Chinese Military Base in Djibouti

 Executive Summary:

Djibouti is small East African nation located between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. It is of significant strategic importance as it — together with Yemen — controls the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow strait at the southern end of the Red Sea which controls all traffic entering or exiting the Suez Canal. The US, France, and Japan all maintain bases in the country to provide support for anti-piracy operations. China also uses the country’s port as a base to supply naval vessels dedicated towards anti-piracy operations. Early in November 2015, China announced that it would build a naval base in Djibouti, most likely in the northern port city of Obock. This would be China’s first overseas base since the beginning of the Communist period. This follows significant Chinese investment in the country and occurs in the context of mutual distrust between the West and China due to disputes in the South China Sea. Correspondingly, analysts in United States have raised concerns over China’s actions in Djibouti, fearing that the expansion of Chinese influence may evict the West from the country.

The interests of the West in Djibouti are military and strategic, with the country playing no significant economic role in Western economies. The Western military bases in Djibouti are of vital strategic importance to anti-piracy and counter-terrorist operations taking place in Africa and the Middle East. Any interruption of the operations coordinated from the US bases at Camp Lemonneir and Chabelley Airfield would present substantial security risks regionally and globally. It is in the best interests of the United States and all other Western powers with operations and facilities in Djibouti to maintain the stability of the country and guarantee the permanence of their military installations.

China has quickly become an important actor in Djibouti, rapidly expanding its cooperation with the Djiboutian government in civil and military fields and beginning a series of ‘mega-projects’ funded and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since the beginning of a charm offensive in 2010. China is exceptional in its investment in the Djiboutian economy, especially gaudy infrastructural projects which bolster the country’s reputation in Djibouti. China has been expanding its cooperation with the Djiboutian military, but compared to the US, Chinese contributions to the equipping and training of the Armed Forces of Djibouti are minimal. Spurred by requests from the Djiboutian military, China is likely to increase support of the Djiboutian military in the future.

The West’s relationship with Djibouti is defined almost purely in geostrategic terms, and is characterized by Western cooperation with and support of the Armed Forces of Djibouti. Both France and the US have strong ties with the Djiboutian military, and regularly train together, provide educational opportunities for Djiboutian officers, and provide capacity that Djibouti currently lacks in logistics and transport. The US in particular has strengthened its cooperation with the Djiboutian military in recent years. America also gives Djibouti large grants of military equipment to increase capacity in targeted areas such as maritime security, transport, logistics, and counter-terrorism. Together the training of Djiboutian soldiers, provision of military equipment, and education of Djiboutian officers make up an informal additional rent for the use of Djiboutian soil for military bases.

The presence of the forthcoming Chinese military base in Djibouti will increase Chinese capacities in the region and foreshadow a greater role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) in the future. The new Chinese military facility in Djibouti does not, however, pose a significant threat to Western interests nor will it affect the stability of the West’s presence in Djibouti. China’s capacity to deploy ships, men, and aircraft outside of its traditional sphere of influence will be greatly increased by the new military installation, and it is likely that China will use this increased capacity to play a larger role in regional security, likely through additional anti-piracy operations or greater involvement in peacekeeping missions. An increase in Chinese influence in Djibouti has not been accompanied by a decrease in Western influence, showing that Djibouti can successfully accommodate multiple powers without falling into any sphere of influence. The new Chinese military facility will not endanger the continuation of Western operations at Camp Lemonneir and the surrounding installations. Chinese relations with Djibouti will likely normalize in the future, with the forms of support provided by the Chinese government falling into the norms established by France and the US, namely institutional support for building the capacity of the Armed Forces of Djibouti through training and equipment donation.

The interests in China behind the creation of an overseas military base are an increased feeling of responsibility towards overseas Chinese, a desire to acquire maritime capabilities as a new world power, and a strategic ploy safeguarding against a potential blockade of the Bab al-Mandab or other important chokepoints of world trade. The initial impulse for the Chinese government to acquire its first overseas base was based on the idea of an increased Chinese mandate in the world; around the idea that as a great power China needs to play an increased role in global security. Constructing a military base close to major Chinese investments is a good way of increasing China’s ability to take on more security responsibilities. Since evacuating Chinese nationals from Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen, China has become more protective of its nationals abroad, and constructing this military base allows China to maintain the capacity for evacuation or humanitarian missions even after the anti-piracy operations off Somalia finally end. Lastly, China is paranoid about its connections to energy resources in the Middle East being cut-off, especially by the United States. By having a military presence near these strategic waterways, China hopes to be able to reopen the chokepoints in the unlikely event that they are restricted.

The creation of a China’s first overseas base in Djibouti does not pose a threat to American or Western strategic interests in the region to any significant degree. The base does, however, represent a new phase of Chinese foreign policy, in which Beijing is more willing and capable to defend its interests abroad. At the current time, Chinese interests in Africa are complimentary to American and Western interests, namely the creation of a positive security situation and increased economic development. The expansion of Chinese influence in Djibouti has not corresponded to a decline in the quality or depth of relations between Djibouti and Western countries, rather the scope of American cooperation expanded during this period. President Guelleh’s administration seems to see no conflict in hosting bases from China and the US, and the relationship between Djibouti and Beijing will likely evolve to mimic the forms of cooperation between Djibouti and its Western partners. While heavy investment in Djibouti makes Chinese influence there seem exceptional, the trend of relations steered by Djiboutian government is towards normalization based on a model of the French or American presence in Djibouti. Under Chairman Xi’s administration, China has become more active in pursuing its foreign policy goals, fortunately in Africa the vast majority of Chinese goals are shared by the West. Both the West and Beijing desire Africa, and particularly Djibouti, to become stable and economically developed. The future activities of the base in Djibouti will likely see increased Chinese involvement in peacekeeping missions and the distribution of humanitarian aid, both of which promote regional security and, thus, further Western and Chinese interests. Despite a generally antagonistic relationship with America, China is a firm partner in the War on Terror, and is likely to support regional stability through peacekeeping and new operations against piracy and the organized crime groups which finance terrorism. In many areas of strategic importance, China has the same goals as the West, leaving some, such as Peter Barlerin, a State Department official in the Africa Bureau, “Quite optimistic about our co-operation and our engagement with China in Africa”.

