Subramaniam, Arjun. "Strategies to Tackle Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW): An Aerial Perspective". Strategic Analysis, Vol.34, No.5 (2010): 756-765.

Subramaniam, Arjun. "Strategies to Tackle Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW): An Aerial Perspective". Strategic Analysis, Vol.34, No.5 (2010): 756-765.

• Since the Industrial Revolution, warfare has gone through four generations: first generation was pre-industrial cavalry and infantry, second was massed firepower and 'human wave' tactics beginning in the Napoleonic War, third was maneuver warfare with a focus on combined arms and airpower beginning in the aftermath of the First World War, fourth is irregular and counter-insurgency warfare beginning mainly in the 1990s (756-757).
• The tools of convention, or third generation, warfare are built up around the world, yet most militaries are unprepared to face the threats posed by terrorism and insurgency in a situation of fourth generational warfare. The rise of fourth generation warfare challenges most conventional military assumptions, including the ability of airpower to win wars by targetting core infrastructure (756-757).
• Democracies, like the USA and India, are the most vulnerable to attacks under fourth generational warfare since they lacks the powerful tools of domestic repression possessed by dictatorships (757).
• Fourth generational conflicts are difficult to win because they combined military tactics with a broader strategy demanding political and economic actions. This is because fourth generational combatants will not present clear military targets nor make a clear distinction between politics and military action (757-758).
• In the four decades following the end of WWII, most countries combated insurgencies through the deployment of ground forces. Air power played a limited role in these conflicts, with the exceptions of the USA in Vietnam and Britain in Malaysia (758).
• The use of air power in counter-insurgency warfare really became prominent during the 1980s, championed by the Israelis. It has since become a staple of counter-insurgency tactics, including by the Soviets in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the Turks in their Kurdish territories, and US forces in Yugoslavia and Iraq (758).
• Air power has been critical to the success of counter-insurgency in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. The targeting of Tamil Tiger bases with airpower, combined with naval interdictions of the 'Sea Tigers', destroyed the organizational and logistical structure of the Tamil Tigers. Similarly, air strikes have proved an effective tactic against Al Qaeda leadership across the world (759).
• Air power has only been successful against insurgencies were combined with ground forces. When air power alone is used, it is usually unable to result in decisive victories over insurgents (759).
• India first deployed the air force in a counter-insurgency campaign in 1936, when biplanes were used in reconnaissance and offensives against tribesman in Waziristan. The next instance was the deployment of combat helicopters against the Mirzo National Front in 1966 (758-759). Not mentioned is the use of the Indian Air Force in the police action against Hyderabad in 1948, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties.
• Indian counter-insurgency is hobbled by the current graded response to security threats. First state police are used, then when the situation escalates, the paramilitaries of the Home Ministry are deployed. If the military is deployed, the security situation there is already severe. Debates within the Indian government make the process of using the military take even longer (760).
• The biggest issue facing Indian use of air power in counter-insurgency operations is the political risks of collateral damage (760). This approach leaves Indian vulnerable to attack, since it means that India suffers from vulnerability and a decline in morale from insurgency and that it lacks the political determination to use its best weapons, its air force, against insurgents. This lack of resolve has also caused India's international reputation to suffer (760-761).
• The author recommends that India deploy air assets in offensive operations against the Naxalites, particularly striking their leadership. This would disrupt the organization of the movement. Risks include alienating the local population and risking valuable air assets, but the author feels that unpopularity is acceptable and that additional security at airbases could minimize the threat to aircraft (761).
• Aircraft fulfill a number of roles in fourth generation warfare, including intelligence and reconnaissance, support roles, offensive combat roles, and joint operations support (761-763).
• As in conventional warfare, the primary role of airpower is often intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance work. This role is even more important in fourth generation warfare, as the enemy needs to constantly under surveillance or the threat of surveillance. Drones are especially important for this capability (762).
• Support roles using aircraft are important in counter-insurgency because they demonstrate the ability of the state to provide humanitarian relief (762).
• In India, these capacities are stretched thin because current air assets are used in support role along the Himalayan border with China and Pakistan and cannot be deployed to sufficient numbers to assist counter-insurgency efforts elsewhere (762).
• Offensive air power has been used very effectively in fourth generation warfare to demoralize and kill enemy leadership, but also results in relatively high levels of collateral damage and costs the support of local populations. This role is effective when paired with accurate and reliable intelligence (762-763).
• In all roles, it is essential that air power be paired with ground forces. This is even more important in the case of fourth generation warfare, when surveillance and intelligence operations are critical to being able to carry out any operations (763).
• In India, the air force is currently unable to undertake the range of activities that would be necessary to carry out major combined arms operations. The training of pilots is insufficient for the performance of duties before communication and evacuation under benign conditions. It would likely take years for the Indian Air Force to train Home Office paramilitary air forces in other types of operations (763).
• In order to effectively combat fourth generational threats to India, the government needs to dispell the notion that it is a soft target by rapidly and effectively defeating insurgencies through punitive military operations. This means prioritizing state security over government popularity. The general strategy of dealing with insurgencies must also change from attempting to accommodate and parlay with insurgents to having the first reaction being military force to terrorize the insurgent leadership, with diplomacy coming afterward (764).
• Having an air force capable to conducting an array of mission types is essential to combating fourth generational threats, since an effective air force will be able to both conduct humanitarian missions to win hearts and minds and conduct offensive operations against hostile insurgents (765).