Smith, Jeffrey A. "Counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan: an adapted FID strategy for policy consideration". Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

Smith, Jeffrey A. Counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan: an adapted FID strategy for policy consideration. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

• This master's thesis examines the contemporary US relationship with Uzbekistan and suggests improvement to that relationship away from democracy promotion towards state building on the basis of recommendation about foreign defense present in Joint Publication 3-07.1, to secure what the author considers to be vital American interests in Uzbekistan.
• Following submission, this document was distributed to the following persons and institutions:  
• Defense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
• Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California
• Professor Anna Simons Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA
• Dr. Jeffrey Starr Office of ASD-SO/LIC Arlington, VA
• Jennifer Duncan Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA
• LTC Jon Chicky CENTCOM MacDill AFB, FL
• Mr. Jim MacDougall Office of DASD-E
• The Central Asia region as a whole is important to a range of actors including the United States. The region sits at the axis of Iran, Russia, Pakistan, India, and China and is host to a number of petrochemical and mineral resources that the surrounding nations covet. Its central position also increases the dangers posed should the region become unstable, therefore the author believes that inculcating long-term stability in Central Asia, and especially Uzbekistan, is a compelling American interest (1).
• The author argues that the current and most prominent threat to stability in Uzbekistan is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU], which despite its size forces the government to take security measures as a priority. Unfortunately the government of Uzbekistan does not have the resources or expertise to run counter-insurgency [COIN] operations beyond those learned from the Soviet Union, which essentially amount to the creation of a police state (2).
• The highly securitized Soviet-style state that must exist for the government of Uzbekistan to effectively deal with the IMU limits the scope of reforms, both economic and political, which can occur. The inability of the government to balance security concerns with civil and political rights or economic reform without outside help leads to a situation of long-term instability despite the stability of the short-term situation (2-3).
• Although the IMU itself does not pose a direct threat to the government of Uzbekistan, nor does it have the capacity to exercise any considerable force inside the country, the threat it poses has effectively paralyzed the Uzbekistani government by mandating intense security and stability at the expense of reform. Promoting effective COIN is therefore the American government's best chance at rekindling necessary reforms in Uzbekistan (3-4).
• Contemporary American policy in Central Asia is ambiguously defined around promoting democracy, free markets, and human rights. While these goal are noble, they have not been defined in a Central Asian context, nor do they seek to promote fundamental American interests in the region (7).
• A source mine of the confusing mix of documents used to define national interests in the United States is available from page 8 to page 11.
• The author defines vital American interests in Central Asia, as in those whose failure would result in a serious challenge to the contemporary American way of life and essential institutions, as countering the threat posed by groups associated with Osama bin Laden. Following the 9/11 attacks the elimination of groups associated with Mr. bin Laden, including the IMU, is considered a vital American interest (11).
• The United States has a number of strategic interests in Central Asia, defined as those interests whose failure to complete may lead to a situation in which the vital interests of the United States are eventually under risk (12). These include:
• Maintaining influence in the region. Although this those represent an interest unto itself, Central Asia is at the epicenter of a number of important regional powers whose visions of the world are different than the US. It is important that the US retain a presence should any conflict situations arise (12).
• Regional security, defined as fostering positive peace, and preventing both interstate and intrastate conflicts (12). Any conflict situation has the potential to massively impact surrounding regions and draw in other state actors in ways detrimental to American interests. Instability would also reduce the ability to effectively protect vital interests (13).
• Controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], specifically preventing the further distribution of technology, relevant research, and expertise left over from the Soviet era. This poses a particular threat should terrorist groups possess such technology. This has only been downgraded to a vital interest because of the full cooperation of all Central Asian governments on this issue (13).
• The United State maintains a number of important interests in Central Asia, defined as those goals which will render significant benefits, but whose failure will not threaten vital interests (11), the most central of which are outlined below:
• Energy development, particularly of oil resources in the region. Central Asian energy reserves are significant and can lessen American energy dependence on the Middle East. While these reserves will eventually be developed, it would be beneficial if the terms of export and extraction were set up in a manner favorable to American consumption (14).