Background:

Djibouti is small East African nation located in a portion of desert between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. It is of significant strategic importance as it — together with Yemen — controls the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow strait at the southern end of the Red Sea which controls all traffic entering or exiting the Suez Canal. Due to its geographic location, Djibouti is of tremendous strategic importance to the West and China. The relative stability of Djibouti, under the paternalistic dictatorship of President Ismail Guelleh, makes Djibouti an ideal location for the US to coordinate and supply missions in Yemen and East Africa. The US, France, and Japan all maintain bases in the country to provide support for anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast. Additionally, the US uses the country to base its regional African command center (USAFRICOM) and staff and equipment associated with intelligence work, counter-terrorism, and drone warfare in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere. China also uses the country’s port as a base to supply naval vessels dedicated towards anti-piracy missions and, recently, to coordinate evacuations of Chinese citizens from Yemen following the coup earlier in 2015. Early in November 2015, China announced that it would build a naval base in Djibouti, most likely in the northern port city of Obock. This would be China’s first overseas base since the beginning of the Communist period. This follows significant Chinese investment in the country and occurs in the context of mutual distrust between the West and China due to disputes in the South China Sea. Correspondingly, analysts in United States have raised concerns over China’s actions in Djibouti, particularly because due to apprehensions about a Chinese base being in such proximity to sensitive American counter-terrorism and intelligence operations. 

Western Interests in Djibouti:

The American interest in Djibouti is primarily strategic and military. Djibouti is the only country in East Africa with enough domestic stability to host American operations in the region, which serve as vital bases near two of the major fronts of the War of Terror: Yemen and Somalia. The US military presence in Djibouti – concentrated at Camp Lemonneir just outside of the capital city – is primarily focused on combating terrorism in the region. The base is home to around 4,500 personnel, including the US African Command (USAFRICOM). The base is thus responsible for American operations through Africa and has the appropriate amount of support staff, equipment, and infrastructure. Camp Lemonneir is also used for American counter-terrorism operations in East Africa and the Middle East, hosting important centers of intelligence and surveillance to combat Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Shabaab, and other regional threats. Although recently moved to the nearby base at Chabelley Airfield after a series of incidence involving accidental endangerment of persons and property in Djibouti City, the US still bases its drone warfare campaign against APAQ in Yemen from Djibouti, which hosts the largest armament of Predator drones outside of Afghanistan. The US also bases its anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia from Djiboutian ports, although this has become less important with the decline of piracy in the area due to similar anti-piracy missions. Conversely, the American counter-terrorism operations in the region have only become more important following a continuation of terrorist activity in Somalia and Kenya by members of Al-Shabaab and affiliated groups, and an increasingly chaotic and unstable situation in Yemen following the military coup in early 2015. The US bases at Camp Lemonneir and Chabelley Airfield are vital to the continuation of multiple security operations on the frontlines of the global war on terror, as well as all operations currently conducted elsewhere in Africa. The interruption or cessation of these operations would severely comprise on-the-ground security situations in not only the battlegrounds of Somalia and Yemen, but the entirety of Africa, where Africa remains a major partner in security provision. The US military installations in Djibouti are thus a nerve centre for a plurality of operations crucial to global and regional security, and it is the primary interest of the US to preserve these institutions by maintaining stability in its relationship with Djibouti.

Japan also maintains a military base in Djibouti, part of the same military complex as the American installation at Camp Lemonneir. Their facility is the newest addition to Djibouti, having been built in 2011 to host 180 sailors of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces participating in international anti-piracy missions.  Japan does not appear to have any long-term interests in Djibouti, indicated by the absence of any effort to improve relations with Djibouti, establish cooperation in non-military fields, or have its soldiers participate in exercises beyond anti-piracy. This is compounded by Japan’s lack of participation in the public performances of investment, military armament, and civil-military cooperation with Djibouti which characterize the republic’s relations with France, China, and America. The only interest of Japan in the country appears to be the prevention of piracy affecting an important area of global trade.

France maintains a number of military facilities in Djibouti which it has retained since Djibouti’s independence in 1977, all of which are clustered on the outskirts of Djibouti City near the American and Japanese military installations. France has maintained an overseas regiment in the territory available for deployment if needed, but the primary purpose of the base in recent history has been the outfitting and supply of vessels and troops participating in Operation Atalanta, the EU’s anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. Because this is the primary base for not only French anti-piracy activities, but also the main logistics and command hub for an EU-wide anti-piracy mission, the continuation of a French military presence in Djibouti is of strategic interest to all EU countries. France also has some economic interests in Djibouti, as French companies with connections from the colonial era have remained a presence in elements of the Djiboutian economy, such as oil and gas production. In addition to the importance of stability to French military and economic interests in Djibouti, France has a certain pride in maintaining good relations with its former colonies and thus the success of Djibouti is important to the French for its own sake. Together these interests support the stability of Djibouti and the continuation of strong partnerships with the West.

Of the Western states with bases in Djibouti, the US has the most significant investment in Djibouti due to the delicate and sensitive nature of the military and intelligence operations conducted at Camp Lemonneir and Chabelley Airfield. Although Japan is likely more concerned about the expansion of Chinese naval power, the US has the most to lose through any possible disruption of its operations out of Djibouti, as those bases are vital to preventing terrorist attacks regionally and internationally. From the analysts and military figures who have expressed concerns over China’s acquisition of a military base in Djibouti, the main threats posed to American interest in Djibouti are the sabotage or infiltration of American intelligence work by Chinese agents close by, and the expulsion of American forces from Djibouti as the country moves into China’s diplomatic orbit. If true, either of these eventualities would be severely negative for American security, either due to the compromise of classified information to an untrustworthy power, or the interruption of military operations necessary to regional security while American forces set up operational headquarters elsewhere. This paper will examine the possibility of these scenarios, as well as other implications for regional politics gained from Chinese actions in Djibouti. 

