Thursday, August 19, 2021

Notes on joint Russian-Chinese military exercise West/Interaction 2021 (Запад/Взаимодействие – 2021 西部·联合-2021)

Name for the exercise in Chinese is 西部·联合-2021 (equivalent name) and in Russia the exercise is either Запад/Взаимодействие – 2021 or Сибу/Взаимодействие-2021.

N.B.: Translation software repeatedly returns the Russian acronym for Eastern Military District (ВВO) as the phrase Air Defense Forces, so by cautious about inclusion of these units in analysis as it may be mistranslation.


  • Exercises are known as Zapad/Interaction 2021. They are set to begin on Monday, 9 August 2021 and last for 5 days. Over 10k Russian and Chinese troops are to participate. The exercise will be held at the Qingtongxia Joint Tactical Training Base in Ningxia Province.
    • An anonymous Chinese military source reported that, originally, it was hoped that the drill would be conducted in Xinjiang, but it did not have a base large enough. Another option was the Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base in Inner Mongolia, the largest base in China and host to previous international exercises and war games, but it was being used for other routine exercises at the time.
    • Spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Defense said that the exercises would involve a joint command center and would involve troops from Russia's Eastern Military District and China's Western Theater Command. Exercises would cover aircraft, artillery, armored equipment, joint reconnaissance, early warnings, electronic and information attacks, and joint strikes.
  • Zhou Chenming, a researcher at Yuan Wang military science and technology institute, who appears to have commented on Chinese and US military relations many previous times, says that these drills were meant to focus on the security of Central Asia, presumably prompted by the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. [Zhou Chenming appears to have permission to speak to the South China Morning Post exclusively and is the only person from the Institute to speak to English language press. He comments on many issues of internatioanl military cooperation and tension]
    • Zhou Chenming also said that no missile forces would be participating in the exercise and that China and Russia had never had joint exercises or exchanges because neither China nor Russia wished to share secret missile data.
    • Zhou Chenming downplayed the involvement of Russian aircraft, saying that Russia sent a number of the older Su 30 planes and not the current model of Su 57 jets.
  •  A former instructor at the Taiwanese Naval Academy, Lu Lishi (Lu Li-shih) 呂禮詩,  says that something to watch out for would be the Russians sharing the experience of drone warfare gained during the 2nd Nagorno Karabax War.
  • Russia announced its participation in joint exercises to become Zapad/Interaction 2021 on 28 July 2021. During an existing SCO meeting in Dushanbe in July, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe 魏凤和 met and discussed these exercises. Sergei Shoigu says that China invited Russia and Russia accepted on 28 July 2021. [This timeline has to be a little felicitous, both because of the time needed to organize an exercise of this scale and because Global Times reports something like this being planned prior to the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in May 2021].
  • An analyst and former PLA instructor, Song Zhongping, said that Russia and China are hosting the exercise for the purpose of creating security in a region menaced by US hegemony and combating terrorism. [Song Zhongping is, among other things, a writer for the bellicose Global Times, source: https://archive.is/I22kb].
  • Claims that Zapad/Interaction 2021 is the first time that a foreign army has participated in a Chinese military exercise. It is the first time that, on a large scale, Russian soldiers will be using equipment provided by China and will be in joint units alongside Chinese troops.
    • The author uses this to stress the strength of Chinese Russian relations, as indicated by the foreign ministry phrase 'better than an alliance'. However, the author also says that this relationship of cooperation will not involve an actual alliance with legal obligations of assistance [This slogan was coined by Foreign Minister Wang Yi in July 2021 after the renewal of the 20 y/o Russian Chinese Friendship Treaty source:https://archive.ph/XjNWr].
  • Confirms that exercise took place at Qingtongxia Joint Tactical Training Base in Ningxia Province.
  • Direct motivation is the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, although apparently it was planned in advance of NATO withdrawal.
    • This article definitely stresses the military aspect of cooperation between China and Russia in the midst of confrontation with USA & friends in the Black Sea and the Pacific. Views this exercise in some anti US light (or, at least, Global Times does).

