Keddie, Nikki. "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective". The American Historical Review, Vol.88, No.3 (1983): 579-598.

Keddie, Nikki. "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective". The American Historical Review, Vol.88, No.3 (1983): 579-598.

• Contemporary theories of revolution do a poor job explaining the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The peasant-driven theory of revolution, influenced by revolutions in China, Russia, and the Third World, do not apply to revolutions in urban Iran. Additionally, previously studied revolutions have not had the religious focus that the Islamic Revolution has had (579).
• Moreover, almost all of Iran's modern revolutions have been absent these 'essentially' revolutionary characteristics, particularly due to their concentration in urban areas. This includes the 1978 Islamic Revolution, the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, and many other mass political movements from WWI onward (580).
• By the late 19th Century, Iran had been forced by Western powers into a number of commercial agreements which limited tariffs dues, causing economic hardship as Iranian manufacturing was undercut by Western exports and limiting Iranian exports to agricultural goods (580-581).
• This economic trend increased economic stratification in Iran, as wealth was concentrated among landowners, whose control of irrigation systems allowed them to dominated agricultural production. Farmers also became much more exposed to famine and poverty due to market fluctuations or bad seasons, as traditional agricultural became replaced with cash crops and export-based agriculture (581).
• Perhaps because it had not been threatened by European colonial expansion to the same degree as other Muslim states, Iran did not pursue modernizing reforms during the 19th Century. Military forces relied on traditional levies and lacked artillery, and power was decentralized, with the exception of the organized and centralized clergy (581-582).
• The clergy, unlike Sunni clergy elsewhere, directly collected and dispersed the zakat and other religious taxes, and controlled large estates. In most of Iran, they were also responsible for providing primary education, distributed social welfare, and acting as the judiciary (582).
• Opposition to Western imperialism in Iran was concentrated among the mercantile classes, who had lost out from competition from European manufacturing and privileged European trade, and the clergy, who objected to the toleration of Christian missionaries. This discontent was concentrated in urban areas, largely because dissatisfied peasants were too dependent on landlords and physically dispersed to organize politically (583).
• By the end of the 19th Century, another locus of opposition had formed among urban intellectuals, who criticized the Qajar dynasty for its venal, backwards, and arbitrary rule in comparison to European modernity. They formed a coalition with the mercantile interests and clergy, who all disliked the Qajar government and its European supporters (584).
• This alliance became cemented in 1890, with the organization of opposition to the concession of a monopoly on tobacco exports in Iran to a British company. With the support of prominent merchants and landlords, the urban elite and clergy were able to organize a boycott of tobacco, the clergy claiming that smoking was haram, which forced the concession to be rescinded in 1892 (584).
• Despite the openly anti-foreigner and anti-Western character of the opposition to the tobacco concession and other revolutions, the clergy has always played a major role in anti-foreign sentiment, largely because of the emphasis within Shia Islam on ritual purity and notions of contamination by non-believers (585).
• The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war marked an important turning point in Iranian politics, as it simultaneously bolstered confidence across Asia, crippled the ability of Russia to intervene abroad, and convinced the Iranian intelligentsia that constitutions -- which Japan had and Russia lacked -- were the secret to Western success and modernity (586).
• The Constitutional Revolution began in 1905, following a sudden increase in the price of sugar due to international market fluctuation. Riots broke out in response, with sugar merchants being beaten and whipped. The Shah promised reforms to appeased the crowd, but rebellion continued as these promises were not fulfilled. In 1906, the Shah was forced to accept a constitution, including both an elected parliament and an Islamic council to approve laws (586).
• The revolution became violence in 1908, when newly coronated Shah Mohammed Ali closed parliament and restored direct monarchical rule. In response, armed groups organized in Tabriz and Gilan, mounting guerrilla attacks, and eventually marching towards Tehran with the support of disgruntled tribes from the south. In 1911, Russia and Britain shifted their backing to the rebels, forcing Shah Mohammed Ali to concede to constitutional rule (587).
• Although a split soon formed between conservative and reformist elements within the revolutionaries, all parties seemed generally satisfied by the results of the Constitutional Revolution. The clergy received a veto on legislation, and both the merchants and intelligentsia received legislative power against the reactionary and pro-Western Shah (587).
• Iranian politics following the Second World War were dominated by leftism, particularly concentrated in unionization of oil workers and anti-Shah localist movements in Kurdish and Azeri areas. This political movement peaked in the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951 by Prime Minister Mosaddeq, who was later overthrown by a British and American-backed coup (588).
• The Pahlavi dynasty, which had come to power with British backing in 1925, instituted rapid reforms to modernize, secularize, and centralize administration. They encourage rapid industrialization, and the mechanization of farming. These reforms led to a growing displacement of peasants and tribesmen, who formed an underemployed class in the major cities. Widespread corruption and torture by secret police further galvanized opposition (588).
• Following a major drop in oil income during Iran's participation in the 1973 OPEC Oil Crisis, the government found itself unable to meet budgetary goals regarding industrialization and military acquisition. They cut back on construction projects, raising unemployment, and the salaries of the clergy. This came during a period of rampant inflation and high consumer good prices, themselves consequences of high levels of investment in industrialization (589).
• Multiple sectors of the Iranian opposition mobilized against the Shah, including a powerful Islamist faction led by Ayatollah Khomeini, liberal democrats, and leftist unionists. Ayatollah Khomeini became the public face of the revolution, and upon his return to leftist-controlled Tehran in 1979, was able to outmaneuver other factions (589).
• The most apparent question regarding revolutions in Iran is why the Constitutional Revolution produced secular reforms, whereas the 1978 Revolution was led to the Islamization of Iranian government, despite the participation of Islamist and Liberal elements in both revolutions (592-593).
• This variation can be explained by different perceptions of threat during the different periods. In 1905, Iranians viewed the Shah as threatening largely because he resisted modernizing reforms, like a constitution, which were perceived as protection from Western imperialism. By the 1970s, however, the modernizing Pahlavi government had shown itself equally susceptible to foreign influence, prompting more traditionalist solutions to contemporary problems (593-594).
• It is important to note that while groups during the Islamic Revolution attempted to establish themselves as 'traditional' and 'authentic', their ideologies were usually newly created. Islam was reinvented to claim 'authenticity', despite both Islamic socialism and Ayatollah Khomeini's rule of jurist being novel inventions (595).