Sino-Djibouti Relations:

China has very rapidly become an important political player in Djibouti, outpacing even similar expansions into economic and political life in other parts of Africa. Within the same timeframe, China has greatly increased its economic investments in Djibouti, deepened political association, and begun cooperation on military issues. Chinese investment in Djibouti has expanded tremendously in the past decade, with China becoming its single largest investor in Djibouti by 2014. Most Chinese activity in Djibouti is characterized by large, showy investments and development work which allow for a public display of the importance of Chinese investment. Chinese investment in Djibouti comes in the form both direct aid and investment from Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in key sectors of the economy. Investment through SOEs and the China Export-Import Bank (China Exim Bank) is significantly more prominent in Djibouti in terms of media coverage, although this is largely because SOEs are responsible for the fourteen high-profile ‘mega-projects’ in Djibouti, whereas direct aid is limited to benefiting local communities. Chinese companies and the China Exim Bank are involved in the construction or financing of a variety of high-profile and high-value projects within Djibouti, including: a national library in the capital, two new airports constructed by a Chinese firm, a railway from Addis Ababa to Djibouti City built and electrified by Chinese SOEs, water supply infrastructure between Ethiopia and Djibouti, new port facilities managed by Chinese firms, gas storage and processing infrastructure, and new business districts in the capital. Together these ‘mega-projects’ total an investment of 9.8 billion USD, or more than six times Djibouti’s GDP. Most of these projects are not only funded by Chinese money, but also built and maintained by Chinese SOEs, such as CGCOC, CCECC, Sinotrans, China Railway Engineering Corporation, or Shanghai Electric. Associations between high-level Djiboutian officials and Chinese firms are common, with men such as the CEO of CGCOC and the CEO of Touchroad – one of the few privately-owned Chinese firms operating in Djibouti – being given the honour of meeting and publicly addressing the President and other key government officials.   Although there are certainly economic reasons for Chinese firms to invest in Djibouti, as some companies, such as China Merchant Holdings International, have framed their investments in terms of continuity with “Earlier investments in west Africa - in Lagos and Lome – [which] strengthen the group's position in the increasingly affluent African market”, and “also consistent with the group's long-term development strategy to gradually roll out its international footprint”. The strong presence of SOEs among the companies investing in major projects in Djibouti, however, indicates that most of these investment projects of politically motivated as a way for China to curry favor with the Djiboutian political elite. The types of projects being pursued also indicate a bias towards investment based on politics rather than financial returns, as a number of projects – such as new water pipelines – are of national importance to Djibouti are prioritized over investments which would result in larger returns for Chinese firms.

Chinese investment in Djibouti mainly focuses on developing the nation’s infrastructure, a move that both inculcates positive diplomatic relations between the countries and creates the necessary logistical conditions for future Chinese expansion in the region. For example, Chinese investment in port infrastructure serves diplomatic, economic, and military goals by furthering cooperation with the Djiboutian government, improving the capacity of Chinese firms to move goods through Djiboutian ports to inland markets, and creating the preconditions for potentially hosting Chinese naval installations. The main non-political interests behind Chinese investments in Djibouti are likely economic, because, although Djibouti’s 900,000 impoverished persons are not a critical market for Chinese investment, Djibouti’s port makes the nation an important transport hub for inland countries, especially landlocked Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s 95 million people export and import 70% of their goods from the Port of Djibouti, making infrastructure in that area critical to supply a large and emerging market elsewhere. For Chinese firms trying to penetrate more populous markets in Africa, investing in Djibouti makes good economic sense. Chinese investment cannot be seen simply as motivated by geopolitical concerns, as the same investments and actions serve a diverse variety of economic and strategic interests within the Chinese government. This is important to understanding the plurality of interests that may motivate Chinese actions in Djibouti.

China has begun giving Djibouti development aid and has expanded this cooperation in recent years to include technical assistance, although Chinese interaction in Djibouti is still primarily through SOEs as proxies of the government rather than direct government-to-government development programs. The first official record of Chinese development assistance to Djibouti is from 2013, when China supplied several areas of Djibouti City and outlying suburbs with photovoltaic public lights for increasing residents’ safety during nighttime. Compared to similar cooperation going on at the time between Chinese SOEs and the Djiboutian government, the scale of this gesture and the rank of the Djiboutian officials in attendance was minimal. This may indicate that increased development assistance to Djibouti is an afterthought to the larger program of investment rather than a coordinated prelude. China has since expanded its range of assistance to include technical assistance, included sending Chinese civil engineers to construct a hospital in the Northern city of Tadjourah, but these forms of cooperation are recent and small scale. 

China and Djibouti have a friendly diplomatic relationship dating back to Djibouti’s declaration of independence from France in 1977. Even before any partnership because strategically important, Djibouti has always been supportive of Chinese positions in the United Nations, especially in its commitment to upholding the One-China Principle, including opposition to separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet. For its part, Chinese conceptions of sovereignty and resistance to democratic norms have been useful for sheltering President Guelleh’s autocratic rule from more severe international pressure, and – unlike its other partners in France and America – Djibouti does not need to worry about China making a fuss about democracy, civil liberties, or the human rights situation in the country. Djibouti has shown an interest in taking advantage of Chinese educational resources and technical expertise early on, creating a special fund for students wishing to study in China in 2001, although no information is available on to what degree that money has been used. Statements by Djiboutian officials, especially the Minister of Defense, have indicated that Djibouti expects ties in education, health services, and other civil sectors to grow under the new Sino-Djiboutian defense partnership. China is now regarded as a major center of research and expertise in engineering and hard sciences, and it is clear that Djibouti means to take advantage of this fact within the nations’ new strategic partnership by increasing civil cooperation and sending people to China for education.