  • Russia and China have conducted over 30 joint exercises with each other, beginning in 2003.
  • The commanding office of Chinese forces during the Zapad 2021 exercises is Lt. Gen. Liu Xiaowu, the Deputy Commander of the Western Theater.
  • The Zapad 2021 exercise is to occur starting on 9 August 2021 and concluding on 13 August 2021.
  • The Zapad 2021 exercise is not the first joint exercise between Russia and China, but it is the first one to occur within China. China participated in Russian exercises Vostok in 2018, Tsentr in 2019, and Kavkaz in 2020 in different parts of Russia.
    • In addition to this, China regularly participates in different international military events hosted by Russia. Chinese troops will be in Russia again from 22 August 2021 to 4 September 2021 to participate in the International Army Games. And again in September as SCO Peace Mission 2021 drills take place involving other member states.
  • Official confirmation of size and details of the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises (original can be found here: https://archive.ph/rtGRg)
  • The joint command of the Russian and Chinese armed forces met 4 times during the exercises between 9 August and 13 August. They drafted multiple operational plans.
    • On 12 August, the Russian and Chinese conducted multiple drills on 12 August 2021 focusing on operations grouping, combat deployment, joint reconnaissance and early warning, and revising the operational plans. This was all in preparation for a live fire drill on 13 August 2021.
  • Russian soldiers were trained to pilot Chinese made armored assault vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and other Chinese equipment. They apparently saw significant improvement as a result of training during this period.
  • The Russian and Chinese air forces plan to coordinate actions in a joint plan during live fire exercises occurring on 13 August 2021.
  • The fire live exercise that ended Zapad/Interaction 2021 was observed by General Wei Fenghe and Sergei Shoigu.
    • It featured combined artillery, armored, infantry, and aircraft attacking a mock enemy, destroying the enemy defense system, and pursuit and elimination of the enemy. These were split into four distinct phases: confrontation, destruction of defense system, attack, and pursuit. The exercise began at 10:20 and was over by the afternoon, at which point closing ceremonies were held.
    • Wei Fenghe and Sergei Shoigu had a discussion following the exercises and signed a document. Sergei Shoigu suggested that Russia was willing to intensify cooperation on counter terrorism with the Chinese.

  • Training at the same military base in Ningxia occurred prior to the start of Zapad/Interaction 2021.
    • It certainly covered paratroopers getting into position and the air deployment of both armored personnel and their vehicles. They also practiced air transport of vehicles via helicopter.
    • China also had an air defense group practice using HQ 17 missile defense system, which will be used as the main air defense system in the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises.
  • During the exercise, the 4-25 missile artillery integrated weapon system will be unveiled.



  • Chinese troops seem to still be wearing their distinctive blue camo in these exercises, representing the opposing forces in exercises (source: https://archive.ph/TIu1q)
  • Russian participants in the exercises were quarantined prior to entry into China.
  • Russian units, including Su 30 aircraft were certainly there and trained in China prior to the actual exercises.  Photo confirmation of Russian troops in Ningxia since at least 2 August 2021; in this photo (source: https://archive.ph/k8qnO), they appear to be operating a Chinese vehicle.



  • Welcome ceremonies were held for Russian contingent of training exercise on the morning of 31 July 2021, likely the day of or the day after their arrival.
    • It appears that the schedule was Russian troops arriving in China an unknown period of time before, completing quarantine, exiting quarantine on 31 July 2021, and then conducting training for 9 days prior to the beginning of the actual Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises.
  • The Russian representative at the exercise was the Deputy Commander of the Eastern Military District of Russia. [Based on analysis of photos from https://archive.ph/Op6jG , this is almost certainly Deputy Commander of the Eastern Military District, Lt. Gen. Mixail Yakovlevich Nosulev].

