes—frequently showcasing the achievements of independence, showing sports programmes (mainly soccer and boxing), or offering foreign (mainly Latin American) soap operas. Of course, not all cable channels specialize in transmitting Russian channels, but the vast majority are oriented toward the people who are used to watching Russian television because of their ethnic origin, background, or other preferences" (410).
• The use of the internet among the population is still very low, with 67.5% of respondents saying that they never used the internet. This is likely due to the high cost of use, with prices ranging from $0.2 to $1 per hour of usage. The rates are highest among urban youth, although this group is only 11.6% daily users and then largely from internet cafes (410).
• The majority of Uzbekstanis surveyed consider their living standards to be average, with under 10% of the population believe that they lived at a low standard. The percentages responding that they had a low standard of living has decreased since 2003, but overall the perception of living standards has remained the same (411).
• The respondents recording that in general they had only one or two working members of the family despite the majority having multigenerational families of three, four, or five. This likely means that many families are only just making ends meet with their employment (411).
• Unlike many economists anticipated, the people surveyed overwhelmingly preferred well made goods to cheaper alternatives. Perhaps this is a legacy of having only cheap shitty goods during the Soviet Union (412).
• Around 60% of respondents described themselves as Uzbek, with another 11% of Russians, 5% of Tajiks and Tatars, and 1.5% as Korean. Interestingly around 16% of respondents didn't have an ethnicity, citing either smaller minority groups or being the product of mixed-race marriages (413).
• The respondents self identified as being deeply religious, with over 80% saying that God was important or deeply important. Of these, the majority of respondents were Muslims, Orthodox Christians, or Protestants. People under the age of 50 are more religious, although the youngest generation is not as devout as the 30 and 40-year olds (413).
• This religious identification did not necessarily line up with observance of religious tradition or behavior. As prayer was often irregular and dietary restrictions ignored by the 'devout' believers. The group most likely to follow scriptural traditions is the elderly and the poorest quartile (414).
• Around 20% of respondents said that religious was a more important indicator of identity than class, region, or ethnicity. Another fifth said that it was just another component of identity, and the rest of the other respondents said that they had not even considered their religion to be a factor in identity (415).
• Societal trust has substantially decreased since the collapse of the USSR. Whereas previously the forms of housing and government had forced people to depend on one another, in the post-Soviet system private life and family life predominates. As a result, around 80% of respondents deeply distrust people they do not know, although this has been slightly decreasing. The most trusting group is older than 50, whereas the middle-aged are the most suspicious (416).
• This is confirmed by reports that around 70% to 75% of the population primarily looks out for themselves, with only 30% trying to be helpful. Again these numbers are skewed with older respondents reporting as being much more helpful (417). Another test case of helping someone looking lost demonstrates a split, with 70% of elder persons stopping to help, but around 50% of 20-year olds ignoring the person regardless of situation (418).
• Family is identified as by far the most important social circle in which people are included. Almost 100% of respondents say their families are important, with much lower numbers for workplace, relatives, and neighborhood. Family is also important elsewhere in Central Asia, with the possible exception of Turkmenistan. The importance of family may reflect an increased dependence on these networks for basic goods and services (421).
• When questioned about what mattered to them, over 85% of respondents said that they wanted good health. This was followed by increased living standards at around 40% and move quality time with loved ones at around 30%. Under 20% wanted to better their community or country, with this figure being the lowest among the young (421).
• When asked about their ambitions for their children, around 80% of respondents ranked first that their daughter would find a good husband, while the figure for sons was only 20%. Instead, around 30% of respondents wanted their sons to become successful men, caring fathers, and good citizens. Similarly career goals are ranked more highly more men than women, with the focus for daughters still being on motherhood, despite similar levels of matriculation and employment (423).
• Despite its legality from the Soviet Period onward, Uzbekistani society is strongly opposed to abortion, often connecting it with extramarital affairs. Less that 10% of respondents said it was even justified, and around 70% said that it never was. Acceptance of homosexuality is actual larger than abortion, with 30% saying it was justifiable (424-425).