• Encouraging economic and political reform along the lines of free market liberal democracy (14). These reforms have been all but non-present in Central Asia, which faces the additional difficulties of successfully transitioning from a Soviet command economy to free market capitalism, a feat yet to be successfully completed (15).
• Environmental protection, particularly through preventing or reserving the degradation of the Aral Sea and implementing new water usage systems which will alleviate those issues. The presence of uncontrolled uranium dumps in Kyrgyz territory also carries unique environmental concerns (15).
• Combating illegal smuggling operations in Central Asia, particularly the exchange of illicit drugs and firearms. These smuggling networks cause crippling corruption in Central Asian governments and provide funding for terrorist groups, including those linked to Osama bin Laden (16). 
• Contemporary national security strategy in Central Asia is laid out on the basis of similar programs in the former Soviet Union, encouraging and assisting with the transition to stable free-market democracies. These goals were originally advanced under the 1992 Freedom Support Act, but these strategic aims have since been separated from those in Russia and Eastern Europe through the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, which prioritizes energy resource development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (17).
• The success of the current strategies, especially during the Bush Administration, is not currently foreseeable, especially because the vital interests of counter Osama bin Laden is so recent (18). However, the regime created by the contemporary Silk Road Act seems to prioritize democratic and economic reform in a way that undermines other US interests, including maintaining a presence in those countries (19).
• Securing American strategic interests in Central Asia relies on maintaining cordial and functional relationships with the independent republics, including Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. If human rights and democracy were prioritized in the manner recommended by the Silk Road Act or Human Rights Watch, then strategic interests would be at risk (19).
• Securing the success of free-market democracies is undoubtedly important, but it is not and will never be a vital American interest in Central Asia. Democracy and capitalist markets make it easier for the US to secure its interests, but since it may take generations for the proper conditions to develop, the US must also secure its interests in non-democratic states (19).
• Rather than promoting 'American values' in Central Asia at the expense of US strategic interests there, the United States should focus on identifying and solving the issues identified as most crucial by the Central Asian leadership. This cooperation will allow the US to better secure its interests in the region, and aid in improving security would take away a common excuse by Central Asian leaders to stall democratic reforms (20).
• There are a great number of countries with interests in Central Asia, the foremost among them being Russia, China, and Iran. Russia and China both demand stability in Central Asia, as conflict would potentially imperil their long and vulnerable borders. Both countries also wish to gain a stronger control over the new markets which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iran is primarily concerned with a militarization of Central Asia, as it views a strong military presence by Russia, China, the West, or terrorist groups as a threat to its national security (21).
• The primary security threats in Central Asia are posed by Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both governments allow Islamic extremist groups to operate within their borders, including the IMU, and actively supported the Islamic front of the United Tajik Opposition during the Tajik Civil War (21).
• Indian interests in Central Asia are primarily directed at countering any influence of Pakistan, or potentially gaining new regional allies to exert additional economic and military pressure on Islamabad (21).
• Turkey claims that its primary interests in Central Asia are rekindling old cultural and historic ties with the Turkic peoples there, but it seems much more interests in guaranteeing that Central Asian oil and gas reserves are directed through Turkey, particular the extensive gas reserves of Turkmenistan (21).
• The Gulf states are interested in Central Asia for economic and strategic reasons. They advocate and support the development of Central Asian economies as they would serve as the primary transit point to serve domestic demand. The monarchies of the Gulf also support Wahhabi groups in Central Asia and encourage the Islamization of the region's politics (22).
• Israel is developing strong ties with the Central Asian states to secure itself a portion of the potential market in the region, and check Iranian influence in the region. Having a good relationship with the Central Asian republics also makes Israel look like its cool and has some Muslim friends in the UN (22).
• Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the EU, and some European countries are all also developing ties with Central Asia, mainly for economic reasons. Of all the states mentioned above, only the US and the EU are interested in promoting democratic development in the region (22).
• Since independence, the Central Asian republics have all attempted to maintain relations with the US as a counterbalancing force to prevent losing autonomy to Russia or China. Contemporary American policy has essentially rebuffed these efforts by making democratic reforms a precondition for meaningful assistance (22).
• Uzbekistani ascension to the SCO, with the express goal to join an organization dedicated to preventing and countering the spread of extremism and terrorism, marks a potential end to the independence of many regional states. While the author predicts that Uzbekistan could retain autonomy, the pressure of instability is pushing other countries closer towards Russia or China (23).
• Contemporary American policy is preventing the US from being an effective security guarantor in the region, forcing states to align with Russia and China. The window of potential US influence in Central Asia is now closing, with the potential for US interests in the region being mediated by Russia or China in the future. Such a scenario would severely limit the ability of the US to secure its interests, promote democracy, or create stability (24).
• Fortunately, America still has influence in Central Asia and the ability to change its present engagement in positive ways. The presence of American NGOs, and valued assistance by USAID and the Department of Defense are critical factor of engagement, but the key sign is that the Central Asia republics still want American support (25).
• "The threat posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an insurgent movement with the stated goal of replacing the government of Uzbekistan, has significantly impacted the policies of the government. Even though the actual threat of the IMU may be small and its chances for success even smaller, it has effectively forced the government of Uzbekistan to fully enforce the only counterinsurgency strategy it knows: internal security - Soviet style. The effects of the internal security measures that have been adopted in turn affect the government’s ability to carry out other necessary reforms" (27).
• Uzbekistan has remained stable in the face of tremendous politic, economic, and environmental pressures affecting the country, but analysts continue to predict imminent state collapse because of regressive policies. Instead of looking at restrictions of civil liberties as the actions of an insecure dictator, we should look at this as an effect of current COIN practices in Uzbekistan (27).
• The roots of the IMU were in the initial Islamist resurgence following glasnost, manifesting first in December 1991, when Adolat Harakati, led by Tohkir Yuldashev, seized effective control of Namangan after the official clergy declared support for President Karimov. Mr. Yuldashev governed Namangan for several months alongside Juma Namangani, enforcing atypically strict Islamic law with the support of Saudi funding. Mr. Yuldashev and Mr. Namangani were forced to flee to Afghanistan by March 1992, when the Karimov administration criminalized Adolat Harakati and restored control in the city (28).
• Tohkir Yuldashev traveled extensively in the Muslim world after 1992, eventually staying in Afghanistan in 1996, where Islamic groups there and Pakistan were willing to help him establish the IMU. He maintains contacts with other known terrorists, including Osama bin Laden (28). Tohkir Yuldashev is the political leader of the IMU (29).
• Juma Namangani had served as a Soviet airborne soldier in Afghanistan for 3 years and seemed drawn to conflict. Mr. Namangani commanded Islamist forces during the Tajik Civil War before visiting Saudi Arabia for religious training and getting support from the Saudi intelligence community. He then returned to Afghanistan to fight in the civil war there and founded the IMU together with Mr. Yuldashev. Juma Namangani is the military leader of the IMU (28-29).
• The IMU is roughly estimated to have approximately 5,000 soldiers based in Afghanistan, with frequent access into Tajikistan. Many fighters are thought to be veterans of the Civil War in Tajikistan, although reports indicated that the group also includes Afghan war veterans, and Arab, Chechen, Uyghur, and Uzbek recruits (29).
• Support of the IMU appears to be available, at least potentially, among economically depressed, isolated, and devout youth. These conditions are especially prevalent in the Farg'ona Valley, but actually measures of support are difficult to verify due to the repressive atmosphere (30).
