Breslin, Shaun. "China’s Global Goals and Roles: Changing the World from Second Place?". Asian Affairs, Vol. 47, No.1 (2016): 59-70.

Breslin, Shaun. "China’s Global Goals and Roles: Changing the World from Second Place?". Asian Affairs, Vol. 47, No.1 (2016): 59-70.

• Many foreign policy reports on China are focused on two questions: when will China surpass the USA as the leading global superpower, and is China responsible enough to take on that role? Whereas the idea that China was irresponsible and would abuse this power was initially dominant, now there is a growing belief that China will be a responsible superpower (59).
• After the collapse of the USSR led from the transformation of the world from a bipolar to a unipolar system, there was been speculation about what will follow unipolarity. One of the suggestions is a US-China bipolarity, represented in the G2 system, but the general consensus is that the world will become multipolar as US power fractures and diminishes (60-61).
• To China and other states dissatisfied with the current unipolar order, the transition towards a multipolar system is viewed favorably and often predicted because it would be in their interests for it to occur (61). 
• The picture of bipolarity during the Cold War is incomplete, as it ignores the sizeable Non-Aligned Movement and defectors like Albania and France, but in general, the Cold War was a period of bipolar division (61).
• The movement towards a more multipolar system can be seen in the increased range of independent action demonstrated by countries such as China, which created the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank [AIIB] to the exclusion of the USA. It is also indicated by broader participation in these initiatives not supported by the superpower, as seen in the participation of European states in the AIIB (62).
• Multipolarity is also demonstrated by a lack of cohesion among opponents of the superpower, as they develop into multiple poles rather than an opposing singular pole. This can be seen in the continuation of tensions between China and India even as they both challenge American supremacy (62).
• The shift towards multipolarity is further demonstrated through the continuation of good relations between the hegemon and its competitor, as demonstrated by continued cooperation between the USA and China on a number of issues in which they share common interests (62).
• China sees the transition from a unipolar order to a multipolar as an opportunity for China is assert its own position and gain concessions and power as one of the new poles. This has propelled China, since the 21st Century, to play a more active role in global politics and be more assertive in its demands (63).
• China recognizes that the post-Cold War international system has greatly benefitted it and does not seek to disrupt this system. Instead, China mainly advocates for a greater role in the system, as it feels that its current role is not befitting of its power and status (64).
• Chinese strategists recognize that, if the USA is in decline, it is decline from an incredibly powerful geopolitical position and China will not be able to challenge the US or the American order for a considerable period of time. This recognition means that China is not trying to overturn or fundamentally change the American world order (64).
• America has been reacting to its decline by attempting to construct new organizations to maintain its supremacy, however, like the TPP. These new structures are designed specifically to frustrate the power ambitions of rising powers like China. This forces rising powers to respond by creating their own competing structures (64).
• China claims that it makes demands for a more democratic and less hierarchical international system on behalf of a number of unrepresented rising powers. These claims serve Chinese interests because they present China at the head of a coalition, while it actuality, China is the second most powerful country on Earth and its demands give it more power (64-65).
• One of the methods that China will likely use to reform the global system towards its interests are existing international organizations. This is demonstrated in proposed changes to the voting power in the IMF, which has finally approved by the USA in December 2015 after years of frustrating refusal (66).
• When there is too much pushback from the USA on structural reform, China is also willing to create its own alternative structures. Examples include BRICS, the SCO, the AIIB, and the One Belt-One Road initiative. These last two, in particular, challenge Western narratives about good governance and investment, and thus represent an alternative way of thinking about development and aid (66).
• These initiatives have not totally excluded or rejected the US-led global order and often, as in the case of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, continue to uphold American ideals (67).
• Power includes both ideational soft power and material hard power. Its hard power is primarily based in economic and financial might from being the center of global production. It has yet to produce a defined soft power presence, although one may be emerging in certain fields, like human rights, development, and cybersecurity (68).
• Part of why China has not taken a global leadership role is that there are domestic pressures against it having such a role. These domestic groups do not want China to be a global leader (69).
• The Chinese military has undergone expansion and become more involved in security issues in the South China Sea. In other fields, however, China still closely follows the non-interventionalist line and poses no security threat. Even those Asian countries that view China as a security threat still view it as an economic opportunity (69-70).