Chinese military cooperation with Djibouti is a new phenomenon developing out of logistics difficulties associated with the Chinese anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, when China received permission to resupply to Djiboutian ports in February 2014. The Somali coast is more than two-weeks journey from the Chinese ports on the South China Sea, so to preventing having to make a lengthy return journey ever time the ships were low on supplies, China developed good relationships with states in the region and received permission to resupply and rest in their ports. Chinese vessels have docked in foreign countries over 120 times in the past seventy-five months, including stops in Djibouti, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Additionally Chinese ships returning from anti-piracy missions have made return stops to countries including South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates, almost exclusively in areas where China has a strong economic presence or is presently building port infrastructure. Traditionally China has eschewed any suggestions of opening overseas military bases, claiming to not be following the same ‘imperialist’ path of the US, however the publication of a new white paper on military reform encouraging China to become a “global maritime power” and the promotion of Wu Shengli – an advocate of overseas bases since at least 2009 – to the position of Naval Chief indicate that China has begun a new chapter in its military affairs.  On November 8, 2015, China and Djibouti signed an agreement of military cooperation, which allowed China to use Djiboutian military facilities, including ports, as well as confirming future cooperation against regional threats such as piracy and terrorism. This agreement was signed as part of a larger meeting between a Chinese military delegation and Djibouti, at which the President, the Prime Minister, and all high-ranking members of the Djiboutian security services were present. This 48-hour visit was extremely important as heading the Chinese delegation was General Fang Fenghui, the Chief of Staff of the PLA and an active member of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party. Also among the Chinese delegation were General de corps Zhang Jianping, General of the PLA air force, and Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, Chief of Staff of the Chinese navy. The presence of such a high-ranking division in a small country, especially including high-ranking representatives of three different parts of the armed forces, indicates that China’s relationship with Djibouti is of the utmost strategic importance for Beijing and affirms the monumental nature of China opening an overseas base in the country. The presence of high-ranking officials from all service branches of the PLA – with the exception of the second artillery corps – may also hint that China wants the base in Djibouti to be more than a ‘supply depot’ as it has been referred to in Chinese media, potentially including facilities for ground forces and aircraft. Djibouti has reciprocated some of the Chinese gestures, granting the entire Chinese delegation a Presidential audience and awarding General Fang the National Order of the 27^th of June, the Republic of Djibouti’s highest honor.

China started expressing intentions of opening an overseas base in Djibouti in the Spring of 2015, although the Chinese government refused to confirm until very recently. The new facilities will likely be based in the city of Obock, on the northern coast, directly adjacent to the Bab al-Mandab, although this location may be subject to change. The Chinese have insisted on using the term bújǐ zhàn, which roughly translates to ‘supply depot’, rather than referring to the planned facility in Djibouti as a military base. The Chinese base will certainly involve a naval installation – likely utilizing new port infrastructure constructed by Touchroad, a Chinese firm with a strong African presence – and certain figures in the American military believe that the base is likely to include elements of the PLA air force. No news to currently available on when the base might be finished, nor confirmation of its final location. Rumors persist that this is not the only consideration for a Chinese base in Africa and that other sites may have been vetted for the installation and may be considered for additional bases in the future, such as Walvis Bay in Namibia. 

Since beginning its current diplomatic offensive towards improving relations with Djibouti, China has given Djibouti commissions of military equipment for use in anti-terrorist operations. The full extent of Chinese arms within the Djiboutian Armed Forces is difficult to determine due to the generally classified nature of documents pertaining to military budget expenditure. The items we know that China has given to Djibouti are large and public displays of diplomatic influence, usually becoming public knowledge at military parades as symbols of state power. In 2015 China has given Djibouti Norinco WMA-301 tank destroyers and a MA60 transport aircraft. The WMA-301 tank destroyers are armored vehicles used by Chad and Nigeria to combat Boko Haram, and were likely donated to aid the Djiboutian mission in Somalia fighting Al-Shabaab, although they could conceivably be used for guarding the violent and disputed border with Eritrea. The MA60 transport aircraft is an important addition to the Djiboutian air force, which struggles to perform necessary logistics operations in Somalia due to a lack of aircraft. Statements by the Defense Minister of Djibouti indicate that Djibouti expects China military largesse to continue and expand along with increased military cooperation, emphasizing in his speech that “Djibouti's navy […] lacked patrol boats, and the capacities of the air force which would soon acquire Chinese aircraft”. Chinese gifts to the Djiboutian Armed Forces appear to be timed together with a larger charm offensive, and represent a new form of tribute expected of the Chinese by the Djiboutian government, who receive similar gifts from France, and America as an informal cost of their basing arrangements.

West-Djibouti Relations:

Djibouti has had a strong and stable relationship with the West since its independence in 1977, even allowing the French to keep old colonial garrisons in the nation. Relationships between the West and Djibouti intensified during the early 2000s, as increased piracy and the new emphasis on global terrorism added a strong security dimension to relations between the Djibouti and the West, in particular the United States. Since that time, France, the US, and other interested Western powers have supplied the Djiboutian government with significant rents and access to Western military and technical resources in return for use of its territory. Whereas Sino-Djiboutian relations have a strong economic aspect, no Western power has a strong economic or relationship with Djibouti or significant non-military investment in that country. French businesses had been present during most of the Post-colonial era, but their operations do not seem to interest the French government in the way that China remains seized in the affairs of its SOEs abroad. The focus of Western interactions with Djibouti is based around security issues, a field which displays strong and stable relationships between Western militaries and Djibouti in both military and civil-technical fields.