  • Joint planning for the command and staff officers began in an exercise on 10 August 2021.
  • For the purposes of the exercise, a three tiered command structure was established.
    • The highest level of command was the Central Military Committee, which exercised overall authority, established what scenarios would be involved in the exercise, and told the Chinese and Russian commands were to optimize coordination and cooperation; in other words, they designed the exercise.
    • The second level of command was the Chinese Russian joint command. It included the representatives of the Chinese Western District and Russian Eastern District (Liu Xiaowu and Mixail Nosulev).
    • The third level of command is unit level commanders within distinct Chinese and Russian military hierarchies. So, joint command at the highest operational level, but no Chinese with Russian commanders or Russians with Chinese commanders.
  • The exercise featured some time of video conference and communication system to enable communication between different command posts and forward bases of combat commanders. Seems like this used some proprietary information sharing system specific to the exercise.



  • The Central Military Committee official responsible for overseeing the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercise was Gen. Li Zuocheng 李作成, chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Committee. [This fact shouldn't raise any eyebrows because the Joint Staff Department, which Li Zuocheng runs, is responsible for military training and planning].
  • The exercise consists of two parts: one focuses on joint planning and establishing and running a joint command; the other is joint operations training, including conducting saturation attacks, destroying an enemy operation system, and annihilating remnants of enemy forces.
  • So far, the only pictures from the first day of the exercise, 9 August, have been a massive parade of all forces and aircraft.

  • A live fire exercise was held in Ningxia on 5 August 2021. In these live fire training exercises, Russia troops were given Chinese armored assault vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and other main battle equipment on a large scale for training in preparation for the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises.
    • A Chinese training group produced Russian language media, instructional videos, and driving simulations to assist in the training of Russian soldiers on Chinese vehicles.
    • A Russian translator, speaking to the Chinese government media, said that there were great difficulties at first in the operation of Chinese equipment due to large differences in design and operation. An example is that Chinese IFVs are driving by steering wheel, whereas Russian ones use a joystick.
  • The training of soldiers of one army on the other's equipment also occurred during the Kavkaz 2020 exercises in Russia. There, Chinese soldiers were trained on Russian military equipment for the first time.



  • The Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises in China still have a paltry attendance compared to the last international exercises in Russia, Kavkaz 2020, which saw participation by 80k soldiers. However, these soldiers were largely Russia with around 1k foreign soldiers total participating, of which Chinese were only a portion.



  • The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed that Russian troops participating in the exercise would be from some motorized rifle subunits, Su 30M aircraft, and Eastern Military District air defense forces.



  • The exercise consists of piloting armored vehicles; deployed in combat positions alongside artillery, air defense, air support, and infantry; and firing various forms of artillery, armored vehicle batteries, and infantry held weapons at mock fortified positions.
    • Other exercises including parachuting and having troops land from helicopters.
    • Crews for unmanned aerial vehicles were also involved in the training.
  • Russian participation is 'units of one of the formations of the Eastern Military District'.



  • Most of the preparatory training prior to Zapad/Interaction 2021 focused on training Russians how to drive and operate Chinese military vehicles and how to use Chinese artillery.
  • During the exercise, troops practiced joint reconnaissance to identify fortified enemy positions and then planned how to assault them for the final stage of the exercise (live fire on 13 August).
  • The video from this post confirms that the leading Russian figure is Lt. Gen. Mixail Nosulev and indicates that communication at all levels was facilitated through translators.



  • Meetings took place between representatives of the Russian Eastern Military District, namely Col. Ivan Tarayev, responsible for international military cooperation in the district, and PLA members in Xabarovsk in late June. Discussions about the strategic exercise and what it would entail were happening at least by 23 June 2021 and the location had already been set as Ningxia Province.
    • Ivan Tarayev and the Chinese agreed at this stage to an exercise involving joint reconnaissance and attack and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.



