Moore, Scott. "Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.2 (2007): 279-291.

Moore, Scott. "Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.26, no.2 (2007): 279-291.

• In this article, the author analyzes India's relationship with Central Asia and how this is conceptualized in Indian foreign policy. For India, Central Asia is at once a bridge and a buffer; it allows India to participate in greater economic opportunities and expand commercial and cultural connections in an energy-rich area, but also serves as a security barrier between India and the anti-Western bloc of China and Russia; acting as a 'bridge and buffer' (280).
• As a buffer, Indian cooperation with Central Asia serves to prevent the creation of an 'Islamic belt' allied with Pakistan, forestall encirclement by Chinese or American alliance structures, and prevent the expansion of narcotics and terrorism endemic to Afghanistan (280).
• As a bridge, Central Asia serves a market for India's nascent export industries, a transit area to Russian gas resources, and a nearby source of raw materials and cheap energy sources. Central Asia is also an important supporter of increased Indian power in the world as both a counterbalance to Pakistan and potential supporter of Indian candidacy for a seat on the Security Council (280).
• It should be straightforwardly recognized that Indian foreign policy concerns are not focused on Central Asia. They exist, but certainly do not predominant nor outweigh concerns about strategic relationships with China or the USA (281).
• US Bases in Central Asia -- still present outside of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan at the time this article was written -- represent a major strategic challenge to India, as they represent a challenge to its influence in the region. Although the US is an ally, it is a tenuous relationship and India considers the states to be in competition (281).
• China also represents a potential strategic rival for dominance in Central Asia, especially through the reach of the SCO. India has attempted to join the SCO and make it less China-centric, however China appears unwilling to let India use the SCO to gain strategic advantage and demands simultaneous Pakistani entry. Overall both China and India fear the empowerment of the other and they compete for both economic and political influence in the region (282).
• India is particularly fearful that Pakistan will exploit instability in Afghanistan -- and to a lesser extent Tajikistan -- to create an 'Islamic Crescent' to channel instability into Indian Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, India views its influence in Afghanistan as important to regional stability, and financially and political supports President Karzai's administration (283).
• India also has a presence supporting the stability of the anti-Islamist government of President Raxmonov in Tajikistan. India has taken in more Tajikistani officers for training than Russia, and has missions supporting the advisement and training of the Tajikistani Air Force and Border Forces (283). 
• American and NATO military buildup following the invasion of Afghanistan has spooked India into fears of encirclement by American forces in a way that will limit its geo-strategic influence in Central Asia. Fears about China are even more intense, as they "share a common geopolitical space" in Central Asia. Specifically India fears that the SCO -- which it was then largely excluded from participating in -- would be turned into a Sino-Pakistani alliance including Central Asia (284).
• India also fears the weakness or perceived weakness of governments in Central Asia, particularly fearful that increased drug production in Afghanistan will spur terrorist movements and violent instability from XInjiang to Kashmir and Jammu (284). As a result, India has made an effort in increase the counter-terrorist and COIN capabilities of Central Asia security forces, providing training opportunities to Mongolian and Uzbekistani officers and being an active participant in the SCO RATS program (285).
• Central Asian represents a number of potential opportunities for India, including as both a direct supply and link to Russia for the estimated 80% of fuel that will need to be imported by 2010, a potential consumer market, and a supporter for Indian political ambition, especially to join the UN Security Council (285).
• India has attempted to bolster its commercial presence by creating business associations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. However during this period, trade between the countries comes to less than 1% of exports for both India and the Central Asian Republics (286).
• Central Asian energy potential has also interested India, but has been difficult to realize. For example, India would love to get hydroelectric power from Tajikistan, but does not appear to realize the massive logistic and infrastructural investment that it would cost. Getting the energy to India is also challenging, as the only pathways not requiring Pakistani cooperation would be either through Chinese Tibet or a sea route coming from Iran -- but inconvenient (286).
• Because all three of its major neighbors (i.e., China, Pakistan, Myanmar) hate it, India has looked to Central Asia as an arena to cultivate alliances and supporters for broader geopolitical ambitions. India hopes that Central Asia can help the country advance its "Growth as a regional power, permanent membership of the UNSC, and ‘counteracting adverse Pakistani propaganda’" (287).
• Russia also broadly supports increased Indian influence in Central Asia, primarily as a way to check Chinese ambitions in the region (287).
• India has generally tried to avoid becoming entangled in 'great power politics', and is likely to continue this pattern in Central Asia. However, this will shape rather than limit Indian ambitions in Central Asia. Due to political and security rivalries with Russia, China, and the US, India is likely to pursue a policy of economic expansion in Central Asia before any further political goals to prevent direct competition (288).
• The extend of influence India can exercise in Central Asia is also greatly restricted by its relationship with Pakistan. Any increased political or trade ties with Central Asia essentially requires Pakistani acquiescence due to its location between the region and India. As long as the enmity remains, India will be unable to establish firm connections in Central Asia (288).
• "China is likely to remain a rival for regional influence, while Russia and the USA will remain objects of cooperation with New Delhi in the region, so long as this cooperation does not degrade India’s influence. In this sense the trajectory of India’s relationship with the SCO is of particular importance. Its ambitions to join the organization, if thwarted, are likely to increase tensions with Beijing, while membership presents a framework for deeper cooperation with Central Asian governments, as well as with Russia" (289).