Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye Jr. "Review: Power and Interdependence Revisited". International Organization, Vol.41, No.4 (1987): 725-753.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye Jr. "Review: Power and Interdependence Revisited". International Organization, Vol.41, No.4 (1987): 725-753.

• The authors of the IR theory book, Power and Interdependence, written in 1977, use this article to discuss how their perceptions have changed or adapted in the decade since the book was published, specifically looking at how the concept of 'interdependence' has been accepted by the scholarly community.
• During the 1970s, the concept of interdependence and many of the precepts of Liberalism were accepted by the international relations [IR] community, as detente between the USA and USSR seemed to eliminate many possible sources of conflict. By the 1980s, this perception had changed as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made many feel that Realism would produce more valuable insights into politics during this period (725-726).
• The differences in culture and assumptions in the 1980s are large, but the geopolitics of both eras have common trends which continue to support the conclusions of Liberalism and Power and Independence (726).
• The authors' previous book, Power and Independence, focused on the emergence of non-security elements of IR theory as an alternative to the security-dominated Realist school. The authors contended that although Realism was no longer the sum of IR theory, the claims of declining state power made by the Modernist school were also false (727).
• The authors claimed that the use of force has become increasingly costly for four reasons: the presence of nuclear weapons, the commonality of guerrilla action in poor countries, uncertain economic costs, and strong domestic opposition to the societal costs of war -- although the last condition does not affect authoritarian regimes (727).
• Drs. Keohane and Nye argue with the conclusions which they made in this book, noting that the high perceived costs of US intervention in Iran or Latin America in the 1980s are contrasted against 'easy' interventions of the 1950s in Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Iran (727-728).
• In their original book, the authors define interdependence as the mutually beneficial relationship between states. This relationship is frequently asymmetrical, which provides the coercion and power within these relationships. The relationships were defined in terms acceptable to Realists and Liberals, because they both based their assumptions on states as rational unitary actors (728).
• The divide between the Realist and Liberal schools of IR theory, as perceived by the authors, is the prioritization of resources. Realism considers military force to be the only guarantor of security, and therefore military force is paramount. For liberalism, economic concerns are just as great as military ones, depending on the situation (729). 
• The authors claim that all international relationships are somewhere along a continuum between the ideal archetypes of Realism and complex interdependence (731).
• The essential claim in interdependence that the actions of one state will incur costs of other states creates political challenges, because each country will try to build a system which increases beneficial integration while minimizing the potential fallout from another nation's failures (730).
• The theory of interdependence does not assume that states will cooperate, that power is not essential, nor that the effects will be positive. Instead, interdependence is a new framework with which to understand state action (730).
• The book also introduced the idea of 'complex independence' as separate from the general concept. Whereas interdependence could describe any international relationship, complex interdependence required cooperation across multiple fields and a lack of force dynamics -- such as that within the European Union (730-731, 738).
• The book also details the authors' conceptions of international regimes and provides four models for predicting development. These include one relying on economic change, one using power dynamics, one focusing on power dynamics specific to issue areas, and one using constructivist concepts of norms (732-733).
• The authors admit that one of their errors in writing Power and Interdependence was not putting enough analytical work into the development of issue-linkages in IR. The text treated most cooperation as if issues were compartmentalized, which is very blatantly not true for most international cooperation (735).
• The agendas of international regimes are subject to change when the contemporary regime operates poorly in dealing with the present circumstances of an issue-area; changes when it needs to change (738).
• International regimes are usually studied, in this period, through the lens of formal intergovernmental agreements on certain issue-areas. Later work begins to develop on actual conduct within the regimes, but the line between regimes and vague norms gets blurred outside of legal institutions (741).
• Regimes may have a number of possible effects on state policy. The existence of regimes can provide governments clear rules for behavior and expectations, over time states may come to correlate their self-interest with the survival of the regime. Regimes also impose normative penalties for violations (743).
• Clearly defining the effects of international regimes on governmental policy would require an analysis of internal government documents, since it is methodologically difficult to distinguish state interests that match regimes to state interest that are shaped by regimes (743-744).
• The international system has two components: structure, referring to the distribution of capabilities among actors, and process, referring to the modes of interaction between actors. The structure of the system provides states with opportunities and handicaps, whereas the preferences of states affect their favored processes (745).
• A significant amount of international behavior is not explained by the distribution of capabilities, as recognized by the Neorealist school of IR. However, this discipline usually relegates the explanation to unit-level factors, ignoring the role that interdependence and the strength of international institutions play in foreign policy (746).
• The presence of these non-structural international factors in IR mediates the abilities of states to communicate, and produces non-structural incentives for state behavior through norm creation. Certain non-structural conditions will change the costs of actions, as will the existence of different sets of behavioral norms (746).
• State-level choice have an effect on foreign policy and visa-versa, with domestic events such as elections frequently changing the perceived national interests upon which state's operate. Similarly, changes in international norms, like those surrounding slavery or colonialism, have an effect on domestic politics and perceived interests (749).
• A key question identified by the authors for scholars going forward is explaining the reasons and processes spurring the "learning" process of political leaders as they redefine national interests based on domestic and international factors. Regimes, by compartmentalizing and formalizing knowledge and communicating information, likely also produce positive learning outcomes, but the specifics are currently unknown (751).