Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory". International Security, Vol.20, No.1 (1995): 39-51.

Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory". International Security, Vol.20, No.1 (1995): 39-51.

• This article is written partly in response to comments of Dr. John J. Mearsheimer, a Realist scholar who disagreed with several points raised by the Liberal Institutionalist school. The discussion of Liberal Institutionalist theory is a defense of the critiques of Dr. Mearsheimer.
• Both the Realist school and the Liberal Institutionalist school of International Relations [IR] theory treat states as rational self-interested actors within a system of international anarchy.  Liberalism does not imagine that states will be irrationally cooperative, nor does it propose a transformational system of IR theory (39).
• Dr. Mearsheimer claims that without the threat of the Soviet Union, and its alternative economic vision of Communism, the institutions of NATO and the EU will start to disintegrate. This is based on Realist theoretical predictions that international institutions have little effect on state policy and cannot effectively maintain security (40).
• The author notes that the trends, in 1995, of rapid expansion of NATO and EU membership, and the deepening of economic and political ties on the European continent thoroughly contradict Dr. Mearsheimer's predictions (40).
• Dr. Mearsheimer explains the large investment of material goods, time, and reputation into certain international organizations by Western policy-makers as a marker of the hubris of the idealist intellectual class, somehow not demonstrative of 'real' policy behavior (40).
• Dr. Mearsheimer privileges his own Realist view of IR, and demands that an overturning of the Realist order must occur before other ideas are considered. The authors object to the idea that Realism is the theoretical default (39,41).
• The generalizations of Realism, such as states behaving as rational and power-hungry entities who are unafraid to use force in the absence of effective deterrence, constantly have to be qualified by consideration of national history, geography, politics, and technology; all of which make the theories in the Realist school disorganized (41).
• The authors argue that the advantage of the Liberal school of IR theory is that Liberalism already includes detailed arguments about the circumstances under which states demonstrate different behaviors. Operating under the claim that rational states will cooperate when it is beneficial to them, Liberal theory outlines the conditions under which cooperation is beneficial (41-42).
• The authors object to two interpretations of Liberal Institutionalist theory detailed by Dr. Mearsheimer. The first claims that Liberal theory does not deal with security issues -- a view held by a minority of the Liberal school and not held by Drs. Keohane and Martin -- and the second claims that 'cheating' is the primary impediment to international cooperation, whereas disproportionate relative gains are equally as important (43).
• Dr. Mearsheimer defines the primary issue of international cooperation in security as the lack of information about the intent of other states. Lack of information means that rational states must always assume worst-case scenarios to avoid disaster, leading to low levels of cooperation. The authors hold that international institutions which make information more available can solve this problem, and thus are important in security issue (43-44).
• The author disagree with the Realist claim that relative gains will always be the dominant concern over absolute gains. The Liberal Institutionalist school agrees with Realist theory that when two blocs are in direct competition, relative gains are more important, but absolute gains are most important in almost all other circumstances (44).
• International institutions are important to create the circumstances under which states are more likely to value absolute gains above relative gains. Institutions formalize outcomes and decrease the time, complexity, and costs of cooperation. These arrangements also make relative gains easily to calculate and can be reconfigured to decrease disparities in these relative gains (45-46).
• International institutions are both independent and dependent variables, as they are changed by state policy and change state policy. Institutions are created by states because of their expected effects on state behavior (46). Testing the effects of international institutions is difficult, as there are no laboratory-like conditions from which to measure the effects of institutionalization (47).
• These epistemological problems can be solved either by finding and studying periods of intense political change following institutionalization, or by studying the histories of specific institutions to find out how they attempted to relevant political events (47).
• Realist theory sets up a contradict by its explicit rejection of international institutions, as it simultaneously claims that states are rational and that institutions have no real effect on IR. This would imply that states are investing resources in useless organizations, thereby meaning the states cannot be rational (47-48).
• There is a source mine of research on the effects of international institutions on state behavior on pages 48 and 49.