Western economic investment in Djibouti appears to be minimal.  Although American firms tend to have a global presence in consumer goods, the only Western firms which seem to have made significant investments in Djibouti are three of the world’s major oil and gas firms: France’s Total Group, the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell, and America’s ExxonMobil. All three firms had been involved in oil production off the coast of Djibouti, but production has largely stopped since 2000 when the Djiboutian Ministry of the Environment brought a suit against the three firms for polluting the Port of Djibouti and poor environmental practices. The scandal has continued for years – during which Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil abandoned the project and sold their assets to Total Group – and has not yet reached a conclusion as the local subsidiary of Total Group is claiming inability to paid a 150 million euro fine on grounds of bankruptcy amidst allegations of corporate malfeasance and the head of the local subsidiary fleeing to France. Whatever presence Total Group and other Western oil companies may have had in Djibouti, they no longer represent major interests to Western governments or to Djibouti. The actions of Total Group in particular has not inculcated any sense of trust in French government and Western investment in Djibouti cannot be considered politically motivated or designed to improve relations between Djibouti and the West. When investment exists, it appears to be motivated by desire for profit by private enterprises, not a result of government policy. 

Djibouti has generally strong diplomatic relations with the West, particularly with their former colonial master France, but these are sometimes undermined by Western criticism of President Guelleh’s autocratic regime. American diplomatic relations with Djibouti in particular present a conflict between the dual foreign policy concerns of America: security versus democracy and human rights. Because of its position near conflict zones and the significant military investment already existing in the country, American policy towards Djibouti is largely shaped by military necessity, which demands the continued stability of the country and its domestic politics. This translates into support, albeit indirectly, of President Guelleh and his authoritarian government. At the same time, the US cannot ignore the curtailment of human rights and civil liberties in Djibouti, especially when feuds with members of the opposition reach international news media, as they did in 2011. As a response to the requirement of championing democracy in the world, criticism of the practices of the current Djiboutian government from American sources has remained fairly constant despite continued cooperation and military support of President Guelleh’s regime. Some scholars have suggested that President Guelleh’s dislike of criticism, and a general distrust that American rhetorical promotion of human rights will not translate into political pressure in the future, have motivated a move towards China, which will not bring democracy or human rights into their diplomatic relationship and continue to provide support without requiring reform. Despite these suspicions, America has continued and intensified high-level cooperation  and dialogue with Djibouti in recent years, inviting President Guelleh to meet with President Obama in 2014 and setting up a bilateral forum of discussion between Djibouti ministers and members of the American Cabinet to take place annually. Despite concerns about human rights, the current administrations seems dedicated to maintaining good relations with the current Djiboutian government.

The vast majority of cooperation between Djibouti and the West is facilitated through the foreign militaries stationed in the country. Although Western programs of aid and development assistance are not limited to building up Djibouti’s armed forces, most development aid is still orchestrated through Western militaries and involves expansion of the services they perform when stationed in Djibouti. France has a long legacy of military and civil cooperation with Djibouti, formalized in an official treaty of military cooperation in 2011. The French military frequently uses its technical expertise to help develop aspects of the Djiboutian economy, most recently having French troops renovate a fishery in Tadjourah and install new equipment, although government statements stressed that: “Cette action, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre des activités civilo-militaires n’est pas la première du genre” [This action, which is part of civil-military activities, is not the first of its kind]. French troops are also deeply involved with improving the military capacities of Djibouti, both repairing and maintaining military infrastructure, such as maritime surveillance, and training Djiboutian soldiers. France also provides military capabilities where Djibouti currently lacks expertise or equipment, with French aircraft and soldiers providing most of the transport of logistics services to the Djiboutian peacekeeping force in Somalia. France also supplies Djibouti with training and access to military education, with one of the primary tasks of the French military installations in Djibouti being the training of Djiboutian soldiers. At the officer level, France also provides opportunities for advanced training, with prominent military officials often being educated at French or American military academies. American forces in Djibouti are also involved in training the Armed Forces of Djibouti, offering courses and training opportunities geared towards preparing Djiboutian troops for deployment in Somalia, most recently leading a 5-month course in logistics management. American training appears to be especially concentrated towards logistics and the engineer corps, according to Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Djibouti, General Ibrahim. The scope of military cooperation between America and Djibouti has greatly increased as of this summer, when the Armed Forces of Djibouti became a partner of the Kentucky National Guard. The National Guard forces to be stationed in Djibouti for training will bring veteran experience to the Djiboutian Armed Forces, and provide specific training on emergency and disaster relief situations to not only Djiboutian soldiers, but also police officers and fire fighters. Djibouti will the eleventh African country to take part in this partnership program, and the second country partnered with the Kentucky National Guard, along with Ecuador. The presence of all high-ranking officers of the Armed Force of Djibouti at military ceremonies celebrating cooperation in both America and Djibouti demonstrates that the Djiboutian military is very excited about this new training arrangement, which many hope to expand into broader partnerships between educational and medical institutes in Kentucky and Djibouti.  Cooperation with American forces ranks very highly on the Djiboutian national security agenda, with specific recommendations for increased cooperation with America being one of three major points in the Ministry of Defense’s independence day address this year. Japan does not have any training programs with Djiboutian Armed Forces, nor does any evidence exist of Japanese assistance to Djibouti in developing military capacities.

