Simón, Luis, and Stephan Klose. "European Perspectives towards the Rise of Asia: Contextualising the Debate". Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2015): 239-260.

Simón, Luis, and Stephan Klose. "European Perspectives towards the Rise of Asia: Contextualising the Debate". Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2015): 239-260.

• The Asia-Pacific has emerged from the 2008 financial crisis as the engine of global economic growth, as well as Europe's largest trading partner and the world's largest world of foreign currency reserves. This economic predominance, as well as the entry of Asian-Pacific countries into the Middle East and Africa, has made Asian-Pacific stability increasingly important for European security (239-240).
• The academic literature has typically discussed the policy of European countries and that of the EU interchangeably. However, European countries have used the EU to advance some of their foreign policy goals, while handling other issues on a bilateral basis. This distinction should be recognized (240).
• All European countries have a primarily economic and diplomatic role in the Asia-Pacific, contrasting with America's military role there. Accordingly, European states try to avoid conflict and do not take stances on territorial disputes. They also tend to reject the notion that China's rise is disruptive to the regional or global security order (240, 257).
• Britain differs from this trend by having more military and security ties with Asian Pacific democracies and US allies in the region. It still tries to emphasize economic ties over these security relations, however (241).
• Germany fits this European mold exactly, totally eschewing security relations and focusing solely on cultivating economic and diplomatic ties in the Asia-Pacific. Economic relations are a particularly big factor considering the robust investment of Germany in the region (241).
• France tries to balance a diplomatic and multilateral focus in its foreign policy with maintaining security relations with US allies like Japan and Australia, and engaging in military cooperation and dialogue with China (241).
• Contemporary discussions of Asian security center around the rise of China, whose increased economic, military, and political power shape regional dynamics (241). This has been most prominent in American strategic thought, prompting a rebalance to the Asia Pacific and an enhanced American presence, although similar anxieties are seen in Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam (242).
• Most of China's neighbors with whom it does not have territorial disputes are trying to remain neutral in these conflicts, while also remaining out of the competition between the USA and China. While most of these states welcome an enhanced American presence and may fear China, they still like having strong economic ties to China and do not wish to jeopardize these (242).
• Europe is pulled between trying to avoid confrontation with China, and lacking any security capacity in Asia, and its obligations to the USA, which are manifested in things like the EU arms embargo on China. The European role in the Asia Pacific is thus balanced between its economic and diplomatic interests in China and its relations with the United States (242-243).
• British foreign policy and security policy are manifested in a commitment to uphold its core values anywhere in the world, including through military force, and its attempt to maintain a special relationship with the USA. In the Asia Pacific, the UK has followed the American example of shifting resources and taken steps to increase the Royal Navy's operational capacity in the Indian Ocean (244).
• Britain maintains a number of military relationships in Asia, including the Manila Treaty, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand, and the USA; the Five Powers Defence Arrangements including the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, dedicating it to protect the Malay Peninsula; and its obligation as part of the UN Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea, dedicated to upholding the ceasefire there (244).
• Under Prime Minister David Cameron, there was an initiative to increase Britain's strategic relationship with Japan, resulting in the signing of treaties opening up cooperation in intelligence sharing, military training, and armaments research, which Japan has previously only had with the USA. Britain has tried to downplay the importance of this agreement to avoid antagonizing China (245-246).
• Britain is also involved in a number of multilateral security projects in the Asia Pacific, including a regional body to prevent and counter piracy in Southeast Asia, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asian-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, and the USPACOM Chiefs of Defense Conference (245).
• As far as military infrastructure, Britain maintains a number of facilities in the Indian Ocean, primarily Diego Garcia, as well as active dockyards in Singapore and a 900-man garrison in Brunei. Britain also maintains access to port facilities in many Asian countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand (245).
• Britain has not taken a firm stance on Chinese maritime disputes, maintaining good relations with China while angling to become China's chief trading partner in Europe. This has included being the first European country to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, against American warnings, in 2015 (246).
