Chhibber, Pradeep. "Dynastic Parties: Organization, finance, and impact". Party Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (2013): 277-295.

Chhibber, Pradeep. "Dynastic Parties: Organization, finance, and impact". Party Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (2013): 277-295.

• Many major political parties in India are dynastic, with control of the political party remain within the same family. This is most notably true of the Indian National Congress, where leadership has flowed from Jawaharlal Nehru down to Rahul Gandhi, but it is also the case for the number of regional parties, like Shiv Sena or Telugu Desam (277).
• This is not to say that all Indian political parties are dynastic -- the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] and the Communist Party are not dynastic -- only that many Indian political parties are this way (278).
• This a phenomenon commonly observed in the majority of Indian political parties and is true for the dominant political parties in all states except for Rajasthan, Kerala, West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh. Dynastic parties can be left or right-wing, and exist in political parties of all religious and castes (279-280, 282).
• The author agrees that whether a political is dynastic or not depends on whether an alternative base of power in the party or in civil societies exists that can hold the political party leadership accountable, and whether party finances are controlled centrally. In cases where an independent power structure is absent and finances are centralized, a dynastic party is more likely to develop (278, 282).
• Political leaders are unlike to give power away to someone other than a trusted successor, often a family member. Dynastic parties are therefore a default, while their formation is prevented by having alternative power structures, especially with regards to party finances (281-282).
• The existence of many dynastic parties in Indian politics is important because a system filled with dynastic parties is more likely to be unstable, dynastic parties are viewed as less representative and legitimate than other parties (289-290), and dynastic parties do not play well with other parties (278).
• Dynastic parties in India are more factitious than other types of political parties and do not value political experience as important to getting elected compared to other parties. Dynastic parties are also less ideologically driven and less organized than other types of political party (280).
• Politicians in systems defined by dynastic parties are likely to be opportunistic, with behavior such as rapid switches to the victory's party being common. Splits in political parties are also more common, as frustrated politicians unable to take power may start their own parties (287-288).
• The Indian National Congress has always had a very centralized organization, which since 1969 has been entirely taken over by the Gandhi family. Essentially no independence exists in the party organization at the local level, and members are overwhelmingly passive (283-284).
• Financing for Congress mainly comes from the donations of private corporations, many of whom have shady deals with Congress government officials. These donations are handled at the national level, with the national party distributing the contributions to specific candidates of its choosing (284).
• Congress was not always like this, during the 1950s and early 1960s the party was dominated at the local level from prominent landowners, who could contest national party decisions at the local level. Financing during this period also depended on individual donations to local notables, leaving the national party with little regulatory role (286).
• The two main non-dynastic parties in India, the Communist Party and the BJP, both dependent on strong organizations and civil society groups for funding and electoral success. The BJP relies heavily on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS] to mobilize votes and many leaders in the BJP are loyal members of the RSS. The Communists are beholden to local party organizations and trade union financially and require the consent of these local groups for their policies (286-287).