Sagan, Scott Douglas. "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability". International Security, Vol.11, No.2 (1986): 151-175.

Sagan, Scott Douglas. "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability". International Security, Vol.11, No.2 (1986): 151-175.

• There are a number of important similarities between Europe in 1914 and the world in the 1980s, namely in that everyone is prepared to risk the beginning of a war that no one actually wants. In both situations, the advantages of launching a first strike were regarded as critical, so once it seemed likely that war would occur, all sides had an incentive to attack first (151).
• European war plans in 1914 all focused on massive and rapid offenses, whose implementation did not allow time for diplomatic solutions to be found. Germany launched an attack through Belgium and Luxembourg, France attacked into Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russians attacked Germany and Austria-Hungary simultaneously (152).
• The pressure of these military plans had a clear effect on political decisions made in July 1914, as politicians were pressured to order offensives as soon as attack by another power seemed credible, as they were convinced that victory was far less likely should they lose the initiative (152).
• The fact that all major European power adopted offensive military doctrines and strategies despite clear demonstrations of the supremacy of defense in the American Civil War and Russo-Japanese War has puzzled generations of historians. The most common explanations have been that Europeans ignored these innovations -- unlikely considering the presence of European observers at most battles -- or that the organizational interests of the military favored offense over defense, which the author believes fails to account for the political rationale for offensive doctrine (152-154).
• The organizational interests of large militaries favor offense over defense because such strategies enhance the size and funding of militaries, they allow for more autonomous military decision-making, they enhance military prestige, they allow for more in-depth military planning by giving the attack the initiative, and most military officers favor necessarily-offensive decisive battles to end wars (155-156).
• The author summarizes the reasons for offensive military plans as given in Jack Snyder's 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984' from page 156 to page 158.
• International Relations theory predicts that security dilemmas can result in conflict between even two states that want to preserve the status quo, because both are afraid of the other's potential for aggression. The security dilemma can take place under condition either where the offensive or defensive nature of weapons cannot be determined, or where offense has an advantage over defense, thereby making preventative wars rational (154-155).
• Early work on the security dilemma emphasized being able to distinguish between offensive and defensive weaponry and imposing limitations on offensive weapons. However, new work on the 'cult of the offensive' during WWI has raised the issue that sometimes offensive doctrine can provoke aggressive and preemptive wars even when technological conditions favor defense (155).
• The 'cult of the offensive' explanation for the start of WWI is inadequate because it overemphasizes the likelihood that offensive attacks would fail (159), the idea of defensive technology being dominant is fraught with definitional issues (161), and this narrative ignores the political decisions that led to these offensive military plans being drafted (162).
• Although the French Plan XVII was likely to fail, the Schlieffen plan had a lot going for it and came very close to succeeding in 1914. The Schlieffen plan offensive was very successful and came close to capturing Paris in September 1914, mainly failing because General Helmuth Johannes von Moltke decided to pull forces back to defense Elsass-Lothringen. Moreover, this plan was specifically designed with French fortifications in mind and intended to avoid a deadly offensive through French lines (159-161)
• Eras and not entirely offense or defense dominant, but instead there is a gradient of what force ratio is necessary to achieve victory in a particular battle. Military technology certainly made defense easier in WWI, but not so much better as to make positions unattackable. Offensive strategies made sense over defense in a number of cases, especially in the case of France and Britain, as failing to attack would have left Russian forces to get pummeled by Germany (161-162).
• Offensive war plans were politically valuable to states interested in territorial expansion and to states that needed to protect exposed allies. In conditions were allies are exposed to attack, states need to attack even if their primary goals are defensive. The European alliance system thus necessitated offensive military doctrine and planning (162-166).
• The need for offense to defend allies meant that Russia needed to attack Austria-Hungary to defend Serbia, France needed to attack Germany to defend Russia, and Germany needed to attack Russia to defend Austria-Hungary (163).
• The adoption of defensive military doctrines by the European powers in 1914 would have likely prevented escalation by greatly reducing the incentives for preemptive war, but they would also have undermined the system of strategic deterrence that supported their allies (166, 171).
• The consequences of the failure of strategic deterrence can be seen in Europe in 1938 and 1939, when France's adoption of a defensive strategy undermined its capabilities to protect and defend its allies in Eastern Europe from Nazi aggression, ultimately leading to a decline in its own security situation (166).
• The offensive war plans developed by Germany in the buildup to WWI were not the result of a generally offensive military doctrine, but a response to specific strategic vulnerabilities in the military position of Belgium and the Triple Entente (166-167).
• The fact that Russia could not rapidly mobilize its armed forces led to German conclusions that it might be possible to knock France out of the war before Russia was able to pose a credible threat to Germany and Austria-Hungary. This is why Germany focused on offensives into Belgium and France instead of defending against Russian attacks (167).
• Belgium had not fortified its strategic railway junction at Liege, meaning that it could, theoretically, be captured intact by German forces and used to stage a rail-based offensive into France. The existence of this railhead made a rapid advance into France feasible (167).
• There was uncertainty about Britain's willing to aid France in a continental war. Throughout July 1914, Germany received contradictory intelligence reports about the willingness of Britain to intervene in a European war. This allowed German politicians to believe they were starting a continental war without starting a world war (167-168).
• Some have argued that considering British obligation to uphold Belgian neutrality and Britain's defense of France in two previous crises, Germany didn't predict British entry into WWI only because of wishful thinking and denial (169).
• The author finds this view unconvincing because not only Germany, but also France and Russia were uncertain about British neutrality and whether it would enter a continental war (169-170).
• Although Germany's political leadership blithely assumed British neutrality, the German military always planned for British entry into the war. This consideration factored into military planning, as Germany sped by its mobilization and attack schedules in an attempt to minimize the impact that British forces could have on bolstering French lines (170-171).
• The lack of certainty over Britain's neutrality, the exposure of the Liege railhead, and the slowness of Russian mobilization all conditions and affected Germany offensive planning, and ultimately allowed the war to begin. Once begun, however, the offensive nature of these plans meant that politicians and diplomats were unable to draw back from the edge in response to changes in prior assumptions, such as Britain's clear stance on war on 30 July or Belgium's fortification of Liege (168-169).
• The 'cult of the offensive' theory of explaining WWI has been used to argue that offensive war doctrines are dangerous and destabilizing, then apply this lesson to contemporary [1980s] nuclear strategy to argue for the maintenance of mutually assured destruction [MAD] and against counter-force strategies (172-173).
• The example of WWI, as outlined here, actually has several major arguments in favor of adopting a counter-force nuclear doctrine. It demonstrates the importance of offensive in securing allies, so an offensive counter-force doctrine would improve nuclear deterrence by making NATO's 'first strike' policy more credible (173, 175).
• Moreover, having counter-force capabilities is preferable to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence because it would allow for limited nuclear strikes against military targets in case deterrence failed a war did break out, allowing for a rapid termination of the nuclear conflict. Having a counter-force doctrine would make American responses in both this scenario and nuclear escalation more credible (174).
• The rapid and aggressive German military planning of 1914 was the result of specific historical circumstances that made such attacks feasible and opportune. Other offensive military doctrines, like a counter-force nuclear posture, would not necessarily create similar instability. Instead, they could make the US nuclear deterrent more credible while also making possible a successful victory in nuclear conflict short of strategic warfare (174).