• The recent NATO invasion of Afghanistan has undoubtedly undermined the capabilities of the IMU, however the group is well funded and has relative freedom of movement into Tajikistan. The organization probably survived in Tajikistan or elsewhere, likely including 'sleeper cells' in Uzbekistan, and is rebuilding its capacity for action (30). 
• The IMU is large financed and equipped by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, with significant additional funds coming from friendly members of the United Tajik Opposition [UTO] in positions of power in Tajikistan. The group receives significant assistance from Osama bin Laden, possibly including two helicopters, and may also receive aid from Iran. The IMU also raises funds internally either by donations from Uzbekistan or profiting off of the drug trade (29).
• Despite great potential and four years of active operations, the IMU is a minor force without strong capabilities in Uzbekistan. Before the 1999 Toshkent Bombings -- which may be the IMU or a conspiracy -- the group was only responsible for small-scale attacks on government offices and employees (30). Since then, the IMU has been responsible for three clumsy and mismanaged kidnappings, however these cases appeared to be accidental rather than pre-planned incidents (31).
• The IMU did attack the government during 1999 and 2000. During the summer, the IMU takes advantage of thaws in the Pamir mountains to infiltrate the Farg'ona Valley, sending 70-100 men with small arms and mortars. It has taken the government several months to root out the militants every year, although conflict has remained constricted to border regions (31).
• The author utilizes the counter-state model of insurgencies, as described by Dr. Gordon McCormick, to explain the boons and deficiencies of the IMU as an organization (31-32). While the factors working against the IMU are obvious, it has some advantages in the competition for popular support which the government lacks:
• The military aspect of the IMU does not require surplus popular support to exist, this means that the IMU is competing for a much smaller portion of support than the government is. Whereas the Uzbekistani government requires the active participation and material support of the population to engage in state-building projects, the IMU only requires that people tolerate its existence. To people tired of the burdens of Uzbekistan's government, tolerating the activities of the IMU seems a beneficial way to get rid of the taxman (33).
• The government is also disadvantaged in that it has inflated the value of security in state legitimacy to such a degree that even minor attacks by the IMU challenge its base of popular support. Because the 'Tajik Scenario' is so omnipresent in peoples' minds, the government is forced to respond with overwhelming force. When this fails to solve the problem, the legitimacy of the Karimov regime is compromised (33).
• The dysfunctional relationship between Uzbekistan and the West is partially fueled by differences in the perception of the government's reaction to the IMU. The West constantly criticizes the government for overreacting, whereas domestically the government feels that it cannot do enough. If progress is to be achieved, the West must recognize and operate within the Uzbekistani perception (38).
• The contemporary situation of economic and social collapse, especially in rural areas and the Farg'ona Valley, leaves many opportunities for the IMU to exploit in weakening the government position. At this stage the IMU has an advantage because it does not control territory and does not need to propose a solution to economic and social issues, only mobilize anger at the current system (34).
• The primary response of the Uzbekistani government to threats of insurgency posed by the IMU has been mass arrests and increased internal security, a legacy of Soviet practices. Analysis indicates that these tactics make the state look vulnerable and insecure, although there is no evidence to suggest that this has resulted in radicalization (34). The author suggests 6 alternative strategies:
• [Option A] The 'hearts and minds' approach, by which the government would democratize and become more responsive to the needs of the population. While the hearts and minds approach is the ultimate long-term goal, in the short-term it will not solve the issues and may even provide additional room for the IMU to operate in Uzbekistan (35).
• [Option B] Massive operations in intelligence gathering which cripple the ability of the insurgent group to establish effective connections with the population. The government is currently pursuing this path, although its ability to do so without massive police intrusion is compromised by lack of high-tech equipment (36).
• [Option C] Targeting the IMU with direct military force. While the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan are well trained, the IMU does not have identifiable 'regular' forces in Uzbekistan, making such confrontation impossible (36).
