Brenner, Louis. "The Jihad Debate between Sokoto and Borno: an Historical Analysis of Islamic Political Discourse in Nigeria", In People and Empires in African History: Essays in Memory of Michael Crowder, edited by J.F. Ade Ajayi and J.D.Y. Peel. London: Longman, 1992.

Brenner, Louis. "The Jihad Debate between Sokoto and Borno: an Historical Analysis of Islamic Political Discourse in Nigeria", In People and Empires in African History: Essays in Memory of Michael Crowder, edited by J.F. Ade Ajayi and J.D.Y. Peel. London: Longman, 1992.

• The Sokoto Caliphate established by Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio in 1804 was the most powerful state of the central Sudanian savanna and resulted in profound political and economic changes that effected its current history. The Caliphate is often evoked in contemporary Islamic discourse in Nigeria and influence modern Islamic thought (21).
• Islamic scholarship in the western Sudanian savanna features trends towards study of the normative and legal aspects of Islamic rule in the area, often to the detriment of socio-economic studies of those societies and implementation of laws, and a focus on individual personality. This tradition underpins Sheikh Uthman's claim that the devotion of the ruler determines the religion of his subjects (22).
• The author explores the specific Islamic discourse surrounding the decision of Sheikh Uthman to engage in jihad against the neighboring state of Borno, before which he argued against Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanami, a Borno emissary who unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sheikh Uthman of the immorality of such an action (22-23).
• The correspondence between Sheikh Uthman and Al-Hajj al-Kanami began with an inquiry by Borno into why the Sokoto Caliphate was attacking nearby peoples. Sheikh Uthman responded to this question by declaring that the Hausa polities being attacked were unbelievers and that supporting them consisted apostasy, demanding that Borno join in the jihad or be subject to aggression themselves (24).
• At this point the Mai of Borno became personally involved in the war against the Sokoto forces and was defeated in battle. The Mai fled east further into Borno territory, marking the beginning of the Fulani jihad against Borno. A number of local Borno notables took up the Caliph's banner and also fought against the Mai (24).
• Further exchanges between Al-Hajj al-Kanami and Sheikh Uthman show that the hostility were begun by the Borno rejection of the offer to join in jihad, which Sheikh Uthman interpreted as apostasy. Further, the support by Borno for the Daura, Kano, and Katsina polities against jihadi attacks was cause for jihad (25).
• The earliest surviving letter of Al-Hajj al-Kanami is addressed to the Borno Fulbe, those nomadic peoples who decided to join the Sokoto jihad against the Borno Mai. He rebukes them for attacking a Muslim community and demands that they account for their actions by proving that they received instruction from God to do so (25).
• The Borno Fulbe continued raiding and pillaging Borno communities and provided only a weak justification of their actions in response, citing Borno apostasy. His further letters were ignored as the Fulbe now attacked the Borno capital. In frustration, Al-Hajj al-Kamani now addressed the Sokoto leadership to whom the Fulbe had declared allegiance (26).
• The Sokoto response to the first directly-addressed letter agrees that the rational of the Fulbe is incorrect and that the 'pagan' practices of corruption, bribery, and unveiling in Borno do not constitute reason for jihad. Instead, the Sokoto leadership argued that the jihad was in response to Hausa aggression against Muslims and the defense of these polities by Borno. To the Sokoto leadership, support for the Hausa constituted apostasy (26-27).
• Sheikh Uthman based his legal opinion that this constituted apostasy on the opinions of al-Maghili, a 16th Century Algerian scholar (27).
• The Sokoto jihad against Borno still rested on shaky legal foundations because it assumed that the Borno Mai had attacked Fulbe communities without provocation in solidarity with the Hausa. Al-Hajj al-Kamani claimed that in reality, the Fulbe had initiated the conflict, meaning that jihad against the defensive Fulbe was unjustified (27).
• Instead of focusing on the reasons behind the conflict in Borno, however, the debate shifted towards whether the Fulbe were justified in emulating the jihad of Sokoto even if they were doing so for the wrong reasons. Al-Hajj al-Kamani asserted that the sin of rulers did not translate onto society or justify jihad, whereas Sheikh Uthman argued that it did, further rejecting Al-Hajj al-Kamani's argument for being based on mistrust (28).
• During the time between this letter and the next one, the Borno Mai had finally abandoned his old capital of Birni Gazargamu after losing most of the western territories to Fulbe raiders. Al-Hajj al-Kamani viewed the Fulbe as worthless people who acted out of self-interest using Islam as a cover. Since Sokoto did not actually provide support for the Fulbe, the issue between Borno and Sokoto was that Sokoto was unwilling to denounce Fulbe actions (28-29).
• Al-Hajj al-Kamani was willing to accept the legitimacy of jihad in some circumstances, but only against Muslims when such action was specifically ordained by God. In particular, Al-Hajj al-Kamani compared the purity of Mohammedan conquest to the crimes and rapine of the Fulbe to demonstrate that it was not true jihad (30).
• The question of dispute between Al-Hajj al-Kamani and Sheikh Uthman ultimately came down to the powers of legitimacy in Islamic leadership. Sheikh Uthman claimed that the Fulbe recognition, nominally, of his leadership conferred legitimacy upon them, making attacks against them apostasy. He further claimed that the apostasy of rulers spread to their subjects, making jihad legitimate against that population (30-31).
• The logic of Islamic leadership determining legitimacy is also seen in other Sokoto discourses on jihad. The same arguments of sinfulness or apostasy of rulers were applied to the Hausa kings to justify war against them. Personal attacks feature heavily in Sokoto writings for this reason (31). They also appear against the Mai of Borno (33-35).
• Attacks on the character of Sheikh Uthman are taken with equal seriousness considering their importance to the Sokoto side of the debate. Whereas personal speculations may not receive this attention in other West African communities, the Sokoto response vigorously against even minor accusations against their leader (31-32).
• The conflict between Sokoto and Borno had to include a section slandering and degrading the character of the Mai of Borno because that character affected the nature of the conflict. If the Mai was a devout Muslim, then the conflict was between Muslims and certain actions were illegitimate. By making the Mai seem like an impious and tyrannic ruler, Sheikh Uthman justified violence against his polity as legitimate exercise of jihad by a superior leader (36-37).