Djibouti receives large amounts of military equipment from a variety of Western countries, with the majority of supplies geared towards enhancing the ability of the Djiboutian Armed Forces to successfully fulfil their security responsibilities in the Red Sea and as part of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The US has been the largest contributor to the Djiboutian Armed Forces, providing 9 million USD of equipment since the country’s independence, most of it geared towards helping the Armed Force of Djibouti better pacify Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia. America has donated 26 land cruisers, 12 Force Protection Cougars, and 10 RG-33s armored personnel carriers to the Djiboutian land forces. All of these vehicles are suitable to desert warfare and counter-insurgency operations, having been used by NATO forces in engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they constitute important additions to the capabilities of Djiboutian peacekeeping forces combating Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The United States has been largely responsible for building the capacities of the Djiboutian navy and air force to the degree that they can fulfil all of their functions within the country’s security commitments. Until 2006, the Djiboutian navy had only small patrol boats suited for security within the Gulf of Tadjourah, but not able to conduct operations in the Bab al-Mandab. The United State has since supplied to Djiboutian navy with five 44-foot patrol boats in 2006, and two Metal Shark 28 Defiant high-speed aluminum coastal security boats in 2013. These craft can remain at sea for several days and withstand oceanic weather conditions. This grant from the US unilaterally increased the capacity of Djibouti to patrol its entire territorial waters, and effectively engage with piracy in smuggling in a capacity which it was previously unable to do. Grants of military equipment from the US have also helped increase the capacity of the Djiboutian air force, with two Shorts-360 transport aircraft and two C-23 cargo planes being given to the Djiboutian military in 2014 and 2015, respectively.  These aircraft address the critical limitations in logistics and supply which have accompanied Djiboutian deployments in Somalia, and are a part in making the Djiboutian armed forces more capable to conduct operations without relying on France for logistics support. American contributions to the Djibouti are specifically targeted at points of weakness in the current inventory of the Djiboutian armed forces, primarily by adding to the stock of the paltry navy and air force, or by donating vehicles designed for use in counter-terrorist operations. This targeted approach in donations demonstrates a responsiveness to the strategic aims of the Djiboutian government and a high level of cooperation and dialogue between the American and Djiboutian armed forces. The other Western country making consistent additions to the inventory of the Armed Forces is Italy, which has sold ten 155mm M109A1 Howitzers and seven Iveco Puma armored vehicles since 2010. These weapons are suitable for deployment in Somalia, however they – especially the howitzers – are also more general use weapons, which could also see use in Djibouti’s other conflicts, such as border skirmishes with Eritrea. The general purpose nature of the equipment given, and the lack of support for the air and naval acquisitions which Djibouti has specifically requested, demonstrates that Italian engagement with Djibouti is on the basis of capacity building of a general purpose to increase regional security, a contrast to the targeted and coordinated donations of the United States, which donates equipment not only to bolster regional security, but to appease the government in Djibouti. 

Implications of the Chinese Base:

While Chinese influence in Djibouti is rapidly increasing, there is no evidence of a concurrent decline in Djibouti’s relations with the West nor of a pivot in favour of Chinese security interests. Analysts who fear that Chinese expansion will push out Western interests in the country have created a zero-sum game – which frankly indicates a deep-seated otherization of China as a global power that threatens to cloud Sino-American relations in the future – in a situation where all actors seem able to cooperate and concentrate on their mutual security interests. China has undoubtedly increased its presence in Africa in general and Djibouti in particular over the past decade, but China’s economic and diplomatic inroads in Africa have not come at the expense of Western interests in the region. Although China has acquired permission to build a base in Djibouti, there is no indication that Djibouti plans to supplant Western support with Chinese patronage. Rather, the expansion of military and economic cooperation between China and Djibouti has come at the same time as Djibouti has deepened military cooperation with the US. In the future, China will most likely acquire a position within Djibouti similar to that of the involved Western governments, gaining a military base in return for paying informal rents to the Djiboutian government in the form of military equipment, civil cooperation, and development aid. The acquisition of the military base, however, does have significant implications for the Chinese capacity for military action in the region, as Chinese troops, aircraft, and naval vessels can now be deployed in a region of intense strategic importance without overextending Chinese supply lines, increasing Chinese ability to carry out operations against security threats in the region, whether those threats be terrorists, Somali pirates, or – hypothetically – foreign forces, including, but not limited to, Western forces.

The acquisition of an overseas naval base in East Africa has greatly increased the capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) to operate internationally and maintain deployments of vessels a considerable distance from Chinese ports. Previously, one of the biggest impediments to Chinese anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast was the length of Chinese supply lines which several limited the number of vessels which could be deployed and the length of their deployment abroad. The creation of permanent logistics and supply installations in Djibouti will allow PLA-N vessels to base in Djibouti, eliminating the need for the fortnight-long journey back to China for resupply. This will not only reduce the costs for Chinese operations in the Middle East and East Africa, but also allow vessels based in Djibouti to conduct operations farther afield. This could make operations in West Africa, which had previously tested the limits of Chinese naval logistics, a possibility for Chinese eager to engage in additional anti-piracy operations. There has also been discussion of the Chinese base hosting aircraft in addition to the naval vessels currently involved in anti-piracy operations, a theory bolstered by the presence of General de corps Zhang Jianping, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLA-AF) at the signing of the cooperation agreement between China and Djibouti earlier in 2015. An airbase would significantly increase the capacity of China to deploy aircraft on a variety of missions abroad, as right now the only potential for deployment of short and medium range aircraft is through use of an aircraft carrier, of which China has only one operational vessel. The potential stationing of permanent forces in Djibouti will also allow China to react more quickly to geopolitical events that may endanger its investments and nationals living in the region, as civil wars in Libya and Yemen did in 2011 and 2015 respectively. The evacuation of Chinese nationals and other foreign civilians has facilitated by the presence of Chinese vessels participating in an anti-piracy operation in the region, and as these operations close down alongside the decline of piracy in the region, China needs a more permanent force in the region to react sudden events threatening its national interests. With the acquisition of a base in Djibouti, Chinese vessels will now be closer to the nation’s vital supplies of oil from the Middle East, located on the Bab al-Mandab, and nearby to the Strait of Hormuz, allowing China to more swiftly and effectively react to any attempts to close down its international supply lines.

