Strachan, Hew. "The Lost Meaning of Strategy". Survival, Vol.47, No.3 (2005): 33-54.

Strachan, Hew. "The Lost Meaning of Strategy". Survival, Vol.47, No.3 (2005): 33-54.

• The author is nonplussed by the fact that people are using the word 'strategy' is ways different than Carl von Clausewitz would have used it. Maj. Gen. von Clausewitz only used the term to describe military orientation above the tactical level, but below the agenda-setting level of politics (34).
• The roots of the word 'strategy' stem from the Greek word 'strategos' [general]. The actual concept of strategy, however, did not develop until the late 18th Century, when armies produced a professionalized staff which planned and studied military conflicts above the tactical level (34-35).
• Strategy, as a separate level of military science from tactics, was first practiced during the Napoleonic Wars, resulting from theorizing by French military officers and the massive expansion of armies, requiring military staff to organize beyond the tactical level (35).
• General Antoine-Henri Jomini defined strategy as encompassing the entire field of military operations and the direction of resources towards military objective. He placed strategy as below only politics in importance, with politics determining war goals, and strategy determining how to accomplish those goals (36). 
• The concept of strategy become institutionalized in European military academies and general staffs as the middle layer between politics and tactics, but the dividing line between politics and strategy was frequently unclear. Prominent military leaders, like Helmuth von Moltke the Elder or Jean Colin, believed that politics determined the timing of war, but should not meddle in the conduct of warfare, which should be entirely under the control of the military. Demands that generals and strategy be constrained by politics become settled only during and after the First World War (36-37).
• This distinction between politics and strategy became more contested towards the end of the 19th Century, largely because prior to that point, political and military power were usually united in the authority of a monarchy. In these situations, there was no tension because the generals were also the politicians (37).
• Until the 20th Century, the concept of strategy -- as institutionalized in the curriculum at military academies and the responsibilities of military staffs -- excluded naval operations, which were discussed entirely separately from the army strategy. After this point, they started to unify into a single joint-force concept of strategy (37).
• Julian Corbett, a British naval officer, divided the conception of 'strategy' into 'major' and 'minor strategy'. Minor strategy consisted of operational planning, military objectives, and deployment of forces. Major strategy regards the posture of forces, identification of significant national interest, and the establishment of the general plans of the military in both wartime and peacetime (38).
• A contemporary of Mr. Corbett, American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, expanded the definition of strategy to encompass national interests, which were then designated of special importance for military protection. Cap. Mahan argued that military strategy is informed by national priorities, which in the case of America are the preservation of maritime trade upon which the economy depends. This conception is 'grand strategy', where all national resources and conditions are considered in plans for military conflict (38-39).
• The concept of grand strategy became deeply influential by the advent of the Second World War and influenced the behavior of the Allies, who coordinated their attacks at the highest level, refusing to reduce battles or theaters of war down to purely military objectives or considerations (40).
• The full adoption of grand strategy among the Allies, however, resulted in a conflation of politics and strategy, as politicians were willing to have politics be heavily informed by the military considerations of grand strategy (41).
• This was generally viewed as a positive development in the United States and the British Commonwealth, based on a liberal misreading of Maj. Gen. von Clausewitz which argues that politics will check military ambition. Maj. Gen. von Clausewitz's actual understanding of the relationship between politics and strategy actually argued that politics would set more ambitious war goals, and in doing so expand and intensify wars (41).
• An assumption was also made that any future wars would be total wars, necessitating the kind of grand strategy which was already being practiced. Therefore, continuing to embrace grand strategy made sense (43).
• The advent of nuclear weapons confirmed the commitment of all governments following 1945 to grand strategy, as any conflict would now affect the entirety of society, and therefore mandated the all-encompassing approach of grand strategy (43).
• This development blurred the distinction between strategy and foreign policy, as the foreign policies of major countries during the Cold War were primarily informed by grand strategy. The use of this strategy during peacetime also made the world lose some of its military connotation, as diplomatic or economic strategies now also existed (43-44).
• Strategy divided into two fields: the strategy of action, which was planning for war; and nuclear strategy, which was a form of grand strategy dedicated to avoiding conflict, including through military means (43).
• To reflect the incorporation of the concept of 'strategy' into the political domain, in the 1980s, the American and British militaries adopted the concept of the 'operational level of war', which existed between politics and tactics; what would have been 'strategy' a century previous (44).
• Significantly, the use of 'operational level' instead of 'strategy' reestablishes the division between politics and strategy which existed prior to the 1940s. Operations can now concerned with the military means of achieving goals set by politics, but do not inform political decisions (47).
• The nature of war has been changed in recent decades. The introduction of international law has caused states to be more reluctant about declaring war, instead engaging in undeclared conflicts to avoid direct violation of law. The type of enemies are now also mainly non-state actors. Warfare now often blurs with peacekeeping (48-49).
• The author believes that the failure of American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are partially caused by the disappearance of strategy, which left a gap between military operations and political war goals, resulting in situations where too few resources were allocated to complete objectives, an issue which would not manifest if strategy connected the military and political spheres (49).