  • Meetings to plan out the specifics of what would happen at Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises were held in Xabarovsk began on 22 June 2021. They jointly planned what the exercise would include, what forces would participate, how to divy up support roles, and the procedure for the entry of Russian soldiers into China.
    • These issues decided on by the 'end of the week' (??25 June 2021??).
  • The opening offer of the Russians, represented by Ivan Tarayev, was that Russia would contribute some army aviators, a division of tactical aviators, and up to a battalion of motorized riflemen.



  • Russian soldiers, for the first time, were trained in driving and using the weapons systems on a Chinese 'medium tank' and a 'armored vehicle'.  [Based on the video provided with this article, the vehicles used for training were the ZBL Type 08 armored vehicle and the ZTL Type 11 tank; they can be distinguished by unique mirror placement].
  • Forces participating in the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises are Chinese ground forces and air forces, a detachment of Russian operational tactical aviation, a 'special purpose unit', command staff, and part of a motorized rifle unit from Zabaykalsky Krai [Taken together, it appears that a single motorized rifle battalion (~500 soldiers) was sent from Zabaykalsky Krai, which would mean one of the battalions of the 29th Combined Armies Army, which is based in Zabaykalsky Krai].
  • The number given for participation in Zapad/Interaction 2021 here is 13,000 soldiers and over 400 pieces of military equipment.



  • Russian members of the motorized rifle unit sent to China arrived in China on 27 July 2021. This, presumably, is the start of the period of quarantine.
  • Confirmation that training was for a motorized rifle unit from Zabaykalsky Krai, command and control units of officers, and some elements of operational tactical aviation (??army aviation??).



  • This clarifies things a lot. The exercises were planned ahead, what happened in Dushanbe at the SCO meeting on 28 July 2021 was that Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe invited Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to personally attend the final day of live fire exercises in Ningxia on 13 August 2021.



  • The Russia aircraft and aviators were stationed at Yinchuan Airfield for the duration of the exercise, not on Qingtongxia training ground with everyone else.
  • Russians have a separate camp and facilities from Chinese soldiers.



  • Confirmation that Russian Su 30M planes participated in the exercise.
  • Article seems to imply that training prior to the exercise was separate and that joint training with the Chinese only began with the exercise itself.



  • Russians and Chinese practiced being picked up and dropped off in unfamiliar areas by helicopter.



  • Prior to the training occurring, on the day of 6 August 2021, Chinese and Russian officers had a consultation on the time and location that airstrikes would occur, including on some conditional targets, in upcoming exercises. [Airstrike are preplanned, not called in spontaneously based on perceived need in faux combat situation].



  • Confirmation that Russian personnel were trained on 2, and apparently only 2, Chinese vehicles: an 'armored vehicle' and a 'medium tank'.



  • On 8 August 2021, Chinese and Russian commands plan out the rules for joint management of forces.
    • Russian officers also survey and makes notes on the territory of the training ground in preparation for future exercises.
  • Unmanned aircraft of some variety will be used in the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises.



  • On 8 August 2021, the Russian crews of Chinese armored carriers and tanks went through their last stage of training, the loading and firing of Chinese guns with live ammunition at fixed targets.



  • Both Russia and China are using unmanned aircraft in their training and they will be used in the joint exercises.
    • Drones will be used for reconnaissance, adjusting artillery fire, and themselves shooting at the simulated enemy from the air.



  • This source says that the aircraft in use are SU 30SM planes.
  • On 10 or 11 August 2021, Russian and Chinese forces began to practice jointly. They practiced deploying together in the same area, organizing joint reconnaissance of a simulated enemy to find strong and weak points in defense, and discussed how to assault these points during the active live fire exercise to occur in 13 August 2021.



  • During the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises, troops practiced firing weapons, including infantry, artillery, and antiaircraft missile system weapons. They practiced deployment. For vehicles, they practiced operation, firing, deployment, camouflage, and engineering support.
  • Unmanned drones were incorporated into the command structure to keep appraised of unit positions continuously and aid in command.