Chinese naval activities are likely to expand in the coming years, in East Africa and elsewhere, as the PLA-N adjusts to its new role as a global maritime power as envisioned by President Xi and Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng. As outlined in a white paper earlier this year, the current administration in China wants to transform the PLA-N from a territorial defense force into a global navy able to support Chinese interests abroad. The creation of a naval base in Djibouti and the resulting expansion of supply lines and operational zones is a major step towards the realization of this goal, and the vessels deployed in Djibouti will likely see a diversification of their roles and responsibilities as Chinese naval policy broadens to include a larger range of activities. The current EU and American anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast end in 2016 without clear plans to replace them as incidences of successful piracy in the region have declined to zero since 2012. Chinese vessels and crew have gained valuable experience from participation in far-seas operations in Somalia, and China will likely try to replace their withering mandate in Somalia with another far-seas mission, such as tackling the rising rate of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The creation of an African base will provide the logistic and supply networks necessary for an increased Chinese naval presence in these areas. Chinese roles in the region will likely also expand with increased policy concerns with protecting Chinese nationals abroad, well over a million of whom live in Africa. The Chinese Foreign Minister has also suggested that the creation of the overseas base – although he used the official vocabulary term ‘supply depot’ – will help Chinese forces better participate in UN peacekeeping, provide naval escorts, and provide humanitarian assistance. These are the activities of a robust, modern navy dedicated towards advancing national interests abroad, and one can expect that Chinese involvement in regional politics and security will be increased as a result of the new base in Djibouti.

The Chinese presence in Djibouti is likely to increase in the coming years, while changing to focus more on military cooperation and access to Chinese educational institutions, as China adjusts its conduct towards the Djiboutian government to match the conduct and norms established by the French and American relationships with Djibouti. Up until now, the Chinese charm offensive towards improving relations with Djibouti has been pioneered by investment from SOEs, with other forms of aid – such as military assistance, join training, or development aid – playing a secondary role in Sino-Djiboutian relations. This is in contrast to the forms of assistance given by France and America, which are directed through the military and focus on increasing capacity through donating surplus equipment or training Djiboutian soldiers. The Djiboutian Defense Minister has made clear his expectations for future Sino-Djiboutian cooperation, specifically requesting that China help increase the capacities of the Djiboutian navy and air force by donating equipment, as well as provide “assistance with surveillance, including radar, and more training through the provision of additional places at China's military training centers and colleges in the aviation, maritime, armaments, logistics and engineering sectors”. The forms of cooperation and assistance outlined above are very similar to forms of support the West gives to the Djiboutian government, indicating that the Djiboutian government expects certain forms of support, primarily in military capacity building, from countries interested in maintaining large basing facilities. The costs of training, equipment donation, and increased access to domestic educational opportunities constitute an additional rent paid to the Djiboutian government in return for good relations. Considering the importance of this naval base to the current administration, China will likely conform its assistance programs in Djibouti to match the norms of conduct, placing a greater focus on supplying military equipment and training opportunities, rather than prioritizing investment and economic development programs. However, Chinese firms certainly have an economic incentive to develop Djibouti independent of demands from Beijing, as improvements in Djiboutian infrastructure will allow increased penetration of interior African markets, specifically Ethiopia, so it is unlikely that Chinese investment will decrease as the Chinese government conforms to the pre-existing patterns of patronage. 

The implication of China’s navy base of ultimate and vital concern to the West is whether the infiltration of Chinese military and economic influence will negatively affect Western interests in the region. As Western economic interests in Djibouti have all but disappeared, the focus of concern is over potentially adverse affects on Western military interests in Djibouti and the surrounding region. As mentioned previously, the fears over Chinese expansion consist of two main concerns: that the proximity of the Chinese base will compromise the classified nature of American intelligence operations in the area, and that the Chinese presence will displace Western influence in Djibouti and eventually result in the eviction of Western forces from Djibouti. The concerns over the intelligence risks posed by a Chinese base and an American base being located in the same small country are certainly valid, as the Chinese would now have an excuse to send over the men and equipment necessary to intercept intelligence without looking suspect. This is a security concern and one to which the intelligence services operating out of Camp Lemonnier should adjust. While a threat from China remains, the fact that they are operating in a foreign country with an interest in keeping all foreign militaries happy and rent-paying means that China may not engage in the espionage activities that would likely characterize Chinese activities in other bases for fear of displeasing the Djiboutian government. The actual distance between the facilities is also significant, as while American installations are to the South and Southwest of the capital, the Chinese base will likely be near the city of Obock in the far North. That being said, the intelligence services of the US have experience and expertise preventing their operations from becoming compromised, and I have faith that they can deter any new Chinese attempt following the opening of the Chinese base in Djibouti. The idea that Chinese influence will displace the West is ludicrous and assumes that Djibouti’s relations with China must be fundamentally different than all other countries, which they do not appear to be. While China has greatly increased its influence within Djibouti, both in economic and military interests, during the same time as Beijing’s charm offensive, France and the US have maintained or even broadened their scope of cooperation with the Djiboutian government. During the same month that Djibouti signed a treaty of military cooperation with China, they joined a training agreement with the Kentucky National Guard, demonstrating that – far from being a competition – the relations of Beijing and Washington with Djibouti can both improve within the same timeframe. The fundamental argument behind the argument that Chinese influence will ‘push out’ Western interests is that China is a special type of world power whose influence is diametrically opposed to the West and thus any region with the presence of both countries must fall entirely into one sphere of influence or another. The continued and strengthened presence of French and American military interests during this time show that the expansion of Chinese influence has not jeopardized the stability of the Western presence in the country, and there is no reason to suspect that Chinese influence will evict Western interests in the future. Furthermore, in terms of military equipment and training opportunities offered to the Djiboutian armed forces, French and American influence still far outweighs that of China, making a Djiboutian swing away from Western backing at this time counter to the regime’s goal of improving military capacities. President Guelleh does not conceptualize the Chinese presence different from any other power based in Djibouti, stating that, “France's presence is old, and the Americans found that the position of Djibouti could help in the fight against terrorism in the region. The Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy - and now the Chinese also want to protect their interests, and they are welcome”. In the foreseeable future, baring a massive downturn in the relationship between the West and China, Chinese bases in Djibouti pose only a minor security threat to intelligence operations based there. The larger more fundamental issue of China replacing the West is extremely unlikely and there is no evidence that increased Chinese influence will result in a decline in Western influence. The West’s intelligence operations will have to practice increased scrutiny, but if anything the security situation in East Africa should be improved by the Chinese military presence, as this likely signals more involvement in peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations, allowing the US to focus its objectives on other pressing security issues.