• [Option D] Interdicting and stopping the flow of foreign aid to the insurgent group. This is not very practical in the case of the IMU, as most foreign support to the group is from Afghanistan, which Uzbekistan cannot pressure save for invasion. Pressure can be applied to Tajikistan or the Kyrgyz Republic, but the issue there is still less about foreign support than the limited capabilities of foreign security forces (36).
• [Option E] Building ties resulting in military assistance from foreign countries. Uzbekistani options in implementing this plan are limited, as the other Central Asian republics are too weak to help and potential security guarantors like Russia would demand a Soviet-style situation of limited sovereignty. Any aid from the US is severely restricted by current American foreign policy, making any assistance unlikely unless Uzbekistan is willing to compromise (36-37).
• [Option F] "Infiltrating the IMU organization or collecting a large amount of the right type of intelligence necessary to effect counter-organizational targeting. While the government of Uzbekistan may be pursuing this option, the results of this option are always uncertain and cannot serve as the basis for a counterinsurgency strategy" (37).
• It should be of no surprise that Uzbekistan is currently countering the IMU insurgency with a campaign of aggressive and invasive internal security measures and police action, as Option B is currently the only feasible option from the Uzbekistani government to definitively weaken the IMU (37).
• The threat of the IMU, and the limited security policy options which Uzbekistan must implement to combat the insurgency, negatively effects the ability of the Uzbekistani government to institute democratic reforms. The tense security situation means that Uzbekistan is likely to restrict civil liberties, and delay economic reforms (38).
• The central thrust of the master's thesis is that the issue is not a choice between democratic reform and security assistance, instead security assistance to the closed-market dictatorship of Uzbekistan is a necessary precondition for any attempt at democratic or capitalist reform (39).
• The US State Department is responsible for the largest portion of funding authorized under the US Congressional Budget, with funds distributed under the Freedom Support Act -- normally distributed to support USAID operations in Uzbekistan, but also utilized on other humanitarian projects -- accounting for the majority of the assistance (41).
• The USAID consumes the bulk of American funds send to Uzbekistan under the aegis of the Freedom Support Act, with those responsibilities sub-divided into five categories:
• Improving the business environment for small and medium enterprises by providing technical and financial assistance to business universities, offer education and training to entrepreneurs, and provide financial advice and technical support to small businesses (44).
• Improve management of critical natural resources by assisting low-level managers in natural resource projects to implement conservative technologies and practices (44).
• Strengthening democratic culture by providing training and technical assistance to civil society organizations, independent media and press associations, and professional associations for lawyers and judges (44).
• Increasing utilization of primary health care by retraining health care professionals as general practitioners, and upgrading laboratory and clinic capabilities. They also provide technical assistance on public health campaigns to increase knowledge of personal responsibilities (45).
• 'Cost-cutting' activities, defined as an internal regulatory responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of USAID funds and suggest improvements (45).
• Also under the jurisdiction of the State Department is Foreign Military Financing, funds for enhancing the interoperability of foreign forces in search-and-rescue, peacekeeping, and emergency assistance, as well as covering bursaries for participation in Partnership for Peace [PfP] initiatives (42).
• As of 2002, most funds allocated to Foreign Military Financing will be used for the purchase of modern communications equipment for the Armed Forces (45).
• The State Department also distributes: International Military Education and Training [IMET] funds, which finances officer exchanges between Uzbekistani and American military colleges; Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs [NADR], covering non-military security concerns and border security improvements; Peace Corps funds; and Emergency Response Funds, a massive influx of cash for security following the 9/11 attacks (42).
• As of 2002, IMET funds will be directed towards funding English-language training of selected officers, and funding attendance by officers, soldiers, and police of a number of American courses in modern military and police practice and management (45).
• As of 2002, NADR funds were spend almost entirely on improving export and border control systems and technologies, including the training of officials (45).
• The Peace Corps is divided into three areas of responsibility: English language training and development of marketable resources, training in Western business management practices, and provision of health and funding assistance to rural clinics (46).