  • The joint command staff during the exercise was provided with information about the terrain, climate, and capabilities of the simulated enemy.
  • The exercises involved the use of secure communication against imagined hypothetical enemy interference and the use of jamming capabilities to disrupted pretend enemy communications.



  • On 12 August 2021, training for the aircraft was conducted. The Russian aircraft were Su 30SM planes and the Chinese aircraft were Jian 7 (Цзянь) and Jian 11 aircraft. [These seem to be the Chengdu J7 and Shenyang J11 aircraft]. They practiced simulated bombings of ground forces; some of these missions were conducted in radio silence.



  • The Russian documents indicate that the simulated enemy was meant to be terrorists deployed for a conventional battle.
  • During the live fire exercise on 13 August 2021, Chinese and Russian forces focused on tactical objectives. They practiced combined fire by infantry, combat vehicles, tanks, and anti tank missile systems. In combination with this, artillery systems and multilaunch rocket systems attacked simulated reserve forces and equipment.
    • The enemy had simulated air forces that were attacked by air defense missile forces, including portable air defense forces.
    • Air forces conducted ground strike missions during the exercise. Unmanned aerial drones were used for reconnaissance and to shoot at ground forces.
    • Some forces were parachuted in from planes and others were dropped from helicopters in the rear of the simulated enemy.
  • Unsurprisingly, the joint Russian Chinese forces 'won' the simulated combat encounter.



  • Zhang Xin 张昕, a professor of Russian at East China Normal University, says that the exercise is meant to focus on regional stability in Central Asia, which has a new dimension due to the fall of Afghanistan. The exercise is also part of increasing Russian Chinese defense ties.
  • Russia and China have been doing military exercises together since 2005, including  naval drills in the recent past. These exercises expanded in 2018 to include joint commands and trying to get high level Chinese and Russian officers to work together, the first being Vostok 2018. [Current mixed participation is still behind Vostok 2018, which saw some 3,500 Chinese soldiers participate in exercises (source: https://archive.ph/AQkjz)].
    • Russian and Chinese forces also train together in the context of the SCO, which will be holding exercises with a counterterrorism focus in September.

  • The main distinction of this exercise is that Russian troops have been allowed to use Chinese equipment for the first time. It also, again, involves cooperation between high ranking Russian and Chinese officers.
  • Some Russian academics have also said that the joint military exercises are about showing the West that Russia and China are not and cannot be isolated.



  • The exercises featured a large amount of new equipment. 81.6% of the equipment used in the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises was new, according to reporters from Rambler.  For many, this is their first use in large scale training.  This includes KJ500 early warning aircraft, J20 and J16 fighter aircraft, and drones for reconnaissance and air strikes.
  • A Chinese troop commander reported to Rambler that the exercise was designed to combat terrorism.



  • The major innovations of the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercise were the use of a combined information sharing system by the command and the first even establishment of a joint command structure between China and Russia.
    • This seems to be confirmed by other sources (https://archive.ph/h04XN)



  • Report from a PLA correspondent notes that drones were used for reconnaissance and to make targeted strikes against terrorist leadership.
  • The description provided is of a heavily planned and choreographed battle against a static enemy, but still clearly demonstrating Chinese and Russian capabilities and attempted to utilize them in an ideal situation in a combined fashion.



  • Li Shuyin 李抒音, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences,  stated that the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises had three major changes:
    • The exercises are hosted by China, rather than Russia.
    • A joint command structure between Russia and China was used. In previous exercises, Russia and China planned separately toward the same objectives. This is the first time where the planning and command structures were together for the whole time.
    • Some bs about more and better equipment.
  • Confirmation that more than 80% of the equipment used in the exercise on the Chinese side was 'new', including surveillance and attack drones, military helicopters, and advanced aircraft.
  • The communication network set up for the joint command is brand new and the Chinese are very proud of the interconnected battlefield concept. 
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