Levy, Jack. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems". World Politics, Vol.36, No.1 (1983): 76-99.

Levy, Jack. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems". World Politics, Vol.36, No.1 (1983): 76-99.

• Despite the weight awarded to miscalculation by historians, contemporary political scientists generally downplay the influence of misperception in diplomatic decision-making. Instead, they assume that politicians are rational actors who can accurately predict and interpret the behavior of other states (76).
• Drawing on the conceptual work of Dr. Robert White, the author lays out a number of forms of misperception related to war, these are as follows: demonization of the enemy, self-image of virility, self-image of morality, selective inattention, absence of empathy, and military over-confidence (78).
• The categories created by Dr. White are useful, but they fail to adequately distinguish between misperception and causes of misperception. Differentiation of these concepts is necessary for the concept to be usefully applied (79).
• The author further disagrees with the method of testing misperception proposed by Dr. White, which has to observe whether the perception came from the available information -- or from the mental errors of the analyst. The author instead proposes simply testing whether or not the assertion was correct (79).
• The author narrows down the categories provided by Dr. White, instead establishing only two categories of misperception, those of capability and those of intentions. Misperception of these two factors is the major driver of warfare (80-81).
• Another form of misperceptions is also identified, a misperception of what the reaction of a third state will be to interaction between two other nations (82).
• In addition to factors such as military size, economy, and demographics, misperception is particularly common among estimation of military intangibles, such morale, leadership, or enemy doctrine. These problems may be exacerbated by an overconfidence in the quality of one's own military intelligence (82-83).
• The factor most likely to play a critical role in the processes leading towards war is misperception of adversary's military capability. In general, states will not initiate wars they do not believe they can win. Widespread misperception about the ease of a speedy victory greatly increases the probability of conflict (83-84).
• An overestimation of one's own military prowess compared to an adversary's is not a sufficient condition for warfare, as the expected gains of the war must also exceed the expected losses. Leaders must think the war is both easy and beneficial (85).
• Any spiral into warfare is a dual process between two nation-states, each of which has its own perceptions about the intentions and capabilities of the other. War can result this way when neither side want war, because countries will try to maximize their gains and in doing so may provoke the other nation (86).
• Underestimation can also lead to a conflict spiral and the outbreak of war under certain conditions, such as a divergence between one's own and another state's perception of military strength. An underestimation of military prowess can lead to an arms buildup, which when negatively perceived by other states, can lead to a arms race (87).
• Overestimation of an adversary's military capabilities can also fuel war by influencing diplomatic policy to be more conciliatory. This dovishness may cause the adversary to misperceive the state's stomach for war and behave more aggressively as a result (87).
• Exaggerating the hostility of an adversary is the most common form of misperception, stemming of systemic psychological and institutional factors which demonize adversaries and produce worst-case analyses. The belief of permanent hostility both increases risks during crises, and during peace as first-strikes are justified is such a scenario (88).
• Underestimation of an adversary's hostility is often expressed through a false underestimation of enemy resolve in a crisis situation, leading to war. In general these beliefs cause a state to behave more aggressively than it otherwise would, increasing the chance of conflict. It also results in a general lack of preparedness for such a conflict (89-90).
• Since perceptions of victory are closely linked to beliefs about the probability of third-party states intervening in the conflict, misperception of likelihoods in this field can lead to serious distortions in cost-benefit calculation and contribute to war. Ideas that a war will be localized can increase aggressive behavior, which results in costly war if mistaken (91).
• Misperceptions about the reaction of third states to aggressive behavior or interference have a close relationship to misperceptions about the intentions and interests of third states. The gap between the perceived interests of third states and those states' actual interests is the cause of this misperception (92).
• A false belief that allies are more likely to intervene can also increase the likelihood of war, as states operating under such an assumption are more likely to engage in risky behaviors or aggressive action (92-93).
• The methodology of measuring misperception of military capabilities is fairly easy, since warfare provides an objective test of each nation's actual military strength. The results of conflict can then be compared to the prior perceptions of how the conflict would proceed (94).
• Perceptions of an adversary's military capabilities can change over time, especially as a crisis escalates. Generally, long time lack of confidence in military ability can transform into overconfidence during a crisis as public jingoism and moral surges (94).
• "A misperception can be said to occur if the estimation of the military balance is incorrect and there is evidence that (i) decision-makers were insensitive to the uncertainties and calculated risks involved, [...] or (2) nonrational psychological, institutional, or cultural factors significantly distorted ca- pability estimates, or (3) capability estimates and expected war outcomes were grossly inaccurate, and the operation of chance factors does not appear to have played a significant part" (96).
• Recognizing misperceptions of adversarial intention is more difficult than assessing capabilities, and also more difficult to measure since clear and verifiable statements of intent are not usually available (96). Judging the effect of misperceptions on warfare is also difficult, since the actions of actors had the possessed correct information is not verifiable (97-98).
• Oftentimes, decision-makers do not have a final plan or intent, instead acting based on how situations develop. In these cases, intent can still be misconstrued. The correct interpretation would be that the adversary is pragmatic, with perceptions of any set plans or policies being an example of misperception (97).
• Some forms of misperception are more important than others is fueling war. The forms most likely to lead to warfare through miscalculation are overconfidence in military capability, underestimation of the likelihood of foreign intervention, and underestimation of the costs of warfare (98-99).
• These forms of misperception are especially important in causing warfare because they are directly connected to conflict, reflect forms of calculation undertaken during crisis situations, and have a number of historical examples where warfare would likely not have occurred if not for these misperceptions (99).