• Following the 9/11 attacks, the influx of cash into Uzbekistan has come along with new responsibilities and expectations of US-Uzbekistan relations. It is meant to not only increase security and military cooperation, but represents an agreement to jointly work towards democratic and capitalist reform (48).
• The current distribution of funds is dedicated towards the declared goals in Uzbekistan of the Clinton administration, reflecting a preeminent desire for human rights and the development of civil society. Although recent years have seen an increase in funding for security measures, US policy is still directed towards human rights with continued funding conditional on democratic reform (43).
• The Department of Defense is the next most important contributor of funds to American involvement in Uzbekistan, and serves as the most important point of direct intergovernmental contact. However, unlike funding by the State Department, most specific uses of funding under the Department of Defense are classified, and thus it is difficult to construct a full picture of American engagement with the government of Uzbekistan (46).
• The one exception to this general classification of funding prerogatives is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, underneath the title Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction. An unknown amount of funds each year are dedicated towards dismantling WMDs and associated technologies in Uzbekistan (46).
• The remainder of American military cooperation with Uzbekistan takes place under the auspices of the Commander of US Central Command [USCENTCOM], which facilitates participation in the PfP program through joint training of peacekeeping forces, as well as combined training of American and Uzbekistani special forces (47).
• The US also maintains a partnership between the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan and the Louisiana National Guard, which has providing engagement in both military and civil fields and is considered dearly important by Uzbekistan (47).
• Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, notes that, "There is a lot of talk about how because we have new military relationships with several of these governments [Uzbekistan is one] that somehow we’re giving a bye to human rights and democracy. In fact, the opposite is the case, and we are finding it easier. Because we have so much more contact, we have an easier time of discussing each of these issues with the governments of the region, particularly Uzbekistan" (48).
• Contemporary assistance agreements between America and Uzbekistan are important, but fail to properly bridge mixed perceptions about aid between the two governments. Whereas America believes that its policy represents complete commitment to supporting reform, from the Uzbekistani perspective the contingent nature of aid implies that the US is not prepared to assist in the difficult process of gradual reform (49).
• Although all contemporary American programs in Uzbekistan fulfill some noble purpose where the Uzbekistani state lacks capacity, only the Department of Defense program aided at destroying WMD capabilities is constructed to secure America's vital interests. All in all, the contemporary assistance regime to Uzbekistan does not adequately work to secure American national interests in Central Asia (49).
• Despite this present disparity between national interests and national policy, the author asserts that most contemporary US assistance programs can be retooled to fit within a counter-insurgency policy. However, this would require the will and planning to do so; currently many State Department program, especially those dealing with civil society, may actually be eroding government-population trust and thus working against America's actual interests in the region (50).
• COIN action as recommended by contemporary US planning is implemented through a policy of Internal Defense and Development [IDAD], a set of policy actions aided by the US which attempt to mitigate problems of insurgency and lawlessness.
• This is accomplished through the implementation of 4 interdependent functions (52):
• Balanced Development; the creation of social and economic policies which equally benefit all societal groups, thereby denying insurgent movements any significant social strata with legitimate grievances against the state. This functions falls within COIN Option A (52).
• Security; protecting both the security of the population from violence and protecting government resources and facilities from the counter-state. This strategy is characteristic of Option B (52).
• Neutralization; A range of actions that minimize the threat posed by the insurgent group. This includes efforts to discredit insurgent leaders to full scale military and police action (52). It is critical that all actions respect human rights and the legal institutions of the country, so that the government maintains the moral high ground. This type of action is characteristic of Option B, C, and D (53).
• Mobilization; Maximizing the manpower and materiel support available from as wide a section of the population as possible, as to better support other IDAD programs. This action is characteristic of Option A and B (53).