• France prides itself on an ability to project power globally and is interested in Asia, but also consciously limits its sphere of influence to the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. France's security commitments in the Asia Pacific stem from a belief that it should, as a UNSC member, be involved, its treaty commitments in Korea and in the Manila Treaty, and its own territories in the Pacific (246-247).
• France conceives of Asian security as critical to global security and economic health, and thus as a priority for France and Europe. France plays particular importance on the Indian Ocean as a corridor between Europe and Asia, and maintains military outposts in its island position in the Indian Ocean as well as in Djibouti and the UAE. These are bolstered by defensive forces in its Pacific territories (247).
• France identifies territorial disputes from the Cold War as the primary driver of instability and conflict in the Asia Pacific, although it avoids taking any stance on these conflicts other than asserting that they should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law (247-248).
• France is interested in maintaining a multilateral world order in which France plays a part in Asian Pacific affairs and security. To this end, it actively opposes the establishment of a G2 between the USA and China. France has thus been increasing its own presence in Asia, although more in a diplomatic than a military capacity (248).
• Part of this multilateral initiative has been dialogue and cooperation with China, which the French government does not consider expansionist. France cooperates with China on security issues and is one of the largest exporters of dual-use technology to China (248).
• France has also, since 2014, strengthened its security cooperation with Japan. France has tried to emphasize that this move was not aimed at China, however, and has steered cooperation away from more contentious security issues (248-249).
• Germany and China have extremely strong economic ties, with China being Germany's second most important export market after the USA, that have nurtured strong political ties, including annual joint cabinet meetings (249).
• Germany has avoided any major security commitments in the Asia Pacific, limiting its engagement to cybersecurity or piracy. What security cooperation exists has been German efforts to recruit East Asian countries to help mediate conflicts in Europe and its periphery (249-250).
• When it does engage in security cooperation, Germany prefers a multilateral setting and has been a major player in supporting ASEAN-based security projects, as well as security dialogues, like the Shangri-La Dialogue. It also maintains security discussions with China and Japan at a ministerial level (250).
• German relations with China are strong, but impeded by its participation in an EU-wide arms embargo on China. This remains a stumbling block to further cooperation (250).
• Japan complains that German security cooperation is much less robust than French or British cooperation and that this represents a harmful trend in German foreign policy favoring China at the expense of Japan, thus limiting the potential of Japanese-German cooperation (250).
• The EU is a marginal actor in the Asia Pacific and is excluded from all of the big international conferences and major international organizations. The EU does have interest in Asia as the engine of the global economy and seeks to protect this growth from security threats, but has little capacity to do so (251).
• The EU limits itself as an international actor by explicitly focusing on Europe and its neighbors. This is further limited by the lack of a coherent stance on issues such as maritime territorial disputes, the arms embargo on China, or the AIIB (251).
• South Korea enjoys the greatest level of cooperation with the EU, having signed a Framework Participation Agreement establishing security ties between the countries. Japan has also sought to increase security cooperation with the EU, although it has not gone this far. Security cooperation with China has been limited to joint involvement in anti-piracy operations (252).
• The EU views ASEAN as its main partner in the Asia Pacific, seeing similarities in their outlook and structure. In 2015, the EU took steps to increase this cooperation, send an official ambassador, and sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It sees ASEAN as promoting regional integration in the Asia Pacific, which the EU believes is the way forward for the region (253).
• The EU's understanding of East Asia is primarily economic and reflects German views of the region, not those of Britain. It primarily follows the same cautious and multilateral policy line as Germany, and to a lesser extent France (256-257).
• Despite sharing many policy interesting with the EU, Germany actually prefers to engage with East Asian countries on a bilateral basis (258).
• Based on the limited survey undertaken here, the authors conclude that European states with a greater focus on economic and diplomatic foreign policy will seek more multilateral cooperation with a greater number of actors, whereas those with more emphasis on security will maintain cooperation with allies (254-255).