Daher, Joseph. "Reassessing Hizbullah's Socioeconomic Policies in Lebanon". The Middle East Journal, Vol.70, No.3 (2016): 399-418.

Daher, Joseph. "Reassessing Hizbullah's Socioeconomic Policies in Lebanon". The Middle East Journal, Vol.70, No.3 (2016): 399-418.

• Scholarship on Hizballah tends to take one of three contradictory approaches: that it primarily an anti-imperialist movement that represents the Muslim equivalent to liberation theology; that it is a pragmatic political party that is moderate its views to become more electorally sustainable; or that it is a nationalist and Islamist movement without the progressive features associated with liberation theology (399-400).
• The author finds that Hizballah's actual economic practices do not reflect fundamentally progressive or anti-capitalist values and work within a neoliberal capitalist system without challenging it. This supports the third perspective commonly found in scholarly literature (400).
• After the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanon's economy was fractured along sectarian lines, with the Sunni bourgeois organized under Rafiq al-Hariri being the largest economic group. The Taif Agreement cemented these sectarian divisions in politics and economics while also giving Syria hegemony in the country -- a situation agreed to by the USA after Syrian participation in the First Persian Gulf War (400-401).
• Although originally shaky under Prime Minister Umar Karami, the election of Rafiq al-Hariri in 1992 saw large capital inflows into Lebanon. The al-Hariri government privatized public services and simplified and lowered taxes in an attempt to attract foreign investment in banking, real estate, and finance, thus reclaiming Lebanon's position as the financial center of the Middle East (401).
• After signing the Taif Agreement in 1989, Hizballah began to soften its opposition to the sectarian political system and promote peaceful politics within the Taif system. Hizballah's acceptance of the sectarian order likely stemmed from provisions in the Taif Agreement that gave it extra power and allowed it to remain armed, unlike other militias, due to its role in defending against Israel (401).
• Hizballah's moderation mirrored moderation in Iran, which had sought to improve ties with the wider world after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the election of President Ali Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. This coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the predominance of American power. Support for exporting the revolution was very limited in the more pragmatic Rafsanjani-Khamenei government (401-402).
• Hizballah has consistently portrayed themselves as the party of the oppressed, claiming to represent farmers, workers, the homeless, and the poor against the forces of international capital. Despite this rhetoric, Hizballah has consistently supported neoliberal policies (402).
• Hizballah articulates its economic platform through the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation [al-Markaz al-Istishari li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Tawthiq], its thinktank. While both its current director, Abd al-Halim Fadlallah, and its former director, Ali Fayyad, recognize the social harm of neoliberalism, they recommend ameliorating some of its effects while still promoting economic growth through continued neoliberal reform (404).
• The Consultative Center does frequently criticize some aspects of globalization, in particular the detrimental effects of free trade on certain Lebanese industries, lack of financial transparency, and reductions in social welfare (404).
• Both the Consultative Center and Hizballah itself have consistently supported further neoliberalism, arguing that expanded private enterprise benefits the overall community. Muhammad Funayyish, a member of Hizballah, was actually Energy Minister during the privatization of the state electricity company and advocated for the privatization of all public enterprises (405).
• As part of the opposition in 2003, Hizballah did not take any stance on the privatization of several state industries following the Paris II Conference. The head of the party's affiliated trade union, al-Wafaa, claimed that layoffs resulting from privatization were ultimately in the best interests of Lebanon and its working population (405-406).
• At no point during its time in government did Hizballah challenge neoliberal policies. No budget increases for healthcare or education were suggested and Hizballah approved an austerity package in 2007 that increased taxes, opened the economy to foreign investment, and privatized the phone company. As the dominant coalition partner between 2011 and 2013 they continued privatizing the state electric company, deregulated rental laws, and rejected a proposal to increases wages and social welfare (406).
• Hizballah also made no attempts to reduce large inequalities in the agricultural sectors, which remains dominated by major landlords. The wealthiest 5% of farmers control nearly half of all agricultural land, while the poorest half only own 8%. Hizballah also tried to breakup large farmers' unions to attract support its own union organization. This is likely because Hizballah receives significant political and financial support from major landlords (406-407).
• Hizballah's time in government was also marked by corruption, as in 2010 a scandal revealed a pyramid scheme led by Salah Izz al-Din, one of the richest men in southern Lebanon and a figure closely tied to Hizballah (407).
• Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the founder of Iraq's Dawa Party, wrote two books in the 1960s to critique Marxism and secularism: Falsafatuna فلسفتنا and Iqtisaduna اقتصادنا. In these books, he criticized Marxism for lacking spiritual essence and advocate an Islamic system of economics and politics to address social ills. This system would include both public and private property, rejecting either a communist or capitalist model (402-403).
• Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had drawn heavily on economic and social justice themes in his speeches, especially during the period between 1979 and 1982, proclaiming that Islamism was the movement of the oppressed against the wealthy oppressors, equated to both the economic and political elite of the Shah's government and his foreign backers (403).
• This rhetoric significantly cooled down after the consolidation of power in 1982, as the term 'oppressed' now included all of the regime's supporters, including wealthy merchants. Ayatollah Khomeini stated that private property was a pillar of society and that Islam sought harmonious versions of existing employer-worker and landlord-peasant relationships (403).
• The Amal Movement in Lebanon, founded in 1974 by Musa al-Sadr -- the cousin of Muhammad Baqir -- as the Harakat al-Mahrumin, did not wish to replace the capitalist economic order and was founded with the attention of challenging leftist movements, which were popular among Lebanese Shia during that time. Amal was intended to promote the interests of the Shia bourgeois and give it more political representation (403).
