Wegerich, Kai. "Water resources in Central Asia: regional stability or patchy make-up?". Central Asian Survey, vol.30, no.2 (2011): 275-290.

Wegerich, Kai. "Water resources in Central Asia: regional stability or patchy make-up?". Central Asian Survey, vol.30, no.2 (2011): 275-290.

• The four major rivers of Central Asia: the Syrdarya, Amudarya, Talas, and Zerafshan were all managed collectively under an all-union body during the Soviet Union, since the collapse of the USSR new water sharing agreements have had to come into existence (275).
• After the collapse of the Soviet Union, representatives from all five Central Asian republics met in Almaty -- the capital of Kazakhstan at that point -- in 1992, where they agreed to maintain the Soviet-era water management situation and created the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) to manage allocation according to this regime. Despite this, there is a major potential for conflict within the region as states ignore the agreements (275).
• The issues of water allocation that might appear in the post-Soviet sphere differ radically by basin and the bilateral relations between the republics affect how the water resources are distributed (275).
• The idea of preserving the exact water sharing agreements and distribution as under the Soviet Union is unfeasible as the funds which had been spent maintaining the hydroelectric and pump infrastructure are no longer available, meaning more water has to come along different paths (279).
• A list of all pumping and water transfer stations on all four Central Asian river basins in available on page 280.
• Following the collapse of the Soviet Union irrigated land in the Amudarya river basin has greatly increased in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan has increased as a new focus on food production requires more land. At the same time, water usage for all these countries has decreased slightly, as the new food crops require less water than cotton plants (279).
• Water usage figures for the Amudarya in the year 2002 are available on page 279.
• No country on the Amudarya trusts the other to properly implement the water sharing agreement, leading each country to take more than its share of water, which further reduces levels of trust and decreases the total amount of water received by downstream areas, like Qoraqolpoqiston (282).
• No riparian state wants to report violation of the 1992 water sharing agreements, however, as that might led to investigative action which would reveal its own violations (282).
• Many of the pumping stations on the Amudarya are different countries that those which they service, leading to poor usage, difficulties with maintenance, and a general inability to replace inefficient infrastructure (282).
• A particular issue of water rights on the Amudarya river basis relates to the construction of additional hydroelectric projects by Tajikistan. There is uncertainly whether Tajikistan would continue to obey the current water sharing agreements, and the construction is criticized by Uzbekistan (283).
• Part of contemporary water difficulties in the Kyrgyz Republic relates to the transition from state farms and collectivized farms to private farms, which generally use more water less efficiently. The Kyrgyz Republic has also seen a reduction in its ability to control water usage in its territory, leading to frequent violations of usage agreements with Uzbekistan (283).
• Confusion over the proper division of water resources from the Syrdarya is compounded by the fact that all water is collected in Kyrgyz dams before distribution. This means that each country is promised a section of the water from the dam, but there is no mechanism for checking distribution levels afterwards, leaving Kazakhstan continually w/o necessary water (284).
• The Talas river runs through Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic and is inefficiently managed (285).
• During the early 2000s, the conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the management of the Zerafshan river related to alleged pollution from Tajikistan, however recently issues of water quantity have become important as point of contention (285).
• In the past there has been mention of Iranian or Chinese investment in hydroelectric projects on Zerafshan river, however objection from Uzbekistan have chased away these and other potential investors (286).
• Although all five Central Asian republics agree in principle to the ICWC water sharing agreement signed in Almaty in 2002, they have attached additional agreements since then for the management of individual river basins (286). All water resources in the region are managed inefficiently and in a general atmosphere of distrust (287).