• In performing each of the 4 functions which make up IDAD, success is contingent on the government's ability and willingness to act according to IDAD's 4 principles:
• Unity of Effort; ensuring synchronized action between all departments of government in the performance of the four functions of IDAD, implying organizational design, coordinated action, and central control (53).
• Maximum Use of Intelligence; All operations must be based in timely and accurate intelligence about the insurgency, regardless of the nature of the COIN action. Similarly, attention must be paid to counter-intelligence, so that the insurgency does not have a similar advantage (54).
• Minimum Use of Violence; Discrete and minimal uses of direct force in COIN actions, specifically preventing excessive violence, which will degrade the legitimacy of the government in the long-term (54).
• Responsive Government; Consistently demonstrate responsibility to the needs of citizens and competence in all areas of administration, which will greatly increase the level of support which the government can expect to receive from the governed populace (54).
• The author recommends an organizational structure for the execution of IDAD, outlined on page 55, which prioritizes centralized planning and decentralized execution. The plan would be coordinated by the Chief Executive -- the President of the Republic -- who would have his office direct resources and set objectives. Civilian and military objectives should then be executed by regional or local offices with large areas of discretion (54-56).
• Fortunately the US government has produced documents outlining proper coordination of assistance to developing countries facing security issues, known as Foreign Internal Defense [FID]. The author uses the expanse and multi-agency definition of FID outlined in Joint Publication 3-07.1 as opposed to the limited definition in Joint Publication 1-02 (51). It corresponds to all efforts which attempt to increase the capacity of a country to improve its implementation of IDAD (56).
• The US must utilize its diplomatic connections with the IDAD country in order to assist and enable the political processes which will make the government more democratic and responsive to popular needs. This is necessary to demonstrate what actions the US will and will not support (57).
• Poor economic conditions create an environmental friendly to insurgency, so a proper American response must use the US's tremendous economic power to alleviate financial issues either through poverty reduction programs or direct financial assistance to the IDAD government (57).
• Aiding the IDAD government in winning the informational war between themselves and the insurgency. This can be accomplished through technical assistance to IDAD country media, or by the US taking active steps to inform the public of governmental benefits and counter insurgent propaganda (58).
• Military support the IDAD government is tremendously positive for the implementation of FID, as the presence of US troops will result in the professionalization of domestic Armed Forces. Any commitment of US forces will also demonstrate massive commitment and engender the trust of both the population and the government (58).
• The tools and methods of assistance given by the US are virtually unlimited. The author suggests that military-civil action -- US troops assisting domestic military forces in construction and development projects -- would be a good method in all situations, as it assists in all areas of the IDAD program (58-59).
• Any FID mission will require different levels of assistance, different capabilities. A small mission of purely indirect support may only require the US infrastructure currently in the country. An FID effort should usually be led by the State Department, with the Ambassador heading any FID activities (60). All assistance needs to be provided via integrated agencies coordinating and responding to the needs of the host nation (61-62).
• The current country team of American officials in Uzbekistan is understaffed and in no way capable of handling the implementation of a new FID program, as it can barely cope with its present responsibilities. Any FID program would require additional manpower and office space in addition to increase assistance funds (67).
• The author strongly recommends the application of the FID framework to the situation in Uzbekistan, lauding the benefits which can come with the coordination and efficient use of resources provided by combining all assistance programs into a single agency in coordination with Uzbekistani efforts (63).
• A transition to FID as the driving force in American policy towards Uzbekistan would involve a fundamental shift in American policy, from making assistance contingent upon unilateral democratic and capitalist reforms to becoming an active partner in the reform process. This would undoubtedly result in significant criticism by human rights groups (66).
• Another significant hurdle to the effective implementation of an FID framework would be establishing the connections required for coordination between American FID and Uzbekistani IDAD. Currently the US has almost no government-to-government contact with Uzbekistan (67).