 

Chinese Interests in Djibouti:

In looking at the implications of the planned Chinese base in Djibouti, it is also necessary to examine what interests are motivating its construction and how the Chinese conceptualize their presence in the area. An understanding of Chinese interests in the region should inform what types of developments can be expected from the construction of the new naval base. Chinese interest in the Djiboutian base are manifold and represent the concerns of both strategic and economic actors within Chinese foreign policy. The decision to open an overseas base in Djibouti was driven by a Chinese desire to assert itself as a global power, increase capacities to protect its growing interests in Africa, and to collect naval strength near the strategic Bab al-Mandab. The reason for China to acquire an overseas base at all is that it wishes to assert itself as a global power and views an increased military presence as a road towards this goal. During President Xi’s administration China has become more involved in the provision of security on a global scale, even sending Chinese soldiers – rather than engineers or medical staff – on a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan for the first time in 2015. By opening a naval base in a troubled region, China is laying the groundwork for increased future involvement in Africa, most likely through additional support in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid distribution. For China increased involvement in security missions such as peacekeeping increase their standing as a world power, and chip away at the US’s monopoly on security as ‘the world’s policeman’. The diversification of security providers also helps to create the multipolar world envisaged by Chinese politicians.

China has chosen a location adjacent to the Bab al-Mandab and nearby the Straits of Hormuz as part of a strategy of defensive control of key maritime supply lines. Despite significant oil and gas reserves in Xinjiang, Chinese industry is extremely dependent on energy resources imported from the Middle East. To reach Chinese markets, these strategic resources have to travel through a series of chokepoints of intense concentration: the Bab al-Mandab, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. Despite the fact that America has been the champion of freedom of high seas transit since its independence, the Chinese military is extremely paranoid about a hypothetical situation in a future conflict with America during which its vital supply lines at Bab al-Mandab, Hormuz, and Malacca are cut. Although the Chinese government has not released any statements admitting to any uses of the base in Djibouti beyond resupply, a prominent IR professor at Fudan University, Dr. Shen Dingli, has stressed the importance of the new base to increased navigational freedom, stating that “If whoever – pirates, or ISIS, or the U.S. – wants to shut down the passage [Bab al-Mandab], we need to be able to reopen it”. Unless the US does have a secret plan to violate the Law of the Sea Convention and close down all international trade to China, these concerns are unlikely to result in any conflict between China and the West, but this fear remains a major factor in Chinese geopolitical strategy. This concern is common at higher levels of Chinese government, and likely influenced the decision to open the nation’s first overseas base on a strategic chokepoint rather than other suitable locations. 

Part of the motivation behind opening an overseas base within the expansion of Chinese responsibilities as an emerging power is a growing sense of responsibility for the protection of Chinese nationals and property abroad. China supplanted America as the single largest trading partner for the African continent in 2009, and has billions of dollars of investments in Africa and over one million Chinese nationals living there. In the past decade, China has shown increased interest in the well-being of its citizens abroad, evacuating Chinese nationals from South Sudan, Libya, and Yemen when those countries descended into civil war. The protection of Chinese nationals and assets abroad function more than as an extension of China’s push to become more involved in regional security, as Beijing sees protection of nationals as important to building a good reputation at both foreign and domestic levels. The overseas base in Djibouti will not only allow for a more rapid reaction force for naval evacuations, but will also enable access to a growing web of infrastructure which can be used to organize evacuation. Although the connection between growing Chinese assets in Africa and China’s military presence there is not clear, the mention of growing investments in a South China Morning Post article on the issue indicates that it does play into official conceptualization of their responsibilities in Africa. An increased official concern for the well-being of Chinese nationals and the security of Chinese investments is likely motiving the current push into an increased security role in Africa – potentially driven by the influence of key CEOs of SEOs with interests in Africa in Beijing’s policy-making process. 

Conclusion:

The creation of a China’s first overseas base in Djibouti does not pose a threat to American or Western strategic interests in the region to any significant degree. The base does, however, represent a new phase of Chinese foreign policy, in which Beijing is more willing and capable to defend its interests abroad. At the current time, Chinese interests in Africa are complimentary to American and Western interests, namely the creation of a positive security situation and increased economic development. The expansion of Chinese influence in Djibouti has not corresponded to a decline in the quality or depth of relations between Djibouti and Western countries, rather the scope of American cooperation expanded during this period. President Guelleh’s administration seems to see no conflict in hosting bases from China and the US, and the relationship between Djibouti and Beijing will likely evolve to mimic the forms of cooperation between Djibouti and its Western partners. While heavy investment in Djibouti makes Chinese influence there seem exceptional, the trend of relations steered by Djiboutian government is towards normalization based on a model of the French or American presence in Djibouti. Under President Xi’s administration, China has become more active in pursuing its foreign policy goals, fortunately in Africa the vast majority of Chinese goals are shared by the West. Both the West and Beijing desire Africa, and particularly Djibouti, to become stable and economically developed. The future activities of the base in Djibouti will likely see increased Chinese involvement in peacekeeping missions and the distribution of humanitarian aid, both of which promote regional security and thus further Western and Chinese interests. Despite a generally antagonistic relationship with America, China is a firm partner in the War on Terror, and is likely to support regional stability through peacekeeping and new operations against piracy and the organized crime groups which finance terrorism. In many areas of strategic importance China has the same goals as the West, leaving some, such as Peter Barlerin, a State Department official in the Africa Bureau, “Quite optimistic about our co-operation and our engagement with China in Africa”.

— Eunice Noh, December 2015