Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions". International Security, Vol. 19, No.3 (1995): 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions". International Security, Vol. 19, No.3 (1995): 5-49.

• Since the end of the Cold War, Western politicians have been rejecting traditional power politics and balance of power in favor of international organizations as a way of expanding Western influence. These figures argue that international institutions are key in ensuring that Eastern Europe is integrated into the Western system (5).
• These politicians do not intend to envelope Europe within a single institution, but within a network of interlaping institutions, particularly the European Community, NATO, and the OSCE. By having different levels of mutually reinforcing institutions, the post-War order will be more stable (6).
• Realist IR theory claims that international institutions do not change the distribution of power in a meaningful way, instead reflecting pre-existing power distributions. This is contrary to the Liberal claim that institutions do change state behavior (7, 13).
• Dr. Mearsheimer defines 'institutions' as "a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other" (8). These rules are prescriptive and accepted by the states that follow them, often through formal legal institutions and permanent organizational structures (8-9).
• Realism has five assumptions about international order: that the world is anarchic, that all states have some offensive capacity to harm another state, that states cannot be sure about the intentions of any other states, that all states have the basic goal to preserve their sovereignty, and that states are rational but not omniscient actors (10). 
• These assumptions about the international order mean that states that all states fear each other, that state actions must place their own self-interest first, and states aim to maximize their relative power to avoid the potential of destruction in future conflicts (11).
• According to Realism, the international order is not a state of war, but an arena of insecurity where war is always possible. Cooperation can occur in a Realist world, but it has limits are does not fundamentally change the system (9).
• Two concerns limit the ability of states to cooperate with each other: relative gains issues and concerns over cheating. The first concern means that even in cases of mutually beneficial deals, states may be so concerned about losing comparatively that they refuse cooperation (12).
• There are three different varieties of institutionalist theories:
• Liberal institutionalists believe that cheating rather than relative gains are the main impediment to cooperation, meaning that institutions can often be effective (14). Liberal institutionalists, however, limit their analysis to non-military issues, as cooperation by directly opposing sides remains impossible (16).
• Liberal Institutionalism has come up with a number of ways to preventing cheating and encourage cooperation. Institutionalized rules make interactions more predictable, tying together issues makes defection more risky, rules make cheating easier to detect, and it reduces the costs of not defecting (18).
• Realism objects to Liberal Institutionalist logic because it does not apply to security. A defection in security affairs could result in state destruction, and therefore trust can never replace security (19). Also that whole relative gains thing, which Realists say applies in every aspect of IR, leaving only unimportant marginal areas covered by international institutions (19-24).
• Collective security theorists take a constructivist view of the global order and stress that the Realist world has resulted from the application of Realist thought, but does not necessarily need to exist. They counter propose a system where all states promise to reject force except when punishing forceful states, thereby countering Realism (14).
• The system of collective security might be fragile and unable to respond to multiple aggressors. The logic assumes the world against one aggressor, while more likely great powers will have to take on multiple noncompliant states, making trust even more important (29-30).
• Collective security faces many challenges, including: difficulty discerning between victims and aggressors, lack of room for humanitarian intervention, other alliances undermining collective action, historic distrust between partners, burden sharing during collective action, coordination issues between partners, accounting for scales of violence escalation, impingement on state sovereignty, and not accounting for reluctance to defend (31-32).
• The alternative backups to full scale collective security intervention are concerts and peacekeeping, but these alternatives do not produce an end to Realist conditions. Peacekeeping is useless against major powers, and international concerts are selective in their intervention; reinforcing Realist balances of power (34-36).
• Critical theory believes that ideas are the primary force in determining the international order and that changing the way in which policy makers behave will ultimately result in peace. They believe that they, as intellectuals, will play a large role in this change (14-15).
• The normative communities that Critical theorists hope to create function along similar lines as Collective Security theory, where violence and force are rejected in favor of internationalized goals of common development. This change will come from a switch away from national interests to communitarianism (39).
• Critical theory fails to provide a reason for why certain epistemologies become dominant or how to actually go about unseating Realism, leaving out an important element of its own ideology (42). Furthermore, Critical theory itself says that the future is unknowable and therefore they have limited control over the success of their theory (43).
• Dr. Mearsheimer agrees with Critical theorist claims that Realism has been dominant since the late Medieval period, thus 'proving' an innate superiority of Realism. This is lots of historic bullshit he believes (44-45).
• Relative gains considerations will matter more to states in conditions when technology favors offensive over defense, as gains in any area can be more effectively translated into aggressive capabilities (22-23).
• Four years is too short a time to judge the effects that the end of the Cold War will have on IR, at the time the paper was written Russian and American forces remained in Germany and rivalry has not practically changed (45).
• Just a note here that Dr. Mearsheimer clearly does not understand Soviet politics or the processes by which the Eastern Bloc collapsed. See his beliefs from page 45 and page 46.
• American policy makers have not and do not like to see their role as a hegemon in a Realist system because it contradicts their core values and belief that they are a 'good' country. Americans, and others, like optimism and peace — neither of which is provided by Realism (47-49).
• The author does a good job at pointing out issues with other theories, but a poor job at explaining why institutions are unimportant. He shows that other theorists fail to provide convincing evidence of institutional effects, but does not provide evidence that they do not work.