MacKay, Joseph. "Running dry: international law and the management of Aral Sea depletion". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.1 (2009): 17-27.

MacKay, Joseph. "Running dry: international law and the management of Aral Sea depletion". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.1 (2009): 17-27.

• The Aral Sea has lost more than half its surface area and over three-quarters of its volume since 1960 as a direct result of Soviet irrigation policies favoring increased irrigation of upstream farmland. Little has improved since the collapse of the USSR, as all riparian states squabble over freshwater resources without solving the environmental issue (17).
• Some hoped that the environment situation would improve following the despite of the USSR as the issue became internationalized and subject to international law. However, if anything cooperation has decreased among ineffective enforcement and decreased trust between riparian states (17).
• The few successful initiatives, like those in Kazakhstan, have been unilateral and not the result of cooperation, bilateral negotiations, nor international law (17).
• Most of the feeder rivers only reach the Aral Sea on certain years, mostly stopping partway through the desert. The lake has greatly evaporated, turning the surrounding area into a salt-laden desert. Once the centre of a large ecosystem, much of the fish population has become extinct. The salt pan, or Aralkum, left in place of the sea has devastated local agriculture through salt deposition and had traumatic effects on the health of nearby populations (18).
• Because the water sources that feed the Aral Sea are still needed for profitable agriculture upstream, little has changed in the situation since independence. Most countries are unwilling to recent land for profitable crops and decreased water usage would require repair and development of aged irrigation equipment to the tune of millions of dollars in investment (18-19).
• Four areas of international and domestic law are relevant to the desertification of the Aral Sea: The regulation of international watercourses and their non-navigational use; International law to prevent desertification; Regional agreements and institutions will be considered; Kyrgyz domestic law relevant to the issue (19).
• While international law on non-navigational uses of transnational waterways might have wider implications within a group of more cooperative and trusting nations, in Central Asia it mainly relates to specific restrictions of state behavior. While Uzbekistan is a party to a number of treaties on shared water resources, it is the only state and the treaties are not customary law. The only treaties in common among the five republics are unenforcible or extremely limited in scope of action (20).
• The starting point for most discussions of international law is the "Harmon Doctrine", which claims that when water is on the territory of a state, it is its sovereign territory and there are no restrictions on how it can be used. This argument remains popular, although it has been largely contradicted by contemporary environmental law (19).
• More relevant is the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, which states that countries cannot use their water resources in such a way that damages the population or environment of another state. This is especially relevant to the pollution of shared waterways (20).
• Some scholars would argue that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the Helsinki Rules both constitute international law, meaning that all riparian states are bound to prevent harm to their neighbors and divide water resources equitably. However, this cannot be successfully applied in most cases as the majority of harmful use comes from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, the same states affected by the ills (21).
• All five Central Asian republics are party to the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), although this convention affects the lands surrounding the Aralkum, rather than the Aral Sea itself (21). By providing relief services for affected areas, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are technically obeying the demands of the UNCCD, by the focus of the document on local government action and relief services to affected populations leaves it powerless to affect actual change (22).
• The UNCCD is also limited by the wording of the document. Although it is binding on all signatory states, the wording is vague enough for most states to wiggle out of their obligations. Essentially the document will only affect state action if they have a desire to change (21).
• A number of regional agreements have been created to deal with the usage of transboundary rivers, but they have also been largely ineffective and poorly implemented (22). Starting with the 1996 Nukus Declaration, the agreements have been limited in scope and membership, with the above mentioned excluding Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The agreements that do demand implementation often are unclear on responsibility, leading to unclear roles and the necessity work being left undone (23).
• The International Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS), the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS), and the International Commission on Water Management Cooperation (ICWC) have all been created to deal with issues on the Aral Sea, but there has been significant bureaucratic rivalry between the organizations hindered by unclear assignment of roles. Additionally, only the IFAS handles international aid, leaving the ICAS -- the organization responsible for work plans -- without control over its own budget. Other organizational problems have also hindered organizational effectiveness (23).
• Domestic policy on transboundary watercourses in the Kyrgyz Republic is also relevant to the issue, particularly in relation to the use of Toktogul Reservoir. The reservoir provides irrigation water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but also powers hydroelectric plants in the Kyrgyz Republic. Two disputes have arisen from this reservoir, the first being the cost of the reservoir's maintenance, and the second being disputes about when the water is released (23). 
• Since 2001, the Kyrgyz Republic has asserted that the water in the Toktogul reservoir is the property of the republic and should be sold as a commodity to cover the cost of the maintenance of the reservoir and associated infrastructure (24).
• Other states in the region have objected to this practice as illegal. Firstly b/c it proposes to treat water as commodity, which is illegal under Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. Secondly, b/c it assumes the water to remain Kyrgyz property while in foreign territory, and lastly b/c the Kyrgyz Republic has threatened to not release the water if debts are not paid (24). 
• The unfortunate present situation has partially been created by the cessation of the Soviet-era agreement by which the Kyrgyz Republic would receive gas during the winter in return for the upkeep of reservoirs for summer inflows. Now the Kyrgyz  Republic is saddled with infrastructure it cannot use w/o angering others and the associated costs (24).
• The Kyrgyz solution to the issues of water usage point to a larger systematic failure on the regional scale. The domestic law pertaining to water usage almost certainly violates international law, but everything is so poorly enforced that a situation has arisen where the Kyrgyz Republic can purposefully endanger the agricultural and well-being of downstream populations. This demonstrates a return to the Harmon Doctrine due to breakdown of international cooperation and trust (25).
• The current system for dealing the associated issues of the depletion of the Aral Sea further demonstrate the lack of focus on mitigating or solving the core issue. As of the 2002 Dushanbe Declaration the focus has been switched from solving the root problem to mitigating the negative health and humanitarian effects through socio-economic programs. In fact this declaration specifically advocated the retention of existing irrigation structures b/c they are necessary to maintaining the rates of economic development required to provide aid to populations in the Aral Basin (25).
• A World Bank grant to build a dyke dividing the northern Kazakhstani half from the southern Uzbekistani half has been the only substantial progress, as it has allowed the Kazakhstani side to improve in all key conditions of health and ecosystem integrity. This again represents a unilateral action by the Kazakhstani government, w/o regards to regional cooperation or international law (25).
• "Thus, the regulatory shift from domestic to international law in managing the disaster has had very little appreciable effect. Indeed, it has led to infighting among the new governments of the region, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s controversial water law, which has drawn heated objections and a refusal to pay from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. More alarmingly, the water issue has led to security issues. There have been reports of isolated military clashes between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the area where the Amudaryo demarcates their border, over control of water management stations" (26).
• International law has had little effect on the use of water resources in the region or on the management of the Aral Sea. States have either not signed the relevant treaties or refuse to implement them effectively. The move towards international law has only undermined trust. Overall the region has seen a remarkable decline in management of shared resources since the collapse of the Soviet Union (26).
• "In short, independence has led to a lack of effective regulation, and state self-interest has filled the geopolitical void left by the Soviet Union. The problem is, in the end, structural: water is a limited resource. Each state, as it defends its own water-access interests, limits access for the others. Absent the coercive regulatory power of Moscow, the issue goes largely unaddressed" (26).