Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 'Uzbekistan, Presidential Election, 29 March 2015: Final Report'. Warszawa: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2015.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Uzbekistan, Presidential Election, 29 March 2015: Final Report. Warszawa: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2015.

• The Central Election Commission [Markaziy Saylov Komissiyasi (MSK)] registered four candidates, nominated by the parliamentary parties, after they collected approximately one million signatures each.
• It has not possible to run as an independent candidate, which further complicated the system that limits party registration.
• The MSK operated in a transparent manner and made clear several key decisions on important points of electoral law. The OSCE believes that these decisions violated both OSCE convention and domestic law, facts contested by the government of Uzbekistan.
• "The quality and accuracy of voter lists remained a serious concern due to the fact that voter lists were compiled in a variety of ways. The lack of clear instructions for the compilation of voter lists, the inconsistent practices of Precinct Election Commissions [Uchastka Saylov Komissiyalari (USKs)], the lack of crosschecks of data between precincts and the use of supplementary lists on election day could allow for multiple registrations" (1).
• "The campaign was lacklustre and none of the other three presidential candidates questioned the incumbent’s policies and achievements. In the absence of a political debate or genuine competition, the campaign was a background to a process centred on the incumbent, who appeared as an unchallenged guarantor of peace and stability for the country and the region" (2).
• No public debates occurred nor were full speeches by any candidate broadcast. All information went through official channels and media outlets and encouraged self-censorship due to general lack of information.
• "On 14 March, the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partisaysi] and the Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [O'zbekiston Demokratik 'Milliy Tiklanish' Partiyasi] formed a bloc of “Democratic Forces,” thus forming a majority with 88 of 150 seats. On 16 March, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi] and the Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [O'zbekiston Sotsial Demokratik 'Adolat' Partiyasi] announced that they were in opposition to the Bloc of Democratic Forces" (4).
• Sources for all electoral law in Uzbekistan as of 2015 (5).
• MSK members are appointed for indefinite terms by the Oily Majlis, based on proposals from the regional Kengashlar. The MSK is currently comprised of 17 members, 9 of whom were appointed in 2014. Two MSK members are women. The members of the MSK elect a chairperson nominated by the President. Decisions are passed with a majority of the members present and in case of a tie, the chairperson’s vote is decisive (6).
• As of 2014, the MSK is now a body enshrined in the Constitution needed significant support to alter.
• Local electoral committees generally performed their duties in line with OSCE guidelines, although they were underprepared by government training to handle certain situations such as tabulation or dealing with complaints. Women made up 43% of these local committees (7).
• Late adjustment of a number of guidelines, or vague language filled with rhetoric led to some confusion about regulations and proper practice, although no ballots were discounted b/c of this.
• The quality and accuracy of voter lists remain a serious concern. Voter lists were compiled in a variety of ways; in some places, mahalla compiled voter lists based on their knowledge of population, while elsewhere voter lists were drawn from the formal address register. The lack of clear instructions for the compilation of voter lists, the inconsistent practices of local committees, and the lack of crosschecks of data between precincts could allow for multiple registrations (9).
• Neither of these systems accounts for internal migrants, who often have not updated their address and may be registered more than once and in multiple locations. No known reports of exist of individuals exploiting this fact.
• Voter lists were made public several weeks before voting day and mahalla officials made door-to-door checks to minimize the chance of exclusion or other errors. Changes could be made until election day.
• All nationals can vote at any Uzbekistani diplomatic mission, where services for such an event have been made available. However, very few took advantage of this opportunity. A fact compounded by an absence of information of the whereabouts of many nationals (10).
• "Citizens of at least 35 years of age, with an excellent command of the Uzbek language and having resided in the country for at least 10 years before election day, are eligible to stand as candidates. Individuals convicted of intentional crimes, those under ongoing prosecution for a criminal case, and professional clergy of religious organizations are ineligible" (10).
• "An application of a political party to register its presidential candidate must include supporting signatures of at least five per cent of the total number of voters in the country, approximately one million signatures, from at least eight territorial units, with not more than eight per cent of signatures coming from any single territorial unit. In total, at least one in five citizens needed to sign in support of one of the four candidates. The four political parties, however, informed the OSCE/ODIHR LEOM that signature collection did not pose any problems and one party submitted far more than the number required" (11).
• "The MSK stated that it formed working groups to inspect 15% samples of the signatures based on criteria listed in the relevant regulation. If more than 10% of a sample would be found invalid further verification was to be discontinued and the candidate would not be registered" (11).
• "Each candidate’s platform focused on a specific segment of the population, prioritizing the targeted electorate’s interests. This included social protection and health care for low-income families for Mr. Ketmonov [XDP]; national values, traditions and support of locally produced goods for Mr. Saidov ['Milliy Taklanish']; and judicial and political reforms for Mr. Umarov ['Adolat']. President Karimov’s proxies focused on the merits of stability, security and prosperity achieved to date" (12).
• Parties each received a grant of 842 million so'm [$340,000 USD] for campaign-related expenses. In addition, the candidates received indirect benefits in the form of free use of meeting premises, airtime in the public media, and generic candidate posters prepared by the MSK. Any other sources of financing or material support for candidates are prohibited. Voluntary contributions from political parties, organizations and citizens, are allowed, but these can only be received by the MSK. Since the funds are to be equally divided between the candidates, such a provision effectively requires a private contributor to support not only his or her preferred candidate, but also that candidate’s opponents (14).
• No such donations to the MSK were reported to have occurred.
• Television is the primary source of information, followed by radio in remote areas. There are over a thousand media outlets, of which almost 80% are privately owned and operated. The only nation-wide television and radio services, however, are provided by the state-owned Milliy Teleradiokompaniy [MTRK] and its regional affiliates (14).
• Sources for all Uzbekistani laws relevant to the control of media (15).
• Journalists and press agencies can be held accountable for any incorrect information -- actual or alleged -- which they provide and this law has been frequently invoked to punish critics. The state agency responsible for registering media outlets is also politicized and uses revocation of license as a threat to difficult news agencies (15).
• All candidates were covered equally by media sources, with reports being either positive or neutral. No direct speeches were featured, and debate or criticism was strongly discouraged. The President was no given any advantage in the media (16).
• Ethnic minorities feature in all four political parties and face no visible discrimination within party structures in terms of achieving positions of power. Materials are provided in the main minority languages with additional materials potentially available (19).
• "In addition to the OSCE, observers from the CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, the Association of World Election Bodies, and a number of representatives from foreign election commissions and diplomatic missions in Uzbekistan were accredited by the CEC. According to the CEC, 299 international observers from 43 countries were accredited, including businesspersons and politicians, who came at the invitation of the government" (20).
• Political parties were also allowed to register observers, which all four parties did in large numbers. They did not report any significant inconsistencies.
• Proxy voting -- voting on behalf of others who cannot be present by demonstrating multiple IDs -- is still a common practice in Uzbekistan, although it is slowly being discouraged and the populace is being educated about its illegitimacy (21).
• The OSCE mission provides its recommendations to the Republic of Uzbekistan from page 22 to page 24.