Zenn, Jacob. "Central Asian Militants’ Shifting Loyalties in Syria: The Case of The Turkistan Islamic Party". Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 April 2017.

Zenn, Jacob. "Central Asian Militants’ Shifting Loyalties in Syria: The Case of The Turkistan Islamic Party". Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 April 2017.

• Concerns in China and among the Central Asian republics about the possibility of returning jihadis in Syria and Iraq began to materialize after the car bombing outside the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek on 30 August 2016. 
• The Turkestan Islamic Party [TIP], the primary radical Islamist group among Uyghurs, formed in Afghanistan in the 1990s among Uyghur members of the Mujahideen, moving to the tribal areas of Pakistan following the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan. Some of its leaders became high-ranking members of Al-Qaeda during this time.
• The Turkestan Islamic Party had minimal operation presence in the region, occasionally conducting limited operations in Afghanistan or sporadic attacks in China. In 2012, however, the Party began actively supporting jihadis in Syria. This branch grew rapidly, surpassing the South Asian branch of the organization, and actively funneling fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China into Syria.
• Hundreds of Uyghurs, possibly over a thousand, have joined the Turkestan Islamic Party or other Al-Qaeda affiliates fighting in Syria. Smaller numbers of Uyghurs have also joined ISIS, which began to actively target and recruit Uyghur militants in June 2015.
• The Syrian branch of the Turkestan Islamic Party participated in major battles against regime forces in northwestern Syria, usually fighting alongside Al-Qaeda's Syrian branches, previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra. 
• There has been growing discontent between the Turkestan Islamic Party and Al-Qaeda in Syria since around 2016, with Al-Qaeda leadership blaming the poor conduct of TIP fighters for its massive losses in Aleppo province. Some members of the Turkestan Islamic Party have called for Uyghur jihadis to stay in Afghanistan, specifically because of disputes with Al-Qaeda in Syria.
• The loyalty of Uyghur militants in Syria has been questioned by other Al-Qaeda affiliates, who accuse the group of being unwilling to support Al-Qaeda in its struggle against ISIS. The group has added pro-ISIS groups, like Jund al-Aqsa, against pro-Al-Qaeda forces in the past, and more Uyghur militants are defecting to ISIS.
• Turkestan Islamic Party support networks in other countries, such as Turkey, are also increasingly disloyal to Al-Qaeda, willing to lend support to both Al-Qaeda and ISIS agents operating in their networks. 
• ISIS is an increasingly attractive option for Central Asian jihadis, as its Syrian and Iraqi branches have demonstrated a tremendous destructive capacity and an ability to create a viable Islamic caliphate, something that Turkestan Islamic Party members wish to do in Xinjiang. Frustrated young militants also support the reckless violence of ISIS attacks in European cities, compared to Al-Qaeda's more cautious approach.
• The  active attempt of Al-Qaeda to change the domestic opinion of its Syrian affiliate, which dominates much of the Idlib province, to incorporate elements of Syrian nationalism and moderate some of its positions may have alienated and angered the Turkestan Islamic Party, which supports the traditional internationalist and radical stance of Al-Qaeda. 
• Individual militants fighting for the Turkestan Islamic Party are also feeling increasingly isolated from the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, who have had difficult rebuilding old relationships with the Taliban, who do not wish to incur the anger of China, Pakistan, or the USA for supporting Al-Qaeda actions. Uyghur jihadis are increasingly disinterested in building an Islamic state in Afghanistan.
• It looks like the Turkestan Islamic Party is set to split like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan did circa 2015, with its older leadership staying loyal to alliances with Al-Qaeda, while younger leaders increasingly ally themselves to ISIS branches in Afghanistan and Syria.
• While the anxieties of the Taliban will likely limit the scope of any attacks against China from pro-Al-Qaeda cliques, pro-ISIS members of the Party may become increasing bold in their attacks in China and elsewhere.