Cheskin, Ammon & Luke March. "State–society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political and social contention". East European Politics, vol.31, no.3 (2015): 261-273.

Cheskin, Ammon & Luke March. "State–society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political and social contention". East European Politics, vol.31, no.3 (2015): 261-273.

• Some studies of the relationship between state and society in contemporary Russia exist, but they are overwhelmingly focused on oppositional groups and politics of dissent in Russia. The authors instead propose a more holistic examination of state-society relations in Russia which includes the civil societies groups which are co-opted by the state and those which fully consent to state domination and/or enforce the status quo (262).
• The term 'civil society' is not particularly useful in the context of discussing non-state groups in contemporary Russia as it has several competing normative assumptions, some of which assume a degree of separation between the state and 'civil society' which does not exist in Russia (262). The term 'civil society' used in this paper will be inclusive of all social movements not official and directly affiliated with the state, leading to a more robust examination of contemporary Russia (264).
• The associations of 'civil society' with democracy and increased democratization are also unhelpful as Russia is not a liberal democratic state and the growth of civil society does not seem to have a direct effect on any transition towards such a political type (263). 
• Genuine organic social movements are frequently ignored in traditional studies of 'civil society', as Western researchers place anti-West or undemocratic social movements in a different category. For a study of the actuality of social movements and society in contemporary Russia, such divisions are analytically unhelpful (263).
• "Most social movement theorists agree that in open polities where opportunities for engagement with state authorities are high, the likelihood for social mobilisation is relatively low (Smith and Fetner 2010, 16). This is because actors have less need to mobilise and have incentives to utilise existing channels for political debate and redress. On the other hand, in polities where political opportunities are greatly restricted through the enactment of highly authoritarian policies, the chances for mobilisation are effectively repressed. As a result, it is regimes that lie between these two poles that face the greatest potential for social unrest and oppositional activism" (265).
• Examination of types of dissent within authoritarian and hybrid regimes exists from page 266 to page 268. It is a real source mine for research and theories pertaining to that subject.
• The Russian form of civil society is constructed to both repress criticism by limiting potential free outlets, while still supporting the development of helpful -- or at least compliant -- civil society aspects to encourage increased participation in the public sphere and advance societal interests (268).
• Particularly Russia supports the development of social and economic NGOs, which promote the interests of the Russian state by engaging citizens politically and helping improve the regime's responsiveness to service provision (268). 
• The situation for many NGOs in Russia is complex and nuanced, with the rules of permissible behavior often unclear. This is in contrast to dissent expression under Communist regimes, where strict regime ideology demarcated the boundaries of acceptable behavior, the limits of acceptability in Russia are often determined by local officials w/o clear rhyme or reason  to those decisions (269).
• The closest guidelines are between patriotic actions (for the benefit of Russia against enemies) and unpatriotic actions (criticism of Russia and support of the West). However these are poorly demarcated, with issues often changing sides, with feminist politics and gay rights sliding into Western unpatriotic activities during the Obama administration (269).