Pidgen, Charles. "Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?". In A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120-132. Malden, Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

Pidgen, Charles. "Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?". In A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120-132. Malden, Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

• The common wisdom about conspiracy theorists is that they are epistemically vicious, believing in crazy or stupid theories even though they ought to know better than to buy into these theories. An assumption is made that conspiracy theorists are committing a form of epistemic or intellectual vice by believing their theories (120-121).
• Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule are not as critical about the character of conspiracy theorists as some other scholars, but instead claim that a 'crippled epistemology' resulting from very few sources of information is preventing conspiracy theorists from coming to correct assumptions. It this view, it is the conditions of the conspiracy theorist rather than their character which makes they susceptible to certain types of thought (121).
• Belief in conspiracy theories can be epistemically vicious, as can disbelief. For example, belief in anti-semitic conspiracies is almost always viciously based on personal hatreds rather than evidence, whereas rejection of the conspiracy theory that Stalin killed millions of innocents during the Great Purge is likely based on an equally vicious rejection of evidence (121-122).
• There is nothing inherently unlikely about conspiracy theories in general, nor is there anything inherently unlikely about Western governments engaging in conspiratorial behavior. Moreover, it is actually epistemically vicious to not believe some conspiracy theories because such questioning of authority is necessary in a democratic society (123-124).
• Epistemic virtue is behavior which identifies truth and rejects falsehood in a way that is commendable by society. The opposite of this is epistemic vice, behavior demonstrating an individual's inability to properly sort between truth and falsehood with negative societal consequences (124-125).
• What personality traits are vices or virtues is situational and depends on the nature of the society and the job of the individual. For example, different epistemic traits are valued in a detective versus a judge (125-126). Considering this fact, the author defines epistemic virtues as those traits which assist citizens in effectively participating in politics (126).
• Even scholars extremely critical of conspiracy theories in Western nations with 'open societies' argue that belief or interest in conspiracy theories is virtuous in certain segments of the population: namely journalists, public prosecutors, and law enforcement (129).
• Conspiracies are plentiful in all societies. Ignoring major and high-profile conspiracies like Watergate, all countries arrest hundreds of citizens every year on charges of racketeering and conspiracy. All corruption, organized crime, and insurgency requires conspiracy. Taking these activities into account, conspiracy is a universal aspect of society (126-127).
• Claims of scholars that open societies or democracy prevent the existence of conspiracy theories for long periods of time are evidently false. Ignoring criminal conspiracies, major government conspiracies like MKULTRA, COINTELPRO, and Operation Gladio remained secret for decades before coming to light (129).
• The author argues that knowledge of and interest in conspiracy theories is virtuous for the average citizen because it allows them to effectively judge politics in a world beset by conspiracies. A citizen unwilling to consider issues of organized crime, military coups, corruption, or insurgency in the form of conspiracies would be unable to effectively participate in politics. Deliberately ignoring conspiracy theories is actually an epistemically vicious behavior (130).