• The US should try to address this issue by establishing those government-to-government connections, but in the short-term there are other methods. Because President Karimov is such a major part of the Uzbekistani political system, the opinions he expresses in works such as "Uzbekistan on the Threshold of 21st Century" are insights into Uzbekistan's IDAD goals and priorities. The American FID program can use these documents as a surrogate for actual IDAD coordination until government trust is secured (68).
• "It is essential that each member of the management organization understand the concept and goals of FID, along with how and where their expertise applies. The FID organization should be made completely aware of the interests the U.S. has in Uzbekistan in addition to how the tools available – in the framework of the elements of national power – can be applied to counter insurgent threats, while at the same time strengthening the legitimacy of the government of Uzbekistan. In coordination with the Uzbekistani IDAD organization, the FID organization should identify target areas and apply resources to achieve clearly defined results, integrating as many of the elements of national power as possible in order to take advantage of their cumulative synergistic effects" (69).
• The success of the FID program in Uzbekistan should not be measured by the success of the government vis-a-vis the insurgents, but rather by the pace of reform occurring in the country, since that is the ultimate goal. Key to the process is that the US should never force reform in one sector, as it will be more valuable for the US to act as a trusted partner and focus first on areas of Uzbekistani priority -- AKA, not human rights or democracy (69).
• Contemporary assistance programs should not need to change fundamentally following the adoption of a FID framework, as they are "doing good work". Rather, the big shift will be towards the integration of these activities within a single organization so that they are refocused towards FID goals (70).
• Diplomatically, the US needs to clearly signal its commitment to the government of Uzbekistan. This would involve increased government-to-government contact, preferably facilitated by the transition of the State Department's 'outside-in' approach to reform to a more holistic model of assistance in improving governmental capacities (70).
• "The overriding principle to bear in mind when exercising the diplomatic element of national power in Uzbekistan is that our goal is not to replicate our system. Our goal should be to create the environment in which the Uzbekistani people have the ability to make educated and informed decisions regarding their government and their future. The milieu of Uzbekistan is completely different than our own. Because of this, it is predictable that their concept of democracy, given the chance to freely develop, will differ from ours. The diplomatic element of national power should not focus on importing specific democratic institutions but should help create conditions under which these can develop organically" (71).
• Economic support is an important part of any COIN strategy, meaning that the US must first begin providing direct assistance not contingent on reform, targeting specific areas in which the government requires outside assistance (71). The success and popularity of contemporary USAID initiatives also indicates that more funding could be directed to this kind of assistance, which would be reorganized and prioritized within the FID framework (71-72).
• The US already has some information capabilities in Uzbekistan in the form of USAID and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, but the effectiveness of these programs could be massively improved by the coordination of information campaigns with assistance efforts; this is especially achievable through a 'town hall model' whereby citizens ask questions to officials, who can then quickly address these programs, with the whole process being documented by the media to demonstrate the responsiveness of the Uzbekistani government (72).
• While the US has no need to have its Armed Forces utilize military force in support of the government of Uzbekistan, military engagement could provide other benefits. In particular, the presence of US special forces -- a particular weak point of Uzbekistan's Armed Forces in COIN -- could instill positive values in soldiers, improve the capability of domestic special opts forces, and lay the groundwork for broader military cooperation (73).
• The author suggests the possibility that, considering the plurality of geopolitical interests in Uzbekistan, American FID could be implemented in concert with other interested countries. This could be beneficial to reducing tension, however the author stresses that America cannot become organizational dependent on other countries, as the US still has non-mutual vital interests to secure in the region (74-75).
• "To avoid any and all of these scenarios requires the U.S. to adjust the policy of making meaningful assistance to Uzbekistan contingent upon rapid, measurable reform in democracy, economics, and human rights. U.S. interests will be much better served by a policy that fully embraces Uzbekistan, and provides consistent – not contingent – assistance towards attaining these goals. In becoming a dependable partner, the U.S. will gain influence over Uzbekistan’s development in a manner that is congruent with U.S. interests and principles" (78).