• Beginning in the 1990s, there was a concerted effort by the Lebanese government to break the power of the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers and subordinate labor to neoliberal goals. All major political parties and figures, including Rafiq al-Hariri, Amal, Hizballah, the Baath, and the Syrian Social Nationalists, took part in plans to divide the labor movement between rival sectarian unions and weaken the Confederation (408).
• Trade unions played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War, orchestrating civil resistance against sectarianism, the conduct of militias, and Israeli occupation (407-408).
• In 2001, the Lebanese government succeeded in engineering the election of Ghassan Ghusn as president of the Confederation, supported by Hizballah and other groups allied with Syria. President Ghusn has attempted to turn the Confederation into a sectarian institution, leading many leftist and independent unions to leave the Confederation (408).
• Hizballah has organized its own Shia unions to rival the Confederation. These unions still remain small, however, with the largest, al-Wafaa, only represented 400 workers in 2000 and 2,500 workers in 2012. These unions are run with an emphasis on harmonious relations between workers and employers (408-409).
• The control of the Confederation by Syria-aligned forces has made it inert to many workers' issues, and it did nothing in response to large-scale privatizations following the IMF-led Paris I and Paris II Conferences, nor the major reduction in employer contributions to social security. Hizballah-aligned labor unions also did nothing in response to these changes (409).
• When the Confederation did support a general strike in 2004, it was pressured by the government to end the disturbance. Despite widespread support for the strike among its membership, the Confederation withdrew support and allowed the army to suppress the strike, firing into a crowd of poor Shia in southern Beirut and killing 5. The Confederation made no comment regarding the strikers' deaths. Hizballah blamed American agents for organizing the strikes (410).
• In January 2007, the Confederation did support protests against the Paris III Conference, but it could only muster 2,000 protesters, largely because it lacked Hizballah's support. Although it supported the goals of the Paris III conference, Hizballah did join the strike on 23 January in order to put pressure on the government, turning the strike in mass protests. Its goal of intimidating the government accomplished, Hizballah terminated the strike without any actual concessions being made on socio-economic issues (411).
• In May 2006, there was a major strike involving over 250,000 people organized by the teachers' union over proposed hikes in fuel taxes and VAT taxes, pension reductions, and the introduction of short-term contract for government workers. Hizballah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Communist Party participated in the protests, leading the government to denounce the protests as orchestrated by Syria and the Shia. The Confederation played little role in the strike (410-411).
• Hizballah has sought to limit protests to short sectarian events accompanied by armed violence, seeking to avoid mass mobilizations that cross sectarian lines. This was demonstrated in 2008, when Hizballah undermined a general strike set for 7 May demanding lower inflation, higher minimum wages, and an increase in public wages, which had been frozen since 1996. After being threatened by the Lebanese government, Hizballah attacked areas of Beirut known to support the ruling March 14 coalition, leading to street fighting that disrupted both the government and the planned strike (411-412).
• Originally basing its support among the Shia lower classes, Hizballah now has significant support among the Shia middle and upper classes. Whereas its original leadership was drawn from lower-middle-class clerics, Hizballah's leaders now usually have a professional background, particularly engineers, doctors, and dentists. Many leaders have doctoral degrees, are successful businessmen, or come from wealthy and prominent Shia families (412-414).
• The demographics of Hizballah's supporters already began to change by the 1990s, when support for Hizballah could be found throughout Lebanese society, not just among the poor (414).
• Many services offered by Hizballah, such as its al-Mustafa schools, are targetted to the middle and upper-classes, as they charge fees unaffordable to most Lebanese (414).
• The Shia middle and upper-classes have supported and benefited from Hizballah's neoliberal policies. Access to political power through Hizballah has also given middle and upper-class Shias the ability to financial benefit from development projects, particularly in real estate, often at the expense of poorer Lebanese. These benefits have also included Hizballah's support for Shia businesses in trade deals (414).
• Hizballah directly controls a number of businesses, concentrated in real estate and construction, and has since at least the 1990s. These businesses are usually run by middle or upper-class men sympathetic to Hizballah, and receive support from the movement. Four prominent examples are Tajco, al-Inmaa Group, Meamar Engineering, and Arch Consulting Company (415). These companies all benefit from patronage from Hizballah, but are privately owned and serve to enrich a small portion of the Shia community in Lebanon (416-417).
• Tajco is a real estate developer owned by Ali Taj al-Din, a Shia businessman whose family owns supermarkets, food-processing plants, real estate, and diamond exporters in Gambia, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola. Ali al-Din had been a Hizballah commander before going into the family business. His company is used to facilitate land deals and construction projects on behalf of Hizballah (415).
• The al-Inmaa Group is a large construction company partially managed by Amin Shirri, who served as a Hizballah member of parliament between 2005 and 2009. The company primarily works in southern Lebanon and other Shia-majority areas, and receives many government contracts. It started out building affordable housing in the 1990s, but has since focused on real estate projects targetted at the middle and upper classes (415).
• Meamar Engineering and Development, founded in 1988, has undertaken over 150 projects for organizations linked to Hizballah or in municipalities controlled by the party. Many Hizballah officials were present at the company's 25th-anniversary party (415-416).
• Arch Consulting Company, originally part of the Jihad al-Binaa Development Association until 2005, is run by Walid Ali Jabir, a Hizballah candidate in municipal government. It has done a number of construction projects in Hizballah-controlled areas of Lebanon (416).
• Hizballah receives most of its funding from Iran, charities collecting in the name of Ayatollah Khomeini, donations of the Shia middle-class, and Hizballah-owned businesses. The revenue generated from Hizballah-owned businesses and private donations explains why Hizballah has been unwilling to go against the interests of business and why it increasingly caters to the interests of the middle and upper classes (417).
• This transformation to representing middle and upper-class interests has also occurred alongside competition with Amal, which seeks to access to the same sources of funding from wealthy Shia (418).